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AN

HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

JOHN BASCOM

AUTHOR OF "SCIENCE OF MIND," "GROWTH AND GRADES OF INTELLIGENCE,"
"PROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHY," "ETHICS," ETC., ETC.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

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ITS THEMES WERE DISCUSSED.

PREFACE.

IT is not our object, in the present work, to offer the facts of philosophy in a form more acceptable to ourselves than the elaborate works now current; much less do we expect to add, at any point, to the fulness of these presentations. Our aim is simply to make, in as brief a compass as possible, a contribution to a clearer understanding of the facts of philosophy in their dependence on each other, and in the conclusions to which they naturally lead. In accomplishing this purpose, we shall have occasion only for a brief statement of the primary features in the different phases that philosophy has assumed, and shall take for granted considerable familiarity with the topics under discussion. If we render any aid, it will be aid in comprehending the facts rather than in securing a more complete knowledge of them.

We shall be more interested in the distinctive and extreme positions which writers and schools of philosophy have taken, the peculiar impulses they have felt and imparted, than in the limitations, qualifications, and partial retractions by which they have striven later to restore the balance of thought and to defend themselves against attack. The points emphasized will be those which define the directions of philosophical inquiry, and which best serve to mark the dependence of its successive positions in its descent to our time. Our work should be judged wholly by this its explanatory purpose.

There are two sorts of superficiality—the possession of numerous facts that are not well understood, the possession of theories that are not well sustained by the facts. It is against the first of these that our contention chiefly lies in this interpretation of philosophy. The very multiplicity of phenomena may hide from us their significance, and leave us content with the simple knowledge of acquisition. Our present effort is to penetrate the meaning of phenomena, not to multiply them. We shall be satisfied, on the side of instruction, if we do not misrepresent or pervert them; we shall be wholly satisfied, on the side of exposition, if we assist the reader in pursuing the paths of philosophy with increased insight and pleasure. All these ingenious and obscure ramifications of thought have grown out of each other, have served partial and temporary purposes of explanation, and, in spite of appearances, have led us somewhat nearer the goal of truth. Their extreme statements have been compensatory movements which have helped to restore the equilibrium of the mind. This supreme fact in philosophy of coherency, we shall endeavor to bring more distinctly into the light. Metaphysics are often derided and avoided as worthless, sporadic products of speculation, because this their inevitableness, both in the efforts after growth and in the errors of growth, is not sufficiently felt. The most comprehensive outlook we can possibly take of the products of the human mind is one in survey of those manifold phases of philosophy by which it has sought to explain the world to itself.

The dates given are, for the most part, those of Ueberweg.

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AN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. An historical interpretation of the progress of philosophy implies a general knowledge of the development of truth in this direction ; the ability to indicate distinctly the position occupied by each person, each school, each era, in this progressive movement ; a recognition of their dependence in growth on each other, and so, as the all-important result, the power to understand the contributions and confirmations which they bring to our present convictions. If we believe in the essential integrity of the human mind—and if we do not, it is hardly worth our while to waste our emotions on so earnest inquiry—we cannot doubt that our power to-day to lay down, with any certainty, the leading lines of truth, must turn very much on our apprehension of the results of thought in the years that are past. If knowledge, in each period, is partial and relative—as it assuredly is—its chief value is found in offering a safe, transitional term to that more perfect presentation which is to spring out of it. We need to distinguish terminal from lateral buds, and, by means

of the general symmetry of growth, separate those more sporadic systems which have simply filled in unoccupied spaces from those central ones which have advanced us along the axis of development. If there is a true growth in thought, it will show this pushing, centralizing tendency, compared with which all other movements are secondary and subordinate. We shall thus be able to confirm the truth we now hold by the support which it derives from the increasing insight of men hitherto, and by the open way it still offers to inquiry. Directions rather than positions, lines rather than points, are the true results of research in the higher fields of knowledge; and these are laid down by the movements of mind, by its successive and successful efforts in the past. If we really know the ground over which we have travelled in philosophy, and where we now are, we are in the best possible condition for defining the right methods of development, and for discerning the issues to which all investigation is tending.

§2. Philosophy brings a clear, deep, light-bearing atmosphere to the knowledge of men. It spreads above the narrow bonds of association the living products of thought, the broad concave of truth, and brings life-giving impulses from every quarter to minister to them. Knowledge is not defined by philosophy. It already exists in the experience of men, in hourly affirmations, confirmed by them in a thousand ways amid the manifold processes of life. The question for philosophy to answer is not whether this knowledge is correct or incorrect. Its correctness is already established in that general conviction, so broad in its premises, so irresistible in its authority, as compared with the speculations of any one man or set of men concerning it. Philosophy is not

competent to question knowledge, but only to broaden and correct it ; to determine whether the mists that press in close upon this field of vision can be dispersed, and the depths which quietly infold it laid open. Philosophy is the astronomy of our intellectual system, and its office is to carry, in harmonious extension, the principles of knowledge we already hold in these centres of observation to the very verge of thought. What the mind longs for is that the little shall be enclosed in the large, the transient be included in the permanent, and one pure medium of light envelop us everywhere. We may know but a trifle of the vastness about us. We are content to abide under its infinity. What we do desire is that it shall be everywhere penetrable to inquiry, that it shall be the one indivisible, homogeneous, and eternal field of thought, our inheritance of truth.

Whatever conclusions philosophy may reach, they must be thoroughly consistent with knowledge. Knowledge must be transparent under this more comprehensive light, and be only the more luminous by means of it. Familiar truths must grow brilliant in it, like crystals, and offer, on all sides, facets of reflection. A philosophy that contradicts knowledge, or lies to one side of it, has arisen in forgetfulness of its own problem. That problem is the exposition of the wider relations of truth, the tracing outward of the indications of knowledge, that the mind may return inward again with an increased justification of knowledge to itself. It is impossible that philosophy, itself a later and more speculative product of mind, should contradict knowledge. Knowledge is the historic fruit of human thought, working in all persons, all places, and all periods. It is, by its own inertia, as immovable as the world itself. It is folly to confront universal conviction

by one man's thought. The philosophy that undertakes this task will be ground to dust as a small thing, a stone pressed and revolved by the undying strength of a glacier. That a single person, in remote, wayward speculation, should attempt to set aside, or even to interpret in some remote way, the accumulated experience of all time, growing into universal convictions under the double ministration of physical tendencies and spiritual appetencies, is an absurdity. It is as if one should strive to alter the orbit of the earth by jumping on it. A theory of knowledge that contradicts knowledge is one that pushes aside the subject-matter with which it has to deal, and expounds the generic movement of the race by the erratic departure of individuals from it. There may come corrections of knowledge out of knowledge itself, corrections wholly in harmony with its fundamental methods, but there can be no criticism by mind that invalidates the processes of mind and the conclusions held under them. It is not the popular as opposed to the disciplined mind that is magnified by the assertion, but the normal as opposed to the exceptional activity of mind.

Science is homogeneous with knowledge. It does in minor directions precisely what philosophy should do in major ones. It makes our insight deeper and more consistent. It accepts the habitual force of thought, and bears it forward in a full performance of its office. It tests its own additions and corrections by their concurrence with knowledge, by their ability to carry familiar lines of light a little farther. Philosophy must start from the same centres of truth and return to them. All conclusions that lie beyond the primary convictions of men will be aberrations, vagaries. An historic interpretation of philosophy will enforce this fundamental fact, and show how

meteoric, flickering, and ineffectual have been all theories of the physical and spiritual universe which have not planted themselves at once on the first terms of experience.

§ 3. Knowledge is made up of two portions, ultimate terms and the relations between these terms. These terms, as simple, are of necessity primary, and capable of no further establishment than that involved in a direct recognition of their being. First terms once accepted, the reflective powers find play in tracing their interactions; and the great bulk of what we call knowledge is a knowing of the relations of things to each other. Philosophy is found, first, in correct analysis, reaching true ultimates and accepting them as such; and, second, in a just estimate of the value of thought, and of its inherent limitations in tracing the dependencies of these primitive terms. The first is more preëminently the problem of philosophy; though the proper extension and correct balance of our mental processes within themselves remain to be determined by philosophy in every possible bearing of them. The winning of true ultimates has been the most difficult and perplexing labor of mind. There has been a very general feeling that what is here termed an ultimate is a negation of philosophy; a vexatious limit of thought which must itself be transcended. It is the work of philosophy not to carry comprehension beyond itself, but to inquire into its directions and conditions. Comprehension is not an unconditional act, but one thoroughly conditioned. The very desire to overleap the limits of knowledge arises from the absence of true philosophy; from a vague, verbal tendency of thought, as if the unconditioned were the antecedent and source of the conditioned; as if we had not reached the secrets of

knowledge till we had transcended knowledge, or found the ultimate till we had passed beyond all terms of experience. It is the office of philosophy to overcome this wayward proclivity; to explore the eternal conditions of order; and to reject utterly the chaotic and formless as a productive region that encloses the definite creations of reason and contains their germs. We define philosophy as a discussion of the nature and limits of knowledge.

Analysis, a search after ultimates, is the first and ever-returning labor of philosophy. These ultimates, whether they are elements in the physical world, sensations in the sensuous world, ideas in the intellectual world, are all to find their confirmation in experience. Being correctly taken, they yield at once the entire field of inductive and deductive reasoning by which we trace their connections with each other. Thus the physical world starts in phenomena, and the intellectual world in form elements, and these being conceded, we are prepared to follow out their constructive dependencies. The hope to evoke all things out of nothing, or—which is another phase of the same effort—all things out of one thing, is an illusion of thought which it is the instant duty of philosophy to dispel. It should be the ambition of philosophy not to overleap itself—a form of transcendent folly—but to define itself, remembering that definition and creation are always identical, equally in the first and in the latest act.

If this view is correct, knowledge lies, from the nature of the case—that is, by the insight of reason—between two distinct terms, including them both, data and the relation of data; insights and expositions; positions, as in geometry, and the bearings of positions on each other. The historic progress of philosophy will be primarily disclosed by its search after a more correct analysis, a more

distinct cognition of ultimates, as indispensable and valid terms of truth ; and, afterward, by attaining more restrained and better harmonized processes of thought under them. Our philosophy will thus, in its most speculative action, grow up within our experience, and look to it momentarily for confirmation. The stakes will be driven and the cords drawn, not in a purely subjective region, much less in one merely objective, but in a field of facts constantly illuminated by a clear atmosphere of ideas that rounds over it like the vault of heaven. Philosophy has slowly pitched its tent between earth and sky, and it will be our pleasure to see how it has lifted and spread wide its canvas, and bound it fast under all the flaws of controversy.

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER.

DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. The one line of speculative thought whose fruits we are enjoying is that of European philosophy. We shall consider no other except in connection with it, and as modifying, in their formation, these theories of the universe. European philosophy readily falls into three periods, strongly separated from each other in their directions of inquiry and in the form of life which accompanied each phase of development. They are ancient, mediæval, and modern philosophy. Ancient philosophy is that of Greece, and, chiefly by transfer, that of Rome; mediæval philosophy is primarily that of the Latin Church during its period of unity and power; modern philosophy is that of the last three centuries, and has been associated with a marked diversity in religious beliefs and national life. While each succeeding period has felt strongly the influence of the preceding one, it has been separate from it and distinct in its own ruling tendency.

Ancient philosophy was primarily one of cosmology, mediæval philosophy of theosophy, and modern philosophy of ontology. These are the three divisions of philosophy, and they naturally arise in the order of discussion here indicated. The attention of the mind is first directed to the construction and origin of the world about us as a complex fact. Out of this inquiry springs the question

of the existence of the Divine Being, of his nature, and of his creating and governing power. This discussion in turn leads to a more profound consideration of the relation of matter and of mind, and of their respective claims as primitive, independent forms of being. The earliest inquiry pushes toward this question and helps to raise it, but it is not till a later period that it becomes the absorbing point of exposition.

Leading features in cosmology, in the meantime, are settled by physical investigation; while psychology, in its effort to grasp the true character of mental powers, becomes a field of vigorous strife. The ultimate terms of knowledge and forms of being accepted by us must turn on our estimate of the nature of mind. In ancient philosophy the separation between matter and mind was left relatively obscure; the two were discussed together as parts of one problem—the origin of things. In mediæval philosophy, the distinction, as a minor one, was overshadowed by the attributes of God. In modern philosophy, the two forms of being, physical and spiritual, have been under constant consideration as the key of all speculative thought. Cosmology and theosophy are both seen to be involved in their relation. This dependence once settled, other conclusions follow with ease and certainty.

Philosophy, a consideration of the nature and limits of knowledge, touches all modes of science and forms of faith. It is thus mingled with various inquiries. It is intimately associated with cosmology, theosophy, and psychology. Cosmology discusses the formation of the world; theosophy, the nature of God; and psychology, the powers of the mind. Psychology is properly preliminary to any inquiry into the nature of knowledge; ontology is of the substance of philosophy, as it investigates the ulti-

mate forms of being. The logical form of inquiry would be psychology, ontology, cosmology, theosophy. Having defined the range of our own powers, we are ready to determine by means of them the ultimate terms of being, to trace these terms in the unfolding of events, and from these events to approach the problem of the Divine Presence.

The natural order is never the logical order. Complex phenomena first offer themselves to us. Only by many analyses and many references do we slowly approach ultimate truths. We explore the river of knowledge from the mouth upward. These various associated forms of inquiry combine and re-combine in very many ways in the slow, irregular progress of thought.

§ 2. Ancient philosophy falls into three periods. The first extends from the dawn of inquiry to the time of Socrates; the second, from the time of Socrates to the Christian era; the third, from the Christian era to the opening of mediæval philosophy. The first period covers the gradual development of speculative thought in Greece; the second, its stage of highest attainment; and the third, its slow decline. The first era is more purely one of cosmology; the second adds to this discussion that of anthropology; and the third passes on to theosophy. The first and the second periods are definitely divisible from each other. Socrates was not only the earliest of the great men of the middle era; he gave a decisively new and more intellectual direction to inquiry. The second and the third periods are indivisible, otherwise than arbitrarily, both in time and in theme. The transitions are slight and slow, arising with different degrees of distinctness in different places. There is also the same obscurity of dividing lines in the passage from ancient to mediæval

philosophy. The former gradually decayed with the decay of Roman civilization, and the latter slowly grew with the growth of Latin Christianity. The two, therefore, lay in the soil together during the centuries of overthrow, the one as the dissolving life of the past, the other as the slowly informing life of the future; the one as the mould of departing civilization, the other as the seeds of coming civilization. The movement which opened modern philosophy was well-defined and general. A new era, however, is never a question of quantities. That which remains of the old counts for little; that which expresses fresh power counts for much.

PART I.

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST PERIOD IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. The Greek was well fitted for speculative inquiry, not only by original vivacity of mind, not only by many distinct centres of civic life, which both by their separation and by their union promoted the most lively individuality of thought, but also by the absence of any overbearing ecclesiasticism. The religious life of the Greek was not such as to intimidate the mind, to lay down for it any directions which it must pursue, or any limits within which it must confine itself. It has rarely happened in the world's history that any religious system has laid lighter intellectual restraints on its votaries. The gods of Olympus, themselves a higher kind of human beings, were so enclosed in nature as to give very few hints by which to settle its constructive problems. The myths of religion bore a poetic, free form, and did not, like those of oriental faith, involve a cosmogony, or burden the mind with the leading features of a speculative method. No dominant notion, like that of emanation, predetermined the direction of thought.

§ 2. Grecian philosophy made a definite beginning with

Thales (640) of Miletus. He gave rise to the Ionian school, whose early representatives were Anaximander (611) and Anaximenes, also of Miletus. Thales regarded water as the primitive element; Anaximenes gave this position to air; while Anaximander accepted, in place of specific substances, an indeterminate substance, infinite in quantity, from which the later varieties of matter were evolved. We thus have an early example of an obscure, general form accepted as the source of special forms; of the definite referred to the indefinite. The world was regarded by this school as a living thing. As the soul of man, which is air, animates the body, so the atmosphere, which is vital and intelligent, gives animation to the world. Matter and life are inseparable. Life is the one arranging power.

These early speculations show how much easier it is to hit on right directions of thought than it is to walk with due restraint in them. The mind, in its satisfaction with what is explained, overlooks the many things which are not explained. It treats the problem before it in a very fragmentary way, and not as one whole. Struck with some slight resemblance, it turns it at once into a complete correspondence. Water and air are very diffusive, penetrative substances, and play an especially important part in living processes. They thus came to be regarded as constructive terms of primary importance. Yet many facts, close at hand and equally obvious with those which had drawn attention, were neglected in the assertion that either of them was the primitive element. A knowledge of the facts was not aided but obstructed by this assertion.

An indeterminate substance, the world-stuff of Anaximander, is a suggestion that opens a door to inquiry, but brings no explanation till the steps of separation and

evolution by which it passes into specific things can at least be suggested. The speculation is rather an instinctive response to the demand which our rational powers make upon us for causes, than an intelligible meeting of that demand. Air is closely associated with life, but the identification of the two is not only hasty, it is wholly obscure. It confounds thought, to begin with, though it gratifies it with some later explanations. Hylozoism, the reference of all construction to life, is an induction, but one so precipitate as to carry no light with it. There is a plastic power of arrangement in all living things which we term life. Comparing one living thing with another, in this particular, we reduce the mystery to its simplest terms by observing its uniformity throughout the organic world.

But if we carry life beyond this world of organisms, conditions become so diverse, so antagonistic even, that not a glimmer of additional insight is given by the extension. The affirmation is simply a blind impulse of reason, willing to satisfy itself with an inadequate statement rather than to be left without any explanation. The inevitableness, and yet the insufficiency, of this movement of thought indicate its instinctive, tentative character. We very slowly learn to give an ultimate fact, like life, its simplest expression, and then to carefully confine it, under experience, within its own range of operations.

§3. The philosophy which flourished among the Doric Greeks is primarily referable to Pythagoras (582), who removed from Samos to Crotona, Italy, and there established a secret fraternity. The method of thought represented by him may, with peculiar fitness, be called a school. It grew up among the disciples of Pythagoras, who were closely united to him as a master, none of them

attaining any marked preëminence. The doctrines ascribed to Pythagoras cannot be given an exact, personal reference with any certainty. They were the fruits of the fraternity, were associated with a rigid ethical temper, and with an unbounded reverence for the one dominant mind.

The ruling idea in this philosophy was that of number. Number, according to it, is the very substance of things. This conception was amplified into many fantastic explanations. One is reason, unchangeable. Two is opinion, divisible, feminine. Three is indivisible, masculine. Four is justice, divisible into equal parts. Five is marriage, the union of two and three.

Number enters especially into music, and music became a prominent term in the fanciful constructions of the Doric school. The soul of man, transiently united to the body, is a harmony. The earth and its counter-earth revolve around a central fire, and the motion of the spheres is musical, made so by the intervention of spaces which have the ratios of music.

That very ancient and persistent doctrine, metempsychosis, was held by Pythagoras, and may readily have been derived by him from oriental sources.

This school, in contrast with the Ionic philosophers, who pushed forward material terms in a somewhat gross way, was idealistic in its tendencies. It was idealistic in this sense: it emphasized conceptions of the mind more than the material things with which they are associated, and assigned them an independent formative power. Number, a pure idea, referrible to the mind wholly, a notion very pervasive, subtle, and constructive in its applications, was laid hold of as embracing the secret nature and energy of things, and of that order which prevails

among them. Without any analysis that disclosed the origin and office of this conception, the mind busied itself in the expansion of the idea, and then referred the relations involved in number to number itself as a productive entity. This method has been reproduced in many later speculations, with the same admirable ingenuity and with the same fanciful force.

§ 4. The Eleatic school derived its name from Elea, Italy. Parmenides (510) was preëminent in this school. Prominent among the subjects of inquiry by the Greeks was the relation between the permanent and the changeable, the substantial and the phenomenal. Eleatic philosophy, like that of Pythagoras, was chiefly occupied with ideas. Being—one of the mind's explanatory notions—was regarded as itself substantial, the substratum of all things. Being is, non-being is not. Space, then, is a *plenum*. Being cannot change. There is no becoming. Changes, phenomena, are deceptions of the senses. The thoughts give the test of reality. What is thinkable is real. Change is not thinkable, and therefore unreal.

We have as yet no clear separation of the physical and the spiritual from each other, but terms that are purely terms of thought, notions called up by the mind in its processes of comprehension, are expanded in a verbal form and made to overrule and exclude the phenomena which have been their occasion. These ideas, therefore, instead of becoming the conditions of knowledge in the mind's inquiry into things, took possession, in a vague, empty way, of the field of truth, and so precluded its successful cultivation. Words rather than things, symbols rather than substances, the shadowy form-elements of thought rather than the contents included in them, came under consideration, and the mind was confused and bewildered in the

contemplation of its own solvents, instead of enabled by means of them to enter on that movement outward and forward in which its real progress consists. The young soldier was so pleased with his equipment that he occupied himself wholly with the manual of arms.

Zeno of Elea (490) furnished the proof of the philosophy by pointing out the apparent contradictions between our conceptions and the phenomena we put under them, and so establishing, as he thought, the illusory character of appearances. If there were such contradictions, it would remain open to inquire what portion of our knowledge is correct, or if any portion of an inconsistent and contradictory product can be saved. The instinctive way in which we refuse to allow the alleged illusions of knowledge to enter into and dissolve our own thought concerning them, shows the inner vitality of reason, a hold on intellectual life that cannot be shaken off.

Zeno argued that no space, in spite of appearances, could be passed over, because any space can be divided into an infinite number of parts, and we cannot surmount the infinite. This is an entanglement which has tripped the feet of philosophers from the beginning until now. The inference should run in the opposite direction. The finite cannot contain an infinite number of parts. A finite space is capable of indefinite subdivision, but not of infinite subdivision. Achilles, he asserted, could not overtake the tortoise, because when Achilles reaches the point first occupied by the tortoise, the tortoise is no longer there. If we overcome half an intervening distance, half still remains. If we now pass over half the residue, a half is still before us; and so on forever. The last half is never surmounted. In philosophy, at least, Achilles has not fully run down the tortoise.

It is not a little surprising that riddles of this order have so long perplexed human thought. It is still more surprising that the conclusions drawn from them have been so disproportionate to the premises and so sweeping. In pursuing the tortoise, or in making half the distance between two objects—for the two examples involve the same difficulty—the first portion of the effort, which the supposition concedes as successfully accomplished, differs in nothing from the last portion, which it shuts out. If the last half cannot be passed over, neither can the first half. The embarrassment is found simply in the inability of the mind to exhaust a period or a space by indefinitely subdividing it. The very nature of the process subjects it to this limitation. Attention is drawn to the mental difficulty and diverted from the actual motion, which involves no such discrimination of parts. One should, by the same method, conclude that it is impossible to remove sand from the vessel which contains it, because the transfer requires the transfer of every particle, and each particle cannot be discriminated from every other. The simple fact involved in all these perplexities is the absence of any definite limit or unit in what we term infinitesimals. Nature, when she deals with the minute,—as in atoms—begins by defining her own unit.

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Zeno argued that the flying arrow does not move, because at each instant it occupies some one space, and therefore is never passing from space to space. But here again there is no absolute instant. An instant, so called, involves a passage in time, and so in space; and this just as certainly as a longer period. The mind assumes a thing impossible, to wit, a period without dimensions, and then perplexes itself with the difficulties involved in the supposition. Philosophy should teach us not to try to

make a process absolute, which, from the nature of the case, is, and must be, relative.

§ 5. In opposition to this effort of the Eleatics to find permanency in simple being, there arose, in Ionic philosophy, the opinion of Heraclitus (460) of Ephesus. Heraclitus put the entire significance of things in movement, change. He regarded the world as an endless process. Fire, identical with the purest air and with life, is the primitive element. There is a twofold movement by which this supreme potency passes downward into water and earth and returns upward into air and life. Creation and destruction, life and death, are involved in these changes. The divine wisdom and power inhere in fire, and express themselves in these perpetual and conflicting transmutations. By thus emphasizing material, phenomenal changes, the world was resolved into a ceaseless and comparatively meaningless flux of events. Mind, movement, matter were merged in each other. The Eleatic school was in protest against this endless, restless, unsatisfying flow of phenomena into and out of each other. It strove after substantial being, something on which the mind could repose ; and it found it in the empty notion of being itself.

At this point we may best apprehend a difference and a confusion of opinion which first appear in the strife of conceptions between the Eleatics and Heraclitus, and have often since recurred. The Eleatics held that the thinkable, the conceivable, is the test of truth. That change is inconceivable, and therefore not real. Heraclitus affirmed that change is the all-inclusive fact ; that everything is and is not, is becoming. This has been interpreted to mean that both being and non-being are inseparably united in becoming. But each of these op-

posed conceptions is inadmissible. Being and becoming are not in rational conflict. Being and non-being, as applied to the same instant and act, are not reconcilable and are not united in becoming.

We rationally accept a continuous period or continuous motion without the slightest sense of confusion or conflict. When, however, we strive by an analytic movement of imagination—acting in the mode of the senses—to conceive the process of change, immediately our period drops into moments, our line into positions, minute parts, which may, however, as well be inches as points, and the movement from one to another becomes spasmodic, discontinuous, inconceivable. The confusion arises from the inadequacy of sense-analysis, or, rather, its inapplicability to pure, rational forms. The senses deal only with distinct, definite magnitudes. The periods and points which the imagination assumes are such magnitudes. Their existence, side by side, instantly breaks up the continuity of the rational form. The apparent conflict lies between these two, an analysis resting on the limitations of the senses, and a rational conception in no way subject to them. Experience easily unites the two in one harmonious fact, but thought is unable to identify them. We show great ingenuity in bringing forward this inadequacy of the senses, and great perversity in urging it as involving a conflict of mental^e conceptions resting on equally immutable grounds.

We assume an absolute point, a single moment, and proceed at once to abolish the supposition by showing how this point, this moment, stands apart from other points, other moments, with which it makes up the entire period, the entire line; and how, therefore, a passage from one to another is disjointed by these divisions. But these

divisions are assumed arbitrarily, and must be used in consistency with the assumption. We must not derive contradictions from a double and conflicting process. If we assume an absolute point, we must not interpret that point by the senses; we must allow, in rational consistency, the moving body to rest in reference to it, otherwise it is not a point; and we must not regard it as a portion, either continuous or discontinuous, with subsequent portions. If we violate these conditions, we render nugatory and misleading our first act. We treat an absolute, a rational, point as if it were a sensuous one. The narrowness of the space contemplated by the imagination does not in the least alter the relations to the whole. In a sensuous point, so-called, there is identically the same motion as in an inch. The discontinuous method of the imagination is simply an inadequate presentation of the perfect continuity of motion. Pure reason finds no difficulty with absolute continuity in space and in time. We might as well say that time is divided into seconds by the tick of a clock as that a line falls into parts by sensuous divisions.

The notions of being and becoming are both applicable to things and acts, according to our method of regarding them, nor are the differences involved in them in any way conflicting. Sensuously we shall fail to divide the two perfectly, yet the two will give us firm conceptions in the rational process of comprehension. We can even say of becoming that it is a form of being, and of being that it is a single phase in becoming, and in both assertions the distinctness of the two notions remains. Being and becoming interfuse each other, like cause and effect.

We cannot fail to see how obedient were these first efforts at speculation to its permanent tendencies. The

comprehension of all changes in some adequate and permanent purpose still remains the goal of thought. The two elementary terms, the changeable and the unchangeable, still fly apart. Some minds yield themselves readily to the mere flow of phenomena, and others refuse to be swept out on this endless tide. Rest is found only in well-directed motion; in the permanent mind, expressing itself in the transient matter. The things seen are temporal; the things unseen, eternal.

§ 6. A later school, in sympathy with the external, materialistic tendencies of the Ionic philosophy, was that of the Atomists. (Democritus (460)) of Abdera, the pupil of Leucippus, was the representative of this type of thought. In opposition to the Eleatic school, Democritus affirmed both the full and the void, both being and non-being. His first terms in construction were atoms. These atoms are of the same quality, but differ from each other in form and size, and occasion further differences by diverse combinations. Round atoms constitute fire and spirit. All atoms were originally in motion downward, but falling with unequal velocity, they gave occasion to rotary motion, and to the union of like atoms with each other. Sensations arise from efflux. Happiness is the motive of action.

Without affirming distinctly the nature of matter or of mind, philosophers began at once to separate themselves from each other by the importance they attached to things or to ideas, to outward processes or to mental relations. Plato despised the works of Democritus. In our time these works have received marked attention from the Empirical school. There are some striking points of resemblance between the conclusions of Democritus and those of modern inquiry. The atom was made the primitive term, but it was the physical, and not the chemical,

atom, and its differences are the accidental ones of size, form, position. Motion also was used as the first constructive agent ; though, in accordance with the knowledge of the times, the grounds of that motion were of a mechanical order and vaguely conceived.

As a cosmogony, the theory of Democritus involved terms of unusual significancy, and opened a fruitful direction of inquiry. Pushed farther than this, as giving the clew to the diversity of things, to psychology or to ontology, it had the obscurity and one-sidedness which so constantly accompany processes of thought that simply pursue an outward direction.

§ 7. The Ionic school found its later development in Empedocles (500) of Agrigentum, and in Anaxagoras (500) of Clazomenæ. Empedocles started with four elements: fire, air, earth, and water. This conclusion was generally accepted for a long period. It best embraced all opinions, and men had not sufficient knowledge to break up such a sensuous group as earth, or to determine the nature of fire. In place of the hylozoism of the earlier Ionic philosophers, he accepted two agents, more spiritual than life: love and hate. Love is a uniting and hate is a dividing power. Each alternately prevails, and creation arises under their joint action. The predominance of either is the loss of special forms. The offices assigned these impulses by Empedocles implied a blended nature in them, both physical and spiritual. The theory did not rise to the height of the words, but the words sank to the wants of the theory. He regarded the material subject to these forces as fixed in quantity and eternal in duration. The combinations of living things are fortuitous, and they survive according to their aptitudes. Vision is the result of efflux.

Empedocles had taken one step toward the spiritual world in his two constructive forces. Anaxagoras went much farther. He shifted his philosophy quite off the physical, Ionic basis. He put the divine mind—pure, passionless reason—in place of love and hate. He distinguished clearly—the first to do so, according to Aristotle—between matter and mind. He thus prepared the way for putting the questions of philosophy in a new form.

§ 8. The first period in Grecian philosophy offers, in an obscure way, the same discrepancy of opinion concerning the relation of physical terms and spiritual ones to each other which has reappeared in all periods as the one unsettled controversy. The different schools of philosophy were widely separated from each other by their naturalism or their spiritualism. The disciples of Pythagoras and the Eleatics dealt wholly with mental terms. Ideas stood with them for the productive forces of the world. The notion was far more than the material in which it wrought. They failed, however, to discriminate between an idea and the intellectual personality to which it belongs.

The Ionic philosophers and the Atomists shaped their theories under physical forces. In connection with naturalism Empedocles accepted a spiritual expression for constructive forces; and Anaxagoras passed on to a distinct dualism. The four elements of Empedocles indicated a gain in thought, as compared with the single element of Thales. Differences were recognized in it at their true value, and also the hasty character of the previous generalization. The result of inquiry was thus more analysis, more division, a multiplication of primitive terms, and, above all, a dim perception of the most funda-

mental of distinctions, that between matter and mind. The tendency to generalization thus received a needed check. There was less of that surreptitious theory which explains things by obscuring the diversities between them, and by blending them together under conceptions only partially applicable. True philosophy demands, as the first essential of every process really explanatory, that it shall preserve the absolute integrity of the facts under consideration, and interpret them under their precise shades of difference; to first blur and mingle the colors of a painting, and then to refer them all to one shade, is not explanation. It is effacing the facts to be explained.

When science carried our knowledge of elements beyond the senses, not only was earth, as a primitive constituent, subdivided, but also the far more homogeneous substances, water and air. Our cosmic theories have now at their disposal more than sixty distinct elements, each with its own group of properties. Deeper than these first terms, now so greatly multiplied, our knowledge does not extend; but, these being conceded, their activities toward each other, their general constructive relations, become a wonderful and inexhaustible subject of thought. We should mark the fact most emphatically, that inquiry has not reduced elements, but steadily increased their number. Unity has not been found a unity of substances, but one of relations.

The desire for simplicity is easily misleading. Democritus sought the diversity of atoms, not in original qualities, but in secondary relations, in size, weight, arrangement. Inquiry has not confirmed this suggestion. Primitive quality is the chief thing in the chemical atom. Size, weight, arrangement are relatively accidents to this inscrutable nature. They are not significant aside from

it. Atoms are not mere counters that owe their importance to space relations. We can, in no case, interpret our space relations aside from the quality of the atom. The formal term in construction has not gained ground as contrasted with the inherent one.

Neither naturalism nor spiritualism was successful in dealing separately with its own conceptions. Naturalism could not escape the aimless flow of phenomena, nor spiritualism unsubstantial ideas to which experience brought no sense of reality. The seen and the unseen, the sensuous and the spiritual, the physical substance and the constructive energy, must find expression together, or we are without a real philosophy of life. They are infolded conjointly in experience, and they must be unfolded coetaneously in our interpretation of it. Very significant was the recognition by Heraclitus of the ceaseless flow of events, the unending changes by which things constantly pass into each other, obscuring all terms of difference. Equally important was the assertion by the Eleatics of fixed ideas of relation, which thread together these shifting impressions of the senses, and turn them into permanent possessions of the mind. But the mobility and immobility of knowledge, of intellectual growth, can be found only in the union of the two, the sensuous impression and the rational insight, in an ever-changeable, always-abiding universe. Two forms of being—physical being, with its untiring complexity, spiritual being, with its growing simplicity—these were the conclusions toward which these earliest efforts of thought were distinctly tending.

The inherent order between the forms of philosophy is psychology, ontology, cosmology. We should first know the nature and scope of our powers of knowledge. This

would give us the distinct forms of being that are open to our discrimination. We should then be ready for the constructive relations which these separate entities sustain to each other in the world. As a matter of fact, philosophy does not arise in a philosophical way, but in one more consonant with our narrow experience and immature powers. Cosmology, the problem of the visible world, is first brought to our attention. With this effort to understand more widely the relations of things, there comes increasingly into the foreground a conviction of the very different kinds of being. This conviction, in turn, leads us to the deepest question of all, the scope and value of our own impressions. In this first period, a few happy suggestions, with more barren ones, were made in cosmology. There was also an increasing recognition of agencies and realities other than material ones. Life, affections, ideas, the human spirit, the divine mind, all began to take part, though in an obscure and insufficient way, in the cosmic product. These results were slowly leading to psychology, though no question pertaining to it was distinctly broached.

CHAPTER II.

SECOND PERIOD IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. The second period is much less divided in its methods than the first period, and receives almost its entire interest from three men, closely related to each other: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. While its leading discussions are still those of cosmology, the human, spiritual terms of thought are much more prominent in it than in the previous period. Things pertaining to man, logic, ethics, and social construction, are widely considered. The light begins to fall on the intellectual, as well as on the physical, side of the world; and its relations are expounded as much by reasons as by causes. It was a period of great power, and concentration of power, and stands almost by itself in this particular. This energy of thought arose rapidly, and was followed by a long, slow decline. The sudden putting forth of strength was startling. Rarely has the fruitfulness of the moral temper revealed itself more distinctly than in the teachings of Socrates. The springs of the new activity lay deep in the ethical constitution of man.

The period was ushered in by the Sophists, who were the link between it and the times preceding; the hinge on which philosophy, in its present revolution, was made to turn. The Sophists were a class, a profession, rather than a school. They were the teachers of the time, and

occupied in Greece much the same position as did the Rabbis in Judea. Socrates, hostile as he was to the spirit of the Sophists, was himself a Sophist; as Christ was a Rabbi. The Sophists, as teachers of a higher order, were interested in philosophy as the most comprehensive form of knowledge; though they desired, as rhetoricians, to make all knowledge minister to persuasion and furnish forth the skilful disputant.

An era of active speculation in philosophy is almost uniformly followed by one of denial and skepticism. The conclusions reached are so partial, so extreme, so inadequate, so contradictory, that no sooner has the enthusiasm of pursuit subsided than criticism and unbelief set in. This result—which has now become so familiar to us—arose from the irreconcilable opinions of the earlier schools, took possession of many minds, and found general expression in the active leaders of thought.

Instruction by the Sophists was not so much imparting to the young well-established principles, as it was the discussion of principles in an independent way. The skeptical temper was favored by the formal nature of rhetoric, held in high esteem as the chief branch of knowledge. Rhetoric makes knowledge a means rather than an end, and hence readily subordinates truth to its immediate uses. Belief is thus weakened, and the inconsistencies and contradictions of opinion are as often dwelt on as its inherent soundness. A spirit is thus developed—one very apparent among the Sophists—of increasing subtilty and superficiality of thought. The desire to succeed in one's immediate purposes, and to impart to others the trick of success, is very unfavorable to sound philosophy. It gave rise with the Sophists to an eristic logic whose sole purpose was to defeat an adversary; this result

being frequently reached by confusing the entire subject, and confounding all just opinions concerning it.

The Sophists thus stood for a transitional period, one of skepticism, superficiality, and dishonesty; all knowledge was regarded as relative, tainted by a personal quality. Opinions, it was said, are many, diverse, and contradictory. These opposed statements are all alike defensible. The Sophists professed the art of proving, and teaching others to prove, any proposition that might be offered to them. The Sophists thus became proficient in all the sophisms of logic, and these were indistinguishable, for the time being, from logic itself. They relied on the inexhaustible confusion in the meaning of words, and added to it all the ambiguities and errors of combination. One can learn nothing, they said. He cannot learn what he already knows. He cannot seek what he does not know. Jones is not Smith. But Smith is a man; therefore Jones is not a man.

Rhetoric, formal as it is, can only rest securely on the truth. When we lose our confidence in truth we lose our interest in the methods of establishing it, and in persuasion by means of it. We must have some faith in the intrinsic value of an opinion, or we can maintain neither our regard for it nor for the manner of enforcing it. Language slowly sinks to the level of the sensuous impressions by which a brute is governed; indeed, falls quite below them in the faintness and barrenness of its images. Morality and religion are utterly impoverished by this flow of facile and futile phraseology. Truth, like Noah's dove, spreading its wings over the weltering deluge of words, finds no place for the sole of its foot. It was the reaction of deeper, more spiritual impulses, that aroused Socrates against the entire sophistical method. It was

the urgent need of exact definition and well-defined methods in reasoning, that stimulated Aristotle to that great achievement, the construction of a logic that should have, in its conclusions, the certainty of mathematical truth.

§ 2. Protagoras (490) of Abdera, who taught rhetoric at Athens, was one of the more conspicuous of the Sophists, and may well have contributed his share toward calling out that deeper insight which belonged to Socrates. He regarded man as the measure of all things. He accepted the extreme view of the naturalists, that all things are phenomenal and in perpetual flow. The sensuous elements are thus uppermost, and things are what they appear to be to each man; nothing more. The existence of the gods is uncertain. Thus early did naturalism show the inevitable tendency which has been present with it in every phase of development to weaken the inner hold of the mind on truth. While it has had many things to teach, even more things than spiritualism, it has struck fatal blows at that faith of the mind in its own processes which constitutes the ultimate value of truth, whether it pertains to sensuous or to spiritual things.

Gorgias (427) of Sicily was a distinguished Sophist. His leading assertions were: Nothing is. If anything were, we could not know it. If anything were, and we knew it, we could not communicate our knowledge. This helplessness attends on knowledge, so-called, as simply sensuous impressions, unable at any point to transcend themselves. Yet the very theory contradicts itself in its own expression. It affirms negatively, and forgets that this carries with it the power of affirmation. The one and the many he regarded as alike impossible. The one cannot exist without parts. The many, the parts, cannot

exist without unity. Plato said of him: "He valued appearances more than truth; made the little seem large, and the large seem little."

Thus method, by becoming everything, became nothing, and unbelief was lost amid its own negations. The insight of the mind, instead of being occupied with harmonizing the rational and sensuous terms of knowledge, was employed in entangling them more and more. This skepticism could have carried with it no force, had it not been for the unexpended energy of previous belief; this momentum it soon exhausted, and then fell dead under the abiding opprobrium of sophistry. Its astuteness and the applause attendant on its immediate success did not save it from its own inherent aimlessness and worthlessness.

§ 3. Socrates (469), whose life was spent at Athens, was animated more by an ethical than by a speculative impulse. He rose against the current lightness, nimbleness, and dishonesty of thought, in defence of the integrity of knowledge, the soundness of human faculties, the value of life. Truthfulness, trustfulness, obedience, and spiritual acquisition are the fundamental temper of morals. He confronted the loose unbelief of the Sophists, and sought, by discussion in the market and the gymnasium, to awaken in the young men of Athens a more sincere disposition, and to secure more just forms of thought. The Socratic method of question and answer was well fitted to dissipate the sophisms of the Sophists. These were made possible chiefly by the want of adequate definitions, of a settled relation of terms, and of insight into real connections. In the absence of a formal logic, these errors were best exposed by an analysis of the conceptions involved, the listeners being compelled to share

and approve the progress of the thought by taking part in it.

As the conceptions under consideration were mostly those of the intellectual, ethical world, and not of physical facts, the discussion involved an appeal to general experience, ending in appropriate definition. The meaning of the words employed, and their fitting use in a specific argument, were settled by an inquiry into the ideas which lay back of them in the various forms of speech. When the premises involved were thus brought to a clear and common expression, the conclusions that followed from them became firm and harmonious. Belief was awakened afresh in the mind. This method was an immediate, practical substitute for the complete, formal logic of Aristotle.

Knowledge was with Socrates the basis of morality. Virtue is insight in questions of conduct. His conception is at one with that of Proverbs. Obedience is wisdom, and disobedience folly. To see the true and the good is necessarily to love them. The good is found in a correct vision of spiritual things and conformity to it. There went, as was natural, with this vigorous, ethical temper, a belief in God and in immortality. A vision of the scope and completeness of the laws of conduct is a revelation of God, and an assurance of the continuity of life. The "Demonic Sign" of Socrates may well be regarded as a personal form of the doctrine of the spirit of truth, a revelation in the mind by suffused light and pulsations of light of the spiritual significance of events; the play of lightning on a wide and heated intellectual horizon.

§ 4. On the death of Socrates his disciples were dispersed and were divided in belief. Their points of division were chiefly ethical, and gave occasion to the two later leading schools of morality. Euclid retired to Meg-

ara. He united the Socratic idea of good with the Eleatic idea of being. Thus the good became to him the only permanent being, God; while sensations were the ever-changeable terms of life.

Socrates had freely accepted pleasure as a constituent in a perfect life, and had simply emphasized the wise mastery of the mind over it. These two terms, happiness and rational oversight, maintained both in theory and in practice with so much difficulty in wise harmony, were now separated by the disciples of Socrates. Antisthenes, who followed Socrates as a teacher at Athens, brought the authority of virtue into the foreground. Virtue was with him the only good. Enjoyment, as an end, is an evil. This doctrine was in keeping with the difficulty of the social position in which the followers of Socrates found themselves. The assertion of an inflexible truth gains somewhat in harshness by virtue of the resistance it is compelled to encounter. This severe form of belief gave occasion to a decidedly ascetic temper. It found a representative in Diogenes of Sinope, who is for most associated with the tub in which he is said to have dwelt at Corinth. His morality seems to have been sincere, but of that extreme temper which leads one to throw aside the enjoyments and amenities of life rather than to be at the labor of purifying them. The beautiful accompaniments of life are thus shrivelled up in a fierce passion for life itself. This severe spirit, which led this school to fall out with the world, gave occasion to the designation of Cynics.

The Cyrenian school, established by Aristippus at Cyrene, took the other half of the doctrine of Socrates, and made pleasure the end of life. This pleasure was not lawless pleasure, but a well-ordered enjoyment of the

world. These two forms of ethical theory are deeply implanted in the events of life and in the constitution of the mind, and hence have always played a leading part in theories of morals. Not often have there been found that balance of thought, that harmony of constitution, that fortunate consilience of circumstances which have enabled the philosopher and moralist to unite the two as fitting outward expression of an inwardly vigorous life. These two forms of belief were taken up and fully expanded by the Stoics and the Epicureans.

§ 5. The great disciple of Socrates and of Euclid was Plato (427). It is through him and Xenophon that we chiefly have access to Socrates. He taught for a long period at Athens, in the garden of Academus, and so founded the school of the Academy. It is not easy to point out another who has had an equal influence over the forms of philosophy with that exerted by Plato. Whomsoever we mention, there will be doubt attached to the opinion. He has been a supreme presence from his own time onward in the spiritualistic regions of thought. There has been no one, of an idealistic tendency, who has not caught sight of Plato, near at hand or remote, and felt the inspiration of his great spirit.

Plato regarded matter as eternal, without qualities, the stuff out of which the world is made. The world is the product of changes allied to those of growth. God, the World-builder, formed the world-soul out of two elements—the one immutable, the other mutable. These two were united into an intermediate substance, and the three, again united, became the world-soul. Matter was first shaped into mathematical forms, and afterward, passing into its present phases, was united to the soul of the world as its body.

The soul of man was also made of two elements, the superior element being the instrument of rational cognition, and the inferior of sensuous perception. In man there are two subordinate souls, one of appetite and one of courage. The soul of the world and the soul of man are intermediate agents between pure ideas and matter.

The point most central in the cosmogony of Plato was that of ideas. The position he gave to ideas makes his whole scheme, notwithstanding the intellectual elements it contains, one of cosmology. According to it there are two terms in the universe, the inner and the outer, the immutable and the mutable, pure being and phenomena. Ideas are the inner, immutable, eternal, creative essences. The idea is not found in individual objects that arise under it, but has a distinct prior existence. These objects are its changeable, sensuous expression.

This doctrine of ideas is allied to the Eleatic notion of being, but has this decisive advantage, that, in the diversity of ideas, it gives a basis for the variety of the world. But this advantage is balanced by the confusion which arises between a wider generalization and the narrower ones which it contains. Socrates had directed the attention of his disciples to the definitions—concepts—which lie back of general terms. The object of his inquiry was to reduce these concepts to a coherent, general, and permanent form. Plato, in furtherance of a like purpose, transformed them into realities, made them the productive energies of the world. He hypostatized the products of the mind, and, to a degree, put them in place of mind. The scheme is thoroughly idealistic in its tendency, carries creation over to a movement of immaterial ideas, and is allied, in inner force, to the idealism of German philosophy. The philosophy, as presented by

Plato, possessed many crude features, and called for much elaboration to bring it into consistency with itself. If ideas, represented by the concepts which lie back of classes, are to have eternal, substantial—substantial as opposed to phenomenal—existence, classification ceases to be a formal combination of the objects under consideration, adjustable to the immediate uses of mind, and becomes an inquiry into absolute, ultimate forms of being. As, however, we arrive at these eternal essences no otherwise than by our arrangement of things, acts, qualities, relations, into classes, and as these are changeable, innumerable, and overlap each other in every variety of way, the essences present to us in them present a most confused assemblage of energies, whose precise work and relative work we are utterly unable to define. This has been found true in connection with the highest idea of all, the good, identified by Plato with God. How is this identification possible? What relation has this idea to other ideas? To preserve the supreme creative energy of God, this idea ought not only to be permanent, but preëminent, pervasive, giving limit and direction to all other ideas. It ought to be personal. What Plato taught on this subject is under dispute. Doubtless, the relation of ideas as ultimate essences to each other and to a harmonious creative act was not fully wrought out by him.

That Plato was aware of this difficulty and not able to meet it, is seen in the dialogue *Parmenides*: "I sometimes get disturbed and begin to think that there is nothing—as hair, mud, dirt—without an idea; but then I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense and perish; and so I return to the ideas of which I was just speaking—the just, the beautiful, and the good—and occupy myself with them." The feeling here expressed

is most natural and just, when we consider the many restricted, unrelated, and overlapping qualities expressed in general terms, and the innumerable abstract relations between things which they indicate. Nothing but confusion can arise in thought from an indiscriminate attachment of all these terms to eternal entities. Plato's philosophy, however, subserved the great purpose of raising that most fruitful of questions, which has occupied so many centuries in its discussion, the nature of general terms. On the one hand, it has led to such inquiries in science as the nature of species, and, on the other, in philosophy, to the separation of general ideas into those which are the product of generalization and those which express primitive formal elements.

It is not these innumerable interior criticisms that are of most moment in considering a comprehensive philosophy like that of Plato. They may serve to define the scope and harmony of thought which belonged to its author, but do not determine its position in the general development of truth.

The analysis implied in this construction of a universe by virtue of ideas—this dialectic of Plato—was very inadequate, yet wholly in the right direction. Though mind and matter, ideas and the products that arise under them, have gained a footing with him as fundamentally diverse, neither is fully apprehended in itself or assigned a true position. Matter is mere stuff; something which is nothing, but out of which all things can be formed. This conclusion is itself unintelligible as well as aside from all the facts of experience. The matter recognized by Plato is not at all the matter we know, full of the most diverse and subtile powers.

The creative energy which is operative in this formless

mass is not so much mind as ideas. These ideas are the personified products of an intellectual imagination, and find no counterparts in a wise, empirical analysis of the world. They are the fruits of mind put in the place of mind itself. There are three grades or forms of reality, the reality of continuous being—matter, mind; the reality of phenomenal being—the transient states and acts of matter and mind; and the reality of the formal elements which belong to these states of matter and mind—space, time, consciousness. Ideas in reference to mind have only phenomenal being; in reference to states of matter and mind, only formal being. In no case are they entities in the higher force of the word. This formal being is associated with the phenomenal being which accompanies it. Space or causation is not a something beyond the facts which arise under it, but the intellectual form-element by which alone the facts present themselves.

Plato hypostatizes ideas and assigns them real being—being of the highest order. This act of the imagination finds no confirmation in experience, is in no way intelligible or explanatory. Ideas, so used, begin at once to take on the attributes of personality, to the limitation or loss of personality itself. So personified, they must find interpretation under terms of mind, as the mind of man is the only empirical form of personality within the circuit of our knowledge. This passage of being, power, creation, over from mind to ideas, the phenomena of mind, from reason to the relations which reason carries with it, is no more sound as a philosophy of being than is a reference of all knowledge to a sensuous flow of phenomena in the physical world. It is, indeed, a far higher and more just product of thought, as it chooses more

wisely between the two classes of phenomena, mental and physical, in determining the nature of truth. In either case, however, the forms of substantial being given in experience are set aside, and phenomenal being is substituted for them. In the system of Plato, mental phenomena, as ruling energies, take the place of physical phenomena, which in their variableness and changeableness had colored the scepticism of the Sophist. Plato did not, in hypostatizing ideas, abandon matter, but he reduced it to the lowest expression—world-stuff. The earth-soul which he gives the world allies his opinion to hylozoism.

Plato, in giving to ideas an objective reality, assimilates the action of the mind in thought to its action in perception. The object of its contemplation, as, for example, the good, exists prior to its discernment and independently of it. In this view, reason is not assigned its true power. The forms of reason, its ruling ideas, inhere in reason itself, and are incidents of its own activity. The good is not something prior to moral insight, it belongs to rational, ethical action as its inner law. It is discerned by the reason as a governing idea within itself of its own activity. The eternity of ideas, in the philosophy of Plato, wholly confounds the relation of reason, human and divine, to the world of order. It does not induce that order, it is not its source, but at best only perceives it. Thus reason is already enveloped in relations which it in no way institutes. It is not ultimate as a creative agent.

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle each made his own contribution to the refutation of the Sophists and to restoring the foundations of truth. The permanent and the changeable elements in knowledge are represented by

intellectual relations and sensuous appearances. The Sophists were able to bring to our impressions a sense of confusion and contradiction by laying emphasis on the shifting phases of our sensible experience. These variable facts of the senses are translated by us into intellectual relations, contained in general terms. Socrates sought to bring out the explicit and universal element in these words by which we identify intellectual connections. Plato, magnifying knowledge, put back of these general terms, one and all, an independent, permanent form of being. Herein he raised the question of innate ideas, or ideas prior to experience. It was a long time, however, before these general notions were sharply discriminated into their two classes—those due to generalization, and those which, as primitive form-elements of the reason, accompany all its activity—and the discussion of origin confined to the latter division. This assertion of Plato opened the way for later inquiry, but growing analysis constantly changed the points of attack and defence. Those who regard philosophy as a fruitless repetition of the same differences of opinion, either do not recognize the continual movement which has accompanied this discussion of ideas, or do not understand its importance.

The mistake involved in the first step in the philosophy of Plato became more and more apparent in a disposition to regain the lost ground by giving to ideas increasingly a personal character, and by identifying the highest idea, that of Good, with God. This is an error of method which has constantly perplexed philosophy—the institution of an inadequate distinction, and then trying to make it firm by drawing back to the notion so separated the very qualities from which it has been divided. Thus, the ideas of Plato, which were to rule mind, took

to themselves the attributes of mind; and thus, also, in empiricism, matter, cut apart from intellectual being, and made the primary cause of events, comes more and more to include in itself mental quality.

We have in the philosophy of Plato an early example of what has often been so unsuccessfully tried—the introduction of an intermediate term between two diverse forms of being as a condition of reconciliation. Thus, the soul of the world and the soul of man are so made up of commingled elements as to be able to act intermediately between the material world and the world of pure ideas. Explanations of the interaction of mind and matter, by the intervention of some third thing, are of a mechanical order, give no real light, and assume a difficulty to exist where there is no real difficulty. Interactions, in their ultimate forms, are, from the nature of the case, simple and primary terms of thought through our entire experience, whether they lie between matter and matter, matter and mind, or mind and mind. As simple terms they are unintelligible by any steps of analysis.

It is the incidents rather than the elaborated substance of the philosophy of Plato that have given it its great value with subsequent thinkers. The fellowship of the mind with truth through permanent ideas, the constructive force of ideas—ideas being allowed to sink to their true position as form-elements of the reason—in all the processes of thought, the communicability of mind with mind through the perfect medium of knowledge, the universal swallowing up the particular in the eternal sweep of thought, the growing supremacy of a Personal Reason in the world, are all positions of profound inspiration. Receiving the modifications which they readily accept, they become the cardinal truths of psychology and ontology.

While movement is not wholly, as Plato presents it, from the universal to the particular, from the idea to the product included under it, yet the universal is ever the luminous element in particulars, and particulars are only stimulating as, by intellectual combination, they flow into the universal—the enveloping atmosphere of all revelation.

§ 6. The ethical and spiritual impulse in Plato was in every way worthy of a disciple of Socrates. A philosophy thus drawn out in antagonism to the slipping, changeable hold of the Sophists on truth was full of insight and trustfulness. Virtue, with it, rests on knowledge, and is to be desired for its own sake. Virtue is the harmony of our nature with itself, and allies us to God. The four cardinal virtues are wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. The state is supreme. The individual holds his possessions in subordination to it. Personal life is dependent on this superior life and wrapped up in it. It was under this theory that the Greeks constructed the state, and Plato accepted it. The worst features in his morality are explained by it, a community of wives, an exposure of infants, and slavery. They were offerings made to the theoretical expansion of a ruling principle not yet corrected by the counter principle of individual life.

The priority of the state, in which justice is the great, constructive idea, gave this virtue with the ancient world a supreme position. By justice in the state Plato understood the subordination of all interests and of all persons, each in his own rank, to the commonwealth. Justice thus becomes the simple, direct administration of wise law, irrespective of the private interests that may stand in its way. This virtue he transferred to the individual by likening each man to a little kingdom, calling for a similar

subordination of parts and harmony of control. Justice, as a personal virtue, stands for self-government. Self-control, or justice, is thus the summation of many virtues. The word and the idea arose in connection with the relations of men to each other in society and the state, and they have settled down around this centre till they stand for a full recognition of the claims of others upon us under our common life. In this more restricted sense, justice is an essential virtue, but by no means the chief virtue. It is fundamental in morals only, because, as a somewhat barren subsoil, it underlies the fruitful fields of spiritual life. Love and the higher affections flourish beyond and above it.

The ethics both of Plato and Aristotle show how impossible it is for the largest intellects to develop the relations of society very much in advance of those with which they are familiar. Insight into the practical application of moral principles can only be called out and corrected empirically. It is between man and man, man and society, that these principles apply, and there we must study them under all the varied circumstances which surround them in the actual progress of the world. The customs of any one time or community have grown up in direct adaptation to existing conditions, and are, in part, their natural products. Though there may be in these customs perverse and oppressive features, there is also, in the circumstances out of which they have grown and which they in turn nourish, much to justify them. They often do not admit of sudden and extended change. The moralist, therefore, finds himself in the midst of social conditions and dependencies which he may improve, but cannot escape. He is liable to regard them as more permanent than they really are. He must be possessed

of a vigorous imagination in spiritual things, if he can reconstruct at once and fully all the details of life as he meets them in the ruling forces and accidental forms about him. So transcendent an ideal, when reached, seems wholly out of connection with the facts to which it pertains. The social good discloses itself only in connection with the slow gradations of growth by which we creep up toward it. If we find in a community slavery and the subjection of women, there are also present many ugly facts which give color to these bad relations. There must be reciprocity between the principles that are current among men and the character of those whom they knit together. The ideal principle is, therefore, constantly humiliated by the practice with which it is associated; the practice hides the scope and beauty of the principle, and renders it, for the time being, inapplicable, or even unintelligible. Insight that is empirical is thus led to interpret principles too narrowly, by virtue of the constraint of the circumstances under which they are applied; and insight that is theoretical becomes extravagant in its use of principles, and so reflects discredit upon them. The moral life, in its insights and its actions,—for the two are inseparable—is unfolded collectively by the growth of society, where its terms of construction exist and are slowly laid open in their infinite variety and force. Having once made a step in social edification, we bestow sharp criticism on those who failed to see its fitness, though we ourselves may be quite blind in regard to the changes still before us. Nothing seems more difficult for men to conceive than the readjustments, the spiritual and the formal transformations, which must accompany the growth of society, and, therefore, to discern the exact time at which events are ripening for the transition.

Prior to any progressive movement it is easy to argue against it, because of the maladjustments it seems about to occasion; but when the eventful moment is present, there begins to be a shifting of thought and action in many directions at once. Both Plato and Aristotle, great as was their intellectual strength, were too much enclosed in existing conditions, were too low down in the mist of the valley, to see the heights of moral revelation that lay in clear, but remote, sunshine on the horizon. This failure must, from the nature of the case, ever be present with us in one degree or another. We are built up in the moral world in wide plateaus and mountain ranges only in connection with great masses, and as the consummation of protracted processes.

Plato held that the Idea of the Good, God, was the supreme creative idea, and that man was immortal from the indestructible nature of the soul. This necessary duration of the spirit carried with it previous existence as well as future life; and this double fact was presented under the form of metempsychosis. Life offers a wide range to living things. Each portion of it may be to the human spirit a discipline in the line of reward and punishment, and lead to a form superior or inferior to itself. Persistence in virtue finally frees the soul from the body, and raises it to the condition of the gods. The one fundamental principle, which gives coherence and value to this speculation, is the moral life it includes and the slow development incident to that life. The exact terms under which this cardinal truth is enforced are of far less moment than the truth itself. The fact that man has so often turned to the doctrine of metempsychosis as an explanation of moral phenomena, shows that in the narrow range of our vision it offers one of the most

obvious ways in which our moral life can be carried beyond the close limits of experience in which we find it.

Plato based his argument for immortality on fanciful conceptions of the nature of the soul, conceptions somewhat akin to those notions of perfection which were attached to certain mathematical figures. An intellectual imagination easily gives some new significance to the simple data with which we have to deal in experience.

The disciples of Plato were quite overshadowed by the genius of their master. He seemed to have exhausted the world of thought. The Academy suffered successive minor divisions, and in no branch of it attained any permanent distinction till the rise, in the next period, of Neo-Platonism. While the philosophy of Plato lacked the correction incident to wide knowledge, and the restraint due to the study of things, it held, in an inexhaustible degree, the stimulus of bold, strong, penetrative thought.

§ 7. Aristotle (384) of Stagira, a man of the same imperial power as Plato, was neither quite his pupil nor quite his rival. He was an independent worker under him and after him. He was, during twenty years, in the school of Plato, and for three years the tutor of Alexander. Alexander, with his large and ill-ordered powers, thus passed under and out of the shadow of the three great minds of his period. Intellectual and social changes, offered in two distinct forms, and each form of the widest range, stand contrasted in the lives of Alexander and Aristotle. The conquests of Alexander were effective and permanent forces in civilization; but Alexander was in them a comparatively mechanical factor. The works of Aristotle became a yet more active and enduring agent in civilization, and the mind of Aristotle was ever and everywhere their clear, luminous centre.

Aristotle taught twelve years at Athens, in the Lyceum, a place on the Ilissus. His disciples, accustomed to walk in discussion with their master backward and forward across the narrow area, were termed Peripatetics; a title they vindicated on the intellectual side by traversing under his eye the widest ranges of thought.

Aristotle united his theories much more closely to the facts before him than did Plato. He was an earnest student of physics and natural science. He was the son of a physician, a profession which has been especially associated with an empirical tendency. His notion of ideas was quite distinct from that of Plato. He believed in one immaterial essence, form-principle—form-giving principle—the absolute Spirit, God. The other essences, form-principles, inhere in matter, and are inseparable from it. Matter does not exist apart from them, nor they apart from matter. Matter is, in reference to them, the potentiality, the possibility, of being; they, in reference to matter, are its informing, ruling ideas. The significance of things is found in these ideas; but true ideas are not to be arrived at hastily in thought, but by careful inquiry and wise classification. They thus constitute the universal, the truly significant, forces in particulars.

He regarded matter, not altogether pliant to ideas, as a source of imperfection. This opinion is, however, hardly in keeping with the nature of matter, defined by him as pure potentiality. Matter, in order to embarrass a constructive movement, must be endowed with some refractory qualities of its own. His scheme of cosmology is much more self-consistent and workable than that of Plato, and much nearer later results in philosophy. He also enforced the very important principle of approaching ideas by a thorough knowledge of things. The idea

is the meaning of the thing ; the thing always exists in a significant form, holds within it an idea. The world is thus the language, the embodiment, of ideas. Motion, change, construction, involves, as empirically interpreted, three things : that which is moved (changed), that which is moved and itself moves, and, inferentially, that which moves and is not itself moved. Motion or change includes three particulars : quantitative motion, qualitative motion, and motion in space. That which moves and is not itself moved is Pure Spirit, absolutely perfect, loved of all.

The universe includes four principles: the form-principle, the material principle, efficient cause, final cause. The form-principle and material principle exist together in the individual. Substantial being belongs only to the particular. Efficient causes and final causes coexist in living things, and in their perfect form in God. Here we have distinctly recognized, in their own diverse relations, the two terms of cosmic construction, matter and mind, forces and powers. Nearly as the philosophy of Aristotle approaches the realism of our time, it differs from it in giving to the idea, the form-principle, everywhere, even in the inorganic world, that distinct, though not separate, existence which is now associated with life, as a plastic power ; or with spirit, as a rational presence. To the mind of Aristotle the organic and inorganic worlds were alike, in each containing, in their distinct species, equally distinct constructive ideas. Matter, as simple potentiality, was, in each case, to the form-principle what matter is, under the modern conception, with its properties and forces, to the principle of life—the means by which a distinct agent is reaching its ends. Aristotle regarded life simply as a fuller form-principle, involving at once

form and moving cause. Man is possessed of body, soul, and spirit. Higher terms are added to lower ones. The soul stands for life, and the spirit for the rational principle. Our knowledge of principles is an insight of reason. It was hardly possible to have hit on the relation of form-principles to matter, till, by chemical analysis, the nature of matter was better understood. Matter offers itself as material to all our mechanical processes. It was natural to conceive it in a similar relation to form-principles everywhere, till the discovery was reached that it itself is made up of constructive activities of various orders and groups, that its properties and substance are one and the same. Many minds still find difficulty in dismissing the notion of dead centres, a kind of stuff which gives substantial being to things.

Aristotle regarded space as limited, and time as unlimited. The limitation of space was reached by considering it as a *plenum*, and directing attention to that with which it is filled. Space expresses the bounds of material things. He added to the four elements generally accepted, ether, filling celestial spaces. Ether is the supreme element, the *quinta essentia*, the quintessence. To it circular motion is native.

§ 8. In morals, as elsewhere, Aristotle felt strongly, and, on the whole, beneficently, the empirical tendency. The end of human effort is happiness. But happiness is the fruit of virtue, and virtue is action conformed to reason. Reason is the proper sovereign of the soul. The leading practical principle with which Aristotle would guide action is that of the golden mean. Vice is of the nature of excess, virtue of the nature of moderation. The balance and soundness of the mind are apparent in its power to combine and reconcile opposite tendencies.

Justice held the same high position with him as with Plato, and for a like reason. Government is the supreme idea with them both, and justice stands for well-ordered control both in the state and in the individual. While the ethical opinions of Aristotle are shaped under a strong empirical tendency, he admits, in what he terms *dianoetic* virtue, elements which stand in harmony with intuitive morals. This virtue is the exercise of the reason in right relation to other powers. If the mind is able to discern the correct positions and proportions of its powers, and finds its highest pleasure, as Aristotle presents the case, in obedience to this law of its being, we therein have a truth which leads directly to intuitive ethics.

We easily err in supposing earlier discussions nearer in thought to later ones than they really are. These discussions indicate directions, but the later positions taken in them were not as yet distinctly before the mind. The ethical temper of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics was that which is now reproduced as intuitionism. While, in the scheme of Aristotle, happiness was regarded as the supreme end of action, it was a happiness that owed its significance to the rational elements it contained. The question had not been distinctly put by him, whether the rational law, as a law, is prior in authority to the happiness which attends on obedience to it; or whether this happiness is itself the ground of this value? whether rational law or rational pleasure lies deepest in our ethical constitution? If this question had been asked Aristotle, he would have been compelled, by the whole tendency of his philosophy, to give the law of reason, disclosed to reason itself, the foreground. This supremacy of law is involved in the ethics of Plato and of the Stoics. The paradoxes of the Stoics imply it. Noth-

ing, according to them, is contrary to the will of a good man. That is, the sense of law and just obedience to it rise above all consequences. So the assertion that pain is no evil, and that the strength of virtue is expressed in apathy, both indicate this supreme sense of law. The temper of the Stoic was obedience of the soul, exacted by the soul itself; as opposed to the temper of the Epicurean, which was a pursuit of happiness. Though the doctrine of Aristotle seems to occupy a middle ground, its deeper affiliations, this middle ground being swept away, are found with the supremacy of rational law, in its most explicit statement, the intuitionism of our time. If happiness is held fast as the supreme end, the notion of law must be given up, and all impulses—ethical impulses as well as others—be treated as primitive constitutional tendencies, sensibilities, under which we enter on this pursuit of pleasure. Aristotle's opinion was in disagreement with itself. It has been the result of more recent discussions in ethics to disclose and escape this collision of conflicting ideas; either to make the law of right simply an evolution of the pleasure-seeking impulses, or to regard it as a primitive product of rational insight and oversight, ripened and expanded within itself under experience, and, as the result of its own supremacy, the crowning condition of pleasure.

The priority of the state is strongly conceived by Aristotle. The idea was thoroughly wrought into the temper and practice of his time. In the rhythm of progress it was, as contrasted with individuation, justly uppermost. It also gives bold expression to that undeniable fact that individual development must be the product of the joint social life. No matter, however, what the particular form of government may be, this idea of

the superiority of the state to those subject to it must give rise to tyranny. A democracy, like that at Athens, may very readily be associated with a flagrant disregard of the rights of the individual. While we cannot pass over to the reactionary doctrine of inalienable rights, expressed in our own Declaration of Independence, the individual, the typical individual, who stands for every citizen, must be made the true fruitage of the state, the only expression of its successful operation. In practical importance, the state, at any one moment, far outweighs the individual; but in theoretical value, the individual wholly overtops the state. The truth which comes first in order in the progress of society is the importance of the state. This is the early organic germ.

The most complete of the works of Aristotle, that which remains a permanent contribution to knowledge and a constant instrument of progress, is his logic. This is allied to those discussions in mathematics from which later inquiry never departs. The logic of Aristotle lays down the axioms and inherent dependencies of judgments from which there is no appeal. These formal processes of thought are united to real things by correct definition, by conforming our concepts to the facts under consideration. Rare, indeed, have been the occasions in which one man has brought to distinct statement and correct use a fundamental method in intellectual activity.

Aristotle divided the forms of real things, and so the forms of our judgments concerning them, conceived in the most general way, into ten classes. These are his categories. They are substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, possession, action, passion. These categories, as they are intended to express the most general forms of being, ought to cover, and cover

only, those intuitions of reason which constitute the primitive form-elements of thought. Thought acts under conditions of rational order which are involved in it, and make it possible. Those general concepts which arise under experience, and are the products of classification, cannot be included in these higher categories, which they themselves imply. For example, all classes turn on the notion of resemblance, and can none of them give this notion or one as primitive as it. This distinction is not maintained in the categories of Aristotle, and they subserve, therefore, no important purpose either in logic or philosophy. They play backward and forward between primary and derived forms, and do not keep quite clear of each other. Thus place, time, action, passion are specific forms of relation. Relation may be generalized from them. There can hardly be a profitable discussion of categories except in connection with the primitive form-elements involved in reason. The consideration of that which is antecedent to thought, and that which is the product of thought, had not yet come to the front.

The disciples of Aristotle added very little to his philosophy. Much of their attention was directed to ethics, and moral distinctions maintained a ruling interest with them to the end.

§ 9. These three men, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, form a group more brilliant, more closely united, and at the same time with more marked personal distinctions than any other in the history of philosophy. The moral impulse, so dominant in the first master, Socrates, remained with both Plato and Aristotle, and through them passed on to their disciples. It is well to remember that this activity arose in reaction to the unbelief that opened the period. Unbelief was the foil on which belief ex-

pended its blows, and awoke the mind to wider discussion and profounder thought.

Plato stood for the more speculative element in this philosophy. By the vigor, freedom, and, still more, by the spiritualistic cast of his works, he has nourished, down to our own time, all the processes of pure thought. The idealistic tendency ever returns with pleasure to the words of Plato, so full of ideas, the impalpable substances of things.

Aristotle, turning from this speculation, not in weariness or disgust, but in search of more tangible results,—a desire so well met in his logic—reshaped the opinions of his master in closer conformity with facts, and became a supreme figure in that philosophy which unites insight with inquiry, and makes theory the rational exposition of the things given us in experience. Aristotle greatly transcends Plato in the firmness of his hold on both terms of knowledge, the rational form-elements and the empirical facts which fill them out and define them. The broken and tangled threads of the net of a balloon, that has collapsed and fallen, are hardly more unlike the same meshes when distended in mid-air by the buoyant up-lift of a lighter element, than are the confused and floating lines of speculative thought to the firm conclusions which are seen to envelop and bind together the events of daily life in their sensuous, pushing energy. The growing differences of subsequent centuries have made the distinction between Plato and Aristotle greater than it appeared in the men themselves. The three most powerful impulses of the human mind, the ethical, the speculative, and the practical, are offered in a relatively harmonized form in the three respectively, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

§ 10. This wide and brilliant outbreak of speculative inquiry passed by with the rapidity of a consecutive movement, and was followed by a long, slow decline in philosophy. The moral impulse gave rise to two adverse schools. The division was not more a speculative one than one of opposing tendencies, deeply implanted in the sensuous and spiritual nature of man. Happiness is the form which all good ultimately assumes. There have been those, whenever and wherever the distinctions of conduct have come under discussion, who have regarded the pursuit of happiness as the most simple and comprehensive purpose in the life of man. Happiness has been offered as an object of pursuit, as if it were essentially one in kind, the substance of all good, and always capable of being an immediate aim.

There has been another tendency, not, perhaps, as general as this search of pleasure, but more profound and more authoritative. It asserts the mastery of man over circumstances, a superiority in man to his circumstances. It cherishes a certain contempt of pleasure, and is disposed to scorn the vexations and defy the calamities of life. The dignity of man seems to it to lie in rising above sensuous and social conditions, always liable to become sordid, and in asserting itself as something to be first thought of and ultimately pursued. The man is never to be weighed with the enjoyments of which he is capable.

Happiness is regarded by those who share the more heroic temper as not, in itself, homogeneous, capable of like measurements in its diverse forms, nor as open, in its higher phases, to direct pursuit. The satisfaction of a self-contained and strong spirit is incident to the integrity which constitutes such a spirit, and admits of no comparison with sensuous delights.

Ethical distinctions may be developed on the practical side, as the fruits of these two tendencies; or, on the speculative side, as involving in one or the other view the ultimate validity of the laws of conduct. In the period under consideration the division was one of spirit and taste quite as much as of pure thought.

Epicurus (341) gave the lax and enticing theory of pleasure, as the comprehensive purpose of life, full expression. The doctrine was not, in his hands, a sensuous one, but one of varied and reasonable enjoyments. Pleasure, as a principle of action, is not necessarily one of indulgence, though it offers but feeble resistance to excess, and is exposed to a constant decline in that direction. Epicureanism has thus come to indicate forms of pleasure more gross and insatiate than those contemplated by Epicurus, or than those contained in the theory itself, wisely developed. The weakness of the theory in this direction is, that it must accept the impulses of men essentially as it finds them, and provide for the largest aggregate of enjoyment under them. Its periods are short, its motives immediate, and it can impose no protracted self-denial. Its measurements, moreover, are quantitative, not qualitative. If it allows one pleasure to be different in kind from another, the simplicity of the scheme is lost, its scale is broken.

Epicurus received the germ of his hedonism from Aristippus, who had developed it in a one-sided way from the teachings of Socrates. Epicurus united it, by a fellowship very normal to it, with the naturalism of the Atomists. Thus planting himself firmly on the physical side of life, he was prepared for a very limited rendering of its scope.

Matter and motion constitute the sum of being. The

soul is made up of atoms. All organizations are the results of development. Some combinations succeed and some fail. Perception arises from images—*εἰδωλα*—that enter through the senses. The senses give us the terms of knowledge. Reason adds nothing. Opinion is the result of continuous impressions. Abstruse reasoning is to be distrusted. This philosophy is remarkable for holding so many of the germs of empiricism. The fact goes to show the affiliation of these germs with each other, both on the intellectual and the emotional side. They arise in clusters, in a semi-organic way. The philosophy was a fitting preparation for the ethical system which grew out of it.

Epicurus was kindly and social, and drew his disciples into a close circle about himself. The place of instruction and intercourse was a garden at Athens. The garden was hardly more than an enclosed court of the house itself. The leading points in the theory are those with which we are now so familiar. Pleasure is the true end of effort, though wisdom must be exercised in its pursuit. Virtue is the use of the best means in the attainment of pleasure. Epicurus did not deny the existence of the gods, but thought that they occupied interstellar spaces, and did not meddle with men.

If we are to understand the reasons which justified the doctrines of Epicurus to himself and to his disciples, we must take into consideration not merely the constitutional force of the pleasure-seeking impulses in men, and the rightfulness that often belongs to them, but also the social vexations, the political harassments, the inimical religious beliefs, and the philosophical perplexities that belonged to his time. Epicureanism was, in part, the demand of the soul for peace within itself, and an uninter-

rupted enjoyment of the possibilities which lie about it. Epicurus withdrew, and withdrew his disciples, from public life. The active impulses were too unsatisfactory in their results to be self-rewarding. He strove to protect from invasion the immediate enjoyments of intimate and affectionate intercourse by denying the reasonableness of the anxieties which harassed men, and laid upon them so much fruitless effort, so many empty alarms. Epicureanism was thus an effort to anticipate spiritual victory, and secure at once its reposefulness.

The apprehensions of life are to be repelled. The gods are not to be feared—a fear, as he encountered it, far more productive of pain than of pleasure, of evil than of good, at least, to superficial vision. If they exist, they exist in remote regions, and do not concern themselves with our affairs. The actions and interests we assign them are quite fanciful.

Fate, moreover, is not to be dreaded; for the reasonings of men concerning the inevitable nature of events are not to be trusted. He confirmed this conclusion by pointing out instances in which things do not prove to be what they seem to us to be; in which like effects do not follow similar causes. Events are more flexible than our thoughts concerning them.

A third fear, that of death, is to be overcome by conceiving it more correctly. Our apprehension of death arises from the fact that when we think of it we also think of ourselves as retaining our conscious life, and so being in uncomfortable contact with its smothering force. This is the result of our tendency to accept immortality. Regard death as absolute reposefulness, and it, no more than sleep, is repugnant to us. As a negation, it can bring no positive evil with it. Epicureanism was not,

then, so much a demand of the appetites for indulgence, as it was a search for a restful eddy in a stream whose rapids and whirlpools, whose toils and fading hopes, had become a weariness to men.

This system, addressing itself strongly and in various ways to human nature, remained many centuries, and has reappeared in various forms all along the history of philosophy. It was a belief far more consonant with the Grecian than the Roman mind. The restless, speculative activity of the one race wearied the thoughts far more quickly than the sober, practical purposes of the other. Lucretius, among the Romans, was its most able and conspicuous advocate.

Epicureanism gave a certain passive support to personal liberty by weakening the bonds of religious and political belief, and seeking freedom for the individual in the pursuit of his own ends. It brought life closer to the man. It is a fungus that is not altogether mischievous when it finds vigorous, independent life on which to fasten. It leads the mind to be less satisfied with the bustle of mere motion. It can do nothing, however, to rebuild a strength it has helped to consume.

§ 11. The more noble Greek temper and the Roman temper find expression in Stoicism. Stoicism united itself, through the Cynics, to the more central assertion in the instructions of Socrates, that of self-control. Zeno (340) of Citium was the founder of this school. He gathered his pupils in the painted porch at Athens, and from this porch they received their appellation of Stoics. The four leading forms of speculation were designated, from the places in which the disciples of the respective schools were assembled, the Academy, the Lyceum, the Garden, and the Porch.

The stern ethics of Stoicism was united, in Zeno, with the philosophy of Heraclitus. This philosophy regarded fire as the soul of things, and attached much importance to the strife of two opposite tendencies, an upward and a downward one. Stoicism, the reverse of Epicureanism in its inner spirit, the conquering, not the reposeful, impulse, pushed men into the thick of the strife with evil, and found in adversity the best conditions of self-assertion. Panætius (180) of Rhodes taught this philosophy at Rome. It was a philosophy thoroughly consonant with the Roman disposition in its loftier and more benignant forms. Stoicism expressed a moral temper quite as much as a system of doctrines, and was associated with considerable latitude and uncertainty of belief. Its crowning feature was the strong assertion of personal power, the power of mind over the conditions which surround it but do not control it. It stood, therefore, in the closest fellowship with all that is pure, self-reliant, and resolute in human character. It attached the greatest importance to law—law in individual action, law in the state, law in the world at large. Obedience is the supreme fact in life, and puts us at one with all that is good and great.

Its chief defect lay in a hardness and narrowness of disposition which separated its disciples from that sympathetic contact with men by which virtue feeds the spiritual world, and is fed from it. It distinguished itself from the teachings of Christ, especially at the point of the passive virtues, meekness, humility, patience. These virtues express the harmony of man with man in the softened contact of a spiritual life, narrow in each individual, but most affluent in its general resources. There is no more distinctive quality in the words of Christ than that spirit of gentleness with which men are taught to walk

with each other in the presence of their Heavenly Father. Stoicism helped to prepare the way for Christianity; Christianity helped to soften the temper of Stoicism; yet the two affiliated less perfectly than might have been anticipated. The self-reliant mood of a philosophy of personal life did not easily coalesce with the dependent, trustful spirit of religious faith. The blending of a thoughtful with a reverential mind, a strong with a concessive one, has always been the most difficult achievement in progress. It is the ideal possession, ever beyond actual attainment. Stoicism greatly needed the ripening processes of grace. It was fruit promising to the eye, but not yet mellowed and flavored to the mouth.

Epictetus, early in the Christian era, presented the precepts of Stoicism in their most vigorous form. He achieved, by means of them, a notable victory over the hard conditions of a slave, though these wounds of the flesh reappear in his rugged habit of mind. Seneca, leading the luxurious life of a courtier, widens out these precepts into a sober philosophy of social relations. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, from the imperial throne, softens them into a humane and generous expression of fellowship. Under these very diverse conditions, Stoicism met nobly the demands of noble spirits upon it. One stands reverently with those who were able in so self-centred a way to abide with the truth—the mind's hold on spiritual relations.

The beliefs associated with Stoicism, while fitted, in part, to maintain its lofty spirit, were not equal in scope to its ethical temper. They were changeable with different persons and periods. Matter and force constitute the sum of things. Force is identical with fire, with intelligence, with God. Air, water, earth, are derived

from fire. Fire and air are the active elements, water and earth the passive ones. All development proceeds by law, and has the determinate movement indicated by fate. This change is in cycles. At the close of each cycle all elements are reabsorbed in fire, and first terms are restored again.

The spirit is not immaterial intelligence, but force united with the finest material substance. Matter and force are in all forms inseparable. The world is pervaded by the divine consciousness. The soul of man is an emanation from God. It is united to the warm breath within him. It survives life, but is not immortal. It necessarily disappears with the close of a cycle. God alone is eternal. All knowledge is derived from the senses. Concepts are the outgrowth, unconsciously and consciously, of perceptions.

The supreme object in life is virtue, a life conformed to nature. Virtue is the basis of true happiness. The virtuous man alone is free. He is inferior in worth to none, not even to God. He is lord over his own life, and may rightly put an end to it. This ideal of strength no man fully attains.

The doctrines of Stoicism combine, in an unusual way, conflicting tendencies. The speculative element is not uppermost in them. They reject the dualism of Plato, and so far identify intelligence with its material terms of expression as to subject it to laws, physical in their form. The unity of the world is reached by asserting the inseparable nature of matter and mind. Intelligence is identified with force, and force receives its exposition under physical facts. Such a philosophy results, when rigidly developed, in the absorption of mental powers in material laws. In spite, however, of this preëminence of physical

relations, the authority of the spirit of man within itself is asserted in the most unqualified manner. The ethical sentiment is left out of harmony with the movement of things, and oftentimes in intense and unsustained conflict with it. Stoicism is a doctrine of persistent strife rather than of full attainment. The incentives which spring from faith were especially wanting in Stoicism. Virtue was unwearied self-assertion, lacking the nourishment of an all-embracing divine love. Its religious terms were far below its moral ones, and chiefly because of the fatalistic forms given to events by their physical rendering. The spirit of man was nobler within itself, and higher in its anticipations, than it of right should have been in a world ordered in so unswerving a fashion, with so little of divine grace. Virtue thus became a more cold and passionless expression of intellectual power than it can be save in a few richly endowed natures. The true Stoic was an unusual man, who commanded more respect than affection, and was better fitted to instruct men than to inspire them. The atmosphere which he breathed was too rare and too cold for the ordinary purposes of life. Men were not drawn together by an all-comprehending energy without themselves as well as within them. Human strength was asserted at its highest value, but not nourished with food adequate for it. There was intensity at the centre of effort, but no widening circles of activity outward and upward, receiving, at each stage of transfer, new inspirations of power and revelations of love. The soul was driven onward, rather than drawn upward in a divine path.

An ascetic tendency readily united itself to Stoicism. Standing in more natural fellowship with it than it did with Christianity, this extreme method did not vitiate it

in the same degré. Some good has come from asceticism, even in Christianity, yet it involves a profound misinterpretation of its spirit and purposes. All men of a strongly predominant moral temper have in them elements of Stoicism. It thus expresses a form of belief which returns, in all ages, in connection with a moral force struggling with the conditions which enclose it. No development, aside from Christianity, is more worthy of admiration, or yields more inspiration, than Stoicism. Its spiritual energy greatly excels its philosophical insight.

There is an interesting, though somewhat indirect, influence of Stoicism found in the Catholic doctrines of the Trinity and of the nature of Christ. There were two distinct philosophical tendencies which those who took part in the discussions that settled the creed of the Church felt, in common with their time. The theosophy of Neo-Platonism regarded God as wholly transcendent, having no term of union with the world. He could stand in no relation of contact with matter. Matter brings with it limitation and evil. Asceticism is the conquest of these physical and malign influences. This philosophy militated with the notion of an incarnation and the divinity of Christ.

Stoicism, on the other hand, regarded God as immanent in the universe. Matter and spirit are inseparable. The Alexandrian school of theology, in its great masters, as Clement and Origen, accepted this immanence of deity. God might, therefore, indwell in Christ. The doctrine of the Trinity was virtually a triumph of the conception of a God ever near at hand, over that of a transcendental, unapproachable Being. Stoicism was not mystical, but spiritually strong, and so affiliated with the more tangible formulæ of faith.

§ 12. An era of positive conviction always gives occasion to skepticism. What doubt is to the individual mind, that is skepticism to the general mind, a test of the work already done, and an incentive to farther work. Skepticism arises, in its more superficial forms, from the conflicting character of the conclusions of philosophy, and, in its more searching forms, from the alleged inadequacy of them, one and all. The skepticism of this period is especially associated with Pyrrho (360) of Elis. The forms and grounds of his unbelief were much the same as those of the Sophists. He regarded reality as unattainable. Truth is beyond the reach of man. The just and the unjust are distinctions of customs only. The wise man, therefore, must maintain a tranquil temper, undisturbed by changeable opinion. As this skepticism is of the most sweeping character, Pyrrhonism came to be a general term for unbelief. Yet this universal denial must itself become an undeniable truth before the mind can be quieted by it. Uncertainty, uncertainty in reference to that which seems to be of great moment, cannot fail to give rise to anxiety.

Carneades (214) of Cyrene exerted very considerable influence on speculative unbelief. At one time, as an ambassador at Rome, he encountered the more practical and more positive temper of the Romans, and gave it sharp offence. Cato the Elder was especially unwilling that the youth of Rome should be turned from the customary and safe convictions of public policy to these perplexing, unsettling discussions of abstract truth. No two forms of thought could readily be more opposed to each other than that of the narrow-minded, forceful Roman, and that of the supple, volatile Greek.

Carneades urged the contradictory character of our

ideas, especially in regard to God. God can neither be corporeal nor incorporeal. Infinity and personality are irreconcilable.

Ænesidemus, who taught at Alexandria in the first century, gave form to the ten tropes current among skeptics as the concise expression of unbelief. They were afterwards reduced to five, as follows: contradictory opinions among men; infinite regress of proof; relativity of knowledge; arbitrary character of first assertions; proof returning into a circle. These again were resolved into two cardinal denials: nothing is certain as shown by the discrepancy of opinions; nothing can be made certain by proof, since proof can find no starting-point. It either recedes *ad infinitum* or returns into itself.

These early perplexities of unbelief are essentially those of our time, and turn finally on the still open question, the nature of the first terms of knowledge, whether empirical or intuitive. That is to say, the foundations of belief are laid in faith, in the confidence of the mind in its own processes, in an insight so clear as to carry conviction with it, or they cannot be laid at all. Mere experience is variable within itself and wholly finite. It cannot overleap its own bounds, and reach any absolute truth.

The final form of denial was double, practical and theoretical. Empirically it is said opinions are in unending conflict. This assertion is met by mathematics, logic, the vast accumulation of reliable truths known as science, and the many safe convictions of current knowledge. Certainly, experience, in spite of all discrepancies, confirms, with an immeasurable preponderance of proof, the distinction of the true and the untrue, and puts its seal, with increasing distinctness, on the stores of learning.

Theoretically, we have only to make and to hold fast the distinction of proof by rational insight and by inference, and the second difficulty disappears. We have first truths, and have them, as alone they can be given, as visions of the mind. Are these two forms of proof after all so diverse that we can accept inference and reject insight? Inference is insight falling into progressive steps. The logical process is wholly powerless without the axiomatic penetration of mind which accompanies it. The conclusion is held in the premises, not mechanically, but for the apprehension of apprehending powers.

§ 13. The period which covered the lives of Plato and Aristotle was one of such great mental vigor as to push skepticism into the background. When, however, this creative movement exhausted itself, the sifting processes of skepticism set in, and in turn gave occasion to eclecticism. Eclecticism, if it is simply eclecticism, which it rarely is, stands for somewhat feeble philosophical power. Yet sound philosophy will always be somewhat eclectic, as each positive phase of thought, while it tends to become extreme, is wont to hold some germinant forms of truth. These sound principles, however, cannot be discriminated, tested, and united save in connection with ruling ideas, which themselves coalesce in a system. Eclecticism, in its least commanding form, is a prudent acceptance of principles that best meet the existing conditions of life; and in its wider scope is framing together, with fresh structural devices, the accumulated material of knowledge.

The eclectic possessed, in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, not only abundant material for selection, but material by no means repellent in its different parts. It was not difficult to unite beliefs taken from masters so con-

current in spirit. In the century before Christ, Antiochus built up an eclectic school at Athens. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus established in that city four schools of philosophy, devoted respectively to the four systems.

Cicero was a pupil of Antiochus, and while he regarded himself as a Neo-Platonist, he shared the eclectic tendency. His chief power lay in putting things, in the intelligibility and interest he imparted to them. Having closed his political career, he gave himself to philosophy. An eclecticism searching for reliable opinions amid much uncertainty and unbelief predominated in him. He was the first to make the statement distinctly, that truth, in the last resort, turns on insight, the hold of the mind on the objects of thought. In consistency with this assertion, he was inclined, in morals, to Stoicism—a law of conduct implanted in the soul itself. He found the strong argument for the being of God and for immortality in the universality of the notion. The drift of mind, the output of the spiritual world, lie in this direction, and stand for very much. This is a proof which addresses itself equally to him who has faith in a pervasive moral impulse, and to him who accepts as validities those beliefs which are developed by an accumulative movement under the progress of events.

CHAPTER III.

THE THIRD PERIOD IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. Eclecticism is an easy point of transition to a new direction of inquiry. The Christian era opened with theosophy, a disposition to inquire into the nature of God, and to search for some form of revelation. A clue was sought, in this highest phase of thought, for a reconciliation of the manifold and conflicting conclusions of philosophy. This tendency was very general. Christianity came forward at a time in which men were already engaged with conceptions not wholly unlike its own. Christianity was modified by this current tendency, and in turn impressed itself upon it. There were three prominent forms of theosophy, not very unlike each other, the Hellenistic—or Jewish Greek—the Neo-Platonic, and the Neo-Pythagorean.

In this theosophic development, which became general, extended, and protracted, the Greek method, which had been predominantly cosmic, psychological, and ethical, came in contact with orientalism, in which the whole movement of the world rests back on deity, and successive developments from its immeasurable depths. Thus, in Brahmanism, a series of emanations of the earth-soul gives us conscious Brahma, the gods, men in castes, and the animals. The world is not built up by material laws and elements from lower to higher, but is unfolded from inscru-

table supersensuous terms in which the higher precedes the lower and yields it. The idea of emanation, so constantly present to oriental speculation, is more applicable to intellectual than to physical relations. The mind proceeds in it from the general to the particular, from the vague to the definite, from images to realities. There are no clearly defined terms within experience which, under this notion, can be made the norm of thought, and hold the mind back from mysticism, and the vague, changeable images of a sublimated imagination. It is a conception especially unfit for any of the purposes of knowledge.

While emanation has the advantage of drawing the attention to a supreme power, pushing its way everywhere in creation, it has the very grave disadvantage of obscuring and confounding all the processes of development. It offers no definite, tangible method under which they proceed. Evolution gives us a distinct, well-defined movement, whose coherent steps are sustained by experience and interpret it; but as an ultimate explanation it labors under the difficulty of inadequate, vanishing first terms. It has mechanism, but not mind; motion, but no propelling power. Emanation leads the mind away from all close thought and definite inquiry, and leaves it thoroughly subjected to its own dreamy and vagrant images. The theosophy which grew out of Greek philosophy, influenced by oriental modes of thought, widely diffused in the earlier years of the Christian era, was one in which the unsearchable character of the ultimate, divine element was united in belief with secondary manifestations and subordinate revelations of God. It was the unfolding of deity, rather than the development of the world, that drew attention. The theme was infinitely beyond the reach of profitable inquiry. The opening of the Gospel

of St. John shows a trace of theosophy: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

This theosophic tendency came forward independently of Christianity. Christianity was brought into warm conflict with it, and was very considerably modified by it. The two were concurrent, yet hostile, movements. Greek philosophy ripened—or at least progressed—into theosophy. In its highest form, in the Platonic period, it renewed itself in the teachings of Socrates by virtue of a distinctly moral impulse. It rejected the evasive methods of the Sophists in behalf of conviction, conduct, character. The most positive and controlling belief to which it gave rise, that of Stoicism, was preëminently full of moral vigor. But ethical truth easily affiliates with religious faith, interests the mind in the spiritual government of the world and in immortality. There was a spiritual temper in Platonism which readily carried the thoughts forward to theosophy, as holding the cardinal truths of being. The vague and mystical element involved in the Platonic doctrine of ideas easily prepared the way for emanation, and an obscure dependence of all forms of intermediate manifestation on the Ultimate Good. Indeed, this relation of God as the Ultimate Good to all other ideas had been, in Platonism, a ground of difficulty and doubt. The conception of the Good tended to assume so abstract a character as at once to include and exclude all particulars. It afforded the stuff from which a plausible process of emanation could take its rise.

The Platonic estimate of matter as bringing limitation and weakness to all forms of being into which it entered, the slight valuation of empirical knowledge which accompanied this opinion, and the strong assertion of a higher

insight of reason, all helped to open the way to a theosophy in which visible things were far removed from those unsearchable truths attained only in an ecstasy of revelation. There was much in the Platonic mode of thought which made it receptive of oriental ideas, and carried it forward into a faith more sober, indeed, than the beliefs of the East, but allied to them in its supersensuous and unverifiable character.

The Pythagoreans, in the mystical importance which they attached to number, in their ascetic and spiritualistic temper, and in their doctrine of metempsychosis, were open to the same prevailing movement. They could hardly escape this inroad of speculation on the highest themes.

Theosophy, in its Hellenistic form, found full expression in Philo (25 B. C.), who taught in Alexandria. God is apprehensible only by reason. He transcends all forms of perfection, even virtue itself. He is universal being, absolute and free. He stands in no contact with matter. The Logos intervenes between God and the world. The divine element, which is disclosed in creation, is the Logos. There are many other intermediate and inferior spirits, who carry forward the movement of the world. They are parts of the Logos, as subordinate ideas are included in a more general idea. The most general idea is the Logos. The Logos springs from God by genesis. He is the first begotten.

The Logos, wisdom, vacillates, in the system of Philo, between an abstraction, affiliated with the Platonic idea, and a person. Higher religious truths are apprehended only under the exaltation of spiritual ecstasy. This, of course, cuts them off from contradiction and criticism, and of itself tends to provoke excess.

This theory gives one of the many examples of a favorite method in philosophy, the introduction of a middle term between two irreconcilable extremes; in this case, between an infinite and perfect spirit and the finite and imperfect products of the material world. Matter cannot fail to mar whatever it enters into; there can, therefore, be no contact between it and the Supreme Being. The difficulty attendant on the union must be subdivided before it can be overcome.

While the language of St. John shows sympathetic touch with the Hellenistic philosophy, there is no close affinity between the revelation of God in Christ and the Logos of Philo. The conception of Christ as a second person in the Trinity, begotten of the Father, approaches more nearly that of the Logos. Yet the notion of an incarnation, a definite revelation of God in human form, is one akin to the philosophy of Philo. It is not in the conception of the apostles, so much as in that of the later theologians, that we find the points of contact between the two systems.

Christianity was brought, in the earlier centuries, in very close connection with this assertion of the remoteness of God from the knowledge of men, and of creation and revelation through intermediate agents. Gnosticism, which came forward persistently in many forms, was a crude religious philosophy, which endeavored to harmonize Christianity with Hellenistic beliefs. A series of emanations from the Divine Being, æons, made up the heavenly hierarchy, and stood between the Supreme Father and the world. The God of the Old Testament and Christ were æons taking part in the redemption of the world. The Gnostic thus strove to retain the perfect and immutable character of one Supreme Being, in spite of the deficiency

and failure in the world. These found entrance through agents subordinate in power, wisdom, and goodness. Men have experienced, because of the obvious conflict of elements in the world about them, great difficulty in finding their way to a sense of comprehensive unity. Whether it has been, as with Plato, the limitations of matter that have trammelled spiritual development; or, as with Mani, the antagonism of two distinct powers, light and darkness; or, as with the Christian theologians, the struggle in the soul of men between the holy and the unholy, the thoughts of men have not been able, by virtue of the processes of growth, to rise to the union of all elements in the Creative Mind, but have sunk into the strife and obscurity of the facts before them.

The most marked direction in which the growing theosophy affected Christianity was in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. The revelation of God in Christ and in the Holy Spirit gave play to that philosophy of the divine nature which had gained so strong a hold on the Greek mind. The Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, might readily have been accepted as a designation of a special form of divine action, but the physical presence of Christ in the world carried the theologian forward into a more curious, critical, and speculative construction of the nature of God, one that should run more nearly parallel with existing forms of thought. The Nicene Creed, in its later form, gives this statement of the belief of the Church: "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things, both visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ; the Son of God, begotten of the Father, light of light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made. . . . We believe in the Holy Ghost,

the Lord and Giver of life, who proceeded from the Father and the Son. . . ." This confession is as remarkable for its divergence from Hellenistic theosophy as for its concurrence with it. The Son is inseparably united with the Father in being and attributes. So far the subordinate relation and service of the Logos are set aside. But the notions of genesis and procreation, so vague and mystical, were laid hold of as a means of preserving the distinction of persons, and giving them a living interdependence. The symbol is more admirable in its opposition than in its concession, in its gathering all things into the mind of God than in its fanciful separation of them in the persons of the Trinity.

§ 2. Apollonius of Tyana, who lived in the time of Nero, may stand as a representative of the Neo-Pythagoreans. They exerted much less influence than the Neo-Platonists. They shared the aloofness which had belonged to the disciples of Pythagoras. Apollonius became the subject of an idealizing and imaginative narrative that quite transformed his history and character.

Theosophy offers itself in a form so much more vigorous in the doctrines of the Neo-Platonists, that we pass at once to these, its leading representatives. Plotinus (204 A. D.), who taught at Rome, affirmed in the most absolute way the transcendent character of God. He is elevated above all cognition. The first product of the One is Nous, the divine reason. The Nous includes, as its constituent terms, the ideas. From the Nous springs the soul, and from the soul come all material forms. There is a plurality of souls, but the highest of all is the world-soul. The soul contains the body. The Nous contains the soul. The One contains the Nous. We have thus, under a notion applicable to intellectual relations,

the procession of all things from the Absolute, the inclusion of all things in the Absolute. Man has sunk into the sensuous terms which surround him. Virtue is a return to God, and this is attained by ecstatic elevation. A rational apprehension of ideas is a transitional term in the process. Matter, though possessed of no real being, though only an indeterminate element that waits to receive form from the soul, is an evil and a limitation.

The philosophy of Plotinus rests back on that of Plato, but differs from it in exalting the One above all ideas; in making the Divine Reason, the Logos, the first step in a spiritual unfolding, and in giving the ideas a distinct existence in that Reason. The system, therefore, as offered by Plotinus, is a more consistent, thoroughly elaborated scheme of emanations by which the One, the Ineffable, the Spiritual, unfolds itself, first in intellectual, and later in sensuous, terms. Ascent is retreat along this same line of advance. The notions which receive new emphasis are the inapprehensible nature of God, and the ecstasy by which we are made partakers in it. The physical world, aside from mind, is only darkness, an empty and barren possibility. The fascinating force of the philosophy lies in its first term, the One. The mind is elevated and stimulated by a conception of the world which derives all things from so inexhaustible a Centre. It accepts a mysticism which turns it aside from experience, and obscures the movements of thought, because of its delight in this transcendent Origin. The mind rejoices in this ecstatic attitude, and denies itself the satisfaction of comprehension that it may itself be comprehended in that so far beyond it. There is hardly a more striking proof possible of the aspiration of the human mind than the eagerness with which it travels any path with an upward

trend, even though its steps are effaced as soon as made. With the enthusiasm of the mountaineer, it pushes upward through blinding and drifting snow. The pressing back, by ecstasy, into the Inapprehensible is regarded as the apotheosis of reason, when in truth it is the suicide of reason. We owe this philosophy two things, the magnifying of reason as the one only constructive term, and the carrying the conception of God above all anthropomorphic expression. It is better utterly to transcend measurements than to tarry stolidly within them. These two elements in the notion of God, the apprehensible and the inapprehensible, will always contend with each other for the mastery. The loss of either unbalances the idea, and robs it in part of its true service.

Porphyry, a disciple of Plotinus, was a vigorous opponent of Christianity. The rising of the soul by self-denial, the separation of it from its own base desires, and a cognition of God, were with him the true salvation. The divinity of Christ was emphatically foolishness to the Greek, trained in the school of Plato. It was making the top touch the bottom, to its own infinite loss. We are to climb upward as best we may, but for that which is above to descend to us is to ruin all; we are not to go forward with God, but to grope our way backward to him. The sympathetic circle in which all things touch each other is slow to reveal itself to men. They have affirmed a remoteness of one thing from another, of matter from mind, of man from God, of the finite from the infinite, most untrue to the facts—ever sweeping on in vortices of intercommunicable thoughts and interchangeable forces. It is what we may term the growing limits of the world, and not its dead centre, lapsed with the lapse of time, that hold all truth, light, and love, all physical, human,

and divine things in instant fellowship. When God comes nearest us in Christ, he most of all transcends us. A moral revelation lies in obliterating spaces, as much as does a physical revelation in establishing them. The spiritually near and remote are akin to each other. When we are so close in spirit as to see, we are able to measure and magnify distances. The Christian system is an empirical, and so a real and distinct, presentation of the wisdom and grace of God. We never truly find these attributes till we find them in things.

Proclus (411), who taught at Athens, systematized the entire body of Neo-Platonic doctrines. He was the latest of its masters. The school at Athens was closed by Justinian, in 529. Greek philosophy slowly and obscurely dissolved into the intellectual soil and helped, henceforth, to fertilize the wide and arid fields of mediæval speculation. By descent and by revival it has come down to our own time, steadily influential in the world of thought. Though nothing of moment is lost in intellectual progress, its methods are discontinuous and wasteful. We do not collectively attain the highways of knowledge, till many minds, at distant periods, have travelled over them, and repeated wanderings have exhausted the terms of error. In the history of philosophy, the liberty of the individual counts for more than the march of the host. Men fall into line, not as a flock which is driven, but as one which is called, and heeds the call reluctantly and hesitatingly. The truths of Platonism and Neo-Platonism have slowly been taken up again, one by one, as later growth was able to assimilate them.

§ 3. This last movement in Greek philosophy was, in a very important sense, a culminating one, and one which has most helped the growth of philosophy. The ultimate

problem of all speculative thought, whether we solve it on the positive or the negative side, is the origin of things. We settle by it not only what is supreme and what is subordinate in the flow of events, but we determine the nature of the leading forces which take part in development. The end, purpose, and movement of the world are thereby laid open to us. This assertion is equally true, whatever may be the beliefs accepted by us. If the full stream of power, which stretches everywhere about us, and in which we are borne forward, is made to flow from a region wholly undefined by thought, the darkness and mystery of this origin go with it in all its course. If it arises in an arid, shapeless realm of physical forces, bereft of all design, barren of all purpose, it gains no human fellowship as it slowly flows forward in the beauty of creation and the accumulating consolations of life. If it takes its beginning in the divine mind, it carries with it everywhere the cheerfulness of the divine presence and the music of the divine love.

The theosophy of this period accomplished its chief purpose, performed its best service, in breaking through the narrow, anthropomorphic forms of thought and feeling which accompanied polytheism, and in reaching backward and upward to an immeasurable Source of all things, who bore, at least to the feelings of men, the force of a personal being. It was inevitable that, in casting off the gross limitations which had so long oppressed the notion of divinity, vagueness and uncertainty should overtake the new conception. In making this great gain, some things were lost. A being strictly unknown, actually beyond all predicates, can serve no purpose in philosophy, give no guidance to thought, or strength to faith. These extreme statements are accepted simply because the

mind is wiser than it seems to be, and discounts its own assertions for the practical uses of life. The very impulse which leads to the acceptance of such an Infinite One implies a profound relation of Deity to the relative and the finite, which are thus made to lead up to him. If he were what he is affirmed to be, he would lie wholly outside of things and thoughts, and bring to them no explanatory term whatever. The whole movement of mind under which such a conception was reached would be illogical and abortive. All the purposes of philosophy, which push us onward toward God, demand that he shall be, when we attain the conception, something other than the Unknown.

We must be able to return from this effort of exaltation to one of expansion and comprehension. The infinite must embrace the finite, eternity hold each moment of time; the absolute must include and define the causal relations of the world, not exclude them, otherwise we have gained nothing. The problem is left precisely as we found it. Moreover, magnitude cannot sustain its majesty on any other terms than those of definition in endless spaces and measureless surfaces. The infinite collapses if it holds nothing, the large and the little touch each other, and complete each other in God. It is more nearly true to say that an inexhaustible number of things can be affirmed of God, than that nothing can be affirmed of him. The one pregnant idea which expounds the Universe stands of necessity in innumerable relations with it. The safety of our thought lies in the fact that in all our certainty, all our overflowing affirmations, we allow ourselves no close, hard limits beyond which there is nothing. How much we understand of the energies enclosed in that enveloping ocean, the atmosphere; yet

in how many ways it transcends us, and maintains its own mystery.

The theosophy of Plotinus added distinctness and elevation to the philosophy of Plato. It moved the thoughts of men profoundly and reverently and worshipfully, yet it, in its turn, needed a far closer and more loving contact with the social, moral problem of the world that chiefly calls for faith in God, and chiefly defines it. It needed to feel his omnipresence, and be made a partaker in his spiritual life. The wealth of the divine life is not left behind us. That which comes from it contains it, reveals it. Abiding with this eternal revelation, this light which is light, we walk with him in growing apprehension. We must not cut off God from the light, any more than we cut off the light from God. If the past needs him, not less does the present need him; if he is the beginning, equally is he the unfolding, of all things. Intermediates, that shut him from the eye, are, one and all, an obstruction to vision and a fresh confusion of thought, inadequate sources of inadequate things. The analysis which brings clearness to philosophy, at this point, must pertain to the exact purpose in spiritual life subserved by the divine presence.

§ 4. The second dogma of the Neo-Platonic philosophy was that of ecstasy, the cognition of God by a mystical exaltation of the mind. There is here also a kernel of truth of utmost moment, which men are always recognizing, yet failing fully to attain. They easily surrender the effort of definition, as if definition in this high, rare, changeable region involved a kind of folly. The term, in religious belief, which is least measured, and can never be excluded by ordinary forms of thought, is that which is expressed as faith. Faith, in its more rapt forms,

is allied to ecstasy. The substantial quality in faith, that which shows it truly amenable to reason, is that, in common with all the higher forms of spiritual apprehension, it is suffused with feeling, as light is with color. The two, light and color, are inseparable in the revelation of the world; if we miss the color, we miss a part of the disclosure, and the defect may extend even to the tangible elements of form and position. Spiritual truth deals with spiritual feelings as certainly as with spiritual thoughts. These are the terms in which its values are expressed. Not, therefore, to feel—to feel broadly and keenly and constantly—the spiritual conditions of spiritual life, is not to understand that life, is a flat failure in spiritual cognition. Knowing, in this region, is a variable of feeling, and the depth, delicacy, and justness of feeling are the penetration and illuminating power of thought. Hence it is easy to say, and in a degree just to say, that ecstasy is the measure of insight. Better is it to understand that reason, in all its manifestations, is not cold and colorless, but, like morning light, palpitating with heat and passing everywhere into variable tints under the touch of living things. This mutability is reason; the feeling which is born of reason is its own lawful progeny, and carries with it to successive generations the true genetic power. The affirmation of ecstasy, mystical and obscure as it too often is in its practical application, is the recognition of unity in the emotional response of the mind of man with the mind of God. One thing is better than it, the recognition that every step of this process may be, ought to be, rationally sound; that reason is entitled to these first discriminating terms of feeling as certainly as to the conclusions which can be drawn from them.

§ 5. A purpose in theosophy of hardly less moment

than that of the exaltation of the idea of God was a protection in thought of his purity from the frailty and defilement of the world. The Platonic conception of matter was very extended in its influence, and yet it was one peculiarly vague, calling for correction by a better knowledge of things. The sensuous impression of a dull, characterless substratum in matter, which is an insufficient medium of active quality, is one which the mind is quick to form, and slow to yield. This substratum was reduced to its lowest terms by Plato, as mere potentiality—terms so low that they admitted of no intelligible empirical statement, and yet were present to exert a very important philosophical influence. Potentiality must involve in clear thought some substantial quality; matter, therefore, that is mere potentiality ceases to exist altogether. But if matter is not real, as Plotinus affirms, it can play no part among real things. The limitations of the physical world cannot be referred to an abstraction. In the Platonic system the sensuous element remains to do a service which its intellectual terms do not allow it to perform. It is kept as an apology for defects which, after all, are not traceable to it. Matter must have positive, independent being, substance and attribute, before it can be made the source of the alleged failures in the constructive idea of the world. For purposes of knowledge it quite disappears in the Platonic philosophy; for purposes of ethical explanation it is a constant and malign presence.

Empirical inquiry has done much in helping us to define the precise position of matter, and in enabling us to reduce it to its fundamental terms in cosmogony. If we distinguish between forces and energies, as the one expressed in the properties of elements, and the other in

the interplay between elements, matter is made up of distinct groups of forces wholly definite in kind, and thoroughly constructive in their relations to each other. There is, therefore, no opportunity to distinguish between formative forces and a passive material by means of which and upon which they express themselves. The form lies in the primitive force. The substance is not here and the force there, the sensuous limits on this side and the shaping powers on that. We do not reach a tangible something by the union of two intangibles. The force creates, defines, constitutes its own conditions precisely as a thought its conditions. A thought is a thought through and through, and that only; a force is a force through and through, and that only. Its conditions, so far as they pertain to itself, are involved in its own being, are the form of that being.

Hence the divine element in matter is all the element there present. There is no substratum, no passive medium, no stuff, no potentiality that puts restraint upon physical forces, or limits pure spirit at work in the construction of a physical universe. This is not denying the distinct nature of matter, the ever-distinguishable activities which we term physical; it is only denying that there are any antecedent terms to the material world, putting restraint upon it when it begins to come forward as a definite structure. The world is not made of stuff, it is made of ideas, given that permanent, self-contained expression which we term matter. We have no reason, under our growing knowledge of the material world, to affirm that there are any antecedent conditions of any sort alien to mind, and which put upon its intelligent activity modifications of any kind whatever. When we have the elements we have the whole thing. These are either wholly

products of mind or wholly independent of mind. They give no indication of being an admixture of conflicting constituents. A notion of this sort is derived from the relation of our own spirits, finite spirits, to the world—a world that exists antecedently to us, independently of us, and with constant restraint upon us.

There is, then, no opportunity to explain the evil of the world by the refractory material of which it is composed, or by any forces whatever which resist the divine hand. All such conceptions are in derogation of that very infinity, that complete potentiality, which stand represented to us in God, and which are the justifying grounds of the conception. Finite beings must be established empirically, the Infinite Being rationally. The limits of the Absolute, and the Absolute in expression is limited, come from within and not from without. Our notion of the Absolute, guided in its construction both by the coherence of ideas and by our knowledge of the concrete facts of the world, should be that comprehensive form of being which has no external conditions, and institutes laws, relations, limits, within itself for its own activity. The only question is whether such a form of being, such a supreme unity, is best found in matter or in mind? Which term can best embrace the other?

We must, then, under the notion of theism, seek some other explanation of the evils of the world than this of the want of pliancy in matter. Matter is absolutely and wholly penetrable by the Divine Mind. The simplicity of matter is as complete as that of mind. All reason and all experience lead to this conclusion. We must, in restoring the omniscience of God, find the solution of the problem of evil—for defect in its highest form is ethical, not physical—in the divine thought, and not beyond

it. Development, growth, a spiritual creation, involve, as a process of revelation, a passage from the less to the greater, from the partial to the more perfect, from comparative darkness into more complete light, and the rapidity of this passage fittingly turns not on the power of the Infinite Mind who unfolds the truth, but on the power of our minds which receive it. It is because the Divine Life, in its progress, enfolds our lives, that its procedure seems so slow and defective, yet in and by this very fact it is spiritually more perfect than it otherwise would be. We must see the beauty of the flower in connection with the crass soil out of which it grows and the coarse integuments which enclose it. The deficiencies and the excellences are interpreted together. They are parts of one thing. We cannot understand the ways of God to man except in the apprehension of both man and God, and the growth of man in God. It is growth, motion upward, that expounds the depths below us and the heights above us. Growth, as a rational conception and one of supreme exaltation, cannot be handled otherwise than through and by terms identical in kind with those which enclose us. Deficiencies in the movement toward perfection have no other significance than shadows in the breaking of day. The question of degree is a variable one of no profound significance. The one hope, the one elation, is, the light cometh.

We may, if we choose, puzzle ourselves with the precise form and measure of these conditions of growth,—growth itself best clears up these difficulties—but their general character and necessity are involved in growth itself, the dynamical force and fulness of the spiritual world. Growth, like the earth in its orbit, carries all things with it. The Neo-Platonist needed to draw near to

God as a living agent, and so to draw off from matter as an obstructive medium. The spiritual world, in its magnificent sweep and resplendent orbit, is not to be delayed or ultimately wound up by the slow retardation of a remainder of matter interpenetrating all spaces, and from which there is no escape. Intellectual and physical analysis alike lead us to a pure spiritual medium, in which the divine purpose moves freely to its accomplishment. Matter is as vital as mind, and both are vital with constructive thought, with energies that stand revealed and expounded in universal light. There will, of course, be many difficulties and much delay on our part in making out the details of this movement, but the movement itself fills and satisfies the spirit. It is this satisfaction alone which turns all observation into insight; all weariness into the assured sense of victory.

PART II.

MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. There is no transition in human history more instructive than that from Greek and Roman civilization to mediæval development. The period of transfer is protracted and the change radical. Yet the later growth took place on the same soil as the earlier, and felt in many ways its stimulating effects. The decay of the previous civilization had enriched the ground from which the later civilization derived its strength. The decline, on the one hand, was protracted and complete, and the reconstruction, on the other, slow and ample. We have in this bold transition a transcript of the causes which pull down and build up society. Greek and Roman development, taken together, combined many elements both of beauty and strength in art, in philosophy, in civic construction, and in social life. By its amplitude, depth, and vigor, by the new phases of power which it so readily manifested in its transfer from Greece to Italy, it gave promise of continuous growth. Yet its overthrow was absolute, with a decay from within that ate away all foundations, and a violence from without that swept away the entire superstructure. The longer the disaster was delayed, as in the Eastern Empire, the more complete was it in the end. There was no power of salvation or reconstruction in the old forms of life.

This decline was moral, social, and physical. The moral failure was foremost, and gave occasion to the loss of social and physical strength. Stoicism owed its sternness in part to the fact that it was reactionary against the looseness and lasciviousness prevailing about it. The agility of the Greek and the endurance of the Roman, each so extraordinary in its way and so magnified by great achievement, perished under a slow loss of the bonds of social life. This decay was not so much a decay of philosophy as of religion; not of the insight and convictions of the few so much as of faith and custom, potent with the many. The overthrow was one of the people. Individuals here and there attained an elevation of thought and purity of character unsurpassed in any previous period. Plotinus gave the Platonic philosophy profound expression, and Antoninus attained a beauty and symmetry of moral development which still remain a study and a delight. But this isolated vigor did not suffice to check retrogression in popular character, and the fortunes of the people are the fortunes of civilization. Christianity is so distinguished a force in progress because it addresses itself to the common weal. While the immediate occasion of the overthrow was the inroads of the barbarians, civilization lost its balance in the presence of barbarism because it had already missed its way in its own growth. It is perfectly plain that very advanced forms of development, in passing over to yet higher social construction, may miscarry and be thrown back on to those primitive conditions in which physical force predominates.

The philosophy of Greece was not, a single potent syllable of it, lost in this transition. As soon as the conditions of inquiry returned, these speculations of the

older world came with them, to make more rapid the stages of growth. The conclusions of the past, though buried in the *débris* of ruined institutions, were not hidden so deep but that the roots of the new life reached them as soon, or nearly as soon, as it could make use of them. The philosophy of the past was saved by an intellectual transmission, and did its work in due time under the abiding affinities of thought.

§ 2. The same assertions are true, though in a less degree, of the art and the law of Greece and Rome. The accidents of life are more potent with these than with philosophy, and hence the renaissance, though very real and very full, was attended with a sense of loss as well as of gain. Yet art so readily overshadows art, and law represses the development of law, that the later life of Europe owes much, in its free and fresh unfolding, to the thickness of the stratum that buried the past out of sight. Its Gothic architecture and common law both sprang up in regions relatively remote from the older civilization.

It was essentially a new life, under new impulses, that instituted mediæval development, and brought it forward to its union with modern times. The physical basis of it was the German tribes of the north, and the moral basis was Christianity. Christianity came forward in direct antagonism to the irreligion, superstition, and vice which were enfeebling the old world—a world that had grown old in its youth—and preparing the way for its collapse. This antagonism partially isolated the new faith, and helped it to maintain its purity. If it had conquered the empire more quickly or more completely, it would, in turn, have been more wholly subjected by it. Its decay came with its successes. Sharing the disasters of the empire, it yet had strength enough to survive them, and

in a more pure and independent development it became the germ, social and spiritual, of coming events.

The philosophy of the Middle Ages was almost wholly theological speculation. Theology ruled philosophy, and theology rested on the revelation and traditions of the past. This was a relation unfavorable for philosophy, yet it may have readily been historically fortunate. When truth has a trembling and inadequate hold on the general mind, when it confronts not so much speculation as passion, the dogmatic temper is the very instinct of self-preservation. In difficult times, when the building is in danger of falling, men buttress it up rather than inquire too curiously into its foundations. To hold forth the truth and to propagate it was a task quite sufficient to employ all the strength of the mediæval saint. In times of ignorance and overthrow, doubt is far more distressing and disastrous than in periods of cultivation and prosperity. Not till the building impulse is strong, can we entertain the disposition to pull down. While, as a phase of philosophy, mediæval inquiry may not seem to yield very much, it was, none the less, busy in deepening those convictions on which all truth rests. Without falling into fatalism, we do well to remember that, in a general way, development in any given period fits itself to the circumstances which enclose it. The philosophy of history, the growth of society, lie between two antagonistic assertions. Things are as they ought to be. Nothing is as it ought to be. Within themselves, things shape themselves to themselves; in reference to things beyond, they call for constant modification. Favoring conditions support that very individual effort which aims at reformation. A totality of wrong and a totality of right are equally impossible. Men, in the period under consideration, were far better

able to conform philosophy to theology than theology to philosophy, life to the practical experience and the wavering convictions already gained, than to a new and obscure exposition of duty. We have occasion, in discussing the philosophy of the Middle Ages, as it was the philosophy of theologians, to glance at the line of development in the Christian Church.

CHAPTER I.

THE PATRISTIC PERIOD.

§ 1. The thing accomplished in the world's progress by Judaism was the acquisition, in a comparatively pure form, as far as power and spirituality were concerned, of the belief in one supreme God. This notion was, for the first time, grafted on to national life ; for the first time became popular, communal. Individuals had attained it in different periods and places, but no society had been constructed upon it ; nowhere else had it shown its power to build men together in national strength. It was the prevalence of this spiritual conception of God that prepared the way for the revelation of his grace in Christ. The path of life, as one of loving obedience, was now ready to be opened to the vision of men. A fundamental modification in the conception of the relation of men to God was, with much misinterpretation and many backslidings, brought about. Christ calling out, deepening and directing the affections, became the way, the truth, and the life.

The assertion that moral precepts and flashes of insight into the laws of spiritual being, quite like those of our Lord, are elsewhere found in the history of the race, is sometimes resented as if it involved an infringement on his preëminent revelation. If the work and words of Christ were as detached and absolute as some conceive them to be, they would have lost all efficacy. No purity of their own could have made them successful aside from

a natural basis and historical power. Long discipline had brought men forward to the point of apprehension. Christ gave unity, fulness, living presentation to truths which had appeared again and again at rare intervals, and in fragmentary forms. The revelation was still so large that it tasked all the powers of men to enter sufficiently into it to come under its vital discipline. Again and again they have failed at this very point. What was accomplished by Christ was to give reality, under popular forms of life, to a revelation of love, divine and human; such reality that the conception gained within itself the power of growth, was planted in the soil of the affections.

The social facts of the world have never been such as to afford most minds sufficient data from which to reason to the beneficence of God. We must have light before we can analyze it, or trace it to its sources. The spiritual temper of God must reveal itself to and in the spiritual temper of men; and hence the conditions of disclosure have always been scant and unsatisfactory. The day has hardly dawned upon us, and we have not understood the glory of its power and its sweet living peace.

Reality in our relations to God, social construction under brotherly affection, on earth peace and good will, these were the gifts of Christ. They would ultimately lead to speculation and philosophy, but, for the time being, they were very remote from it. Those to whom they were intrusted, and those who received them as living impulses, were plain men, who were thoroughly occupied with the achievement of a quickened and purified life. They offered to the world its best gift, a life pregnant with spiritual truth, germs of growing conviction. It was this preëminently practical temper, this individual development, this search for salvation in society,

this reconstruction of men in a Kingdom of Heaven, that saved Christianity from sinking into the inanities of premature speculation. It was this that enabled it to wage a long and successful strife against Gnosticism, more ingenious in thought than vital in practice. Paul, the most intellectually active of those who propagated the new faith, was corrected and restrained in all his reasoning by a burning and loving zeal for the immediate well-being of men. Theology, in its later history, unwisely extending, and making unduly rigid, the glowing conceptions of Paul, has illustrated the great danger which always attends on a philosophy of faith, running in advance of real development—the danger of mistaking our transient conceptions of ultimate facts for the facts themselves. What the world wanted, what it still wants, was more empirical data from which to reason, a disclosure in the lives of men of the truths under discussion.

The universality of the salvation preached by Christ was a truth so novel and so profound, that while it was forced at once upon the attention of the disciples, it taxed to the utmost their powers of apprehension. Once accepted, it became a strong defence against the narrowing force of speculation. The incipient faith was saved not only from the rigidity of Judaism, but from every variety of misleading dogma, in its contact with diverse communities. Catholicity was its first contention. The church universal could not become local, and so lose its inheritance of truth. The persecution which it encountered helped also to hold it fast in this region of practical life. The repression it suffered was one which nothing but love could overcome, or enable men to bear. There was a large amount of comparatively sound philosophy current in the Greek and Roman world that prepared the

way for new forms of thought, but this philosophy had achieved very little in social, organic expression ; and it had, therefore, but slight bearing on the propagation of a faith which was one of a transformed and purified life. This philosophy simply gave to individuals, like particles of steel under electric currents, a little quicker disposition to feel and to obey the new power.

§ 2. The earlier church was occupied with the dissemination of a faith whose chief expression was practical ; and only partially with its theoretic defence. It found itself in too close contact with hard conditions to spend its strength in a speculative unfolding of its own beliefs, or in an effort to harmonize them with the beliefs of others. It accepted the facts of conflict and reconstruction, and gave its strength to them. When, at the opening of the fourth century, in connection with the difficult doctrine of the Trinity, the church entered on the task of sharp discrimination, it suffered not a little in temper, mingled with its statements notions alien to its own revelation, and pushed the definitions of doctrine in advance of clear thought and living experience.

Perhaps the best example of an enlargement of Christian thought by Greek philosophy, without drawing it aside from its own direction, or vitiating it, is found in the church in Alexandria, more especially in Clement and Origen. Yet their conceptions of the character and methods of God, just and liberal as they were, suffered this disadvantage, that they fed the speculative and divisive, rather than the practical and unifying, temper, and, instead of winning the liberty of the individual, called out the bitter and distracting cry of heresy.

Our summation is simply this. The Patristic period was one chiefly occupied with social, spiritual facts, and

so far was much in advance of mere speculation. It was fortunate that philosophy was so long held in check, as the inner life on which it was to proceed was not yet strong enough, the perverting external conditions were too strong, to render its conclusions sound and invigorating. Inevitable and desirable as philosophy is, it is always to be dreaded for the dogmatic cast it is liable to assume, and for the bonds it thus puts afresh on the living processes it itself holds. Philosophy must rest loosely on the mind, if there is to be continuous growth; and as long as there is growth, its data are constantly changing. The world has occasion to be devoutly thankful for that primitive period of simple spiritual prosperity which enabled it to pass through, without fatal loss, the thorny and perplexed paths of theology.

The Eastern church became more immediately barren, occupied with idle lines of speculation, than the Western church. The theosophy of Neo-Platonism opening up vague, impractical inquiries, for which the mind has no sufficient data, was present with it in the many nice and narrow subdivisions of faith into which it fell on the doctrine of the Trinity. No conception is less capable of final definition, or needs to be kept more open and free, than that of God. It is to our thoughts what the overhanging canopy of the heavens is to the atmospheric phenomena that hide it, illuminate it, reveal it, and sink infinitely below it. Construction and definition here become constriction and death. The futile speculation of the Eastern church was the evaporation of thought, and the affections perished under the chilling process. A lifeless theology spread, like a brazen heaven over a barren earth, and extinguished a life it was intended to nourish.

The Western church took but little part in the debate.

Its inheritance of doctrinal discussion came to it through St. Augustine rather than Athanasius. The questions which interested it pertained to the nature of man and the government of God, bore more immediately on practical morality, and filled the mind with the present issues of life. After the long and troubled sleep of the Dark Ages, mediæval philosophy returned in the Latin church—occupied in the intervening period in defending Christianity and propagating it among barbarous tribes—to a series of inquiries which were intended to define the relations and duties of man, and the enveloping spiritual conditions within which he is contained.

Large life is built by many forces. Wise speculation is only one among them. The Greek church manifested a more comprehensive, more subtle, more searching spirit of inquiry than the Latin church. Yet this fact did little to check its steady decline. The Latin church laid hold of customs and traditions, deepened and extended them, and so built up institutions to which a great future was to be given. "Away with the man who is ever seeking," never finding, became the spirit of its movement. As men needed unity, safe conditions of social life, this narrow temper was fit to the occasion. The great leader and doctrinal expositor of its early history, St. Augustine, was a man of an intense, dogmatic, and narrow mind. Individual freedom went for little with him. He was prepared to build a church on unconcessive, unflinching doctrine. He had in his own convictions the material of an immediate and definite construction. His work, deeply at fault as it was within itself, was in keeping with the occasion. The creed he had to offer could yield support to powerful ecclesiasticism, and ecclesiasticism was the want of a period ready to dissolve into the shreds of barbarism.

CHAPTER II.

THEMES OF DISCUSSION IN MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. Three closely allied questions especially occupied mediæval philosophy: the nature of God, the nature of man, the government of God. They were discussed in their theological bearings. The dogmatic uses of thought overshadowed its speculative relations. These questions were practical ones, not only because religious faith was a great social interest, but because these conceptions controlled the pursuits of the best men of the time, and were effective in shaping conduct and character. The three points are closely interdependent, and the elevation and scope of action turn upon them. Impossible as it is to make an exhaustive statement of any one of them, we can discuss no one of them without being led to the consideration of all three; and no other discussion will so lay down for us the circuit of motives as this. It is wholly in vain that men protest against it as beyond the range of knowledge. The very mystery that clings to these topics enhances our interest in them. The elasticity and freedom of life lie in this direction, and here they are sought by all large spirits. Those who forbid entrance are compelled, generation after generation, to renew their denial with protestations based upon a new set of reasons.

Nor are there any questions propounded to us more frequently by the circumstances in which we are, nor any

on which new light is more constantly cast in the inner experience of earnest, ethical minds. We cannot rise into the highest realm of action, the relation of man to man, the relation of the present to the future, without being led to seek the clews of conduct in a better understanding of our own nature, of the immediate spiritual conditions in which we are enclosed, of the ultimate purpose or ultimate drift of that creative or evolutionary movement of which we form a part.

The one central impulse which governed the minds of men in this period, in the consideration of these questions, was their relation to Christianity. Practical faith had been kept alive by extended missionary work; it had moulded and was still moulding dogmatic expression under its own living power. That which sustained discussion was not so much speculative interest as a desire for doctrines that should express and support a faith that was being built up, in the Latin church, into a very broad, and, in spite of severe drawbacks, into a very beneficent power.

There came in, to modify the beliefs which Christianity had reached along its own line of revelation and in its protracted labors for the renovation of society, the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato. Conceptions due to these great minds had permeated all philosophic speculation, and more or less penetrated the church in its several stages of progress. Nor had the decay of knowledge and the hard pressure of disastrous times, though they served to reduce the influence of pure philosophy, by any means destroyed it. Doubtless, Christianity owed to these conditions the power to maintain its practical energy, and so the power to defend itself against speculations alien to its own temper; but the intellectual atmosphere in which it

unfolded was Aristotelian and Platonic, and its conceptions were called on to adjust themselves to these best and most vigorous phases of thought.

These same influences, in the Middle Ages, came indirectly to the Latin church through the beliefs of the Jews and Arabs, who had been profoundly affected by them. The unusual activity of the Arabs in intellectual attainments as well as in conquest made their speculative conclusions influential, in spite of the national prejudices and religious convictions which divided them from western Europe. The Greeks, also, before, and still more after, the fall of Constantinople, renewed their intercourse with the West, and were active in restoring Greek culture. Thus Greek philosophy came a second time, chiefly in its elder form, in distinct contact with Christianity, and that, too, when the sense of collision was greatly reduced. These beliefs, entering slowly by diverse channels, helped to awaken thought, and gave occasion for the readjustment of doctrines. The speculation brought to bear on the three leading questions, though narrow, was extremely subtle, and by manifestly exhausting the terms at its disposal gave occasion to the next period.

§ 2. There was one discussion of a purely philosophical character which came to this period directly from Greek dialectics, and was treated with endless diligence and difference of opinion, that of realism, the relation of the class to the individual. The first occasion for the inquiry arose in connection with the Sophists. Their feats of proof and disproof were chiefly a legerdmain of words, the word reappearing each time under a new and disguised meaning. Definition, therefore, became a first necessity in dispersing these sophistries, and in restoring the coherence of truth. It is general words that require definition,

and hence the inquiry arises: What is it that lies back of a general term, controls our definition, and gives reality to our assertions? This discussion occupied men's thoughts two thousand years, and has not yet entirely disappeared. It affords a good example of the extended interlock of truth. Different conclusions here have arisen from diverse habits of thought, and have led to very diverse systems. The question is one of analysis, in which we settle what are primitive and what are secondary forms of being; and what each contributes to the final result we call knowledge.

In its more simple form this discussion gave rise to three inquiries, whether genera have or have not a substantial existence? If they have a substantial existence, whether it is material or immaterial? Whether it is apart from objects or in them? The first question was answered by Plato and Aristotle alike in the affirmative, and by the nominalists, in the later stages of the discussion, in the negative. The second was answered by Plato; ideas, generic entities, have an immaterial existence; while Aristotle responded, they have a material one. This was the great distinction between the two philosophers. The third question served only to further define this difference. Plato held that ideas exist apart from and prior to individual objects. Aristotle affirmed that they exist in these objects, and are inseparable from them. These three forms of diversity were concisely expressed in the phrases: *Universalia ante rem. Universalia in re. Universalia post rem.* The words, *Universalia post rem*, indicate that the general notion arises simply under the action of the mind, surrounded by specific forms of being.

This discussion followed from the effort to attain well-defined concepts with a certified value, and, according to

the method in which it was settled, gave one or another degree of force to general terms, and to our knowledge under them. If Plato was correct, each of these terms stands for an ultimate and eternal form of being, in its own order creative. While this opinion magnifies, in the highest degree, the certainty of knowledge and the grasp of the mind on the material of knowledge, it involves itself at once, by this very breadth of assertion, in endless difficulties. General terms are so changeable, there are so many cross classifications established for variable and secondary ends, so many more can be instituted any moment for similar purposes, that it seems preposterous to assign permanent being to the vague, erratic, and shifting notions that lie back of words. It is, indeed, astonishing that so many lines of order, so many productive generalizations, can be instituted among things; but it hardly follows that each one of them, overlapping each other in so many ways, stands for a distinct, ultimate form of being. If there were a few permanent genera readily distinguishable from all other forms of being, it would be more possible to give them this rank. Even then they would stand quite too much apart from each other to expound the world in its unity.

The nominalist, on the other hand, was liable so to weaken the concept, to make it such a variable, accidental, and transient combination of impressions as to lead at once to scepticism. If our fundamental notions have no stability, if they are as changeable as the experiences which give rise to them, if they are mere reflections of that experience, then our best assertions concerning them gather no scope, and indicate nothing but momentary relations in the intellectual landscape that is gliding by us. What, how certain, how permanent are the con-

cepts which gather our knowledge into knots and make the network of truth a strong and retentive receptacle of experience, become primary questions in settling the bounds of belief and unbelief.

In determining the meaning of words we strike still deeper, and settle the character of all knowledge. Knowledge either becomes, under this inquiry, fluctuating and relative in all its parts, like shadows, definable only so long as they last, or it has in it absolute lines of order which make it coherent through and through, and give its more variable and more permanent portions a fixed significance in reference to each other and to the coherent ideas that underlie them all. The cross relations we institute from our own particular positions, for our own special ends, arise incidentally, yet with a real meaning in them. Trees that are planted in rows take on at once diagonal relations.

Here we strike hard against the one problem of philosophy: a difference in general terms themselves. There are simple notions, antecedent to all the facts that arise under them, eternally the same, whatever may be the specific forms of those facts, and identical with themselves in every possible presentation of the phenomena subject to them. Such a notion is time. All events involve it, and involve it in the same way. Difficulty—a simple, empirical characteristic of action—is one of infinitely variable forms, does not apply to all actions, and applies in endless degrees and ways. The one notion follows experience—*post rem*; the other precedes it—*ante rem*. If Plato had given to these simple notions, always identical with themselves and precedent to the experience which they expound, an eternal existence in the reason, whose forms they are, he would have attained that fundamental truth of

philosophy which, even in its obscure presence, gave color and force to what he affirmed. The shifting generalizations of experience, held firm in the primary forms of order by these cardinal ideas, are the incidents and accidents of an experience made profoundly valid by the validity of the fundamental movement.

Those, on the other hand, who lay hold of such a generalization of action under experience as this of difficulty, making it the type of all our knowledge, find that they have a concept which is measured by every man differently. There is no absolute difficulty. All difficulties are relative to the means employed, and the person employing them. Our affirmations concerning difficulty change with every change of circumstances, and may never coincide between different persons or different periods. We float on a stream whose experiences are unlike in all degrees, and never repeat themselves.

Yet our knowledge involves uniformity as well as variety. Our notions are in part absolute, and predetermine our experience, and, in part, are variable and derived from our experience. We cannot arrive at the complex intellectual world, in its certainties and its doubts, without a just apprehension of the notions, one and all, under which it is constructed. Knowledge is relative in the measure in which it is dependent on empirical concepts, is absolute in the measure in which it rests on rational ideas. The nature of notions is thus fundamental in all truth. If the mind cannot, in any instance, verify to itself its own ideas, it is, indeed, hopelessly afloat among the changeable terms of experience. If it can do this, it thereby imparts stable relations to all the manifold phenomena of being.

Another truth of much moment involved in this doc-

trine of concepts is that of the nature of genera in natural objects. Are these classes as much extemporized, as much dependent on our immediate purpose or changeable apprehension, as are the nouns, adjectives, verbs, by which, in conversation, we distinguish infinitely variable shades of difference from each other? Do all agreements and disagreements melt back into one undivided mobile mass the moment we lift our speech off them, as much in the one case as in the other? Here we come again on a long, hard battle, not yet ended, over the ultimate nature of genera among living things. Among inorganic things differences are often final, and when there are between them intermediates, these are the results of intermixtures rather than of any changeability in primitive elements. In living things, the discussion tends to the result that genera do stand for at least permanent positions taken along the path of progress, that development does not proceed in indifference to genera. All positions are not alike in their stability. There are points of stable and of unstable equilibrium, and the problem of life must be studied in connection with them both. The development of living things is not like the motion of a sphere indifferent to directions and positions; it is like that of a polygon, which has lines of movement and faces of rest.

Just concepts, which lay hold of permanent distinctions and define them in their true force, are, therefore, supreme results of knowledge in living things. No development whatever weakens this knowledge, any more than marching effaces the camps which an army has occupied, or the positions it has defended. The validity of knowledge, the method of argument, the object of investigation in science, all turn on this question of general terms. It is plain, therefore, that this discussion has stood in the

closest relation to the differences which lie between an empirical and an intuitive mode of inquiry, and to the manner in which the two should be united. Realism favored a rational, idealistic type of philosophy. Special forms owe their significance only to the creative idea which they contain. The universal precedes the particular; and if the mind can trace this development, it has small occasion to dwell on empirical distinctions. Nominalism, on the other hand, affiliated with empiricism. Individual objects are to be studied as the substantial facts of the world. Words simply stand for them, and owe their entire interpretation to them. The particular goes before the general. The general is comprehensible only in connection with it, is the impression left by it on the sensitive, receptive processes of mind. The stability of the general is no other or greater than the stability of the particular. The comprehending process is developed along this one path of empirical determination.

In the progress of scientific inquiry nominalism gained ground. The two justified each other. As science and philosophy fell into opposition, they tended toward adverse conclusions in this discussion of the nature of concepts. Philosophy stood by realism and magnified the relation of the general to the particular, while science struggled for a new method, and directed its first attention to particulars, as holding the secrets of all knowledge.

This slow development of nominalism helped the mind to shake off the inapprehensible and mystical, to make its sensuous knowledge definite, and to put back of it, in their most simple forms, those terms of reason which expound it. Speculation, which, in an imaginative way, assumes its own premises, has nothing to restrain it but

the coherence of the logical process by which they are unfolded, and thus philosophy becomes increasingly vanishing lines of thought, pursued through a thin, impalpable medium of fancy, with no verification beyond themselves, without beginning of days or end of years, so far as the historic progress of events is concerned. Nominalism helped to awaken the mind from the dreams of a logical imagination, to give it definite terms of inquiry in experience, and to attach the thread of its speculative web, at each new stretch, to some real object. Its conclusions were thus no longer loose, waving lines floating in the air, which one might see or not see according to his position.

This question of realism, touching so widely and so profoundly the central points of philosophy, necessarily branched off in many ways, and approached a solution but slowly, with much confusion of thought. It virtually involves the priority of mind or of matter. If material relations are antecedent to mental ones, if both these relations are in continual flux, then the fundamental principle of nominalism is correct. We proceed exclusively from the particular to the general, and the general is only the latest grouping in experience of special qualities and objects. But if mind, as the one universal constructive agent, precedes all physical products, then ideas—the ideas under which the creative mind advances—are fundamental, and alone bring light to events. Realism thus arises from a tendency to magnify mind and the rational conceptions referrible to it. It also serves, in its development, to enhance this tendency.

All the scope and stability of thought are referrible to those antecedent rational notions under which experience arises. These furnish the points and lines of triangula-

tion from which all measurements are made. Without them our generalizations could not transcend our observations. No sense of generality would accompany any uniformity of qualities or actions which might offer themselves to us. It is the notion of causation which makes experience intellectually homogeneous within itself, and extends its truths to the ends of the earth. Uniformities have no footing in the court of reason without it, and must fall back on sensation and habit, without even the power to explain the habit induced by them. Habit presupposes causation. It is a definite form of causation which has induced it.

The fact that we interpret the word so directly under the methods of our own inner experience, that things offer themselves to us, therefore, as active, and that action chiefly interests us, and that our general words, as has been pointed out in mythology, stand for personified forms of action, greatly helps this doctrine of ideas. Plato's philosophy offered it in its most exalted and most extended form, but in a form that can gain no coherence except by a passage into pure idealism. Ideas, then, as logical entities, issue in that logical development which is the unfolding of the intellectual world, the only world of real being. Hegelianism is thus the ultimate result of Platonic realism. The world is a thought process, and progresses through personal consciousness as the arena in which it takes place.

The many implications of this doctrine of concepts are shown in the unfortunate, yet derived, use of words to which it has given occasion. The realism of the intuitionist is the corrected realism of Plato, yet is quite different from it. It asserts, not the reality of ideas as ultimate terms of being, but the reality of matter and mind

as permanent coöperative agents in all phenomena. Later idealism is not the assertion simply of ideas, but the exclusion of those physical phenomena by which those ideas were expressed to Plato and to Aristotle.

Not only did the doctrine of concepts in its many entanglements cover the questions which lie between intuitionists and empiricists; it extended to all those differences which define the nature of ideas, their relation to the mind, and their relation to those sensuous experiences which they enclose. No form of philosophy can escape, either in its connection with other systems or in the construction of its own inner scheme, this inquiry. A solution of so comprehensive a problem is not reached till we are able to define matter and mind, physical qualities and intellectual products, sensations and ideas, in their circle of interdependence—in short, till we have a philosophy. Since, then, this question covers a philosophy, implies a complete analytical penetration of all forms of being, it would be shallow on our part to make light of the endless phases and slight differences under which, through the lengthened centuries, it drew itself along.

§ 3. This inquiry, leading to a more exact measurement of the terms of knowledge, and modifying in many ways the method of thought, has played a most important part in philosophy. We need, therefore, to consider more carefully its secondary phases. We start with the extreme realism of Plato, whose hierarchy of ideas remains unverifiable, and very unmanageable within itself. These entities stand with each other on no terms of interaction and subordination. We are compelled to give them relation, not as realities but as concepts, thought-products. Then comes the softened realism of Aristotle. This, taken in

connection with natural classes, seems a much more simple doctrine, yet it leads to much the same confusion as the theory of Plato, when considered in connection with the loose, changeable generalizations of ordinary speech. Certainly there is no common term of substantial being in the things we call pleasant or disagreeable, base or grand. Even in natural genera, the view fails on careful analysis. The real object—say a horse—belonging to a given class, is individual in every part of it. Take away in succession its specific forms, and there is no remainder in substantial being which we can call its generic force. The generic being is as much a creation of the mind as is the potential statue contained in a block of marble. Generic qualities are affirmed not on the ground of sensuous impressions, but on the ground of intellectual relations between physical qualities. They arise wholly under the ideal notion of likeness.

From realism let us pass at once to extreme nominalism, as expounded by Roscellinus. According to this view we are dealing in general terms with words and things only. The things, in their separate forms, are real. The words by which we designate them are also real, and these two sum up the realities involved in speech. If this analysis were sufficient, we should not be able to distinguish between common and proper nouns. The difference does not lie in the fact that the one noun is applicable to many things and the other to a single thing. John Smith applies, as a designation, to many persons, and may recall any one of them; the name is not, therefore, a common noun. In answering the question, wherein lies the distinction between the common and the individual term? we reach at once the second form of nominalism, conceptualism. It would seem,

however, better to regard it as a distinct theory than as a variety of nominalism. The implications of the two theories are very different. Nominalism seems so very bald in its statement as to make it difficult to understand how, on its own ground, it should find entertainment. It secures it chiefly by its affiliation with extreme empiricism. When a single object—say, a snow-bird—is first seen, the impression it makes is purely specific. If it receives a designation, the word is a proper noun. The sign and the thing signified are all that we have. If like birds are repeatedly seen, the points of agreement are distinguished, and the word becomes a common noun. If, however, the mind is purely receptive in its knowledge, if generic impressions are merely repeated impressions, then we have no new terms of thought in the later as compared with the earlier experience. We have simply an extended association, and our analysis must remain as before—a word, and the objects with which it is connected. The moment, however, we restore to the mind its initiative in knowledge, this statement seems wholly inadequate. A third term is called for—a concept, a recognition of the qualities in which the objects classed together agree. This concept becomes the connecting link between the common noun and the things to which it is applied. There is a relation between these objects, and this relation is indicated by the name.

Occam held this belief, and it seems to us to offer a complete analysis. We have specific objects which have substantial existence. We have words which, as written or spoken, have, for the time being, a sensuous existence. We have a product of mind, an activity of mind,—an activity and a product of mind are identical—which unites these two: the words and the things included in the

classes they designate. The meaning of the word and the agreement of the objects are the same—a mental recognition. This concept has that form of being which belongs to mental acts—is knowledge. There are these three things included in knowledge as contained in general terms: the objects empirically known, the relation between them intellectually known, and this knowledge made definite and manageable by a word, a symbol, whose office it is to designate and retain this connection.

To these four forms of answers two others have been added by combination and modification. Thomas Aquinas accepted all three formulæ: *ante rem*, *in re*, *post rem*. The general idea exists before the particular object, in the creative mind of God. It also exists in essence in the objects which come under it, and as a concept in the minds of men who later unite them in a class. In the first assertion we have not the realism of Plato, but only conceptualism. The relation of time is indifferent in the analysis. In the second assertion, under the notion of essence, we have substantial being assigned to an intellectual relation. We have the realism of Aristotle. If essences and specific attributes exist together, we have double being in one and the same object. Attributes, however, exhaust the object. The relation of attributes is a mental product called out by the attributes themselves. It was objected to nominalism, even under the form of conceptualism, that if there was no common essence uniting individuals in the genus, then, by a parity of reasoning, there was no whole uniting the parts in the individual, say, the man. The parts thus exist separately. Their union becomes solely an act of thought. Substantial coherence is everywhere lost. This seems at first a

formidable objection, but is not so if truly apprehended. In a statue the parts are physically united simply by coherence in space relations. All other union between them, all art union, is a product of thought, and sustained by thought only. In the living man the members are united in space and also in a vital circulation and interplay of offices. Yet the unity of these changeable and complex facts in a man is not something beyond the facts, but the facts themselves as understood by the mind. The unity exists in a living man, as the meaning exists in words. It is the potential power of certain facts over mind, by which they cease to be barren, sensuous impression, and call out rational insight. This notion of essence is another example of a *tertium quid* of which no intelligible use can be made. If it is sensuous, then we have not gotten beyond the separation of the senses; if it is intellectual, then the unity is still referrible solely to the mind. All unity is intellectual in its origin and intellectual in its apprehension.

That which gives color to this objection, in the case of living things, is the recognition of the plastic power we term life. This controls the organic structure, and is the ground of its relations. But this life is no more generic essence than it is specific attributes. We are compelled to accept life not as a physical entity, but as a spiritual power, the ground of spiritual, that is, invisible, relations. Life stands to its phenomena as mind to its phenomena. In neither case are the phenomena physical, though they are expressed through physical things. Meaning always lurks somewhere back of its instruments. Unity of all sorts can only be an intellectual product, and referrible to an intellectual power.

A sixth phase of belief, in connection with concepts, is

relationism. This has been recently urged by Dr. Abbot in his work on scientific theism.

The validity of knowledge turns on the reality of things and on the connection of the concept with them as their true expression. Interpretation depends for its value on words in combination as possessing a permanent meaning, essentially the same for all, and on the power of each man to confirm his own apprehension of that meaning. If the meaning is unstable, or incapable of a uniform rendering, then interpretation is simply subjecting the mind to one set of many impressions.

The question, however, of the validity of knowledge is not whether our impressions concerning things correspond to things-in-themselves. Things-in-themselves is an arbitrary notion of which we know nothing, and in which we can have no interest. The only questions of moment are: Do the same objects make like impressions on different persons? Do they make like impressions on us, by virtue of stable qualities, at different times? If they do, then we have stable, that is, real, knowledge. Any correspondence between our impressions and the objects which occasion them is as unnecessary as between the meaning of a sentence and the characters in which it is written. That the sensuous qualities of objects express real attributes in them, we cannot doubt. This is involved in causation. These effects must stand for their own causes. The presence of the causes is precisely what the effects affirm. The relative uniformity and perpetuity of these relations are involved in the uniformity of nature, itself certified by causation. The same causes must produce the same effects, and the same causes are unchangeable within themselves. Given terms must, therefore, be faithful to their own expression, their

own laws. This reasoning is so consonant with experience, and so constantly confirmed by it, that very few do doubt, or can give any other reason than a vague distrust for doubting, the validity of knowledge. The tendency to trust is so deeply planted in the constitution of the mind that it much more frequently becomes excessive than fails in its office. This phase of unbelief always implies a failure to accept the authority of the mind in its own assertions, and this is a type of wisdom which belongs only to those who are wiser than it is written.

Relationism affirms the valid correspondence of the concept with the things which give occasion to it. It does not, however, as a doctrine of general terms, hold any tenable ground as opposed to conceptualism. We cannot, in relationism, put four terms in place of three: the class name, the concept it covers, the particular objects, and the qualities which the two last terms have in common. If relationism differentiates itself by affirming class qualities, our knowledge of them and of the agreement of the concept with them, it is slipping back into realism. General qualities have no existence aside from special qualities, and admittedly specific qualities are not those covered by the concept. The significance, the intellectual significance of any one object in reference to other objects, is the result of comparison, and this result it is which the concept expresses and retains. This meaning is derived directly from many particular objects, and there intervenes between the concept and these particulars no third term with which the concept stands in agreement. The question involved is one of the power of the mind to lay its own stepping-stones. The meaning of a sentence is not something additional to the words, and additional to the impression made upon

the mind by them. The nature of language is to call out certain ideas in the mind that comprehends it. Understanding a sentence is simply allowing it, by virtue of its representative power, to evoke these ideas. Studying a sentence is giving it that careful attention which enables its physical signs to produce fully their intellectual effects. Concepts are the intellectual products or meanings of things. All that is requisite for their construction are sensuous objects, and the power of understanding them. There is no intangible something which stands for generic qualities, which hovers between sensations and the general notions under which the mind marshals them. The validity of our knowledge does not turn on our power to affirm any correspondence between the concept and something objective to it, any more than the actuality of pain means an agreement between it and some quality in the world from which we have suffered injury. The validity of general terms turns on our ability to translate into intellectual expression the signs of thought before us. All that we have occasion to affirm is, that these sensuous signs do have permanent causal relations in reference to each other and in reference to mind, and hence that the concept is a second step of knowledge, following on that of sensations; is, like the sensations themselves, a mental term in real connection with outward things, whose dependencies it expresses. The agreements we are dealing with are agreements between sensations, and not an agreement of sensations with things-in-themselves, or an agreement of concepts with some form of being corresponding to them. The concept stands simply for the intellectual recognition of a resemblance between sensuous impressions. There is in things a real ground for this intellect-

ual action, but the only realities involved are the objects, the mental activities they awaken, and the words which give permanent form to these products of thought.

§ 4. The nature of things and the nature of concepts, as offering two distinct forms of being, physical and mental, or as indicating only different phases of one form of being, either physical or mental, must receive solution not from the doctrine of general terms, but from considerations involved in idealism, realism, and materialism. Yet the conclusions we reach as to the ultimate forms of being will affect our theory of general terms. It is unfortunate that the word realism should appear in both discussions, when the things expressed by it are so wide apart in the two cases. The concept must stand in permanent connection with special qualities, whether it is first present as a general idea and is later specialized in those particular forms, or is the fruit of insight directed at the outset toward objects, or is the passive product in the receptive tissue of mind of the repeated presence of material things. In each case there is a difference in the form of being attributed to the concept or to the object, but no difference in the fact of the connection of the two with each other.

There are three forms of general terms which so far correspond to the three theories just referred to as to afford respectively convenient examples in enforcing each of them. There are primitive, simple notions present to the mind, which it specializes in its experience in a great variety of ways. The special use implies the general idea; the general idea is not derived from the particular facts which it expounds. In this relation idealism finds its defence. The notion of causation is such an idea. Each case under it calls for the light of

the antecedent conception for its solution. In each instance we are dealing with a purely intellectual relation, and not with the sensuous terms involved in it. To return to a comparison we have so often found illustrative, we are not seeking the meaning of any one sentence, but we are dealing with the previous implication, that every sentence has a meaning. The mind, in this notion, and in many others, comes so furnished as to fit a great variety of particulars to its own constructive framework.

There is another class of general words which are in their formation especially favorable to the theory of realism. In them the mind shows the very variable way in which it unites objects to meet its own changeable ends. They are those general terms which do not express natural classes, with relatively permanent and extended agreements, but which mark some one correspondence, often transient in itself and transient in the purposes of thought subserved by it, between things and actions remote in all other relations. These are the classifications of ordinary speech, such words as swift and slow, bright and dull, hard and soft. These classes lie often between qualities which are intellectual rather than sensuous, as frugal and extravagant, agreeable and disagreeable, eccentric and commonplace. It is difficult to regard these generalizations as the result of a purely reflective or a purely receptive process. They involve in their formation many accidental changes of external conditions and changeable points of view under them. They are the products of two sets of causes, the diverse nature of things, and the diverse ends the mind pursues in dealing with them. The two factors, matter and mind, events and uses, stand in equilibrium in them.

The general terms which express natural classes are,

on the other hand, so dependent on uniform, sensuous impressions, arise so inevitably in all minds as the daily result of experience, that they readily lend themselves to materialism, and become the expository types of its methods of development. The sensuous impressions, in these cases comparatively obvious, regular, and constant, leave, as a deposit of their protracted action, a general notion and a general term. It is thus easy to overlook the definite, intellectual activity which has given occasion to a concept. The mind takes on the appearance of simple receptivity when it is truly active.

The certainty of knowledge in the three cases is very different. An ideal movement, pure in kind, carries absolute conviction. We have in it only to trust the mind itself, to walk by sight, and this we do readily. When we come to those discussions which determine the transient positions the mind is taking, subject to its own mobility, and the infinite variability of things, we find occasion for much painstaking if our impressions are to assume any general character, and be worthy of registration as a significant part of human experience. The landscape of shifting phenomena leaves undefined any one point of observation, and assumes new appearances under slight changes of position. We have occasion to carefully plot our surveys. We start more or less accidentally. We measure our distances more or less arbitrarily. And while what we do is real, it is difficult to make it conform in an instructive way to the impressions present in other minds. It was in this region of loose and slipping terms that the Sophists played their tricks; in this region that the nature of concepts became an urgent inquiry, and that the concept was seen to call for definition and rectification according to the end in view.

In empirical investigation, directed to natural classes, we have the stability of comparatively uniform physical forces. Though the mind may be much perplexed in a fortunate framing of natural concepts, this accomplished, it feels that it has in them the material of exact knowledge.

There is one more point in this laborious discussion which occupied so many centuries, and by which men attained a correct analytic expression of the factors of knowledge: the relation of the universal to the particular. The particular is the product of experience, chiefly of the senses; the universal is the product of the reason and the understanding. The one stands for impressions, objects, to be combined; the other stands for this combination, this apprehension of the mind.

All to whom mind, in its insight, seems the ruling element, will give weight to universals; all to whom matter, with its phenomenal presentations and causal relations, furnishes the clews of knowledge, will find in particulars the laws of being. Plato regarded universals as the eternal realities, and particulars as their changeable, imperfect expression. Aristotle took one step toward reconciliation: universals still retained with him their supreme importance, but they exist in and with particulars. The two are not separable. The nominalist shifted the point of view wholly: particulars are the only realities; universals are mere words, aidful to the mind in retaining particulars. General relations have no antecedent force over particulars, and no existence aside from them; particulars give rise to universals as results of their reiterated action on the mind. The conceptualist returned decisively toward realism. He affirms the particulars as realities. He also affirms the universal as a distinct product

of thought. The two are united in language as the expression of knowledge, and in knowledge itself as its inseparable terms. The concept is not less real than the percept. The percept implies an external object; the concept implies a comprehending power and a distinct product of that power.

In acquiring knowledge, particulars precede generals. Particulars alone are mere impressions; their comprehension leads us at once to generals. This, indeed, is comprehension: to know the universal relations which particulars sustain to each other. In any act of creation universals and particulars are inseparably united with each other as thought and language are united in speech. The particular is the realization of the universal; the universal is the significancy of the particular. Creation, as of the artist, lies in this combination. Creation without significancy is not a thing contemplated as possible.

It is necessary always to distinguish those ideas which are primitive insights of reason from those which are the results of generalization. In acquiring the one, the movement is from the general to the particular. We have the notion of space as the condition of any and every measurement. The particular gives occasion to the general, brings it out more and more distinctly into consciousness. Universals are the solvents of knowledge, though we find the need of them and learn their uses only in connection with particulars. Particulars are the objects on which mind expends its powers.

In classification the movement is in the opposite direction. Sensuous qualities are grouped according to their relations, and particulars must be completely grasped as the condition of success. The one process is allied to the expression of thought, when the thought is present to

the mind ; the other to the disclosure of thought to the mind, through the medium of the language which contains it. The mind is the master of neither process, save in connection with the other.

When we see the many and subtile implications of this doctrine of concepts, how closely it interlaced itself with all the fundamental inquiries of philosophy, we shall not be surprised that men were for so long a time occupied with it, nor that they still reach different conclusions according to their points of departure.

CHAPTER III.

PERSONS IN MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. Mediæval philosophy did not move over a wide field. It was characterized by great patience and subtilty in the discussion of a few questions, but made no bold transitions. Our purpose of exposition will be met by referring briefly to a few leading men, and by their means defining the trend of thought.

The period is regarded as opening with Johannes Scotus Erigena. He belonged to the earlier part of the ninth century. He was born in Ireland, but went to France under the invitation of King Charles. He identified philosophy with religion, a position in itself just, but at all times difficult of achievement, and in his time practically perilous. We have seen that the Christian Church maintained its purity by keeping obedience in the foreground. The bigotry which later characterized it in doctrine was the fruit of an instinct of self-preservation. In religion, as in science, if speculation is unrestrained, running before inquiry, the chances are it will speedily issue in error. Yet it remains forever true that theory and fact, the principles which should rule conduct and conduct itself, philosophy and religion, must perfectly coalesce.

The philosophy which John Scotus brought to Christian dogma was that of Plato and Neo-Platonism. He

accepted the antecedent existence of ideas, and made the creative process a passage from the more general to the less general. From God, the supreme essence, the all-inclusive idea, proceed classes, and, later, sub-classes in the order of their generality. This evolution of ideas gives us the exact counterpart of empirical evolution. It can only be maintained in the mind by abstract terms and logical relations constantly passing into darkness and mysticism. The insistency of purely logical dependencies in his conception of the world led Scotus to affirm that all things return into God; and to give a pantheistic form to faith. While the mind can proceed from universals to particulars, it can also return from particulars to universals. The first universal thus remains the all-comprehending term.

A conception of the universe is pantheistic in the degree in which the parts are merged in the whole, and each change, as a transient expression, is taken up in one comprehensive process. Distinctions thus cease to be permanent; positions are drawn back into the primal centre. Whatever we affirm of specific stages and relations in this movement of evolution is lost again in a wider view of the whole. We are dealing with a maelstrom, whose waters revolve in concentric circles, forever sink within themselves, and rise on their own circumference. The one thing expressed by them, at every stage of movement, is an all-absorbing and controlling energy. Conceptions of this sort can only be sustained by a philosophical imagination, and receive a tenuous expansion from a logical impulse that acts from within, unguided and uncorrected by experience. The personality of God, as a distinct form of being, thus disappears, and the material and the immaterial, the process and the

interpreting idea, blend in one movement, which merely stands for itself, neither less nor more. All is God, and God is all. God no more expounds the all than the all expounds God. Indeed, exposition between such shifting terms lapses, like the last stages of a dream, into a bare sense of motion, sinking into unreality.

Nothing is more illusory than a philosophy which is hovering, like eddying mist, over this abyss of pantheism. It will affirm almost anything you wish under familiar terms of experience, but there is in its affluent affirmations neither significance nor substance. Its conceptions are those of a dream, which have among themselves a certain coherence, but disappear never to return. On, ever on, till swallowed up in nothingness, is the law of their being. The pantheistic philosopher has gone to sleep, so far as sensible realities are concerned. He knows nothing of them save as furnishing the intangible shadows of his multitudinous fancies. It is only facts, with their firm outline, that can hold and occupy a waking world. This dream of pantheism has often been dreamt, but chiefly by minds whose inner processes are so unvarying that they soon become enclosed, like a chrysalis, in their own web.

§ 2. Roscellinus, of France, belonged to the last part of the eleventh century. He is identified with nominalism, to which he gave, if not the first, the earliest influential expression. This doctrine assigns him his position in the philosophical world. He illustrates the varied significance of the belief in its dogmatic relations. As only individuals exist, he found himself shut up to one God or three gods. The acceptance of the last branch of the alternative brought upon him ecclesiastical discipline. Nominalism did not stand in ready sympathy with the creeds of the Church, and made its adherents obnoxious

to the theologians of the time. This fact helped to repress it. Such beliefs as the headship of Adam and original sin easily unite with realism. Individuality and individual responsibility affiliate with nominalism. As long, therefore, as the corporate feeling was uppermost, realism found in it a strong ally. Earlier discussions are often only a more remote and obscure handling of the truths which reappear later under nearer and more exact forms. The force of hereditary influences in contrast with personal powers is the phase of thought under which the conflict offers itself in our time. Many a scientist who owes his point of view to nominalism is yet contending in heredity for relations closely associated with realism.

Anselm (1033), first of France, and later Archbishop of Canterbury, was a strong, bold figure in theology. He is especially associated with the *a priori* proof of the being of God, and with a rigid exposition of the doctrine of the atonement. Both of these beliefs have shown more persistency than their merits are able to explain. The *a priori* argument struggled in vain to identify an ideal with an actual dependence; to make our conceptions the measure of the facts. The exposition strove, in a somewhat similar spirit, to cover our wide and deep spiritual dependences on God by the very narrow ones which express our relations to justice under civil law. An explanation so inadequate would hardly have held its ground so long had it not, while misrepresenting, also magnified, the divine attributes of grace and justice, and chimed in with our narrow thoughts concerning them. His temper, which was the theological temper of his time, is expressed in his motto, *Credo ut intelligam*. This spirit, if we look at it wisely in reference to that it im-

plied in those who entertained it, and to the predominant demand of the period, was a noble one. When vision is not clear enough nor universal enough to maintain belief in its conflict, not so much with unbelief as with gross appetite and passion, it must be aided by authority expressing itself as dogmatism. Assertion takes the place of proof when what is needed is impression and not conviction. Dogmatism, as a phase of thought, intervenes between superstition and liberality, between sensuous domination and intellectual government. Dogmatism suppresses disobedience, and is, in turn, set aside by insight.

The motto of Anselm gave occasion to that of Abelard (1079), *Intelligo ut credam*. This reaction was on the higher side of apprehension, and so prepared the way for progress. It was not against belief, but against that authority which obscures the true grounds of belief by checking sincere inquiry. The two mottoes are profoundly significant. In the order of intelligence, in a well-sustained movement of thought, the motto of Abelard has the precedence. Belief must rest on apprehension. In the order of historic development—the order which adapts itself to popular ignorance—the motto of Anselm expresses the more constant and familiar facts. Understanding follows slowly and hesitatingly on belief—a belief conventional and hereditary in its prevailing forms. Even the transfer of a sound rational faith along these darkened ways of life takes place largely by physical and social contact, and only breaks out into light, here and there, in an experience already profoundly ruled by it. It is this practical relation of things in a lower region than that of pure thought that has helped to justify, to such men as Anselm, the motto, “I believe in order that I may understand.” Moreover, this principle

recognizes a fact in the highest realm of intelligence, not sufficiently covered by the maxim of Abelard. Belief, by means of the experience to which it gives occasion, constantly reflects light. It makes answer within itself, like pure water, to the heavens over it. What we are ever needing, as the key with which to unlock divine grace, is more grace among men. Only thus do the manifold reactions of goodness begin to disclose themselves. Yet the principle of Abelard expresses the ruling order of sound criticism, and will be the prevailing method of spiritualized intelligence. The starting-points of activity are conscious, approved to the mind in their own light. The triangulation is from star to star, from summit to summit, in the otherwise void spaces.

Abelard had been a pupil of Roscellinus, and we see in the fact an indication of the clearness, sometimes shallowness, of thought which have been associated with nominalism. It eschews all mysticism. It brings truth, if possible, to a distinct, even if it be an inadequate, statement. Realism, on the other hand, leaves its profoundest terms unexplained. It easily becomes mystical, and allows feeling to take the place of comprehension. Its thought-processes lack definition. Like slow evaporation in an atmosphere already saturated, they deepen the general obscurity.

Abelard very naturally inclined to the authority of Aristotle in his greater clearness of conclusions. In his ethical theory he traced transgression to the relation of one's actions to his own conception of right. He did not allow virtue or vice to sink below consciousness, and to be lost in those obscure conditions of behavior which make up the subterranean streams of heredity or disclose themselves in conventional forms. A man achieves char-

acter, as a navigator achieves success, by the manner in which he contends with undercurrents and adverse winds. Abelard, in his free dialectics, did not escape the charge of heresy. He taught with great brilliancy at Paris, and in various portions of France. The positive mind has influence, but the clear, bold, positive mind sweeps all before it. Men yield to a push in the dark, but they run delightedly with an impulse toward the light.

§ 3. From the time of Abelard the scholastic philosophy began to feel the influence of Greek philosophy as transmitted through Jewish and Arabic channels. This reintroduction led to a more extended inquiry into Greek literature and to a ready reception of the Greek culture of the East. Aristotle was especially influential with the Arabs. Their interest in physics predisposed them to sympathy with him, and his logic attained that commanding influence to which it was entitled. The strict monotheism of the Mohammedan faith put it out of touch with the emanations of Neo-Platonism.

Averroes (1126), of Spain, was a leading representative of Aristotelian philosophy as developed in connection with Islamism. He was a reverent admirer of Aristotle and a diligent commentator on his works. He awakened fresh and extended interest in them. He was at first held in much esteem by the Moors. Later he fell under suspicion by his free methods, and Greek philosophy was prohibited as inconsistent with simple faith in the Koran.

The Jews stood, by an oriental habit of thought and from their connection with the school of Philo at Alexandria, in more direct sympathy with Neo-Platonism. While this led to an exaltation of the conception of Jehovah, it readily admitted intermediate angels. The chief influence of Jewish authors on scholasticism arose

from the translation of Arabic works into Latin. The Jews in Spain gave asylum to the rejected philosophy of the Arabian Aristotelians, and entered on the work of reconciling Jewish theology with Aristotle. The later forms of scholasticism were determined by this revival of Greek philosophy, and by the conflict of opinion incident to it between the influence of Plato and of Aristotle.

Alexander Hales, who belonged to the earlier portion of the thirteenth century, is said to have been the first scholastic who was thoroughly acquainted with the works of Aristotle. The prevalence of Aristotelian philosophy and its victory over Platonism in the Neo-Platonic form were advantageous to theology. It helped to hold it fast to a simple, distinct affirmation of the Divine Being, and turned its attention, in proof of that Being, to the physical world. It prevented a mystical development of the doctrine of the Trinity into a series of emanations, and held it in check as a single mysterious dogma whose authority rested on revelation. It also served to arrest a tendency to pantheism, and to keep the processes of thought in clear, intellectual light. The ideas of Plato, on the other hand, easily lent themselves to barren forms of fanciful, mystical development. Hales was termed, by his disciples, Doctor Irrefragabilis.

Albertus Magnus (1193), Doctor Universalis, taught at Paris and Cologne. He reproduced the entire philosophy of Aristotle, with many comments of Arabic masters. He was somewhat open to Neo-Platonic influence, and combined, in his doctrine of generals, all three symbols. The universal exists in the mind of God (*ante rem*); also in the particular (*in re*); and later, as a concept (*post rem*). This view approaches conceptualism. Its concession to Platonism is formal rather than real, while a care-

ful analysis of the second and third statements leads to their union by accepting the general as a mental product. We are compelled to choose between a percept and a concept. The general cannot well be both. If it exists as a reality in the particular, it should establish itself directly or indirectly to the senses. If it does not, it can only be a concept. Albertus reserved the doctrine of the Trinity from the field of philosophy, and thus helped to initiate an effort, so often made, to establish, within the field of thought, a sacred enclosure denied to the relatively profane processes of speculation. Theology, once possessed of this retreat from the exacting claims of inquiry, finds it very convenient to enlarge and defend it. He taught, in opposition to Aristotle, the creation of the world. He laid the foundations of a sound ethical theory in the freedom of man.

§ 4. Thomas Aquinas (1225), Doctor Angelicus, was a leader in scholastic philosophy. He was an Italian, and taught in the chief schools of Italy and France—at Bologna, Naples, Cologne, Paris. He was a pupil of Albertus, and held the same opinion in reference to generals. The moving impulse was agreement with Aristotle, and the rejection of generals as antecedent realities. This concession, however, to conceptualism was soon to eat out the Aristotelian essence. The being of God, he held, is declared by the world about us. The order of the world involves it. The chain of causes demands it. God is pure spirit. The world has been created, but the proof of the assertion rests on revelation. The soul is immortal by virtue of its own spiritual nature. He held, in common with Albertus and against the disciples of Aristotle, that the mind is spiritual throughout. Its sensitive and appetitive powers belong to its very substance,

though they can be exercised only in connection with material organs. The mind has no innate ideas. Its knowledge is derived by abstraction from sensuous impressions. The inner mechanism of the mind admits of no liberty, action being determined by apprehension. Liberty refers only to the absence of external restraint. He reserved the cardinal doctrines of the Church from discussion, as above reason, not contrary to it. They appeal to faith.

Thomas Aquinas gave very complete expression to the dominant tendency in scholasticism. The Thomists, by the influence of their master and by the concurrence of their system with ruling tendencies, became the leaders of orthodoxy. The questions broached remain, many of them, the subjects of an active diversity of opinion, while others of them have passed into the background. These topics have not been so much settled as displaced by more historic and restricted forms of investigation. The mind returns to them only as it can throw some new light upon them by considerations more within the range of our knowledge.

The ideas of Plato, as real entities, formed refractory terms of order in any hierarchy save one of logical relations. The doctrine pushed, therefore, steadily toward idealism, the substitution of intellectual for physical connections. There was also in this belief a strong current toward pantheism. The most comprehensive idea, as the most comprehensive class, embraces all other ideas, and finds its expression in them. The many and the one are different aspects of the same movement. The dispersion of all these essences and the acceptance of a pure creative spirit was a far simpler faith. The philosophy of Aristotle was much nearer to Christianity than that of Plato.

In another direction the remnant of realism which Aristotle retained wrought mischief, and was rejected by Aquinas. The general, existing in the particular, becomes its very substance. The two are inseparable from each other. The general is as dependent on the particular for immediate expression as the particular is on the general for inherent character. It becomes, under this doctrine, far more difficult, in connection with man, to assert pure spirit, individual being. So much, also, was ascribed to the life, and the life was so inseparable from its physical forms, that the spirit was but a maimed thing, an abstraction, aside from its union with the life in the body. This conception interfered with the integrity of the spirit, subjected it unduly to physical conditions, and perplexed the doctrine of immortality. In behalf of the fulness of intellectual being,—the divine mind within us—Aquinas affirmed that sensuous and appetitive impressions are sensibilities of the one spiritual being, though owing their instruments in use to the body. The division of Aristotle, therefore, between the soul and the spirit, the sensibilities of the body and the insights of the mind, was greatly softened. The higher life holds, in its own unity, all the terms of conscious being. Spiritual being and physical being are thus asserted in their simplest and most distinct forms. Another *tertium quid*, with its double riddles, is escaped. Life, as a plastic power, is always allied with the spiritual world, whether operative below consciousness or through consciousness, or under the forms of intelligence. It is not, in this higher union, a separate factor, adding its own powers to those of the mind. The conscious activity is spiritual through and through—an harmonious union of diverse powers in one being. Life, separate from intelligence, is a spiritual

activity ; but life, united to intelligence, does not divide with it the conscious facts of mind. The unity of spiritual action involves the unity of spiritual being. Our spiritual life is not a conglomerate. The lower is fused into the higher ; the higher goes out through the lower. The life is not to be anatomized out from the physical powers with which it is united, nor the activity of the mind from the activity of the life in which it lives. Our mental analysis implies no mechanical division. The spirit is not a remainder, physical powers being first removed and vital forces later. The integrity of intelligence is in no way lost by its dependences on the body. These dependences are simply the existing conditions of its activity. Things as diverse as mind and matter do not, in their union, divide substance and qualities between them. Magnetism permeates iron and modifies its action without occasioning an aggregate of two sets of qualities. The spiritual world is not additive in its structure ; it is, in the highest sense, organic. The world holds two factors forever diverse from each other, forever acting on each other, forever owing their significance to each other, matter and mind. Like thought and language, they are inseparable in all practical uses, yet, like thought and language, they owe the form of their union to their intellectual separability. Thought and language, as united in speech, are not the union of things with different properties, but belonging to the same category of being, and dividing the product between them ; they are forms of being so diverse as to coexist neither by inclusion nor exclusion, but by a reciprocity of relations so simple and absolute as to compose a higher unity, capable of comprehension but not of division. Immortality involves a unity of the spirit within itself, like that of truth ; and diverse expressions for it

through physical energies, like the various utterances of truth. It denies the identity of inner and outer terms, and also the unchangeability of their conditions of union. It affirms the eternal marvel of all spiritual life, its growing mastery of expression.

In these conclusions, to which the denial of Aquinas helps to lead us, a limit is set to analysis. It is in no case equivalent to separation. The emphasis forever rests with that which is highest. The lower does not win control over the higher by assigning it conditions. Organic force, spiritual unity, mean the submission of that which is beneath to that which is above, the penetration of constructive energy downward to the very bottom of things, the virtual subsumption of things into the constructive energies which make use of them. All this makes for, and ultimately means, the spiritual unity of the universe. The division does not lie between things eternally distinct, but eternally one.

The discussion of innate ideas reached the light in Aquinas. It, too, is to be understood in connection with Plato. The form which it bears with us is only remotely allied to that under which it offered itself to the scholastics. A denial of innate ideas came with a denial of metempsychosis, the eternal shifting of life from form to form with the partial retention of its impressions. The Christian Church, with its doctrine of the creation of the spirit, of salvation by faith, and of future rewards, found no point of union with this eternal flow of living things through all the imaginary phases assigned them by Plato, save only in the moral element which controlled the results. The general forms of knowledge which rise more and more distinctly in the mind in the progress of inquiry, were, with Plato, the traces of a previous life, the innate

ideas which indicate our relation backward to a prior experience. The woody tissue of thought remained, though its succulent material had disappeared. A denial of a previous life carried naturally with it a denial of innate ideas, and led to the reference of all generalizations to those powers of abstraction which yield so large a share of them.

Later philosophy, by denying the possibility of a successful analysis of all our ideas into terms of experience, launched us on that large theme, What portion of our knowledge is involved in the sensuous terms of life, and how is our knowledge evolved from these terms? His defensive attitude against Platonism naturally carried Aquinas farther over toward empiricism than the general tenor of his belief called for. He was asserting the sensuous, not as against the rational, but as against the blind trailing of truth down the endless æons. He was affirming the present as a fresh and self-sufficing phase of experience. The question into which this debate has now passed by laborious transfer is the measure of primitive, rational insight which belongs to the mind as its own initiative in all knowledge. How far is what we term knowledge an acquisition, and how far a deposition? The empiricism of to-day, with its traces of hereditary tendencies, is nearer Platonism, with its innate ideas, than is intuitionism.

One other profound inquiry, still pursued in the deep-sea dredging of philosophy, one of much variety of method and diversity of result, was pushed to the front in the theology of Aquinas, the freedom of the will. The freedom of the will, in ethical and theological discussion, is a primary consideration. Conduct turns on laws freely accepted, on the control which man has over his processes

of thought, and his feelings and actions under them. The divine character and government can only be understood in connection with the character of man. A tendency to conceive the divine will, primarily under the close-knit connections of things, is accompanied with a tendency to reduce the power of man in obedience, and to subject him to the conditions by which he is enveloped. He is made to feel the fatalistic flow of events in their full force. He floats on a stream he can in no way control. In proportion as the power of God is spiritually conceived, and his own freedom becomes the freedom of the largest reason, tempered throughout by the largest grace, man is taken into the same supreme realm of ideas, and begins to move freely under its spontaneous impulses. A rigidity in the divine decrees, a pressure in the supreme will, bring corresponding abjectness to the human subject. While God is thus honored with an absolute authority, that authority becomes imperious, and contracts all the taint of evil in the world. When the freedom of thought, the self-contained movement of reason, prevail in the highest realm, they draw all intelligence to themselves, with an increasing participation of powers. Man becomes more and more perfectly united to God, identified with him.

Freedom belongs, first, to the intellect. Its law is the law of truth, a law in no way to be resolved into that of causation, but one that implies a free response to inner insight. Under a constitution determined in its tendencies, in part by its physical terms, in part by the appeal of circumstances, in part by the trend of intellectual development, in part by the present force of thought, in part by previous thought, certain feelings accompany, as persuasives, all prior presentation to the mind of the con-

ditions of action. These feelings are neither immediately subject to the processes of thought, nor independent of them. Emotional tendencies are present in each instance, but they are not absolute nor final. Emotions are the intermediate terms between thoughts and actions, which give momentum and stability to effort. They are shifted, but shifted slowly, as the result of development within the mind itself. The liberty of thought tells upon them, but not in an instant. They lie as a balance wheel between the quick responsiveness of mind and the uniformities of conduct in which it is to be expressed.

Action, the third stage of liberty, involving what we term the freedom of the will, is not dependent on existing feelings under causal relations. The pervasive presence of rational insight prevents this. The feelings cannot hold their own under the play of thought, any more than clouds can retain their color and form in a blaze of sunlight. The process is not, first, thought, then feeling, then action, the last following as an inevitable sequence; it is, rather, thought, feeling, action, omnipresent with each other, in the most complex and shifting relations. Insight accompanies the formation of feeling, and equally the concessions we make to it in action. Feelings never pass as motives into dead weights, carrying on their face a fixed registration of force. They fluctuate every instant under the clear eye of reason, and take on new relations to conduct. Thus various terms, as pleasure, pain, sense of righteousness, sense of wrong, are altogether incommensurable with each other. There is no fixed adjustment among themselves by which they can regulate action. The spirit must choose between them. This relation is of its own order, as much so as the relation of conclusions to premises in proof. The one is the law of virtue,

the other the law of truth. No analogies of the physical world, no connections of causation, can act otherwise than to confuse the subject. As a simple and primary fact it must be accepted in itself. The necessitarian overlooks the infinite mobility of feeling each moment, and the impossibility of its holding its ground under the vigorous assaults of reason.

Reason, personality, defines its path by its own inner light. Though it walks obscurely and hesitatingly oftentimes, oftentimes gropes its way along or misses it altogether, the essential nature of its own life is not thereby altered. It is one of insight, with the feelings and actions incident thereto. This citadel of thought is also the citadel of personal power. The truth makes us free indeed. It defines all paths before us.

There are not in this liberty the same peace, the same precision, when it awakens in the soul of man as when it flows in resistless restfulness from the mind of God; yet it never lapses into a blind sequence of causes. The eternal antithesis of the universe lies between these two terms. The entire equilibrium of life is in the adjustment and readjustment of these relations. Let the one or the other predominate, and we lose either the order of things or the significancy of that order. Freedom is not complete in the human spirit, but it permeates it everywhere. Its consummation is fulness of life, an absolute reign of reason, in which light and color, revelation and feeling, are inseparable parts of each other.

Aquinas regarded the connections between given conditions of mind and subsequent actions as necessary. The will follows the understanding. He thought we might bring forward new considerations, and so modify action. This view implies a mechanical and impossible

separation of states of mind from each other. Liberty permeates mental action through and through. The unity of the spirit is supreme. There are no given states in the living spirit, in the sense of fixed terms. The spirit is forever fluent; its laws are laws of motion. If there were once one determinate state, all subsequent states would follow from it, and the lapse of liberty would be absolute. Whatever may be the phenomena of mind at any one moment, the mind remains in and with them, an unmeasured and immeasurable term. These phenomena do not, as causes, contain the sequences which follow. The mind contains both the phenomena and their sequences. The recurrence of like experiences in mind is not the sweeping round of causes to the same point in a circuit, so that from that moment events go on to repeat themselves. The one incommensurable and living presence in all spiritual phenomena is the spirit itself. Phenomena of mind do not become so many objective facts, which at once react on the mind for its final subjugation. The truths we attain always lead to greater truths; the actions we wisely perform give scope to wider action. Having allowed the mind, just ready to pass into action, to sink into necessity, we cannot restore it to liberty by regression, by taking on a new stage of thought. This regression is itself a phase of action, and must be determined either freely or by the phenomena which enclose it. If one state is final, all states are final. Having sunk into a finality, we cannot restore ourselves to freedom by retrogression. We must find liberty everywhere, in all its pervasive power, or we can find it nowhere. It is like Deity, in whose nature it is ultimately enclosed; it must be grasped in its omnipresence.

It is, indeed, true that action tends to follow the under-

standing, and, in the ultimate harmony of being, will coalesce with it. Conduct will either be raised to the level of thought, or thought will sink to the plane of conduct. Understanding itself arises in the use of liberty, and brings powerful persuasives to it. But if liberty followed obediently in the footsteps of truth, there would be no conflict in the human spirit. The one great spiritual fact of life, the want of harmony within the mind itself, the failure of our powers to act concurrently, is overlooked by this assertion. The fluctuations of human life betray a law waiting determinate expression.

Aquinas gave his sanction to a view often repeated in subsequent years, that the doctrines of faith, as beyond the range of human reason, were to be sheltered from speculation. This is an opinion which empiricism, with any tincture of belief, the more readily accepts, because it at once becomes painfully obvious that a simple interpretation of the sensuous terms of experience can bring very little support to faith. Philosophy has also often found this view practically convenient, as helping to shelter it from the opprobrium attendant on unbelief. Having established a preserve for religious dogmas, as for the clean animals of the altar, it is the more at liberty to push the hunt in all other places. Yet, to one resting his proofs on reason, there is no region in which sobriety of thought is more urgent than in religious faith.

§ 5. Johannes Duns Scotus, the Subtile Doctor, of English origin, was, in the earlier portion of the fourteenth century, the distinguished critic of the doctrines of Aquinas in the schools of Oxford, Paris, and Cologne. He still farther extended the beliefs which must be made to rest on revelation, and united destructive criticism to implicit faith. The critical mind often loves to take

refuge from its own processes in dogmatic assertion. Scotus, in common with Aquinas, accepted universals as existing before, in, and after particulars. Leaning, however, toward Plato, he laid strong emphasis on the general as distinct in existence from the particular, with which it is united. In the reality of the general he found the reality of knowledge. Since all knowledge pertains to the general, knowledge, he thought, would become unreal and visionary if reality did not belong to the general. Herein he attached superior weight to physical, as contrasted with intellectual, existence. The reality of knowledge lies in the justness of the mind's action, its universality in the fact that it is derived by all men in common from one set of symbols.

The notion of matter, as a kind of stuff involved in all creative processes, clings strongly to most minds. Matter is always indispensable material to man in every physically constructive process. Hence he comes to assume this as a universal relation in his thoughts. Scotus regarded matter, in itself of very different degrees of subtilty, as associated with all forms of being save that of God. He alone is pure spirit. Matter stood with him in three relations: as unformed material, as material shaped to the uses of living things, and as material in the hand of man for voluntary construction. We are indebted to a more penetrating inquiry into the primitive properties of matter for the power to see that the most direct and simple forms of activity carry with them both material and construction. There is no separation between them. Matter is throughout orderly activity, nothing more. There is no passive, receptive substratum. Receptive processes in the physical world are as definite as active processes, and of the same nature with them. The dis-

inction is a superficial one, turning chiefly on phenomena of motion. The object that is struck is not in its reactions different from the object that gives the blow.

Scotus believed in the freedom of the will, but greatly reduced the value of the doctrine by the arbitrary form under which he conceived the will. The will, not the understanding, is the determining power. What God wills is right. Right follows after volition. Scotus and Aquinas stood on opposed positions, which need to be merged in the unity of a free spirit; free in all its activity, but kindling the light for its pathway always in the reason. It is the very light of the reason, itself a voluntary power, that enables it to see and propose to itself diverse methods of action. The right lies in the searching vision of reason. Liberty is not arbitrary,—so far as it is so it is losing guidance—it is the power of the mind to see and assign itself laws, and to pursue them. Failing in this, it loses counsel, loses choice, loses liberty. If the derivation of the word dunce from Duns is correct,—the disciples of Scotus being called Dunces—the subtilty of the Subtile Doctor, employed in too narrow a field, would seem to have issued shortly in sterility.

It is far better, with Aquinas, to conceive the centre of personality and of conduct to lie in the reason, even if the reason does not seem to us to include liberty, than it is, with Scotus, to lodge it in will, if will stands for arbitrary power. A God who moves rationally in the realm of nature and of grace better calls out our love and feeds our life than one who moves irrepressibly. A liberty, so-called, in God which overrides our own liberty is a loss rather than a gain to us. Liberty above and liberty below can coalesce alone in reason. It was a great merit

in Aquinas that he gave such weight to reason in action, in nature, and in grace.

Freedom in its highest form lies in the relation of reason to action. It is a conscious union of the two. Though a logical process is an unflinching movement, it is one of insight and not of coercion, one centred in the mind and not out of it, one of reason and not of force. The complete development of the truth and the perfect transfer of it to conduct are that very play of our rational life within itself which we term freedom. This activity, even though it be united to the omnipotence of God, allows the unconstrained inclusion within itself of all effort like unto its own.

§ 6. William of Occam belonged to the earlier part of the fourteenth century. He brought forward the doctrine of conceptualism, which offers an exact and final analysis of the relation of generals, holding the mental and physical terms in even balance. As this balance, however, had been lost for long by the prevalence of realism, conceptualism arose in opposition to it, under the shadow of nominalism. It thus tended, at first, to an undue assertion of particulars, and so of the sensuous terms of knowledge. It opened the way to that pursuit of physical inquiries which was soon to follow, and to renew the fertility of thought. The extreme tendency of the doctrine, as urged by Occam, is seen in the fact that he regarded all theological dogmas as matters of faith and not of reason. When one turns from speculations which have become futile by their remoteness from experience to an inquiry into things, the first fruits of this investigation seem so distinct as to stand out of all connection with the abandoned themes of thought. These are either pushed aside entirely, or locked up, as

disused furniture of the mind, under the key of faith. Not till physical relations begin to cover the whole field, to unite themselves to one another, and to social and ethical facts, do they rise to, and begin to raise again, the old questions of belief, and to furnish material for a more rational answer to them. Simple, physical inquiry starts at the point most remote from spiritual centres, and much time is necessarily consumed in reaching them again. The doctrines of faith are the last, the largest, the most comprehensive terms of reason. We see this, in our own time, in the far more tolerant attitude which empiricism is taking toward religion.

§ 7. There was not a very wide range in scholastic philosophy. Religion, directly or indirectly, dominated it all. It is not necessary to enumerate those who took part in it without gaining any representative positions. We are defining the river chiefly by its curves. While France possessed the leading seats of learning, England played an honorable part in the number and ability of the leaders in thought whom she furnished.

This philosophy owed its moderation and strength to the practical temper of Christianity. This restrained the theologian from wandering away from the earlier and simpler expositions of Christian doctrine, and the traditions of the Church. To be sure, there was not much toleration, not much freedom of thought, but the themes and the times had not yet come which demanded them, and could make profitable use of them. The realism which prevailed in philosophy held a decided element of mysticism. This had developed itself in Neo-Platonism as the doctrine of ecstasy, the ineffable union of man with God in higher insight. The Neo-Platonic sentiment was not altogether extinguished in the Church by the

very desirable prevalence of the Aristotelian philosophy. It easily affiliated with realism, whose inscrutable entities were not readily defined or kept apart in thought. This philosophic tendency, united to an earnest Christian temper, gave rise, at the close of the scholastic period, to mysticism in Germany, in the preaching of the gospel and in its practical enforcement. Piety must be exceedingly wise, exceedingly beneficent, or, wearying of the commonplace, plodding duties of life, it nourishes a fervor and cherishes a devotion which have in them the seeds of mysticism. Mysticism thus easily affiliates with the ardor of piety, and becomes its most immediate danger.

Eckhart, a Dominican, belonging to the last part of the thirteenth century, was an earnest and very influential preacher in Germany. He was thoroughly imbued with the conjoint Platonic and Christian spirit. It was the supreme duty of men, as he conceived the world, to reunite themselves to God by a higher intuition of him. The real steps of growth in the world were thus obscured by the urgency of the sentiment that was to animate them. The fire that was to warm men became a conflagration and wasted itself in the air. Among the many who followed in his methods of thought and of instruction was Johann Tauler.

When the strongest feeling and the clearest apprehension touch each other, it is difficult to maintain sobriety of thought. Intense light loses its revealing power. We do not see by looking at the sun, but by looking with it over the wide landscape. Intuition, so-called, lapses readily into confusion. The world, in its bald literalism, is needed just as much to sober, direct, and unfold feeling in a healthy way, as it is to keep thought from those

visionary flights in which it gathers nothing but weariness. The intellectual world, though not far astray in its philosophy, was waiting for the voice of God in that clear, homely fashion in which it is wont to utter itself; and this voice came to it in the next period, directing the attention outward to physical things, first apprehended sensuously and later spiritually. We may well thank scholasticism for the firm way in which it laid down and maintained fundamental ideas, and so cut short less adequate, more visionary and shifting presentations of truth.

PART III.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. The changes by which scholasticism passed into modern philosophy were initiated in the fifteenth century and completed in the sixteenth. Modern philosophy differs from the philosophy which preceded it by a wider range of subjects, by much greater freedom in their consideration, and by fresh and varied data of inquiry. The relation of truth to a given form of faith is no longer a supreme matter. Philosophy rests on its own merits, and is pursued for its own ends. The disparagement and weakness it suffers arise not so much from a dogmatic temper as from the greater relative success which has attended on physical investigations.

The questions which it chiefly considers are the sources of knowledge, the nature of matter and mind, the mode of their union in one system, the manner in which this system has been developed, with the social, ethical, and religious inquiries incident thereto. Science and philosophy unite in a careful analysis of the constructive agents which take part in the progress of events, and in a search for the laws, narrow and broad, which define their methods of action. The fortunes of faith are deeply involved in these investigations, but less anxiety is now felt from this fact, since it is more distinctly seen that they are, and ought to be, enclosed in the larger fortunes

of truth. The barrier between things to be believed and things to be sought out everywhere gives way. All belief is called on to make proof of itself in terms of reason, and these terms themselves are at the same time much enlarged.

The new directions given to these discussions in this period are preëminently those incident to physical inquiry. The physical world has ceased to be a secondary factor, and has at times threatened, not merely to absorb the attention of men, but to drink up the living processes of thought in its own thirsty sands. The contention for the possession of the ultimate throne of power, the throne of being, is vigorously pushed between matter and mind; and the conflict can only be settled by an exhaustive estimate of the resources of both kingdoms, by a determination of the true seats of that order which is so widely expressed in matter, and so profoundly apprehended by mind. Does the apprehension precede or follow the presentation, becomes the urgent inquiry of philosophy; and this is virtually an extension of the question of generals and particulars. While the concept arises as the product of generalization in the mind of man, is this its ultimate and complete relation? Do we virtually create the meaning we find in things? Does this meaning call in itself for no explanation? We are pushed on to the problem whether thought is a process of physical forces acting in consciousness, or whether thought, as the truly antecedent, creative energy, makes its record in and through these material agents.

Clearness will be best attained in the consideration of this period by first marking transition causes and persons, and by tracing, later, the development of philosophy in the leading nations of Europe.

CHAPTER I.

CAUSES OF THE NEW ERA.

§ 1. The first occasion of a fresh philosophy was the decay which naturally overtook scholasticism. Its discussions were subtile, and often far removed from the possible correction of any known facts. This tension of thought becomes wearisome, even to the few minds capable of it, when it is found simply to open the way to endless diversities of opinion. The assertions of scholasticism were also increasingly liable to become merely verbal. The mind could not distinctly shape and firmly hold conceptions which had nothing in the world of experience to define and fasten them. Thus the thinkers readily slipped into logomachy. Still more was it difficult to make certain that disputants held the same conceptions, and were talking about the same things. Indeed, how could they meet in identical ideas, when the things under consideration were not empirical facts, but notions evolved from their own processes of thought, and so liable, in each instance, to be colored by a distinct method? But nothing is more fatal to prolonged inquiry than the suspicion that it is becoming merely formal, and is losing all hold on the world of things.

Scholasticism was also much constrained by authority. It was shut off from themes of the utmost interest to it, or bound, in pursuing them, to reach conclusions which

should lie within the narrow limits of orthodoxy. Philosophy cannot long prosper under such conditions. It soon ceases to be philosophy. Philosophy seeks the integrity of interior relations, and must be left, in its pursuit, to the creative freedom of thought. We may not regret the restraint put upon speculation for the moment, by superior practical interests, when we recollect how little there was to guide or restrain it within itself; but scholasticism, none the less, in losing its liberty, lost its hold on the minds of men. It was subject, therefore, not merely to the decay which falls to every system in its passage into a higher one, but found itself distinctly superannuated by its narrow range and attenuated connections.

A second concurrent and provocative cause of change was the revival of classical influence. The modern world woke up, almost abruptly, to the marvellous strength and beauty of the civilization which had preceded it. This was especially true in art. The desolations of war had swept away art, and most of its monuments. An artistic sensibility had been called out a second time, and was in vigorous action, when this fresh and powerful appeal from the dreamy years of the past came to it. The effect was rare in human history. Out of the very sombre and very limited records of events with which men were familiar, there arose before their astonished vision the most perfect, varied, and extended period of art known to men. This renaissance affected philosophy more indirectly than it did most other forms of social activity. Scholasticism had, through its lines of descent, established and maintained a connection with the best speculations of Greek philosophy. It had derived from it most that it could confer, and, in its sober handling of the dif-

ficult themes of discussion, occupied a position in advance of that philosophy. The widening of Greek influence, therefore, brought directly to scholastic philosophy few new data. Its indirect influence was, however, considerable, and lay in the direction of enlarging the liberty of thought. Many minds, overshadowed by the power of a previous life, dropped into a cold, crude scepticism of truths which had so long been enforced upon them, but which they had not deeply received. The Humanists of Italy maintained, under these unreconciled incentives of the past and the present, a formal belief and a profligate unbelief, which were true to neither. This license of thought, though incapable of any worthy production within itself, favored that liberty which both empirical and speculative inquiry so much needed.

The European world was also much stimulated, in this transition period, by geographical discovery. This entirely altered the balance of things, and opened up to the imagination and to adventure fresh and wonderful fields. Though our own time has experienced a more marvellous impulse, derived from the discovery and appropriation of the powers of nature, the world has not, at any other period, been so magnified before the eyes of men as in the years which joined the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Inventions, in themselves as productive of change as any that have followed them—gunpowder, printing, paper—were indicating the enlarged activity on which society was about to enter. Though philosophy was less affected by these changes than were most forms of thought, it could not fail to be reached and stimulated by them.

Free cities, the fruits of awakened industry and com-

merce, were becoming the seats of a more generous and liberal development. The area of thought and its incentives were much widened by them. The experiences of life were not only greatly brightened over narrow surfaces, a more extended interchange of intellectual influences grew up. Philosophy was less confined to the lecture-room, less associated with theological instruction, and drew more independently the attention of those best fitted for it.

§ 2. This also was the period to which science dates back its illustrious record. Since Copernicus, the names of those who have given themselves successfully to physical inquiry gather rapidly. Philosophy was, from the outset, much influenced, as it needs must be, by the empirical movement. One-half its problems are physical, and neither half can be discussed advantageously except in connection with a thorough knowledge of the physical world. Science has aided philosophy by directing attention more explicitly to the facts which call for explanation, by enforcing more exact and sober methods of inquiry, by establishing new criteria of success, by leading to different views of the nature of matter, by giving entirely new weight to the slow and orderly development of events, and by transferring inquiry from a speculative to a historic field. While science, with an immense balance of advantage, has aided philosophy, it has brought to it many immediate embarrassments. Its great successes have not only led to the partial displacement of philosophy, they have occasioned a feeling of contempt for the more obscure and less immediately fruitful form of investigation. The excess which always accompanies a ruling tendency has shown itself, with even more than wonted force. The methods and results of science have

been regarded as exclusive and final, and the hope has been entertained of banishing metaphysics, or of subjecting it, in its small remainder of truth, to physical forms of inquiry. The intoxication and bewilderment of success have never been shown in more ludicrous or in more painful forms than in the extreme doctrines of philosophy that have accompanied investigations primarily physical. Time is correcting, and will fully correct, these errors of precipitancy, and, with vastly increased knowledge of the material world, and thereby also of the intellectual world, we shall be prepared for their harmony in a universe completely comprehensive of them both.

§ 3. As was inevitable, decided unbelief sprang up in this period, and helped, at its own great cost, to break the yoke of dogma. Bruno (1548), a Dominican, who finally suffered martyrdom at Rome, is a favorable example of an unbelief which is in truth a higher form of belief. He caught clearly the new idea of matter which was being slowly given by science, asserted the identity of matter and inner force, regarded nature as the constant product of the Divine Presence, and the universe as the unfolding of the Supreme Reason, to the absolute exclusion of evil as a separate principle. The truths of astronomy, as presented in the beliefs of Bruno, infringed violently on the dogmas of the Church, and the Church was slow in learning, as it has been in each successive contest, that the letter being cheerfully surrendered, the spirit, in a freer, purer, more profound and helpful form, remains to it. The supreme moral force of the world is shown in the fact that, while it is so full of these pitiful collisions, each of them strikes out the divine fire.

§ 4. A last occasion of change in philosophy which we mention was the Reformation. This, also, was a very

complex fact, and in its speculative bearings freely mingled good and evil. It was a break with authority, and yet a very partial one. It was a fresh appeal to the minds and consciences of men, but one rapidly withdrawn when it began to take effect beyond the limits assigned it. Religion, though it raises the most profound questions we have occasion to answer, is primarily practical. Its popular precepts are of more moment than its speculative doctrines; its government of conduct than its guidance of thought. Men have not yet entered sufficiently into the largeness of reason to find it an absolute necessity, or to make a wise use of it. They seek safety in the shelter of authority, and cling to it as a protection against the weariness, erratic tendency, and futility of inquiry. The mind is yet so far short of its manhood that it can attain neither with generality nor constancy a manly use of its powers. Authority is habitual in religious action, partly because the leaders of men recognize its necessity, and yet more because they themselves, in their most independent efforts, still cling to a higher sanction, as they deem it, than that of reason. Few, very few, are yet able to see that nothing is lighter than light, holier than holiness, or more weighty than the verdict of truth; that the mind of God meets the minds of men in the brightness of revelation only as they act together in insight. Reason, from its own nature, can accept no limitations. As the largest and the best, it seeks to win all to itself. Reason is no other than the universal presence and push of the divine thought in us as in God.

The authority which the Reformation cast off was, as authority, more august and safe than that which it accepted. Its gains lay in breaking, at least for a moment, with authority, rather than in the new authority which it

set up. A book is less fit to rule men than a universal Church ; a creed than a historic movement. A book, and especially a book so open to diversity of exposition as the Bible, can only win authority through those who gather around it, interpret it, and administer it. Hence there spring up many divisions—a thing not unfortunate in itself—and each division—a thing most unfortunate—claims an absolute, an unequivocal right. Thus the authority of the book is loaned, in a most contradictory way, to all who set up in its name an ecclesiastical government ; while the rationality of the book itself is obscured by all the glosses which the most partial and inadequate interpretation puts upon it. Thus we have that very unfortunate rule in which the king is unapproachable, and his ministers affix his seal to their own rescripts. The actual thing and the formal thing are not the same. The authority urged on the consciences of men is the Word of God ; the pressure actually felt in their thoughts is some specific rendering of truth which owes its value to the modicum of reason that may chance to be in it. The inner reason of revelation is thus hidden from inquiry, and the unreason of the theologian is put in its place. The inadequacy of the entire method is disguised from those who take part in it by dividing reason against itself, by assenting to and denying its authority in one breath. The king is dethroned by his ministers, but constrained, as a last act of sovereignty, to make over his government to those who have undertaken to assume it. No other book, hardly the world itself, searches the human mind so diligently, so profoundly, with such varied and changing appeals to spiritual insight as the Bible. It must, like the world of which it is a spiritual record, abide with us individually, for a rendering constantly renewed

and deepened, or it slowly ceases to be to us a revelation. It kindles into light by the constant ignition of reason.

The universal Church in its historic growth eliminates the caprice of individuals; stands, in part at least, for the combined force of events, the evolution of truth under the manifold demands of life; and so, in its unity, perpetuity, actuality, may far better represent authority than any system of doctrines freshly rendered in a creed by a single sect. But the universal Church, not less than its sacred books, fails in its intrinsic weakness and manifold perversions to disclose the perfect truth. This is, in its infinite largeness, the constant pursuit and everlasting reward of individual minds.

The Reformation did much for philosophy by suddenly throwing open to thought fundamental questions. Though it took back its own gift, so far as it was able, by giving these questions a dogmatic answer. Yet neither could the question be asked nor the answer accepted without a great increase in the activity and freedom of thought. In a given case, men claimed and exercised a right which they were not yet willing to proclaim as a universal principle.

Since the Reformation reason has, with growing distinctness, asserted its ultimate right, not as against revelation, but as itself the medium of revelation. What the ether is to the light, that is reason to all truth. The authority we are to feel and to enforce is the authority of the only divine word, the word of truth. The Divine Spirit, in whose presence all revelation culminates, is the Spirit of Truth. The early defenders of liberty of thought strove to protect themselves from the authority of the Church by the authority of the Bible—by asserting two forms of truth, that dependent on revelation and

that which is the fruit of inquiry. Yet both of these, in all the uses of intellectual life, must make answer to identically the same powers and the same laws.

The Reformation did most for the spiritual problems of life by helping to renovate life itself, and so giving it more adequate data from which to draw its conclusions. It is the poverty of virtue within us that chiefly hides its power in the world about us. The twilight is so feeble as not to be a clear forecast of the coming day. Protestantism helped life in its practical, popular phases immensely. Its many subdivisions served to bring the truth more closely to each group of disciples, and enabled it to work in them a more personal renovation. It gained in special forms, as in Puritanism, a fresh hold on individuals. Though the analysis had not reached its ultimate atoms, had not liberated the person, it had broken up the mass into many groups, and so prepared the way for the next step. Protestantism seems to offer an unfortunate division of sentiment, but when the next stage shall have been reached, and the individual have attained his own vital force, the conditions will be present for larger, freer, and more fortunate combinations than ever before. When the primitive atoms are set at liberty, reunions of all sorts are open to us. Protestantism remains to be yet justified by the intellectual unity and freedom for which it is preparing the way.

CHAPTER II.

TRANSITIONAL PERSONS.

§ 1. Sir Francis Bacon (1561), hardly himself a philosopher, influenced very vigorously the change in direction of thought in connection with which modern philosophy has been developed. This change consisted in diverting the attention from metaphysical principles and directing it to facts, more particularly to physical facts. In its extreme form—and its form has become increasingly extreme as the result of its own progress—it casts contempt on metaphysics, which it identifies with speculative vagaries, as without value and without verification, and would confine inquiry, as it confines knowledge, to the sensuous world.

This transfer, as enforced by Bacon, though extreme in temper, stood for a greatly needed change. The theoretical tendency had so outstripped men's knowledge of the world as to have become unfruitful. They were striving to reach underlying principles without understanding the facts through which they were expressed. The realism of Plato was very influential in defining the method of investigation. The general contains all knowledge, and it exists prior to the particular. The particular is its partial and inadequate expression. This belief diverted attention from physical inquiries, and turned it to a definition of ideas within the mind itself. Aristotle modified

this doctrine by the assertion that the general exists only in the particular, and so prepared the way for physical investigation.

The conceptualist went much farther. He directed inquiry to particulars as the only form of substantial being, and to concepts as owing their existence and entire value to their correspondence with the common qualities found in particulars.

Bacon threw himself heartily into this effort to secure a change of base. In this lay his chief influence for good, that he gave efficient aid in strengthening a tendency whose conditions were ripe. He united to the largest intellectual endowments untiring enthusiasm for knowledge. He regarded all knowledge as his province. Yet his own contributions were more theoretical than practical, touched the methods of inquiry more than its data. His superiority lay in his general oversight of the field, rather than in any careful labor in any part of it. He was thus as much allied to the scholastic whom he was leaving as to the scientist whom he was approaching. He never gave in his adhesion to the Copernican theory.

He strengthened, with all his energy, empirical inquiry, and opposed the dogmatism which so easily allies itself with speculation. Speculation, divorced from facts, finds its tests of truth within the mind itself, and so leads to that peremptory assertion which is dogmatism.

Bacon maintained that religion and science should be kept apart. Science, associated with religion, gives rise to unbelief, and religion, associated with science, occasions extravagance. One is tempted to feel that he, with his large insight, accepted this statement in moral indolence, as a convenient protection of his own pursuits, and not as a clearly defined principle maintained within itself.

Science and religion both need, in mutual correction and enlargement, the very influences, each from each, which he implies in them. The too ready belief of religion—which by reaction in due time cuts down the limits of faith—imperatively calls for the clearer vision of science; and science, moving in too exterior and mechanical a way among mere phenomena, greatly needs to recognize the heat and freedom of spiritual life, in themselves facts of a higher order. The life of Bacon is a painful commentary on the separation which he thus advocated, between the outer and the inner circles of conduct and conviction.

Bacon, as opposed to the scholastic method and as enforcing inquiry, urged the necessity of overcoming prejudices. He enumerated these as the images—*idola*—of the tribe, the cave, the forum, and the theatre; illusions which are inwrought in our common methods of thought, illusions which belong to us as individuals, illusions which arise in connection with language, and illusions which are the result of tradition. This thorough and penetrating exposure of the misleading lights which surround the mind, always in order, was at that time urgently needed.

Bacon insisted on fruit as the only sufficient test of sound inquiry. Though his definition of fruit was a limited one, this insistency was wholly in the line of progress. All real knowledge will give us, in one direction or another, a better mastery of the conditions of life. Knowledge lies in the correspondence of our conceptions with some permanent subject-matter to which they pertain. The permanence, however, of the object of knowledge may arise either in connection with physical existence or in connection with convictions which are the enduring possession of the human mind, evoked in it by

these physical facts. Bacon failed to recognize, as shown by his slight esteem of mathematics and of logic, the full value of those mental solvents which the mind brings to every discussion. The excessive swing of empiricism was felt by him, as by those who came after him.

§ 2. Descartes (1596), born in Touraine, spent his earlier life in France and his later life in Netherlands, which gave more freedom to speculative inquiry. He was eminent in mathematics and physics as well as in philosophy, and saw considerable service as a soldier. The affiliation of mathematical truth with the acceptance of primitive beliefs may be seen in him. He had, as a philosopher, to encounter dogmas no longer maintained with fresh conviction, the light esteem of religious beliefs by men of affairs, and the more determined and growing unbelief incident to physical inquiry. He felt, therefore, the need, in the defence of truth, of laying anew the foundations of knowledge. He wished to test the validity of that mass of beliefs which men had come to hold under such a variety of obscure and accidental causes. He assumed the attitude of universal doubt, not that he might attack the defences of faith, but that he might see in what new and sufficient way they could be defended. Doubt, with him, was simply a preparation for wiser and firmer belief.

He reasoned in this way: This universal doubt remains with me, as the very substance of the act by which I call in question current opinion. It, therefore, cannot be involved in doubt, but must be the basis of doubt. Hence arose his first conclusion: I think, therefore I am. The present fact of doubt removes beyond doubt the existence of the mind that entertains it. But the acceptance of myself as a thinking agent carries with it my

other conscious experiences, as those of perception. I know these, on their subjective side, precisely as I know my distrust. Hence the mind is arrived at as an indubitable fact in its own inner circle of experiences. On no other terms can I make anything of unbelief itself.

But among these mental experiences is a conviction of the being of God. This conviction must have an adequate cause. The mind itself is not a sufficient cause for so transcendental an idea. Hence it must be referred to God himself, who has awakened it in me. Thus the existence of God becomes a second indubitable truth.

But if God is, then the powers which he has given me must be trustworthy in their legitimate lines of action. That which they affirm with distinctness they must also affirm with correctness. I am, therefore, entitled to a third comprehensive assertion, that human knowledge, open to progress within itself, is valid. Hence the mind may go forth to hopeful inquiry and assured truth.

The primary assertions of Descartes can hardly be said to have been very influential, otherwise than by opening wide the door to free thought. There is an odd admixture in them of the easy and the difficult, the certain and the doubtful. Our primary convictions are so simple and so absolute that they are liable to suffer loss and confusion by any exposition of them. Weaker truths are introduced into our lengthened statements.

The last of the above assertions, made dependent on the other two, is the trustworthiness of our own powers. But these same powers have been relied on in the reasoning which establishes them, and must, therefore, have been antecedently trusted as a condition of its correctness. That which is wisely doubted must be proved by some test which reaches beyond itself. If we think that

one is deceiving us, we can hardly accept his own statement that this is not the case. By no possibility can we distrust, with any absolute doubt, our own faculties, and afterward, by any process of reasoning, restore our faith in them. That faith must first be renewed as the condition of solidity and safety in all the steps of proof. Confidence in our own powers is the eternal postulate of all thought.

Descartes should, therefore, have started where he left off, the irrationality of disbelieving the clear and uniform declarations of the human mind. Disbelief at this point is absurd and contradictory, since it affirms and denies in the same breath the same thing. To disbelieve is to believe. We cannot deny unless we can also affirm, since the difference between negation and affirmation is formal, not substantial. Reason is transparent through and through, and establishes by its own force its own convictions. To look beyond itself for its authority is to be irrational, since such an action throws the mind upon the futile effort of seeking an ultimate and denying it when it is offered. It is of the very nature of reason to be satisfied with its own insight. This is to be rational. The mind is regnant on this condition and this only. It reigns by reigning.

Moreover, the first assertion of Descartes involves the last. *Cogito ergo sum* is not simply a statement of a fact of consciousness, but is also a statement of the simplest principles involved in it, the principle that phenomena imply a seat or source. The affirmation that I am, is thus nothing other than the affirmation of the correctness of the action of those mental powers by which I affirm it. This is the sole significancy of the statement. Without this force, the assertion becomes a mere phenomenon

among other phenomena. Mathematical reasonings are mental phenomena equally with dreams. Are they more than phenomena, to wit, truths? That question is answered by a distinction of powers and a belief in powers. When I affirm the *ego*, I affirm the powers which compose it. The fundamental faith from which there is no escape, which doubt itself does not avoid if it has the consistency of an assertion, is trust in our own powers.

The second indubitable principle, far from being among primary and simple impressions, involves many complex, changeable, and remote ideas. While the notion of spiritual being finds early entrance to human thought, and readily reaches, in surrounding and inner experiences, the grounds of conviction, this conception only passes very slowly, or, rather, is always passing, into that of the Divine Being in his infinite wealth of life. The proof of his existence shifts its form and force with the entire growth of knowledge. This idea, like a revolving light, seen across wide stretches of angry ocean, comes and goes, gains in clearness and is lost utterly, according to the course the anxious mariner is pursuing, the mists that are driving by, and its own laws of change. The growth of the conception of God, and of our belief in him, covers the history of all spiritual development, is the slow gathering of intellectual light into one focus of revelation. It is, therefore, very far from being a first term in consciousness, demanding, in its completeness, especial explanation. The difference between later and earlier discussions in philosophy, between empirical and speculative methods, gathers distinctness at this very point, the effort to trace our more complex notions through their stages of growth. Our idea of God, whatever it

may be, must be justified by the presentation of his attributes in the world about us, and, therefore, calls for no supernatural origin.

Of the various processes of thought, difficult to verify because of their scope and complexity, the most difficult is this belief in the being of God. Yet Descartes laid hold of it as so certain within itself as to be fittingly set up as one of the three pillars that were to support all knowledge.

The ideas involved in the first assertion, I think, therefore I am, though of the most simple character, have tasked modern philosophy to its utmost, in a search for their origin and validity. The chief problem of later inquiry has been found in the source of these notions, consciousness, causation, existence, on which this and like assertions turn. The effort, on the part of Descartes, to define fundamental truth, disclosed the need of more exact definition and discriminating analysis. The chief merit of Descartes lay in the effort he made to attain ultimate truth rather than in the exact form of that effort, and in the ready use he made of primitive terms of thought. Descartes helped himself forward over obscure and difficult places by a tacit acceptance of innate ideas. He then proceeded, at the earliest moment, to win authority for human beliefs from the veracity of God. This being conceded, certainty attaches to the ideas and processes which he has impressed on the mind. His philosophy, therefore, in spite of the bold search for fundamental truth with which it starts out, soon takes refuge in religious faith. It is our convictions on this side that steady and confirm inquiry. The first spurt of reason is exhausted in finding its way to God. Yet there is no consistency in such a method.

We must make a true beginning, either in ourselves or in God. If God finds us, then we must abide in his light. If we find him, then ultimate trust is in our own reason. Is not the truth rather this? our fellowship with God is one of reason, and God finds us, and we him, in a fellowship of truth which involves throughout self-sustaining and guiding light. The process is rational in all its stages, and so accepts a rational reference. We—a veritable we—live and move and have our being in God. The reason of God arises in and under our own reason.

The notion of innate ideas, which Descartes entertained as indisputable bequests to knowledge, necessarily drew attention at once in critical inquiry, and became, in its acceptance or rejection, a distinctive feature of philosophy. The untiring discussion by which this question has been brought down to our own time well discloses how much argument and insight are called for to secure changes of position in starting points that may seem very trivial. The notion of ideas, as complete terms of knowledge, remaining with us from a previous experience, or directly awakened in us by God, has been displaced by the inquiries, What are the powers of mind? How far is it active, and how far is it passive, in knowing? What, occasion being given, does it furnish to the processes of thought, and what does it receive from the objects of thought?

On these questions there has virtually been a change of sides in the schools of philosophy. The empiricist holds that the mind, in its extreme passivity, bears down with it by inheritance impressions which define the forms and outlines of knowledge—impressions closely allied to the innate ideas of Descartes. The intuitionist affirms that the power of knowing is preëminently active, ra-

tional ; and, no matter what expansion it may experience by growth, that it remains, in its radical characteristics, a putting forth of a primitive, distinct energy in living insight. Descartes helped to precipitate this discussion. His difficulty, and the difficulty of his time, lay very much in leaving the mind too passive under the action of God. God's reason is not thrust upon us, but rises within us, and is always and ever our reason. A unity of thought does not obliterate a distinction of personalities.

A second point in which Descartes and the Cartesians who followed him strongly influenced subsequent philosophy was the relation of matter and mind. His belief tended to extreme dualism. Matter and mind stood over against each other in a very separate and incommunicable way. This question is fundamental in our apprehension of the universe, What are the relations of matter and mind to each other? Ancient and mediæval philosophy handled it in a wearisome—how much philosophy is wearisome, groping its way among inquiries which awaken thought, but are beyond its grasp—discussion of the relation of the general and the particular. The general stood for ideas, mind ; the particular stood for sensuous experience, matter. To interlock these two in a living way without dwarfing either, it found a most perplexing problem. Conclusions which at first seemed satisfactory, traced a little farther, led to the loss of one or other of the two terms, or a hopeless separation of them. Thus the doctrine of Aristotle seemed the best-balanced statement. The general and the particular have inseparable and substantial being in and with each other—a notion not far from that of Spinoza. Yet this assertion lands us in mysticism. We virtually affirm a union in

space of distinct elements, and, when we undertake to specify that which belongs to one and the other, we deny it again. We waver between difference and identity, till we make nothing of either. Sensuously the particular absorbs the general; intellectually the general absorbs the particular; and we are compelled to go back to a distinct statement of each, under its own presentations, before we can make anything of them. The material remains material, and the intellectual intellectual, in spite of all our fusion.

Modern philosophy puts this question—at least, this is the form which it is constantly assuming—as the relation of reason to law: Does law inhere in reason, or is reason itself one of the expressions of law? Law finds its most universal exponent in physical relations. Is this its primary exponent? Reason involves conscious relations, and so inheres in the activity of mind. Is this fact the true ultimate? Do all construction, all exposition, rest here, or do they arise in mind as it were from a deeper depth, so that reason itself, in reference to order, is secondary and phenomenal, the seats of law being hidden in the opaqueness and darkness of things? Whence does light come? One makes answer, From mind. Another makes answer, From matter. One affirms it arises from reason, which can alone receive it. Another declares, It inheres in law, which can alone retain it.

Mediæval philosophy also handled this question as a discussion of the government of God and the freedom of men. Pure spirit was, to the theologian, represented in God only. Man was deeply involved in the physical world, with which he is associated. Is he so involved in it, and are enveloping circumstances so pressed upon him by the divine will, as to completely contain his life and

exhaust its possibilities? These questions cannot be answered otherwise than by a distinct affirmation of the nature of mind and of matter. Before we can affirm liberty, we must deepen this division between physical and intellectual activity. Intelligence, spirit, must stand here, and physical things there. Man must win his liberty with God, and matter must sink into an intermediate term, open to the uses of both.

This discussion, worn so threadbare as that of the freedom of the will, appears in modern thought as the conflict of the natural and the supernatural. Physical laws, in their exactness and unchangeableness, stand for the natural, and all intervention of mind for the supernatural. The struggle goes on between the two, as science, as religion, as philosophy; with a determined effort, on the one hand, to make the causal relation all-inclusive, and, on the other hand, to supplement it and complete it in the independent connections of reason. The most fundamental point, therefore, we are always touching in philosophy, is the relation of matter to mind, reason to law, comprehension to order. If comprehension is the shadow of an order which inheres in things, then we reach one result; if order is the light which follows in the wake of comprehension, we attain a very different conclusion.

Descartes, though not himself reaching the full force of his doctrine, led his disciples to an absolute dualism, which has given occasion to revolt after revolt in untenable forms of monism. Unity is the fruit of all successful inquiry. The mind, in satisfaction of its own rational impulses, pursues it with unwearied effort everywhere. How shall it be attained in the widest field of all, that of universal being? This is the one absorbing question of philosophy, and has been put with renewed vigor because

of the dualism contained in the doctrines of Descartes. Thought and extension he regarded as attributes of incommunicable substances. He thus made the most of the mystery, so-called, of the interaction of matter and mind. It became the turning-point of his philosophy, and a constant demand for some more admissible solution of the problem.

A false idea of mystery arises at this point. Knowledge necessarily has limits, and we are tempted to call these limits, one and all, mysterious, as darkness is mysterious in contrast with light. But this is only a popular and childish use of language. Reason, in entire consistency with itself, recognizes its own laws, and that these laws involve certain limitations. This fact is not mysterious. Mystery is present only in connection with intervening spaces, which ought to be coherently covered by the web of thought, and are not so united. It is not the ultimate that is unintelligible, mysterious, but relations, as yet untraced, that lie within it. Ultimate terms arise necessarily, are accepted distinctly as the starting-points of reason, and share the light of all its processes. The properties of an element, for example, are not mysterious. Our knowledge begins with them, and if not with these particular elements, then with some other elements. We might as well say that the taper which gives us light is an obscure term in our experience, because we are not looking at it by a light other than its own. The relation between a first and second experience in the progress of mind may seem to us obscure, if we try to contemplate it under other relations than those in which it offers itself, to transform an immediate sequence into an intermediate one. Our error lies in pushing against a limit as if it were not a limit. The true comprehending

process is, in these cases, found in a determination of boundaries, and in accepting them as fast as we find them.

Thus the connection between a thought and a feeling, or between a volition and the physical activities which follow it, is not, in any proper sense, obscure or mysterious, if it is ultimate. All our processes of thought lie within these and like connections, and cannot, from the nature of the case, enclose them. First terms must be rationally, cheerfully accepted, not as something forced upon us, but as something given to us, germinal to all truth. Whenever we are dealing with phenomena in their sequences, whether in the physical world or the mental world, or in the union of the two, and learn the order of their succession, we must needs be satisfied with it. It is the very thing we are in search of. We cannot forever insert between events intervening events. Even if we could, the relation of each of these to those that touch it on either hand would still share that unwise mystery that we have cast over the whole movement. The success of our pursuit of knowledge is found in reaching these very ultimates. We shall find occasion to shift ultimates, but never to set them aside. We deny, then, that there is any mystery, in any sense that makes of it a philosophical difficulty, in the action of mind on matter, or of matter on mind. This connection offers an example simply of ultimate dependencies, which we are meeting everywhere.

That the two sets of phenomena occur under different form-elements does not affect the force of our conclusion. A physical event takes place in space; a mental event in consciousness. But space and consciousness are no more exclusive of each other than they are inclusive of each

other. To assert exclusion is to give them both space relations. They are simply different. Difference does not exclude interaction, it makes it only the more significant. Mind, in acting on matter, is not acting where it is not, for the dependencies of place are simply inapplicable to it. We have no terms of thought which render the interaction of mind and matter impossible, while experience affirms it every moment. This relation is an ultimate, and as admissible as any other ultimate.

Having gratuitously placed this impassable gulf between the two forms of being, Descartes was compelled to look about for some way of uniting them, and necessarily found no satisfactory method of restoring a connection whose primitive form he had denied. He regarded the pineal gland as the seat of the soul, and the point of interaction between it and the body. But this view was only possible because his thought had not cleared itself. Incommunicable entities are not helped by a pineal gland. They cannot touch each other in it as an intermediate term. It belongs wholly on one side of the dividing line.

Nor could his physiological theory be helped out by his religious faith. He wished to unite the two worlds by the intervention of God. Our knowledge of the physical world, he thought, and our power over it, come to us by the divine mediation. This belief, in the hands of Geulinx (1625), became the doctrine of "occasional causes." Occasion being given by our volition, God causes the physical actions which follow; and occasion being given by material objects, God awakens in us the sensations associated with them.

This belief was further modified by Malebranche (1638), an amiable and dreamy ecclesiastic, into a literal rendering of the assertion, We live and move and have

our being in God ; we participate in the consciousness of God, and so enter into knowledge and power by him. Thus a retreat from dualism was opened up on the side of idealism. Idealism would readily flow from such a doctrine. We can no more ascribe to the action of God than to that of man the power to effect a union between perfectly heterogeneous entities. The two must be absorbed and softened in the nature of God, and this can be accomplished only by idealism. In the meanwhile, the difficulty is not in the least relieved by assigning to the intervention of God an interaction, which is in itself impossible. This is merely confounding thought by omnipotence.

Malebranche associated with the belief of our union to the world of knowledge in God a doctrine of considerable interest, when it is made to rest on a more independent basis, that of the constant activity of the mind. Our view of the nature of the mind and of its relation to the body will be somewhat modified if we regard its activity as constant within itself, and not as liable to complete arrest in subjection to states of the body. The proof of this activity must be chiefly empirical, and can hardly be absolute.

The consequences of Descartes' doctrine of dualism came slowly out, and were found more and more inadmissible. He regarded animals as automata, a cunning mechanism of sensibilities played upon by the outward world. This doctrine was at a later period applied to man by De la Mettrie. The inconsistencies in the philosophy of Descartes became increasingly obvious. If the sensibilities of the animal are so associated with the body as to be simply a device for its government, like sensibilities in man lose their spiritual character. We

have, in an extreme form, that separation between sensuous states and intellectual ones which appeared in the philosophy of Aristotle, and which breaks up the unity of the mind within itself. If the soul is without extension, it ought not to be able to find contact with the brain, even at a single point. Neither would this contact be of any moment when secured, if the two are incommunicable in nature.

What is possible to God, to wit, action both in matter and in mind, cannot, from any intrinsic difficulty, be impossible to man. The gulf between the two must, after all, be capable of being bridged. Is it not, then, just as probable that God has given this power of intervention, under fixed conditions, to man, as to suppose that he has laid upon himself the mechanical connections of the world, and that, too, in the face of all appearances? This supposition reduces the universe to deception and thimble-rig. Such weakness of method is out of harmony with the magnitude of the Maker. Man is enclosed in relations which render his life almost visionary. The system is one of arbitrary dependencies.

Descartes missed in ethics the one great advantage which his doctrine of innate ideas should have conferred upon him. He regarded the right, not as an eternal law of reason, but as dependent on the will of God. He thus became a timid moralist, disposed to pay much deference to custom and law. The golden mean comes easily to be regarded as the path which the many are pursuing. There has been a strong theological tendency to exalt God by setting him over against his works, made insignificant by the majesty of his presence. The glory of God must keep company with his power, wisdom, and grace in his works.

§ 3. From this time on in philosophy the controlling effort has been to reach some form of monism. Scarcely any speculation escapes from it, as a determining tendency, in its inner exposition of its own doctrines. If the inquirer gives himself, as he thinks, to a simple study of facts, as in physiological psychology, the clew of relations is still supplied by a desire to bring the very distinct phenomena of matter and of mind under one form of expression. This tendency to monism—oneness of substance and of law—arises from a wrong apprehension of what sound reason desires. Its search is not for monism, but for unity. If we were to attain to a one, identical with itself throughout, we could never, by means of it, win again the two. We should have utterly ruined ourselves by our success. Diversity, real, not formal; significant, not accidental, is as much a necessity of thought as is unity; nay, more than unity, since no claim for unity can arise except in the presence of this diversity. Monism is the loss of the primary term of construction; through it, of the secondary term of construction; and through them both, of the whole process with which we have been so long and so diligently occupied. Plurality of terms is as essential to a universe as plurality of methods. We can have no complexity without the various elements that are framed into it in their manifold properties and dependencies. It is the same sort of folly to endeavor to wipe out the first fundamental division of things and actions by which we get to ourselves two eternal terms of construction in the universe, as it would be to reduce elements in chemistry to one by arbitrary hypotheses, and with no power to restore the diversity lost in the process. It is not only the most direct test of knowledge to accept ultimates, elements; it is a necessity

of knowledge, since knowledge lies in relations, these very relations which diverse qualities give us. If we resolve differences into purely formal dependencies, our knowledge becomes so illusory as by no means to correspond to the rugged facts of experience. When we seem to have grasped the last term in knowledge, knowledge itself melts away before the eye like a dissolving mist. Monism and dualism, an absolute one and an absolute two, are equally opposed to truth. An absolute one or an absolute two cannot give conditions of construction. Not one, because all relations are lost in its homogeneity. Precisely in the measure of that homogeneity distinctions disappear. Not two, because each, by the supposition, stands out of relation to the other, and for building purposes we have not two. In dualism, matter is not a product of mind, nor mind a product of matter. Both are eternally diverse and absolutely independent modes of being, and can, therefore, stand on no terms of construction—unless it be purely mechanical ones—with each other. They are impenetrable to each other, cannot so much as collide with each other, while their apparent connections are the strangest of illusions. We have two pillars on which to build up our universe, only we cannot embrace them both in the same field of vision. Whatever we lay upon one is wholly lost to the other.

If we are, then, to reach unity, we must have primitive differences that are related to each other, elements that can act upon each other, ends that can be concurred in by diverse processes. The wider the separation, the deeper the unity. This necessity excludes monism and dualism alike. Our one must be distinctly two, our two must be concurrently one. This condition is met in matter and mind. The universe is simple and apprehensible

by means of the very fact that its first division is a bifurcation under terms that are not only harmonized with each other, but carry harmony to all later divisions. Mind remains forever mind by virtue of its own irresolvable phenomena; matter, forever matter, by its distinct laws. The two together, not by separation, but by interpenetration, not by equality of relations, but by subordination, give us a universe which gains material expression and is full of spiritual power. This division is the deepest possible, that which lies between distinct form elements, between space and consciousness—the letter and the spirit. Reason appears in the phenomena of mind, and reappears in those of matter—our experience reiterates this in a limited way—as directly or indirectly the ruling law in both. When we reach the profoundest union in reason, and the widest diversity and variety in its distinct modes of expression, we have a universe in its sensuous magnificence and in its mental force. Our unity lies back of our universe, is deeper than it, is no monism of things that subdues and deadens their differences, as water is frozen into crystals, but a union of ideas widening out into grander and grander fulfilments. Our approach to union is always an ascension, a penetration, into the very life of things, into reason.

The universe that philosophy has so assiduously sought in ways so diverse, by assimilating mind to matter or matter to mind, or by uniting them in one common substance, has resulted, and must ever result, in confusion, inevitable and all-absorbing. The mist spreads over the entire heavens and settles so low on the earth that we lose vision of our own hands and feet. The monism of inclusion, the inclusion of all in one substance, in one law of being, has always resulted in a most unempirical

and contradictory interchange of activities between mind and matter. Take the effort to reach monism when it has turned in an empirical direction. Unable to dispense with intellectual qualities, this philosophy has slowly and insensibly transferred them to matter, so that matter is made to do the work of mind, with no added clearness, but fresh confusion rather. We have the same ultimate, inscrutable qualities, only we now have them where our experience has not placed them, instead of where it has placed them. The extent to which the activities of mind, by insensible but continuous transfer, are filched from the spirit, to reappear as the native endowments of matter, is very astonishing. Having lost a soul in man, we replace it by a thousand souls in atoms, more variously and wonderfully endowed.

The same is true, though somewhat less obviously so, when the movement is in the opposite direction. Sensuous phenomena, ultimate facts of experience, are very lamely resolved into logical processes—distinctions—associated with them, and which grow out of them. The general, a mental product, has the power of begetting the particular. The distinguishing process furnishes the objects distinguished by it. This development, no longer that of pure intelligence, becomes correspondingly necessary, inevitable, lapsing under the law of causation. The flow of reason and the flow of events become indistinguishable. Having lost matter we sacrifice mind in restoring it.

What is all this but subverting experience, and arresting the growth of knowledge in the most arbitrary and confusing way? Intellectual activity is most comprehensible where we find it in direct experience, in mind; it is least comprehensible where we have no experi-

ence of it, in matter. There is here, certainly, opportunity for confusion, easy confusion and great confusion, and for this reason we should cling closely and tenaciously to those terms of life which give us the empirical clews of knowledge. The ultimate outcome of knowledge should conform to the general ideas under which it has grown up. Mental phenomena and physical phenomena should lie forever distinct—the one in consciousness, the other in space—in our processes of comprehension, because they have lain so in the entire progress of our experience. The initial step in this subversion of knowledge is found in recognizing a subconscious region as a seat of true mental action—a region admittedly beyond all experience, as it is open neither to intellectual insight nor to sensuous inquiry, has no position either in space or consciousness. It is a hypothesis that cannot be illustrated in terms of experience, and thus it brings confusion and leads to still further confusion. If the relations which belong to matter and mind beyond the scope of our experience are under consideration, they should conform, in general principles, to those that lie within that experience; otherwise our theories become arbitrary and disjointed, carrying with them only the shadow of ideas. Monism, either as materialism or idealism, steadily deadens knowledge, reduces in force all those divisions which have made the world intelligible to us, and slowly transfers activities from the sources in which we are familiar with them, and the methods under which we find them, to other agents and other forms of expression. Such a philosophy is not, therefore, no matter what it may be called, empirical, but speculative and visionary. Knowledge loses coherence within itself and hold on the mind. It is not strange that such

systems do not carry conviction beyond the minds which conceive them. They have no affiliation elsewhere with habits of thought, ordinary methods of reason. Reason must be coherent; this is its force.

In connection with this break in experience, and in consequence of it, language, in the speech of monism, becomes illusory and misleading. It no longer means what it is wont to mean, it no longer conforms to surrounding facts. It gathers images and dependencies in one region, and applies them in another alien to them. As this change of meanings has arisen slowly and unconsciously, few are fully aware of it. Most glide along on a thin connection of words, like a skater on a film of ice, not in the least observant of the abysses of danger and uncertainty that may at any moment open beneath them. Schemes of philosophy that profess to have been wrought out in closest connection with experience thus become prodigious products of logomachy. If their statements could be distinctly restored to familiar language in its familiar uses, they would seem so far off from ordinary forms of thought as to be wholly inadmissible. The experience of the philosopher becomes like that of the aeronaut. He reports marvellous adventures and strange conditions of action; he dwells upon these unusual terms of experience, till they gain a sense of certainty and safety wholly alien to the feelings of his fellow-men, very few of whom ever travel with him these undefined paths, whose way-marks are never renewed. Herein are the illusions of philosophy, which have provoked, not without reason, the scorn of sober and consecutive minds.

§ 4. The dualism of Descartes so disjointed the intellectual world that it was at once followed by an effort to restore unity. This came not by a quiet return to ex-

perience, but as an extreme form of monism. Spinoza (1632) was of Jewish extraction. He spent his life in Holland, chiefly at Amsterdam and at The Hague. His philosophy gives us the most simple form of monism and pantheism. If these doctrines were to prevail, they could hardly offer themselves in a more direct way. His system, were it not for its first immediate contradictions of experience, would be the clearest and most succinct statement of the inner relation of things. It covers the whole ground with marvellous consistency, and sweeps away the distractions of ordinary philosophical and theological discussion with remorseless consistency. One can understand the intense enthusiasm of the mind which conceived it, and made its conclusions seem real to it. The man was thoroughly enclosed in his scheme. He spun it out of his own bowels—if we may for a moment restore the word to the early use in which it was associated with the spiritual sensibilities—as absolutely as the silkworm his cocoon. His philosophy has recently drawn to itself fresh attention. His centenary was kept in 1877. One may say that his character was swallowed up in his philosophy, and bore the same simple, direct, constant impress. This seemed to be the relation, rather than the more ordinary one in which lines of thought follow character. He affords a striking example of the connection of character with the tension and sincerity of one's spiritual activity, with slight reference to any absolute correctness in it. He was said to be "a God-intoxicated man;" yet, to most he seems to have missed the very substance of the divine idea and of the life which it infolds.

Spinoza regarded extension and thought as attributes of one substance, and that one substance, in its eternal unfolding, is God. The two, extension and thought, are

inseparable. A thought corresponds to each form of extension, and extension to every expression of thought. The two forever run parallel and reflect each other. God exists in this movement, and in no way aside from it. This evolution is a necessity of the terms involved in it, and so a necessity of the divine nature. Man is the highest expression of these unfolding terms. He, therefore, no more than the causal energies in which he is involved, possesses liberty. The knowledge of the senses is partial and confused, as compared with that of the intuitions. It is less evolved, more primary, than this higher insight of the spirit.

This theory, weighed by itself, is very complete and coherent. The difficulty with it is that it stands in violent contradiction with the first terms of our experience. While, therefore, its inner force has given it much influence in philosophy, it has made no progress in two centuries as an accepted term in general knowledge. With all its symmetry and fructifying force in the mind which begat it, it has dropped dead, with no power of general propagation. The product of a dialectic imagination, it has no more hold on life, no more weight of truth, than the tales of a sensuous fancy.

We do not find extension the constant accompaniment of thought, nor thought in immediate union with things. The only fact that approaches this statement and gives color to it is that things are orderly, have in them, for the most part, an inner arrangement of reason, and that reason sets itself at work at once on things. But the two statements are far away from each other, as interpreted by the accumulated experience of mankind. Thought has its own exclusive existence in consciousness, quite detached from extension; and extension has its exclusive

existence in space, wholly separate from thought as a conscious, vital process. Before we can accept the statement of Spinoza, we must overlook the very substance of thought, the conscious, coherent action of reason within itself; or, rather, we must accept it and deny it at the same time. We must accept it as the highest expression of thought, to wit, in man; we must deny it as any necessary characteristic of thought in its inferior forms, to wit, in the crystal. We thus are called on to merge the highest and lowest movements in each other, to identify things, actions, at the farthest possible remove from each other, to swallow up all the differences of experience in an unintelligible homogeneity, and so to reach a philosophy. When a stone rolls down a declivity, and an artist conceives and executes a statue, we are to recognize one identical movement, inclusive of the same attributes, extension and thought. Things which are arranged constructively, words which express ideas, are made to contain thought in the same certain way as the mind itself. Thoughts which occupy the mind intensely, yet gain no expression in the world of things, are made to involve extension as much as the life of a plant. In spite of all the ingenuities of speech, in spite of all its confusions, the fundamental assertion of Spinoza flatly and extendedly contradicts experience, and so subverts the first terms of thought that are wrought into the entire framework of knowledge. If we are willing to overlook this difficulty, and proceed as if it did not exist, we shall doubtless find much to delight us, and nothing to peremptorily check us, in our airy movement. It is the first step that tells in errors of thought as in errors of conduct. To identify extension and thought, matter and mind, as coequal and coeternal attributes of one substance, virtually wipes the

board clean of all we have hitherto traced upon it, and leaves us to begin anew the problem of philosophy.

The apparent reverence which accompanies this system is, within itself, illusory. Man becomes the highest development of reason; the movement of thought is in him most clear and distinct. He is, by virtue of the entire progress of things, the most advanced product of the world. He marches in front. The wisdom and grace of God are not simply best expressed in him, they reach their own fulness, their own consciousness, in him. Not only is the transition of thought, from its marvellous perfection among things into a higher stage of expression in consciousness, unexplained;—indeed, simple continuity of movement is thought, for some unrendered reason, to dispense with all explanation—not only, considering the range in reason of the universe and the range of man's powers in comprehension, are we left at a loss to understand why this transfer should be regarded as a passage into a higher phase of being; the majesty of God is summed up in the mechanical movement of physical things, in the unconscious, or half-conscious, instincts of living things, in the obscure—how very obscure—thoughts of men. The universe was not to Spinoza the first intelligible syllable in a sentence already complete to the mind uttering it, it was an inarticulate cry, slowly struggling toward articulation; it was not a fact afloat on reason, it was a blind pushing of reason into light. The God to whom the mind of Spinoza was ever bowing in worship, was, after all, found, in his highest expression, in Spinoza himself.

The illusion of language can hardly go further than in this philosophy of pantheism. Spinoza is to be regarded as, in a high degree, the victim of his own enchantments

of speech. Language has won its real significancy on the tongues of men who are profound, if not discriminating, believers both in matter and mind, both in man and God. Its words express, as matrices in the rock, wonderful and prolific life, and they must be interpreted as they have arisen, along these lines of spiritual development. To take these words of this lineage of the spirit, so buoyant with aspiration, and set them up simply to mark stages of physical unfolding along the sensuous world as it is and has been, is to mislead us in every way, is to turn into a milestone on a commercial highway a slab which is covered with the inscriptions of praise of a past generation. Men seem to do this, but do not really do it. Spinoza did not fully accomplish it. More and deeper meanings hang about the words, and flash, as an inner illumination, through the sentences, than belong to them in the service they are performing, and in the system of which they are a part.

In this philosophy the birth of a truth is simply the earliest expression of it. It perishes as soon as it passes from the mind. The roots of all spiritual things lie hidden in the physical world. Nothing rises out of it except to fall back at once into it. Life is no more than the bubble on the water, that dissolves the light and so for an instant gains color. Immortality is the perpetuity of the stream into which the bubble breaks. God is not a spiritual presence pervading all things, but only the things themselves, in their unexpounded, relentless, painful, and perplexing flow. The spirit is alone. Its strange endowments in consciousness serve simply to bring close about it the fears, solitudes, hopeless longings, of its situation. It is the forlorn hope of the universe, assailing in vain the physical conditions which envelop it.

These theories of Spinoza were, indeed, a spiritual intoxication, a whirl of conceptions which were the empty images of realities, and cut the mind off from any quiet possession of the world.

Everything with Spinoza was intense. His mind was trained to the highest activity. Pure intellectuality and pure spirituality were one and the same in him. No vice entered into his life to part them. His ethical system, though, like his philosophy, disembowelled of all ordinary organs, functions, duties of existence, retained, as it needs must, the old ring of words. Virtue, according to Spinoza, is a movement by which we harmonize our nature within itself and with our fellow-men. The highest attainable state is a clear consciousness of God, and of our relation to him. Yet, as there is no personality in God, no freedom in man, no stage of consciousness other than that which reflects the things about it, this language can only mean that we are to thoroughly feel the chill of the cold waters on which we are floating.

Spinoza strove to reduce moral principles to a demonstrative process. He thus became a victim to the mysticism of exact ideas. The facts, in their own complexity and variability, were not before him, but abstract concepts, the counters of his dialectics, by which he defined intellectual positions, and, for the moment, indicated their relations to each other. His definitions attempt to carry the insight of the mind beyond its real scope; his deductions from them become barren, and even lose logical coherence. Conceptions that are primarily dependent on facts cannot be held clear and firm without them. The demonstrative methods of mathematics are a constant snare to us, tempting us to seek the same rigidity of proof in handling ideas which are obscure and change-

able. Few men have more needed to have the inner world confronted with the outer one, to be stretched upon it and put to strain by it, than did Spinoza. He idealized philosophy, till he had lifted it far away from all the experience which it is called on to expound.

He also offers an example of the certainty with which mental laws are subjected to physical ones, when the two lines of development, spiritual and material, are taken up in one process. If extension and thought are attributes of one substance, then thought must often be nothing more than those causal relations which unite events. It then comes throughout to be but another expression of material dependencies, and disappears in its own spontaneous, primitive powers. Our false methods of synthesis succeed only by so impoverishing the universe as to reduce it to their own measurements.

§ 5. Leibnitz (1646) gives us the pivotal point of transition in Germany. In him, philosophy passed over to its modern form. He was a man of large attainments and practical penetration. He was born at Leipsic, and spent his life chiefly in public service under the Elector of Mayence and the Duke of Hanover. The beliefs of Leibnitz stood in immediate relation to those of Descartes and Spinoza, and were themselves very influential in later German philosophy.

The most urgent problem before him was the relation of matter and mind. The doctrines pressing on his attention were the dualism of Descartes, the monism of Spinoza, and the Aristotelian conception of the passive character of matter, something that is moved and does not move. The chief result of his long meditation on these questions was the monad. The word had been employed by Bruno to express an atom, infinitesimal in dimen-

sions, and combining mental and physical powers. Leibnitz uses it to express a point without dimensions, containing the germs of both relations. The monad, in the scheme of Leibnitz, was an indivisible, unextended substance. He arrived at this result by considering the infinite divisibility of matter. The ultimate, he thought, could not be reached and retained in any atom, however small, because the process of subdivision might pass beyond it. It would be an aggregate, just as certainly as the largest bodies. Moreover, such an atom would have no true unity; an aggregation is not a unit. He therefore regarded his ultimate, his monad, as without extension. In opposition to Aristotle, he thought matter to be active as well as passive. The physical world is not, in construction, simply mechanical. An inner energy guides and governs it. In disagreement with Descartes, each of his monads combines two elements, force and idea; the idea the law of the force, the force the expression of the idea. There are as many kinds of monads as there are diverse forms of things, and each monad has its own appetency, which may be obscure or clear, wholly instinctive or wholly rational. There is every gradation of ideas, as regards distinctness, and an idea can, therefore, be obscurely present in things wholly material. Physical existence and intellectual existence are not, therefore, distinct from each other. Leibnitz would have been at one with Spinoza in his assertion of monism, had he not denied extension to the monad. His notion of substance was closely allied to the idea entertained of the soul. The notion of ultimates is to be developed on this side. These primitive monads are closely analogous in nature to each other, reflect each other, and reflect the entire universe. The perfect monad, pure activity, pure

idea, is God. Other monads are fulgurations of God. There is a complete gradation of monads from those which constitute material objects to those which compose pure spirit. Extended bodies are made up of an aggregate of ultimate monads, and living bodies combine under one living monad.

Monads do not act directly on each other. The mind does not affect the body, nor the body the mind. All monads are independent centres of force, fixed in amount and direction. They have no power to impart influence or to receive it. Thus, the notion of the Cartesian was extended—and with equal reason—to all monads, notwithstanding their common construction and close gradation. Each monad is ordered within itself in reference to all other monads, and so moves in absolute harmony with them. This is the doctrine of “preëstablished harmony,” a harmony that rests back for its maintenance on the one pure, perfect monad, God.

Descartes had made a decided step in advance in asserting the permanently distinct nature of matter and mind, the one involving extension, the other thought. Unfortunately the value of this statement was much impaired by the accompanying doctrine of the absolute incommunicability of the two. Spinoza had reaffirmed their constant interpenetration, but, in turn, had marred his statement by denying their distinct nature. They were simply inseparable attributes of one substance. Leibnitz retained the unity of Spinoza, but established it, not in the unity of substance, but in the unity of ideas—ideas with every diversity of distinctness, but always concurrent in method, and ever resting back on the one absolute idea, God. Here, virtually, is the only basis of unity. Unity is not a coherence of existence, either in

space or time; it is only and always a coherence of relations in the reason. Leibnitz, in the spirit of Descartes, narrowed down this unity of reason in a very gratuitous way by denying all reactions between monads. The universe is not a web, it is a floating skein of threads held tightly in one hand.

Accept the fundamental distinction of Descartes; lay hold of the unity of idea offered by Leibnitz; grant the easy interaction conceded by Spinoza; cast aside the mechanism of them all, and we have at once the diversity which is affirmed in our daily experience, and that gathering of all things into one which is the inextinguishable desire, the unending labor, of reason.

The system of Leibnitz, taken by itself, is inadmissible, not simply because of its want of coherence within itself, but because it stands so widely out of relation with human experience, which all philosophy must include and expound. The movement in each monad, in the human mind, is a dumb show, and not the real progress of events which it seems to be. We are dependent for the validity of facts, not on our own painstaking processes, our own powers of penetration, but on a divine harmony by which different events keep pace with each other. Leibnitz aptly likened the universe to clocks that keep time with each other, though in no way united. All is mechanism, and events are struck off, each with each, with no more interdependence than have the wheels of the different clocks either with themselves or with the movements of the solar system. Such a conception is but the impalpable and distorted shadow of the world in which we live. It is not strange that Leibnitz believed that all thinking could, with proper care, be reduced to reckoning. A movement of this sort, like the running of

railroad trains by a starter, should be capable of numerical expression in a time-table.

Though Leibnitz conceived his system in rejection of a purely mechanical view of the universe, it still retained a taint of this most crude method of exposition. His unity is not the pure unity of idea, but the unity of a monad which has no clear, apprehensible standing either in the physical or the spiritual world. Out of unextended monads he constructs an extended universe. Under the notion of infinite divisibility, the mind, in search of the ultimate, is pushed into an unintelligible position, and then finds its way back again into the world of realities, in contradiction of the principles of its own process. Out of the divisible it cannot reach the indivisible; or, attaining it, it cannot return to the divisible by means of it. Monads are virtually crowded out of the material world by a denial of extension. They can come to nothing unless allowed to freely reappear in the spiritual world, and therein to become living souls. There is in them no true conjunction of matter and mind, and, used as a common point between the two, they can only breed confusion. The excellency of the conception of pure spirit is that it is pure power. It shakes off all mechanism, and calls for no dead centres of any sort. The monads of Leibnitz are, after all, only bits of being, wholly unempirical, incapable of distinct statement within themselves, and, at last, entirely unserviceable as constructive material. They are closely allied to that brood of intermediates and infinitesimals which philosophy has so often brought forward to fill in spaces which might much better be left vacant. We cannot explain the universe, in its interaction, by crowding its open areas with atoms. We must come, sooner or later, to

the naked fact of power, action, and reaction between things.

We can see in the theory of Leibnitz a coming truth of science, a point at which it was to give great aid. Leibnitz was not satisfied with the passivity of matter. He thought it an embodiment, rather, of forces. While chemistry leads us to this result, it helps us over the puzzle of the infinite divisibility of matter. In actual construction, the atom is found with dimensions. The physical world starts with extension as well as maintains it throughout.

The system of Leibnitz tends strongly to pure idealism. Force, that stands for physical energies, and is not merely a figurative expression, can gain no existence as an absolute mathematical centre. Forces must have directions, spaces, spheres, through which to declare themselves. Physical activities, as much as physical passivities, demand extension. The application of the word force to mental activity—as the force of thought—is unfortunate, as the energies of the physical and the spiritual world have, as forms of being, nothing in common. Thoughts can spring up without centres or circumferences, forces cannot. The forces with which Leibnitz is dealing in his indivisible monads must be wholly drunk up in the idea, and go forth from the idea, or there is no union between the two. Force, therefore, as a realized physical factor, must inevitably disappear in the monad. In reaching unity between its two terms, the productive power must be lodged with the idea.

Another direction in which modern science would have helped the conception of Leibnitz is that of the alleged incommunicability of forces. Leibnitz regarded the sum of forces in the universe as ever the same. He secured

this uniform aggregate by maintaining the fixed relations of each monad. They always count up the same. A wider experience teaches us that energies are transferable, and are gathered now in one form of expression and now in another. Action is saved from wastefulness by reaction. The two are distinct terms in one process and are intelligible only when taken together. The single line of sequence, which Leibnitz provided for in each monad, would be especially inapprehensible under modern thought.

While the omnipresence and perfect control of God are preserved in this philosophy, they assume a very mechanical form, and are taken quite out of the light of experience. The monads, the fixed fulgurations, offer themselves rather as parts of God than as initiative, creative acts, living energies in every form of reaction. Or, if they are not parts of God—for the monad admits of no parts—we have no hint of the way in which God acts through them, since monads are wholly impenetrable in themselves. Monads lie helplessly apart from each other in the universe which they compose. Here is an inconsistency akin to that we found in Descartes. The ultimate monad is expected to accomplish a union alien to the nature of monads themselves. Earnestly, as Leibnitz struggled after an intellectual, living unity, he has lost it in the absolute isolation of the monads of which he constructed the universe. Separateness and living interplay are the conditions of unity.

The inevitable idealism of the system of Leibnitz is also disclosed in his notion of sensuous phenomena, and of space and time. Sensuous experiences are included in the history of that ruling monad, mind, not by virtue of the action of physical monads on it, but by the harmoni-

ous flow of its own experiences. He endeavors to maintain a certain validity for these impressions by means of the doctrine of preëstablished harmonies. But if all monads, save the one sensitive monad, mind, were to perish, its experiences might remain unaltered. The alteration would come, if it came at all, not from a change in the enveloping facts, but from a change in the one monad, the mind of God. Leibnitz regarded space as the order of coexistence in phenomena, and time as their order of succession. Neither of them carries the mind beyond itself. Herein is the germ of Kantianism, and so of the idealism that succeeded Kant. Such land-locked monads as those of Leibnitz must, more and more, find all motion and sources of motion within themselves.

Leibnitz opposed himself to Locke, and brought forward the doctrine of innate ideas, through one more stage of development. To the assertion of Locke, There is nothing in the understanding, he opposed the assertion, Except the understanding itself. But the understanding is a monad preëminently endowed, clear and self-contained in its processes. From its action arise those agnate ideas, universal and necessary, which are the conditions of all knowledge. His image of the bent bow, ready at any instant to put forth its power, as an expression of the nature of the monad, is particularly applicable to mind. Empiricism, in its development through the disciples of Locke, has utterly reversed the earlier conception. Matter no longer stands for that which is moved and does not move; mind for that which moves and is not moved. The two have interchanged places. Mind is pure receptivity. Its movements follow wholly initiatives taken by the physical world. Matter is the one eternal storehouse of energy. Mind has no original

patrimony of powers, but gleans its spare earnings among material forces, as the heavy sheaves of the harvest.

Leibnitz, while he assigned primitive energy to mind, did not concede it liberty. The development of thought is fixed within itself. This conclusion follows naturally from the doctrine of preëstablished harmony. If physical and mental, lower and higher, monads are to run parallel with each other, each must maintain its own ordained movement, otherwise the universe is quickly out of joint. Moreover, all monads, those of matter and those of mind, are harmonious in structure, involving the same elements, force and idea. Liberty can hardly be freely conceded and consistently maintained till the action of reason is taken wholly from the category of causation, and seen to involve spontaneity, exercised in the pursuit of truth. Its impulses are not expended in darkness and limited in direction, but are operative in the light, with an instant change of activity according to the relation of the mind to the object of search. The spirit is in pursuit, and possesses the freedom of exertion and of change which pursuit involves.

Leibnitz opposed the separation of religion and reason, and sought for their reconciliation. He helped forward, therefore, true faith, faith in our own powers, faith in truth, faith in God, in whom all these relations cohere, faith in reason, as the ultimate source of all truth. Authority is thus not without the mind, but within it, contained in the divine insight granted it. Inspiration is not breath falling upon us, as if we were ships driven by the wind; it is breath fulfilling within us the laws of life. Truth is not water drawn in a bucket and offered in a cup; it is a well of water, springing up within the mind itself unto everlasting life.

The seductive force of the doctrine of monads lay in its opposition to the dualism of Descartes, in the unity it seemed to establish between matter and mind, force and idea. Yet this first prepossession becomes increasingly illusory the longer the thoughts dwell upon it. The union between force and idea is arbitrary, between monad and monad is arbitrary; while the unity of the monads is deceptive, each being diverse from every other, and all inferior monads wholly different from that supreme monad by whom they are united into one universe. The conception is every way inferior in its pliancy and nearness to experience to that of pure spirit, as an ultimate form of being.

Bacon, Descartes, and Leibnitz showed, at the very opening of the modern era, the tendencies that were to prevail in England, France, and Germany, respectively. This is especially true of Bacon and Leibnitz. We have in the one the inelastic, empirical temper of England; and in the other the free, speculative thought of Germany. Descartes held more even-handed the complementary terms of philosophy, yet in a manner so little reconciled with experience as to leave the way easily open either to materialism or idealism.

CHAPTER III.

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. The changes by which philosophy passed into a new era in England, France, and Germany involved, though in different degrees, the same feeling. The moving cause was the desire for a philosophy which should give more room to inquiry, more freedom to thought, and better accommodate itself to the new conceptions of physics. The world was fast ceasing, in the minds of men, to be a pure mechanism, its relations put upon it from without. It was henceforth to be dealt with as a very distinct, if not an independent, term in knowledge. In England, this tendency to practical inquiry was the dominant motive of change. The same tendency was present in France, but it did not there so much divert the mind from philosophy as lead to its reconstruction. The freshest and most influential conclusion of the Cartesians was that of the detached character of physical phenomena. This conclusion was fitted to prepare the way for the careful discussion of these phenomena under their own laws.

The system of Leibnitz grew directly out of his early acceptance of the mechanical view of the world, and later out of his growing sense of its inadequacy. His monads were the result of an effort to give inherent energy to all forms of being, an effort to bring causes and effects into

the closest conjunction. Matter ceased to be merely stuff, a receptive something on which mind was remotely at play. This change in the conception of matter, a statement of the new energies conceded it in its simplest, most empirical terms, and the union of the forces of matter and the powers of mind in a harmonious universe, constitute the burden of modern philosophy.

§ 2. From this time on the development of philosophy was much modified in each country by its own national life, and can best be treated in three leading lines; philosophy in England, in France, and in Germany. The reactions of these three forms of unfolding on each other were usually secondary in vigor to the forces operative in each of them in direct descent.

It may be a surprise to us that philosophy, undertaking so universal a task, should be seriously affected by the conditions of national development. Are not its principles—if indeed they are principles—measurably absolute, the same for all? Science fails of completeness because of its amplitude; philosophy escapes the grasp of thought by its profundity. Philosophy aims to give us that circle of ideas in which all relations are comprehended. It must, therefore, take on new lights and new shadows so long as the great field of facts is only partially explored. New revelations here will involve new exposition there. The sun cannot ascend the heavens without altering the expression of the landscape. Insight cannot gain ground in the construction of the world, events cannot flow forward in history, society cannot take to itself in more felicitous action its spiritual impulses, without modifying our conception of the form and balance of the forces which rule events. Philosophy defines the directions of thought, completes our defini-

tions, gives a wider range to vision, but can never issue in fast conclusions which constrict the universe within themselves as if they were purely logical processes. These coveted results would be strangulation, not life. As philosophy has to do with ultimates, and as ultimates are proclaimed only by the full rendering of the facts under them, philosophy must ever wait for its last word on the progress of events. The divine narrative of life is always ready for the deeper meaning, the richer exposition, which its own movement involves.

There is no question of any breadth that does not ultimately appeal to philosophy. Physical and spiritual issues, with all their comprehensive impulses, are open to it; and, therefore, philosophy must ever keep pace with the soul of man, and have an answer as wise as his wisest thought, as late as his latest inquiry. Philosophy is thus national as well as universal, accepts the phase of experience prevalent about it as well as pushes through it to that which lies beyond. As is the horizon of facts, such is the light that falls upon them and is reflected by them.

It is a direction less adequate than it seems to be: Seek simply the truth, follow where the truth leads. Men are more frequently misled in philosophy by an implicit obedience to a ruling idea than in any other way. The French, especially, have scrupulously—it would be equally correct to say unscrupulously—followed to their extreme results certain clews of thought; and, as a consequence, French philosophy has been peculiarly inadequate. The sound temper of philosophy must express itself, not so much in the severity of logical processes, as in a broad comprehension of data, as in a reluctance to do violence to facts, to pass over or abridge any portion

of them. It must not only harvest the field, it must glean it, and that, too, equally in its more subtile as in its more palpable phenomena; equally in those spiritual laws which are waiting to be achieved as in those physical laws already achieved. Indeed, the deepest significance of events is ever the meaning not yet made clear. Philosophy, therefore, to be conscientious, must be comprehensive. When a logical development of premises is bringing one's convictions straight against familiar facts in human life, it is only ruthless iconoclasm that, in the name of truth, holds on its way. Sound philosophy has the wisdom of timidity, regards the unfortunateness of a result as a probable disproof, and carefully reasons backwards to the deficiency or error contained in the data.

English philosophy has been preëminently empirical, sensuous, materialistic. It offers, in the line of speculation, a continuous development, characterized by laborious inquiry and much sagacity. Yet it has been a practical philosophy, a philosophy held strongly in check by its relation to the religious and social convictions of the people. We understand by a practical people, which the English peculiarly are, one which keeps the issues of action within a somewhat narrow and somewhat sensuous range, and within this range accentuates the comfort-yielding processes of life. Thus the test of sound inquiry, as indicated by Bacon, is met; it yields fruit. Such a national tendency leads, in philosophy, to giving extreme weight to the physical causes and conditions of action, and reduces to a minimum the influence of the overshadowing ideals and ruling powers of mind—ideals and powers that make of life a crusade, a struggle for a holy land that is never altogether won. This empirical form of English philosophy has, however, been held in check, as well as

promoted, by the practical force of English character. The English have strong restraining social and religious beliefs, not of ideal purity, but of much immediate and prevalent worth. These have restrained the materializing tendency of their philosophy, and not allowed it to sweep on unreservedly to conclusions which would wreck faith and weaken social construction. What may seem to have been the cowardice, has often been the conscientiousness, of philosophy. It has involved the fundamental truth that facts rule philosophy, not philosophy facts. If philosophy is pressing hard on long-established and current opinion, it is doing it by virtue of some extreme premise or sophistical method, and not simply by the reserved force of truth. The truth is equally in the phenomena of society and in the energies that have built them up, as in our later speculations concerning them. English philosophy has been peculiarly sober and continuous in its development by virtue of these two facts, the wide, vigorous, practical sentiment which envelops its action, and the very definite path which empiricism itself assigns to inquiry. Generation after generation of thinkers has labored in England to widen and support conclusions early indicated in philosophical inquiries.

In addition to this empirical philosophy, so widely accepted and well restrained, there have been occasional outbreaks of more spiritual insight. England has not lacked points of light and men of an idealistic cast, and these have served to abash the sensuous movement about them. A philosophy which restores to mind its true powers, and rolls back before them the physical forces which threaten to engulf the world, has found, side by side with empiricism, brilliant, though far less consecutive and well-sustained, expression in England.

England also gave birth to the Scottish school, a school that sprang up in immediate reaction against the unbelief—unbelief in mind, and so unbelief in God—which followed inevitably from the extreme, yet consistent, presentation of current philosophy given by Hume. This school, in turn, has shown much tenacity and has been sounder in its conclusions than in its methods. It has held fast dogmatically to the leading facts in our spiritual life, even when unable to give them any clear and sufficient exposition. For a full understanding of English philosophy we shall need to render, first, this ruling empirical tendency, and then to supplement it with the sporadic rejection and the systematic opposition which it has awakened.

PART I.

THE EARLY EMPIRICAL MOVEMENT IN ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY.

§ 3. Hobbes (1588), the Sage of Malmesbury, offers a very typical expression of English speculative character on its more positive, but least inviting, side. Strong, sinewy, and bold, keen-sighted within narrow and sensuous bounds and unappreciative beyond them, he was safe from attack and from change by virtue of the very goodness and badness of his powers. It was a much-needed exhortation of Bacon to his countrymen that they should lay aside prepossessions. Familiar feelings were as often their medium of knowledge as independent inquiry. The vision of a mind saturated with sentiments is like that of the owl, narrow, searching, serviceable, and in better affiliation with partial darkness than perfect light.

In the view of Hobbes, all substantial being is physical

being. The spirit is a corporeal substance. Substances are made up of minute parts. The world is a plenum, and God is one with the universal ether. Motion is the exclusive medium of change, and philosophy is the tracing of these changes as causes and effects. All reasoning is closely allied to mathematics, an addition and subtraction of the forces expressed in motion. Sensation is the product of motion, induced in the organs of sense, and is, therefore, an impression which belongs to the receptive mind alone. Sensations give rise to returning impressions, phantasms, and these constitute the staple of knowledge. This is the first doctrine in English empiricism. The productive sources of all knowledge are sensations, giving rise to restored impressions. The knowing process is a passive rather than an active one. The chief capability it involves is the power to receive sensations, and repeat them in modified forms. Hobbes regarded will simply as the energy of desire; and liberty, therefore, as freedom from restraining force. His conception of the universe was as mechanical as it well could be.

He was especially interested in civic construction, and held to it under the most simple form of diabolism. The primitive condition of men is one of universal conflict. To escape a condition so intolerable, government was instituted, involving a compact whose terms are absolute submission, on the one side, and protection on the other. Power, thus established in the state, is the source of laws, and laws define rights and the right. The distinction between the two virtually disappears. Religion owes its authority to the same source. Whatever worship the state prescribes is authoritative; all else is the erratic superstition of individuals. Ethical law is the law of self-interest, and the supreme interest lies in preserving the

state, without which men would lapse into universal barbarism. Ethical law rises no higher than physical law; both rest on force, producing order. The one moral sentiment, therefore, with which Hobbes broke down every other, was our conviction in favor of social order.

A philosophy moving on so low a level, with so complete a neglect of all the higher sentiments which find expression in society and religion, could not gain much acceptance; and yet it was able to prepare the mind for those softened opinions which followed it. Hobbes' philosophy seems to have arisen from the impressions made upon him by the first steps which were being taken in science, and with which he was familiar. He carried kindred conceptions in a very crass way over to mental, social, and spiritual phenomena. These phenomena were overwhelmed at once in their subtile characteristics, before this barbaric invasion. He who has lost the sight of one eye, no matter how completely he may retain the use of the other, can never command the perspective of perfect vision. He merely casts the inadequate constructions of a mutilated power over all spaces.

§ 4. Locke (1632), who gained a controlling influence in English philosophy, and took a position which speculative thought was busy for a long time, everywhere, either in attacking or defending, reducing or expanding, finely represented English character in a phase of it much more restrained and sympathetic than that offered by Hobbes. The chief tenet in his philosophy, chief in importance and in the attention which he drew to it, was that already enunciated by Hobbes: all knowledge is derived from sensation. His philosophy was the result of a thoroughly empirical tendency, intensified by the study of medicine. This connection is very common in the his-

tory of speculation. Methods of reasoning are readily carried over from the body to the mind.

His chief philosophical work was his essay concerning the Human Understanding. Its purpose was to discuss the origin of knowledge. He regarded the mind as best represented under the image of a screen, a *tabula rasa*, open to all the impressions of the external world. Ideas are mental impressions, and arise from sensation and reflection. Sensation is our knowledge of impressions due to external objects, and reflection our knowledge of other states of mind. These states of mind find their material exclusively in sensations. There are no primitive, innate ideas. Our knowledge arises from comparing sensations as to their agreements and disagreements, their reality, their coexistence. A portion of the qualities of sensation, as those due to motion, belongs to the objects themselves; another portion, as color and sound, belongs to the mind alone.

Those judgments are sound whose truth lies within the range of experience and the knowledge dependent on it. Among these he put the judgment of the being of God. Those judgments which transcend experience, if accepted at all, must be accepted as matter of faith. Among these he puts the doctrine of immortality. Those judgments which are contradictory to each other, or to experience, as clearly expressed in mental conceptions, are irrational. He regarded the soul as probably immaterial. Freedom of the will is nonsense. The only question that can arise in this connection is that of external liberty, the freedom of man. His ethical theory rested on happiness, the crude term to which the attention of empirical philosophy is always first directed in its search for the law of individual and social life. Govern-

ment owes its validity to a voluntary surrender of rights on the part of its subjects. He thus led off in a direction which, though ill-grounded in theory and in fact, has been very helpful to liberty. Opposed as he was to speculation in philosophy, the most influential doctrine in his philosophy of government, that of a social contract, was purely speculative.

Locke had found that eager debate led to no results, because there were no common and sufficient criteria of truth. The ultimate sources, therefore, of knowledge called for fresh consideration, that men might, if possible, bring effective and final arguments in support of their positions. The most important contribution of Locke to metaphysics undertook this service of bringing into the foreground the question of the origin and nature of knowledge. The discussion has shown its timeliness by being vigorously pushed ever since, approaching, without reaching, the end. On it depend the validity and limits of truth. Primitive mental terms had been accepted from the time of Plato. Locke attacked them with such vigor as to make the question at once one of wide interest and import. He was able to secure the acceptance, in empirical philosophy, of its first fundamental proposition, that the entire material of knowledge is derived from sensation; that there is nothing in the understanding which is not first in the sense—not derivatively, suggestively, but directly, as sensation. While his own analysis did not go very far in establishing this conclusion, it went far enough to prepare the way for those various and labored defences of it which have since been offered.

The attack of Locke on innate ideas served to clear away a good deal of rubbish, and open up the real point

of difference between the two schools. The careless imagery of ideas impressed upon the mind disappeared, and it became necessary, in defending the powers of mind, to define their action more carefully, to restrict with more searching analysis those ideas which are due to insight, and to state with more caution the conditions under which, and the manner in which, they are present. Remote and abstract truths could no longer be at once assumed as the primitive endowments of the mind. The chief result of this division of opinion so far has been increasing clearness along these lines of separation.

The question of the origin of certain constructive ideas still remains the initiative and determinative point of debate between empirical and intuitive philosophy. The one side maintains the assertion of Locke, that there is nothing in the understanding which is not first in the sense; and the other still contends that the mind, by an insight deeper than that of the senses, fitting occasion being given, discerns, in their application, certain simple ideas which are the antecedent conditions of all rational knowledge. These ideas are distinguished from that large class which arises in experience as the fruit of generalization, by the absence of any sensuous, empirical quality, by an absolute identity of the idea with itself in every application of it, by its antecedent necessity to all experience which arises under it. Thus the notion of space, as contrasted with such an idea as that of sweetness, makes no appeal to the senses, gains no variety under experience, and is prior in thought to every relation contained in it.

The discussion has at length reached that point in which, all that is obscure and ambiguous in expression being removed, the conclusion is left to turn simply on

the mind's grasp of truth. Nor is it easy to believe that there would remain any diversity of opinion on the question itself, were it not for its many implications and the very different ways by which the mind approaches it.

As was natural, Locke, in entering on so difficult an inquiry, involved himself in a good many inconsistencies, and was unable to measure the reach of his own affirmations. Thus, he recognized two kinds of qualities which pertain to objects: those, like size and hardness, which belong to the object itself, and those, like color and flavor, which belong to the mental sensibilities. But if the mind is blank paper, how can this distinction be maintained? A large share of external impressions are made by it to owe their form to the nature of the receptive power. The mind has then a nature of its own, which so unites with external qualities as to determine the character of the results. Moreover, those impressions referred exclusively to the object, as its shape and size, are not in the senses equivalents of that which they represent, but call for the most protracted and painstaking activity of mind to transform them from signs into the things signified. We can no more read the world than we can read a book, by the senses alone. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is, in an indirect way, that between intuitive and sensuous processes. The sense predominating, we have secondary qualities; the intuitive conception in the foreground, we have primary qualities.

The topic is merely broached by Locke, not expounded. He has entered upon the field, but not captured it. He is involved everywhere in the inconsistencies of immature opinion. Thus, he accepts the notion of substance, and still regards it of little import. Yet, in this notion is

locked up that master-notion, causation. The empirical philosophy has had occasion to labor longest and most unsuccessfully in striving to regain that coherence of things and of thoughts which it has lost by putting the mere images of things and the sequence of things in place of the substratum of causal energies which sustain phenomena and bear them forward. The notion for which Locke found so little use is all that prevents the world from becoming to us the thinnest film of shifting appearances, through which the plummet of thought drops at once and is lost forever.

Locke also put the being of God—with an easy deference to the necessities of the case—among the verifiable truths of experience. But interpret experience as he would render it, on the sensuous side, and there is no idea which lies more wholly beyond it. He did not regard the immateriality of the soul as impossible, yet this truth is as directly involved in experience as the materiality of physical things. The two are correlatives in experience, resting on one and the same process of interpretation. The analysis which discriminates matter, discriminates it from mind in this very particular. The two antithetical conceptions define each other, define the physical and the spiritual. Space is the distinctive form-element in material things, and consciousness the distinctive form-element in mental things. This is the simplest and most universal distinction in experience. A thought, a feeling, have no space relations. That which sustains them is spirit. We know spirit in and through them, and in and through them alone. The difference between substance and spirit is this universal fact of experience; the one yields qualities under space, the other activities under consciousness. To proceed, under this experience,

to say that the spirit may be material, is no more fit than to say that matter may be spiritual. Such an affirmation is, having won the first terms of order, a renewal of the cry, Hurly burly. To suppose that what we put back of mental activity and call spirit can have other wholly unknown qualities of a material nature, is as beyond all reason as to suppose that things tasted and handled are, in the last analysis, impalpable.

Locke, in common with the school he did so much to establish, shows this swimming of the eye, this loss in vision of the first, most palpable, most reliable distinctions of truth. He raised the question, Does matter think? Why not, pray, if the mind may be material? Can things fly? Why not, if flying is being hurled from a catapult? Such methods are simply walking backward over the same ground we have traversed in moving forward. What should we gain in chemistry, having distinguished hydrogen and oxygen from each other in a uniform experience, by raising the question whether, after all, hydrogen may not have the qualities of oxygen, and oxygen those of hydrogen? The action of reason is thus like the elasticity of a rubber ball, which responds to the last impulse, while all traces of earlier influences disappear.

It is the more worth while to make these criticisms, because they do not apply to Locke alone, but concern a method very general in the empirical school. The powers of mind are greatly restricted in mind where they are normal to experience, and are freely admitted in matter where they transcend experience. This philosophy consists very largely in obliterating the dividing lines between matter and mind, and so wiping out the first and most fundamental truths of experience. Yet, in face of

its break with experience, this philosophy still thinks itself empirical.

Locke gave sufficient substance to his convictions to make them the germs of a school. The four ideas of agreement, relation, coexistence, and existence, by which he defined knowledge, passed into the single relation of agreement and disagreement. The association of ideas, which he was the first to enforce, became the one law of mind, and was readily based on the coherence of successive cerebral impressions. Thus, the simply mechanical and organic evolution of mind, which he initiated as a theory, only partially apprehending its implications, has gone bravely onward to the most extreme conclusions.

We are to remember, in estimating a man like Locke, that he stood at the beginning, not at the end, of a movement. At its close, we chiefly see the directions in which it has miscarried, and the reasons why it should be superseded. At its opening, the evils which it is to correct, the reasons which demand it, are in the foreground. The empirical tendency, which has brought with it, in all its history, great gains, was imperatively called for in the time of Locke as a defence against dogmatism and barren speculation, and as opening up new veins of inquiry. That it, in turn, should sink under its own excesses, was a matter of course. This fellowship of Locke with progress, which led him to seek criteria of knowledge elsewhere than in the arbitrary assertions of men—a fault which so besets intuitionism—is seen in his other works, often admirable in spirit and method; his "Letters on Toleration," his "Thoughts on Education," and his defence of the "Reasonableness of Christianity." The temper which ruled in him was a thoroughly liberal and progressive one. The sense of indebtedness rather than

of disasters should be uppermost in our estimate of him.

§ 5. Hartley (1704), a physician, made the second important contribution to empirical philosophy. While Locke by no means measured the full sweep of his principles, and might readily have wished to withdraw from some of their results, it is none the less true that the conviction which ruled him was a greatly reduced estimate of the powers of mind, and a correspondingly increased one of the powers of nature. This is shown in the position he gave to the association of ideas. The movement of thought was ceasing, in his conception of it, to be the incident of thought, and was becoming the more or less automatic product of the terms involved in it. As, however, ideas are only transient states of mind, we cannot easily regard them, aside from the mind itself, as having any hold on each other, any power to order their own succession. We must either push the association of ideas farther, or drop back on the power of memory, of judgment, of imagination, as offering the only basis of the union of ideas. This second step in the development of empiricism was completed by Hartley. His attention, in harmony with the pursuits of his profession, was strongly directed to the brain, the organ of the mind. He regarded sensations as the results of medullary vibrations. What we term ideas are impressions due to vibrations, which linger in the brain and return to it in the absence of the objects of sense. Sensory vibrations being repeated, tend to restore themselves, and to produce impressions allied to those of perception. This conclusion gives us the second principle in empiricism. Mental impressions, in their simplest form, are the vestiges of sensations—sensations that arise independently of their first occasions. By

this direct and complete dependence of mental states on the states of the brain, the way was prepared for sustaining the law of association, independently of mental powers. Association of ideas rests on the connection of medullary vibrations with each other. These, renewed and repeated in a great variety of ways under a varied and growing experience, combine in numerous and complex methods, and so give occasion to general ideas, and to the orderly succession of ideas. Memory is the sequence of ideas dependent on repetition. It results simply from the previous presence of ideas, is the fruit of a law of nervous tissue. Judgment arises from the combination of vibrations by agreement and disagreement. The mechanism of thought is involved in the implications of that infinitely susceptible and mobile material, the brain. Thus we are ready for the third assertion of empiricism. The combinations of mental processes are predetermined by the dependence of the medullary movements which give rise to them. As these are capable of an ever-growing complexity under fixed laws of production, all the subtile relations of thought find their causes in them. Hartley regarded those convictions which, on account of their certainty and universality, had been termed innate ideas, as the results of very early and very often repeated vibrations, which thus became an inescapable habit of the brain. The objection, then, does not hold to innate ideas as innate; this they are, but to them as products of mental power. What we term will, Hartley regarded simply as action following on an idea. The real connection lies in the dependence of states of brain on each other. The succession of mental states is like that of shadows, which chase each other on a screen. Following a logical order, this would be the sixth prin-

ciple in empiricism. The mental states we term voluntary are the sequence of ideas and actions. The same causal relation, the dependence of successive states of brain on each other, rules in them as in the succession of thoughts and feelings. The foundations of empiricism were thus laid by Hartley, and built upon by him in all their principal parts. The mind, as a productive power, was abolished, and the brain put in its place. The vibrations of the nervous system were followed out in a method almost wholly hypothetical, and then made the valid forms of which thoughts are mysterious simulachres.

§ 6. The conclusions of Hartley were supported by Priestley (1733), distinguished in physics and chemistry. He regarded mental processes as strictly dependent on the brain, and capable of being looked on as its functions. In consistency with this subordination of mental to physical phenomena, he thought the soul to be material. Yet we hardly see why we need to concede a soul if thoughts are functions of the brain. In one direction he helped forward the spiritualizing process. He looked upon matter as an assemblage of forces, not as inert centres. Matter itself was thus readily put into the hand of Supreme Power.

Erasmus Darwin (1731), also a physician and a successful botanist, followed in the same line of suggestion. Matter, as he thought, receives motion, spirit induces it. Life is the higher form of motion, and motion, through the organs of sense, gives ideas. From these conclusions he passed readily on to the doctrines of Hartley.

It is very observable that empiricism arose not merely in reaction against an unfruitful speculative tendency, a relation which in itself would readily carry it forward to

an extreme position, but that it also owed its early development chiefly to those whose subjects and habits of inquiry were associated with the physical world. Disease, with which the physician has to deal, is the product of material causes, and often involves the abnormal control of the mind by them. The philosophy of these men was, as it were, a branch of pathology, a giving of universality to the causes prominently active in mental disorder. As the instrument in its defects mars the mind, so in its perfections, it was inferred, it makes the mind. The controlling power lies on this side, not on that. An induction that starts with material phenomena, and thence extends to mental phenomena, is antecedently exposed to the same suspicion that attaches to inquiries that commence with mind and finish with physical relations. This suspicion, strong in itself, is greatly enhanced, if abnormal connections are made the type of normal ones.

§ 7. The scepticism which is the inevitable outcome of empiricism, and which those who develop the philosophy may be slow to admit, was not long in making its appearance. David Hume (1711) unfolded these doctrines thoroughly and unhesitatingly to the moral and religious conclusions involved in them. Hume dates an era in the history of philosophy, not by giving new views, but by precipitating the empirical philosophy at once into all its disastrous results. He pushed it forward into a scepticism so complete, so overwhelming, so inevitable, that it was, and should have been regarded as, a *reductio ad absurdum* of the entire system which gave rise to it. Hume's scepticism was very effective, but less effective than it, of right, should have been. It was only because men, having lost the path, find it again so slowly, that the road of empiricism, as a highway of philosophy, was not

forever blocked by the ruins with which it was so thickly strewn by Hume.

Hume was remarkable, not for sympathetic and constructive insight, but for that next inferior grade of power which expresses itself in a clear, rapid, remorseless development of data, till their true contents are wholly disclosed. In this phase of endowment he has hardly had a superior. Nothing in his spiritual make-up deterred him from an unhesitating use of his keen, searching analysis. He rendered, though in a measure unintentionally, a great service to philosophy, and one that would have been much greater if philosophy had had the power fully to avail itself of it. As it was, faith was as much stunned as instructed by the blow it had received, and slowly recovered its consciousness under many of its old forms of thought. The upshot of the philosophy of Hume was nihilism. Nihilism is suicide, and the philosophy that sinks into nihilism should find no hand to pluck it up again by its drowned locks.

Nihilism is pure phenomenalism. The substances, energies, laws which underlie appearances and give them rational significance are all lost. We have everywhere a succession of changeable impressions, with no known origin or end, no measurement or determinate good. These phenomena shift among themselves under relations that vary with every observer and every period, and have nowhere that fixed quality which is implied by truth. One reasons, but cannot defend his reasonings; one believes, but has no ground on which to justify his belief. He is the victim, wherever he turns, of illusions. Thus the search of Locke for the sources of knowledge was made by Hume to end in the conclusion, It has no sources the same for all, the same for any man under

changing circumstances. Let the babel of tongues proceed ; it is a chronic insanity for which there is no remedy. One opinion has no advantage over another, except by virtue of the shifting impressions which for the moment give it force. Empiricism, under the rapid evolution of Hume, ended in a slough of impotency and unbelief as profound as, and wider than, that which received the Sophists. It called out, however, no Socrates.

Hume says, "After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I should assent to it ; and feel nothing but a *strong* propensity to consider objects *strongly* in that view under which they appear to me. . . . The understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition either in philosophy or common life. . . . We have no choice left but between a false reason and none at all. . . . If I must be a fool, as all those who reason or believe anything *certainly* are, my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable." Here we have absolute scepticism, with its last will and testament on its lips. Nothing is worth while, unless it be self-indulgence.

We can attach no value to these assertions of Hume. They are thoroughly self-destructive. If it be true that those who believe anything are certainly fools, then we have one important and valid proposition. But if we have reached one truth, why may we not more? The declaration destroys itself. We cannot maintain the distinction between a wise man and a fool, we cannot carry on the discussion, without conceding far more than Hume is willing to grant. Hume cannot accept his own philosophy, and attach any importance to its conclusions.

True impotence, real incompetence, are left without any philosophy to rest on. The show of success in this theory of human faculties is achieved by first quietly, tacitly, conceding their validity, and then, on the ground of that validity, giving weight to the reasoning which overthrows it.

Knowledge, with all its stores of truth, and wise, coherent uses, remains, after such a criticism as this of Hume, precisely what it was before. No matter how often the lithe gymnast revolves in the air, he lands on his feet when he comes down. Call knowledge whatever we may choose to call it, its relations to man's life are not thereby altered. Scepticism cannot, from the nature of the case, move the world of truth, because it can secure no position outside of it. The most it can do is to correct minor errors in the process itself of acquiring knowledge. If men were not covetous of conjectures and ravenous of fears, not a tenth part of the importance would have attached to the speculations of Hume which has fallen to them. There would have rather been a sense of mirth at seeing a philosophy so badly shattered by its own explosion.

This absurd scepticism is really in the philosophy, and its disclosure should, therefore, at once have destroyed it. Hume accepted the principles of empiricism already current. Sense is the source of all mental impressions. Ideas are restored sensations. These ideas become more and more complex by combination under the processes in which they originate. To these he added the fourth dogma, That reasoning involves comparison only. It turns exclusively on the agreement and disagreement of impressions. These concur, and so strengthen each other; or are diverse, and so weaken each other. The

reasoning process thus becomes, under the interpretation of Hartley, the conjunction of harmonious vibrations.

The fifth dogma which Hume emphasizes is, Belief is the result of the liveliness of ideas. The idea that is making the strongest impression carries with it the state of mind we term belief. Belief is the mere fact of a predominant movement in the mind. To give any reason for it is simply allowing it to renew itself in a slightly varied form. It owes its force to conditions more or less changeable and accidental, and has no test beyond that of actuality. Belief is force declaring itself for the moment where it is, and as it is, by its own energy. Truth thus melts, like a snowflake, with its crystalline structure sinking in turbid waters, in the flow of meaningless events. There is no longer any interpretation to a purely phenomenal world, among whose most infinitesimal occurrences are thoughts themselves. Under this view, "all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative, part of our natures." Indeed, there remains no deep distinction between thought and feeling. Every state of mind is one induced in it, has authority while it lasts, and no authority beyond itself.

This conclusion, sound within itself, ought to have ended the philosophy which brought it forth. Modern empiricism has no sufficient defence against it. It has resumed its old lines of movement, as if the denials of Hume had not fatally broken its connections; but it has won no real test of validity other than that of vividness of impression. It may go on to distinguish thoughts and feelings, as if they still possessed that diversity which we know to be in them, but reasoning yet remains a sensi-

tive, rather than a cogitative, act. The empiricist may affirm the validity of thoughts, truths, because they are the products of real causes; but it is the mind alone that can make that declaration in an authentic form. If this assertion is itself another impression among impressions, it does not help us to rise above impressions.

It may be said that the intuitionist must make the same appeal to conviction. Most truly, and he makes it, therefore, wisely, at the very beginning, and is not forced into it at the very end, in contradiction of all his previous affirmations. He postulates powers of mind, and the validity of these powers, as antecedent condition of all truth. Thus only can truth be reached, and thus it is reached from the outset. We must carry it with us, or we shall not win it. Start in subjection to sensation, and, like Hume, we shall end by being the slaves of sensations.

“Unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how poor a thing is man.”

The scepticism of Hume gave occasion, both in Germany and in Scotland, to new forms of philosophy. In England, however, it did not suffice to break the flow of empiricism. So far, at least, this philosophy proved itself; for the English mind moved on, against reason, under the dominant impression which custom had fastened on it. Empiricism, under the quiet assumption of causation, ceasing also to distinguish the connection of events from those of thoughts, held on its way. It could hardly have done this had there not still remained many truths, on the physical and physiological side, which needed to be incorporated into psychology, and were ready to reward and stimulate its inquiries. It was the strength of the scientific movement, with which empirical

philosophy affiliated, that enabled it to rally. This, and the subordinate truths of which we have spoken, helped it to survive its *coup de grace*. The scientific temper, though at bottom at one with a sounder philosophy, takes on a hasty and superficial union with empiricism, seeking to establish causal relations in the realm of mind, and so to extend the victories of science, in their first and simplest form, over this last and widest field of thought.

Hume affords an example of what is common in philosophy, the unexpected union of extremes. One would say that the general drift of his doctrine was materialistic—so materialistic that he had sunk all the processes of thought in the progress of things. Yet, as he regarded the impressions of space and of time as contained in the forms of sensation, and causation in its order; and as sensations are shut up within themselves, he was on the verge of idealism—the idealism which Kant was the means of developing. Having reached this position by a movement empirical and materialistic in its form, the mind is compelled to complete it in a speculative and idealistic fashion. Having denied the power of the mind to apprehend space as a valid form-element, it and all the phenomena it encloses become pure, subjective impressions, to be traced only in the intricacies of the mind's own meanderings. Philosophy becomes thus like a stork, which stands upon one leg till it becomes wholly weary, and then composedly takes it up and puts down the other. We can retain neither mind nor matter, in their true complement of powers, without retaining them both. Turn wholly to one or the other, and we find ourselves shortly driven to a conclusion the reverse of that with which we started. Mind is first blank paper, and then it is the total record of the entire universe, it is the universe.

Hume regarded any real nexus in causation as wholly beyond our knowledge. The force of sequences is due to the anticipation of them begotten in the mind by habit. He failed to see that habit itself involves causation. Impressions must have causal power in the formation of habit. Habit is the result, the effect, of previous action. In the absence of all causes, we are thrown wholly back on the liveliness of ideas as the test of truth. Or, rather, the two are one and the same thing. We cannot distinguish truth from liveliness, and ground it in it as a cause or reason. The whole notion of reason or connection has been lost.

The denial of Hume which occasioned the most immediate flutter in the practical and religious mind was that of miracles. Many insufficient ways were found of answering it. So universal was the empirical tendency in England, that few understood how disastrous were the blows which faith was receiving, or saw any way of warding them off. The replies were generally makeshifts, that failed to fathom the argument of Hume, and did not see their way to that rectification of the lines of thought which the case demanded. If our beliefs are solely the results of experience, the uniformities of nature, Hume reasoned, being as a million to one, must have an insuperable advantage in power of impression over any miracle. It is idle to suppose that miracles, few, remote, scattered, should overbear in force, in liveliness, the fixed order of events. A man cannot make a path by once crossing a meadow. The new-comer will pursue the old way, trodden by the feet of successive generations. The empirical philosophy admits no antecedent, rational presumptions preparing the way for one or another assertion, and making the mind ready of belief. The conclusions of

the moment are simply the result of a balance of forces, and this balance must, from the nature of the case, be immensely against the miracle. The law has been deepened in its impressions by a thousand examples, the miracle by one only. A single fact cannot, in the physical realm, put to flight a thousand, whatever may be done in the spiritual kingdom. Belief is merely an addition of forces, and cannot be commanded by sporadic events. This method of reasoning is so diverse from that current among men, that few empiricists, even, fully grasped it. Theologians, accustomed to disguise from themselves other methods of thought under empirical terminology, met with great difficulty in approaching the argument, and often answered it in a very slight and insufficient way. The scepticism should have disclosed at once the inadequacy of the philosophy which sustained it. The mind is full of rational anticipations, which make some things easy, others difficult, of proof, quite aside either from the inertia or the momentum of experience. Indeed, this inertia and this momentum are opposed influences to reason, and, like the *idola* of Bacon, are to be resisted. The theologian said with surprise, This doctrine of Hume would not allow me to trust my own senses. Certainly not, if your senses begin suddenly to take on new and irregular forms. Under this changeableness, the sense of reality would disappear, as it does in a dream. The spectator of a miracle would, under the empirical philosophy, be in the condition of a man who had successfully used a complicated machine without understanding its structure, if the machine should suddenly become entirely uncertain in its performance. He could only say, Something is wrong. What it is I do not know. The absurdity lies in a philosophy which so sub-

jects the far-reaching anticipatory mind of man to physical connections that it can bring to them no forecast whatever, nothing but simple passivity.

Yet the nihilism of Hume should have subverted his refutation of miracles, in common with all his other conclusions. If the belief in a miracle makes a lively impression on any mind, as it certainly does on some minds, then that belief is adequate. The question is one simply of facts, of what is, not of what should be. We are not to inquire whether a flood is probable, but to look out of doors and see whether it is actual. If it is, that very fact is its reason of being. Absurdities have exactly the same rights in this philosophy as things rational, if they once succeed in coming into existence. Indeed, the distinction between that which is absurd and that which is worthy of belief has been lost, swallowed up in the distinction between that which is and that which is not. Hume regains the use of his rational powers when he wishes to attack belief, and the believer allows him to play this double part. He is in the light of reason or out of it, as suits his purpose.

Almost any doctrine contains some truth. It is this which buoys it up. We are to remember this fact in a criticism of Hume. There is almost universally present in thought an irrational inertia. Hume makes this, instead of a conflicting tendency, the very substance of thought. An example of this inertia is offered at the present time, in the unqualified way in which we reject the supernatural. There has been a change, induced by science, in the customary methods of thought, and this change gains a force beyond the reasons which sustain it. It offers a weight over against the weight of previous methods. Few minds can discuss the questions involved

in the supernatural without a sensible bias. Pure reason is constantly interfered with by inertia and by momentum, forces which Hume would make the very centre of rational movement. These are really due to the tenacious interests which lay hold of life, and the limited area it looks out on. It misses, in part, the largeness and liberty of truth. Reason is more or less arrested in its functions, and displaced by the swing of feeling, as a carcening vessel is swamped by its own movable ballast.

PART II.

THE LATER EMPIRICAL MOVEMENT IN ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY.

§ 8. Empiricism recovered quickly from the scepticism of Hume, like a prosperous city from a conflagration. Yet, like a careless city, it made no adequate provision in its reconstruction against a repetition of the disaster. It retained its hidden physical connections, though it disguised them a little more carefully under psychological expressions. If the scepticism of Hume had been less sweeping it might have been more effective. As it pulled down all knowledge, practically, men could pay no attention to it; and, theoretically, they were less impressed by it. The conviction was instant and inevitable, that there was some profound error in it. Men went on in their constructions very much as if the riddle had not been propounded to them.

James Mill (1773,) of Montrose, Scotland, without essentially enlarging the data of empirical philosophy, gave them a thorough restatement. He helped, also, to fasten an empirical bias on the mind of his son, John Stuart

Mill, from which, in spite of all his philanthropy and vigor of thought, he never escaped. One is perhaps justified in regarding the younger Mill as not altogether satisfied with his philosophy, and holding fast to it only in the absence of any convictions which seemed to him more tenable. His mind could not relieve itself from a life-long method. The philosophy of both father and son was associated with social theories and civic interests which helped to make it inflexible.

James Mill, in his "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," gave a full and carefully guarded statement of empirical psychology. He escapes the repulsive force of its materialistic features by expressing the connections of mind in terms of mind, rather than in the terms of the nervous system. Yet the underlying grounds are not different from those offered by Hartley. In the construction of complex ideas he lays strong emphasis on inseparable association. Processes of thought that are often repeated together are so merged in each other as not to be distinguishable from a simple state. This is a fact of great moment in mental analysis. The use which Mill makes of it is to be objected to only because of the mechanical character imparted by means of it to the highest mental action. That action is not a growth in celerity of insight, but a lapse into an abbreviated, automatic action; a thing of facile connections and not of facile thoughts. Mill presents, in a striking way, what has since been so characteristic of the school, a careful rendering of psychological forms, with a steady elimination of those forces which alone impart to them any significance. The meaning is made to consist in the very words which present it. The inner movement of mind, on its phenomenal side, stands for mental powers.

Phenomenalism, without being affirmed as a truth, is all that is offered. Sequences are causes, and a statement of the order of events is their exposition. Philosophy is descriptive. Mill was a strict nominalist. A general term is a word that calls up many objects. The inner procedure of the mind, in reaching this result, is thus covered up by the result itself, inadequately stated. Again, Mill regarded the qualities of an object and the object itself as identical. Successions which are constant are not the indices of causes, they are the causes, all that we are at liberty to understand by causes. The notion of the infinite is simply the conception of the possibility of indefinite extension, as of a line or of a surface. The phenomena of mind were consistently cut down in scope to their alleged sources. The absolute passivity of mind under its impressions is seen in the assertions, "To know a sensation and to have a sensation is the same thing." "To have unlike sensations is to know unlike sensations."

Every sensation does, indeed, involve consciousness, and this fact gives color to the assertion of Mr. Mill; but, sensations being granted as phenomena, the entire action of the mind in considering, expounding, and combining them remains to be considered. This action is either left out by Mr. Mill, or something very different from it put in its place. To describe the processes of consciousness, even if the description were complete—and the description in hand is very incomplete—is not philosophy. If it were philosophy, life itself would be the perfection of philosophy. What Mr. Mill constantly omits is the gist of the whole matter, the rational impulse involved in the movement. If there are no underlying powers and causes and reasons, we are back at once on phenomenalism. Mr. Mill escapes nihilism by ignoring it,

and adhering to his descriptive processes. His language implies causation and the coherence of mental processes in personal power. These connections are so essential to every rational movement, that the thoughts of our philosopher are united by them for him and for us, even though they find no recognition in a theoretical statement of belief. If mental facts did succeed each other in consciousness in the manner indicated by Mr. Mill, their progress would be wholly automatic, involving by no possibility any oversight of them, or rational inquiry instituted by the mind itself concerning them. Philosophy, at least, must prepare the way for philosophy by recognizing the bent of the mind toward it. The succession of impressions in the experience of an animal, a purely imaginative flow of ideas, should be, under this system, the most perfect type of rational being. Did not Mr. Mill's philosophy involve every moment more than he explains, to wit, the motives and methods of explanation itself, it would be brought to an instant close. Empiricism quietly insists on the diligent delineation of the branches of a tree, whose roots it has cut up. It denies the powers of mind for theoretical ends, and gives them constant employment for practical ones. It is able to do this with easy oversight of the fact, by those who construct and those who accept the philosophy, because language—language which grows up in the midst of human experience, as men spontaneously interpret it—is so saturated with all causal and voluntary relations as to bear them inevitably with it in every affirmation. The assertions of the philosophy cohere by an attraction of the words for each other which is the inherent force of our common reason in them.

Empiricism, by its diligent pursuit of phenomena, has done much to correct philosophy and enlarge its data.

It has been worth all the ingenuity and activity it has developed. As a philosophy, however, no iridescent film of thought has ever been thinner, more unable to express or control the forces that surge beneath it. The spirit of the wheels is not in the wheels. The sign is here, but not the thing signified—this plays remote in a spiritual realm.

§ 9. John Stuart Mill (1806) was a man of ample powers, sustained by wide and pure sympathies. The empirical philosophy especially commended itself to him on its ethical and practical side. Intuitionism, often assuming conventional forms, was easily associated with an unprogressive and dogmatic temper. It was quite possible, therefore, that one so earnest and beneficent as John Stuart Mill, trained as he had been from his earliest youth in this system, should find something very attractive in the fresh, ethical spirit which inspired empiricism. A philosophy that is breaking with old methods always offers, for the time being, a ready opportunity for attacking abuses, and uncovering the weaknesses of conventional thought. The intuitionism which Mill had to encounter was often of a very indolent and illogical order.

There was little in Mill of absolute and unequivocal assertion. He seemed rather to accept empiricism as offering fewer difficulties than other systems, than because he found no difficulties in it. His chief addition to its sum of beliefs was its seventh principle. All logic is inductive. This follows directly from the general line of its beliefs, and yet was an assertion difficult to make and defend in the presence of a universally current deductive logic. In his "System of Logic" he gave the scope and methods of induction exhaustive statement. The work was one of great value. He regarded

the axioms of mathematics as ultimately truths of observation, though they have now been wrought into our experience as indisputable facts by inseparable association. The deductive logic in which we affirm of each one of a class what is true of the class is merely a restatement of knowledge already won in the slow growth of induction. Induction prepares the way for deduction. We reason from individual to individual. An individual has a given attribute, another individual resembles it in all other attributes; it resembles it also, we infer, in the given attribute. This succession of thought contains, in its simplest form, the entire inductive growth of knowledge. All later processes of deduction are following backward this path by which we have advanced.

If this were an adequate explanation of reasoning, there would be no reasoning in the ordinary sense of the word—a process of thought which furnishes proof. On what ground do we expect that the same substance will show like qualities at different times, or that substances like in all observed particulars will be like in others? We have, in empiricism, nothing but fixed association as the ground of such an anticipation. Association has no rational basis deeper than itself; its force is of an instinctive character, for which we can render no reason. Reason we have none, and so reasoning disappears. Our logic has spoiled all logic. We must at least recognize the validity of causation before the coherence of facts is explicable, and before we can see why this coherence should reproduce itself as a fixed association in our conception of them. We are, therefore, instantly launched, if we are to reason at all, if we are to offer any, the very least, exposition of experience, on the *a priori* inquiries which concern causation in common with all necessary connec-

tions. Does not the very notion of reasoning, if we retain the word in its ordinary force—and if we do not, we cannot relieve logic from the general overthrow—involve this insight? A reason is a conviction of mind, which satisfies it as to some assertion. The following of one event on another is not reasoning, nor is the watching of such a succession. Reasoning offers some consideration to the mind, which determines for it this sequence. Mill resolves all reasoning into an empirical knowledge of the sequence itself. This is only the raw material, the suggestion of knowledge. A reason, when it offers itself as a reason, can only be a conviction of mind involving a second conviction. Sensations following sensations, ideas pursuing ideas, are not reasoning. In these, we are mere spectators of experience. Induction as fixed association is experience, not exposition; so long as we are learning attributes and the manner in which they are grouped, we are not reasoning. If we begin to reason by making certain attributes the ground of anticipating other attributes, we are either thrown back on instinctive connections for which we can give no reason, and which in turn can give us no reason, we are thrown back on the simple facts themselves, or we must bring forward explanatory notions, notions like that of causation, which give to the mind a coherence of events and of thoughts. There is no possibility of rising out of sensuous experience into its rational rendering without giving the process a spring beyond itself. We are left by Mill in the confusion of confounding the fact with the reasons of the fact.

This is clearly seen in the canons of inductive logic which Mill so wisely and carefully sets up. Take the first one, that of agreement. If two or more instances of the phenomena under investigation have only one cir-

cumstance in common, the circumstance in which all instances agree is the cause or effect of the given phenomena. How do we see the fitness of this canon? Certainly not by experience merely, since it is brought forward to expound experience. If it is itself a constituent of experience, then experience needs no exposition. The canon owes its force to the insight of reason. This canon and every other canon on which induction depends are simply self-evident statements of truth, brought to the intellectual illumination of experience. No inductive process can be lighted up in any other way than by assertions due to insight. Insight is precisely that which we are in search of. The experience, as experience, is complete in itself, and now we wish to understand it. Mill's conception that experience slowly expounds itself is virtually the assertion that it is never expounded. Connections of fixed association are, in every stage of them, equally opaque. The axioms of mathematics must be seen—seen through—and not till they are seen do they explain anything. An experience that occurs under them does not expound them, they expound it. A clear expository power must attach to fundamental principles, and it may just as well attach now, in our immediate use of them, as to attach at any previous period and be transmitted by inseparable association. Nay, it must attach to every use of them, or they fail of their purpose. We do not see by the light a lamp has yielded, but by that which it is yielding. When the canons of induction are first brought forward, the clear light that is due to their distinct statement is not the product of the more obscure light which belonged to them, when tacitly accepted in the individual cases which came under them; but to the fact that the connections of reason are now

distinctly indicated in them. The growth of thought is not the resting back, by virtue of fixed associations, of the connections of thought on instinctive ties, but the rise of these processes of reason out of the obscurity of use into the clear statement of general truth. Insight is gaining ground on instinct, not instinct confirming itself by repetition. This process Mill exemplified in his inductive logic. He brought its several canons into clear vision, as the intuitive convictions on which its processes rest. The mind is thus led to see for itself, guided by the notion of causation, that the facts so stated involve, under the canons, the conclusion associated with them. That by which induction is justified to itself is, and ever must be, insight. The canons of induction are necessarily deductive. Mill put back of his great work that which the work was intended to disprove.

We can interpret the facts of experience by ideas which the mind, in its own insight, brings, as the axioms of mathematics; or we may interpret them by ideas which have been established by previous induction. The second method gives us that form of deduction in which we reason from the class to the individuals contained under it. We thus spread out in particulars the knowledge we have accumulated in generals. The process of exposition cannot, it is true, be opened by this form of deduction, since it involves previous induction. The very first terms of knowledge, the earliest steps of reasoning, are possible only in connection with those primitive insights for which we look exclusively to the reason. Without these there can be no opening of the processes of thought. We must again insist that empiricism uniformly destroys itself in reaching its last results. If all logic is inductive, there is no logic; as the association of attributes is not a

matter of logic, but of a purely sensuous experience. That step which is a rational step, a stride of mind, is always deductive, even when it is prepared for by induction. The connections which pervade induction and give it intellectual force are deductive. The idea of causation involves not only that the same cause will be followed by the same effect, but that similar causes will produce similar effects; and so the mind gains reasons, though of unequal force, through all the variable connections of resemblance.

Mill held a midway position between materialistic and idealistic tendencies. Both elements met in his system. Materialism is a term in ill odor and of variable force. We may well, therefore, be called on to use it cautiously and with careful definition. Rarely is any philosophy, especially any English philosophy, consistently materialistic. Idealism is more frequently and more readily conceded. It does not involve the same humiliation of the mind. Strict materialism covers the assertion that mental phenomena are the direct expression of physical causes, that physical and mental forces have one nature and one source. Without going so far as this, a system may be materialistic in its methods. It may identify the dependencies of mind with those of matter, and bring the two classes of phenomena under one law, that of causation. This is a result as subversive of the true character of mental powers as is their identification with physical attributes. If these phenomena are identical in the laws which govern them, the inference is almost inevitable that they are one in origin. We know nothing about substances, and have no interest in them, beyond the agreements they present in their modes of action. Phenomena whose laws are the same express thereby similar-

ity of substance. When we say of a philosophy, as of that of Spencer, that it is materialistic, we may simply mean that its reductions of mental phenomena are made on the basis of causal relations, relations which characterize the physical world.

It is not uncommon for one fully under the influence of this fundamental method of materialism to approach, as did Mill, very close to idealism in his ultimate assertions of the forms of being. He regarded the world of sensations, with the mental constructions which follow upon it, as that which we alone know. The external world is to us simply "a permanent possibility" of these experiences. Having put the powers and laws of mind in the closest dependence on those of matter, he is not able to find in the mind strength enough to grasp with certainty these very things that give to it its own order of being. If the mind is robbed of its true endowments, we may be landed in an idealism of sheer weakness, an idealism that cannot assert the origin of its own impressions.

The hesitancy of Mill's philosophy is remarkable, and has extended somewhat to the empiricism that accompanied and followed it. He admits causation, yet finds no sufficient reference for it. He is ready to identify it with succession, yet uses it as if it retained its own character. His first inductive canon, already given, can mean nothing under mere succession. Its entire purpose is to turn a succession into proof of causation. What can "the permanent possibility of sensation" stand for other than a permanent cause of sensation? But a permanent cause involves at once an external world, which he yet regards as beyond proof. He is thus constantly using causation as a valid notion, and yet refusing to it the position that is properly its own in a system of speculation.

While we have, according to Mill, no ground but a limited experience on which to affirm the universal presence of causation, even in physical things, he still believes that it applies in the same thorough way to human action. A little scrap of conviction, the product of habit, and mutilated within itself, is thus made the archetype of the universe. One is deeply impressed, in Mill, by the astuteness of a conscientious mind groping its way outward, and forever baffled by a congenital weakness it cannot shake off. The processes of disintegration are always a little in advance of those of integration, and no worthy and beautiful body of belief is built up.

The manner in which causation, the constructive notion of the physical world, is handled, goes far to determine the character of a philosophy. Empiricism, while emasculating it in its own field of things, struggles to win for it universal force. There are two essentials to the integrity of intellectual phenomena, that we characterize them exclusively by their own form-element, consciousness; and that we unite them under their own laws, the thoughts under the law of truth, a connection in rational vision. This law stands in no dependence on causation. The two are inconsistent with each other, and supersede each other. Effects are all equally valid. No distinction of correct or incorrect, true or false, obtains between them. If, therefore, our opinions are effects, they are equally real—we cannot properly say sound—one with another. The falling of a rock is not true or untrue, as compared with the overthrow of a tree. If what the empiricist affirms were true, in his sense of the word, it would cease to be either true or untrue in any fitting use of words. Each event, whether in the world we call physical or in that we term mental, would simply be a fact—

neither more nor less—with other facts. This obstacle in the path of empiricism is so absolute that it is a waste of time to add any other to it. A system that destroys the nature of truth cannot profitably be subjected to the tests of truth. In whatever direction empiricism takes its course, it shortly encounters a gulf it cannot bridge. Attacking liberty, it must also attack the spontaneity of thought, the construction of thought, under its own visible law of truth. But losing this, it loses truth itself, and with it all rational grounds of controversy. Let the thoughts of Mr. Mill follow each other like the waters of a mountain brook till they gather at any lower level whatever, and they have nothing to do with, and stand in no contradiction of, the thoughts of another philosopher, spreading out, like a distinct stream, another mirror in another direction to the world about him. Every conclusion, as every event, is fully established, whether it be one affirming necessity or affirming liberty, by the simple fact of its existence.

§ 10. Alexander Bain, professor at Aberdeen, has written voluminously in defence of empiricism. While he shows the same hesitancy as Mill in reaching the last conclusions involved in his philosophy, his method of presentation is much more positive. Mill hesitated to resolve the mind into a succession of phenomena; he hesitated to refer all states and actions to ourselves—this self a series, this series so strange a one that it is ever taking into itself inferences as to its own nature; he naturally hesitated, under the mere force of an impression, to sweep away all the impressions the world has been accumulating up to the present moment. Professor Bain does not stumble over these long leaps. He takes them without reluctance, with more boldness and less

insight. Having failed to accept the interpreting power of reason, he cannot restore the connections of sensations with that which they represent. The mind is enclosed hopelessly within its own impressions. The sentence is to be rendered, but it is to be rendered by merely seeing the words. Everything is relative, with a relativity the mind can in no way measure or escape. In the degree in which the mind commences in helplessness, does it end in helplessness. Empiricism opens with the affirmation, all knowledge starts in sensation; and it closes with the affirmation, all knowledge ends in sensation. At the outset, sensations were the images of physical facts cast on the mental screen; and at the close, this much of truth is lost, and the last conclusion is that these images are so tintured with local color that we can affirm nothing certainly about them. We lost the mind in our earlier assertion, and now we have lost the external world in our later assertion. The only real result is that which Hume divined so quickly and so justly, phenomenalism.

Professor Bain has made valuable contributions to the data of philosophy. These lie chiefly in the direction of physiological facts that touch psychology, facts which bear on perception and the methods of mental action. If these physical relations seem to cast a dark, materialistic shadow on the connections of mind, it is because of the way the light is made to fall upon them. Shift the light, and immediately we stand on the bright heavenward side of spiritual phenomena.

§ 11. The advocate of empiricism whose works are most voluminous and influential is Herbert Spencer. There are an elaborateness, clearness, and breadth of presentation in Spencer, which overawe the mind and crush it under an avalanche of considerations. Yet few

philosophical speculations are more thoroughly illusory, are wider apart in the impressions which they make and the naked facts for which they stand, than those of Spencer. This constant glinting of light, which, after all, cannot be found, arises from the fact that he uses words familiar to us, words which we are clothing with their usual force, and yet which have, of right, in his system, a much more restricted meaning. A process essentially physical is described as if it were truly intellectual.

The psychology of Spencer reposes on the same basis as that of Hartley. It is expanded, however, in connection with the doctrine of evolution, wholly beyond the history of the individual. The growth of the race and of life universal are among its resources. The scope and complexity of the processes of combination are thus indefinitely enhanced, and the means of explanation correspondingly multiplied and made correspondingly vague.

Intelligence consists, according to Spencer, in the establishment of correspondences between relations in the organism and relations in the environment, and the development of intelligence is the progress of this correspondence. The powers of mind, so-called, reason, memory, imagination, are portions of this correlation, special forms under which it takes effect. The fundamental law of this development, a law resting on the nervous system, is that two psychical states that have been once united in experience tend to evoke each other. Under this simple principle, whose ultimate ground is found in the properties of matter, the world addresses itself to the sensitive organism, the organism responds to the world. This interaction, in its less complete expression, is organic life; in its more complete expression, is intelligence. Those ideas which are most distinctive of intelligence, the pri-

mary terms of reason, are long-established connections, from which the mind has wholly ceased to depart. They are the great waterways of thought, which mark out the territory of mind, and indicate its permanent lines of declination. With great assiduity and abundant illustration, that seem to confirm these conclusions, Spencer holds on his endless way through devious lines of evolution. A system of this sort may have interest and instruction in its details, but must, as a philosophy, be pronounced upon collectively. Does it cover the facts to be expounded, or is it so far aside from them as to make its correspondences illusions? We cannot answer this question by entangling ourselves in particulars, but must rather strive to determine whether that which is offered as intelligence is intelligence, whether the phenomena discussed and those calling for discussion are identical. All extreme systems, whether materialistic or idealistic, are condemned, not on the ground of particular failures, but for a want of general conformity to the great outlines of human experience. They tell us from their own speculative resources what knowledge is, rather than strengthen our hold upon it as already the common possession of men. If this first incompatibility of an extreme philosophy can be overlooked, it is not surprising that secondary failures are readily condoned. Empiricism has this grave advantage also, that it is always dealing with a series of sensuous facts, often throws much light upon them, and unites them, in a more or less solid way, with the stratum of psychological phenomena which lies above them. It thus gains an anchorage, with a corresponding sense of reality and security.

Intelligence was defined for us long before the philosophy of Mr. Spencer, by the accumulated experience of

the race. The fundamental objection which we take to this system is, that that which it accepts as intelligence does not agree with that which we know by that name. The correlations which lie between living things and the things which enclose them are very many, and have steadily increased under that movement known as evolution. But these correspondences are exceedingly diverse as well as manifold. Mr. Spencer has laid hold of certain midway phenomena in this development, to which his method is in a measure applicable, and has made these stand for facts above and below them. What we know as habit is largely a better response, and a more intricate one, of the nervous and muscular systems to stimuli through repeated action. Complicated correspondences are induced, and there arise, as active habits, various forms of skill; and, as passive habits, a more quiet response to our situation. This men have recognized, but they have just as distinctly seen that habits are not intelligence; that intelligence is rather opposed to habit, and far superior to it. Habits, correlations induced in the nervous system, are not to be passed upon us as insights and sound conclusions of thought, any more than copper is to be received as silver because they are both parts of one currency. Habit and intelligence are distinctly different. In the degree in which an act has become a habit, has it ceased to be one of intelligence; in the measure in which it is enclosed in the automatic action of the nervous system has it passed from the field of consciousness. Intelligence is most distinct and positive when it first declares itself. The later correspondences induced by it dim, rather than enhance, its brilliancy. This defect in the system of Mr. Spencer is well seen in the explanation offered by him of intuitive ideas. If they are the remain-

ders of mental habits, incident to our early experience, they should be among the most instinctive and obscure connections of action ; they are among the most declared and clear connections of thought ; they are knowledge, not organic drift, in its most pronounced form. Take the theories of mathematics ; the mind pushes them with the most fresh, intense, and clear conviction, in directions new to the individual and to the race. Iron and incandescent iron are not so distinct from each other as a cohesion of impressions by virtue of the organic force of the nervous system, and a luminous outlook of mind, pliant to new truth. In the measure in which we are dealing with intelligence, are the theories of Mr. Spencer inapplicable. Intelligence, as the self-guided movement of mind, is a thing so transcendent, and, of its own order, so supreme in human life, that no man, aside from the compelling force of a theory, can confound it with the processes which lie below it, and prepare the way for it.

Mr. Spencer is able to multiply the number of facts which he brings under association by slurring mental powers. Nervous states are doubtless organically associated within themselves ; but it remains, by the entire breadth of the assertion, to be shown that intellectual connections are the incidents of these physical dependencies. This supposition, fundamental to this philosophy, is not to be assumed, but to be most thoroughly established. Memory cannot be the return of previous experiences simply ; yet this is all that we can refer to the automatic action of the nervous system. Rational memory—memory as associated with the rational renderings of the mind as opposed to the sensuous repetitions of impressions in the animal system—involves a higher act by which present experiences are perceived in definite

relation to past ones. Recapitulation is not memory. But if we accept memory as a primitive power of mind, it, and not nervous connections, becomes the ground of rational associations. Experience, in the human mind, unites impressions under the rational relations of time, cause, space; and memory restores them under these forms. The nature of the union and of the restoration is found in the reason. The theory of Mr. Spencer expounds a large class of facts which lie close to the border line which separates organic and conscious action, but cannot be successfully extended to those higher activities of mind which constitute the preëminent theme of philosophy. The memory of the animal, regarded as a repetition of sensuous experiences, may be explained by it; but in the explanation we totally miss any combining power of reason, a consciousness embracing insight, and not one simply of receptivity.

The system of Mr. Spencer purports to be empirical. It is as thoroughly deductive as idealism itself. Ideas which belong to the mechanical world are carried deductively into the organic world; ideas which belong to the organic world are extended deductively over the intellectual world; and so conclusions are reached which identify phenomena a wide way apart in our daily experience of them. The facts of physiology are attained not by observation, but by long stages of easy inference; the facts of psychology are accepted, not as they lie in living relations, but are rendered as the wants of the system demand, and thus the whole structure is built together deductively, with only a remote likeness to that for which it stands. An effort to express all the phenomena of the world in terms of matter and motion can be accomplished no otherwise than by a deduction which obliterates differ-

ences, gives figurative expressions a literal force, and follows primary dependences, not by observation, but by inference and imagination, through all their supposable stages.

Take the following passage in his "Psychology," under physical synthesis and psychical laws, as an example of method. He is explaining the affirmation that each individual reaches a limit beyond which repetitions bring no improvement to mental action. "When a wave of molecular motion passes through a line of molecules that are greatly out of symmetrical arrangement, much of it is absorbed in turning them toward symmetrical arrangement. As they approach nearer and nearer to symmetrical arrangement, more and more of the wave passes on; less and less is thus absorbed. But to say that each molecule offers diminishing resistance to the transfer of the wave, is to say that there is a diminution of the force which tends to bring it into polar relations with its neighbors. And since the molecule has inertia, and is also restrained by the actions of surrounding molecules, the force available for altering its position bears a continually decreasing ratio to the forces that maintain its position, until at length the effect of this readjusting force becomes insensible."

There is in this reason thus presented no observation of facts. A figurative relation is struck up between very remote things, physical on the one side, mental on the other, and its deductive extension is offered as a sufficient exposition of real causes. This is done with no adequate knowledge of the physiological facts which intervene between molecular action and mental relations, nor the least inquiry into them. What do we know about a wave of molecular motion, a symmetrical arrangement of mole-

cules, a polar connection of molecules with their neighbors, as the basis of a mental process? The mind is simply gliding forward on loosely coherent mechanical conceptions. You can hardly put a single question to such an exposition and secure an acceptable answer. Hundreds of pages of these explanations, imposing as they may seem to be, bring us no nearer to understanding a single intellectual power. The process is merely beating exceedingly thin small nuggets of gold, till they cover over immense surfaces in our work of purely wooden construction.

The philosophy of Spencer, because it stands as the best developed and strongest expression of a movement not to be escaped, and productive incidentally of great advantages, deserves a somewhat disproportionate attention. We regard it as in a high degree the product of the scientific imagination. The mind is led on by ductile images and tenacious physical connections, and is so occupied with the constructive relations possible to them as to neglect both the cerebral phenomena implied in them and any identification of them with the mental activities for which they are made to stand. Everything is virtually assumed, except the one tenuous thread which comes steadily forth from the deductive spinneret. This is due to the easy extension which under the idea of causation we give to mechanical forces, and to the fact that the language we employ in psychology is so full of the physical imagery of its birth that it imparts vitality to the most barren processes. If Spencer wished to present his conclusions in their real baldness, he would be compelled to lay aside the vocabulary of philosophy, and even to press out of the words which express purely physical relations much of their present force. In spite of the apparent

plainness of his style—or, rather, by means of it—comparatively few readers are aware of the very limited results to which his data entitle him, and their great remoteness from human experience. They have enriched the reasoning, as they have pursued it, with fruitful mental conceptions, begotten under an intellectual life much larger than that whose dimensions they are measuring. They bring a scale to the map which is not that which belongs to it. They need the remorseless logic of Hume to break the illusion for them.

Spencer regards, for instance, the sense of resistance as the substratum of knowledge, the universal constituent of causation. Yet he speaks of the impression of resistance as one and the same thing in every sensitive creature, and in every part of the sensitive organism. There are at least six forms of resistance of which we take cognizance, and which in no way explain each other. There is the mechanical resistance offered by one solid to another by virtue of hardness, and that which is due to weight. There is the resistance which a living thing, as a tree, presents to unfavorable conditions of growth. There is the pressure of contact in the animal system, which may produce motion without awakening sensation. There are the sensations incident to all forms of contact, which, without observation, play so extended a part in association. And there is that rational recognition of these sensations by which they become the data of knowledge, and open up to us the external world. To assume that resistance and the causation it involves are one and the same fact in these various forms, that the last form can be, by consistent manipulation, evolved out of the first form, is to wipe out fundamental differences, and substitute an agreement of words for an agreement of things.

When Spencer says our cognition of space can arise only through an interpretation of resistance, he ought to mean through its rational interpretation, yet he can only mean one more implication in those cerebral involutions, which, one and all, demand the light of reason as a condition of knowledge. These three things, so distinct in themselves, cerebral involutions, associative processes, and rational apprehensions, are made to flow together, till the primary boundaries of knowledge are swept away. If the three are one, of course the evolution of each from the other is easy.

Spencer affirms in the same connection that we are conscious of force. But if we are conscious of force, force is a mental phenomenon, and its many forms are one and the same thing. What meaning can we, under this statement, attach to the equivalence of forces? Which force is it we are conscious of—mechanical, chemical, or thermal? Spencer, under the flexibility of language, allows these three things, physical force, organic experiences, intellectual relations, to coalesce with each other or to fall apart, as suits the convenience of the moment.

Another example of this trick of words is found in the use which Spencer makes of "The Unknown." These words steal vigor from the vocabulary of theology. Without that inspiration they would be an empty symbol. The consistent positivists are quite right in indignantly disclaiming his Unknown as a part of a discarded system. It is not something absolutely unknown, a mere nothing, which he is striving to introduce anew into the currency of thought. It comes laden with the weight of causes, and begins at once to gather values from all the history of religious thought. It soon becomes the summation of physical and spiritual energies, and grows great under the

appellation of The Unknown, not as possessed of no known efficiency, but as embracing all known energies in a transcendent form. It is the transcendentalism of divine attributes, which, by a silent, irresistible induction, slowly passes over to this empty entity, this verbal contradiction, of Spencer. The same phrase introduces the conception either as the overflowing term of fulness or as the vanishing line of being. The mind is left to play between the two as if they were identical; to accept The Unknown—as so many are now doing—as a new discovery of faith, or to retain it as the dead-line of intelligence.

If what has now been urged is at all true, the empirical philosophy, notwithstanding its amplitude, the demonstrative character it so readily affects, the light it often yields when its inquiries lie in the direction of organic facts, is exceedingly superficial. It is constantly hiding the true quality of higher activities under lower ones, and assuming this equivalence as the very substance of its proof. It effaces all sharp discrimination, and puts voluminous description in place of precise analysis. It erects an immense edifice on temporary supports, and forgets to replace them by real foundations. It traces imaginary neural dependencies and does not return to show their reality; or their identity with the processes of mind; or the possibility of the purely causal relations of the one standing for the conscious connections of the other; or the feasibility of maintaining the distinctions of truth; or of generating truth and error by means of a fixed physical movement; or of reaching either actual agreements or disagreements in intellectual conclusions by a kindred genetic movement in distinct brains. The real substructure of philosophy is nowhere built. It is assumed or deferred. Mr. Spencer's philosophy could

hardly have achieved any great success, were it not that there are so many facts of organic life to which it is more or less applicable; were it not that its successes on the inferior side atoned for or concealed its failures on the superior side; and that so many are so eager to reap the harvest of the doctrine of evolution, and have so strong and predetermined a faith in it. If sheaves are brought in which yield but little grain, they ascribe the fact to hasty cultivation, and still retain their first confidence. A deep conviction is still present, the result of successful physical inquiries, as expressed in the words of Huxley, "Consciousness is the function of nervous matter, when that nervous matter has attained a certain degree of organization." "The progress of science means the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant exclusion from the regions of inquiry of what we call spirit and spontaneity." Under this current conviction many were ready to see the preliminary work of identification between cerebral and mental connections passed lightly, and the possible parallelism of the two traced extendedly. This Mr. Spencer has done to the satisfaction of his disciples, having left as far behind him as any of his predecessors the facts of experience, being fully occupied with the ingenious work of making an intellectual world out of material forces. Instead of supplementing science with philosophy he has made philosophy an annex of science, and so has won his following at once.

§ 12. Dr. Carpenter, in his "Physiology of Mind," has dealt more directly with the primary terms in an empirical philosophy, and has endeavored to establish an equivalence between simply cerebral activity and the activity of thought. Antecedent cerebral action is assumed

as a means of explaining conclusions that have entered the mind abruptly, and judgments involving unusual insight. There is thus presumably a mental state, and that one of marked intelligence, the direct product of neural activity. Judgment, as well as sensation, becomes the result of antecedent physical causes. When we accept a previous cerebration as the ground of a particular rational conviction, our cause is wholly conjectural. The sudden insight must establish the existence of the cause before the cause in turn can explain the insight. We are not deducing effects from known causes: we are deducing unknown causes from effects. Moreover, the causes thus assumed give no real explanation to the mental states which are said to follow from them. We can give no reason why a definite cerebration is not, when it first occurs, accompanied by the thought appropriate to it; nor why, failing of this, it should have any effect on a later act of real intelligence. The process is not made more simple, but more complex, the unmanageable elements are not fewer, but more numerous, as the result of our supposition. It is, therefore, most unphilosophical as assuming unknown causes, causes whose connection with the effects we cannot trace, and which simply enhance the complexity of the problem. Far better is it to accept the fact as indicating an ultimate power of mind. The action of the mind culminates in sudden insight; it has its vantage points and its moments of power. Moreover, these successful judgments, when formed, sweep the whole ground. They are complete within themselves, and leave nothing, as a missing link, to be referred to some previous action. These suppositions need the support of a previous identification of thought with cerebration, and can bring no proof to the doctrine itself.

Empiricism quietly assumes that sensation is the type of thought, but sensation and thought differ so widely as to make this view improbable. A thought that is the product of previous physical causes must lose its function as a thought. The mind may as well remain exclusively under a simply sensuous, impulsive experience, adequate within itself to all purposes of control. The fact that activities of mind and of brain are constant accompaniments of each other does not define the line of dependence between them. Machinery is a means to expressing force, as in the steam-engine. We are not, therefore, to suppose that the motion of the mechanism is the antecedent of the force. If thought is an impelling power, it gains a rational purpose; if it is not, it becomes an illusion and a superfluity. The connections would hold without these shadows in consciousness as well as with them.

If we are to have a psychology in which cerebration is to be regarded as the ground and cause of thought, it must open its inquiries by a distinct and sufficient proof of that fact. It is not one which lies on the surface of experience, but the reverse rather. The multiplied details of empiricism lose their interest, till this fundamental assumption is established.

§ 13. George John Romanes, in support of the doctrine of evolution, has discussed very extendedly animal and human intelligence, and the two as embraced in one line of development. Any acceptable theory of these two phases of mental life must cover the entire group of facts broadly. Chief among these phenomena is that universal observation that the animal arrives quickly at the limits of knowledge, while rational powers meet with no kindred restraints. Farther, as a means to this develop-

ment, and in furtherance of it, men create language, the signs of abstract ideas. Animals fail to use it, even when it is forced upon them.

There are two very distinct forms of intelligence, sensuous impressions associatively combined, and ideas reflectively united under rational relations. The first is sufficient to account for the intelligence of the animal in its unprogressive form; the second belongs to the human mind, in its endlessly progressive power.

Mr. Romanes interprets the actions of brutes too liberally in the inner experiences they imply. The gist of his argument, however, lies in establishing a common ground to which the animal attains, and from which the infant takes its departure. This overlap is the possession by both of receipts. Receipts are general impressions not reflectively defined. When defined, they pass into concepts, give occasion for language, and open the highways of thought. The child, for example, perceives the agreement between dogs, and at once tacitly establishes the class. The dog, it is affirmed, does the like thing, and recognizes a sheep as a sheep, notwithstanding individual differences. Thus, the animal has attained the impressions from which the child derives his concepts.

Receipts, in a sensuous experience, are simply shadows cast upon it from above. Like causes are sufficient to produce like effects, with no recognition, in sensation, either of agreements or disagreements, between them. An unreflective discrimination, on the other hand, is involved from the outset in a spontaneous use of rational powers. Reflection is simply bringing more distinctly before the mind the processes normal to it. No amount of light thrown on sensuous associations can disclose in them rational connections, while rational connections cannot

fail, under the reflective use of its powers by the mind, to reveal their latent bonds of union in primitive notions. The phenomena support this psychology. Passing a few acts whose implications are differently rendered, the animal admittedly fails to find the realm of reason, and the child enters almost at once, and necessarily, into it. The reason of the difference is as fundamental as the difference itself. It is, that in the one case the rational implications involved are potentially present, in the other, they are not.

§ 14. The later stages of empiricism have been closely associated with evolution. Evolution demands an empirical psychology. We cannot consider this question to any advantage, without understanding by evolution—what it ought exclusively to designate—the unfolding of forces without increments. A doctrine of development is wholly consistent with an intuitive psychology. Evolution prejudices such a psychology.

Its weakness as a psychological theory is disclosed at once in the part which causation is made to play. Fundamental as is this conception to evolution, the psychology incident to evolution has no way of establishing it. Its usual substitute for causation is succession, but under succession evolution loses its hold; evolution affirms a quantitative and qualitative dependence of each succeeding on each preceding physical state in the conjoint flow of events. Under simple succession there are no measurements with which to fill out this conception. Less and more can follow each other, and we must have some notion of forces between which an equivalence can be affirmed. In mere sensuous phenomena, our equilibrium, the basis of our evolution, is lost. Restore it again arbitrarily, and, as we have so often pointed out, causal de-

pendencies become the staple of rational connections, and these in turn disappear. We can neither unite our events nor make our thoughts cohere without a psychology other than that provided by empiricism.

Discussions in the philosophy of evolution and in the detail of its methods show, in consequence of this weakening down of the inner rational links of being, a constant tendency to occupy themselves with processes rather than with powers, with phenomena rather than with the relations they interpret. Granting freely the many and great advantages which have followed this new direction of inquiry, it, in itself, at once leads to maimed and halting results. It attains to the terms of reason, but not to reason itself.

An example of this is seen in Spencer's definition of life: "The definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences." If this definition is to be regarded as simply an effort to point out one feature which the various forms of vital action have in common, it is fairly successful, but it is in no sense a law. It explains nothing. It leaves each specific type of organic structure exactly what it was, and where it was, previous to the generalization; a distinct energy or group of energies to be considered by itself, and capable of no reference beyond itself. The differences in it are all there, and must be finally accepted and understood as differences.

Evolution gives rise to a tendency to minimize distinctions, and to reduce their significance in themselves and in their relations. Shortening one's stride does not alter the fact of progress, nor does the reduction of transitional terms in their extent destroy their nature. Our knowl-

edge is made up of two somewhat opposed, yet supplementary, processes, the careful laying down of dividing lines and the constant restoration of unity in spite of them. To obscure differences is to obscure agreements. The analytical and the synthetical movements must sustain each other. Evolution can only be converted into progress by being something more and better than itself. If there is no reason why we should be unwilling to unite each succeeding to each preceding step, there is also no reason why we should not freely accept the physical and intellectual advance present at every stage.

Regardless of the widest relation of events, instinct has been thought of as "lapsed knowledge," a knowledge which has sunk into the connections of habit. Habit is allied to instinct, and knowledge may associate itself with, and so, in a limited degree, be merged in, instinct, but these incidental relations should not, for a moment, cover up the grand sequence of knowledge to instinct, and the partial displacement of the organic by the rational terms of life.

Evolution assigns itself an impossible task, to fully and obviously include all succeeding stages in preceding ones. It cannot, therefore, avoid doing the facts themselves an injury, obscuring, in the progress of events, those subtle and beautiful diversities which accumulate upon us in the growth of the world. Growth is not admitted. The movement must be the more mechanical one of evolution. Yet the world is best apprehended in experience under the notion of growth, a development by stages, with increments, toward a more perfect organization. A wish to put evolution in place of growth must be attended with an effort to scout all later forms of development, and preëminently that rational life in which

they all unite. The method and the impulse become intensely *a priori*. Empiricism, working in defence of evolution, should greatly fear an undue reduction of the facts with which it has to deal. There is in it a consciousness of doing this, as was shown in the eagerness with which, having first denied intuitive truths, it afterward laid hold of inheritance as a means of explaining their peculiar quality.

The philosophy of evolution discharges the colors from a half-dozen prints, and then brings forward the bleached texture as proof of the ultimate identity of them all. Quite true, we reply, if attention is directed to the point in the process which precedes prints, but wholly untrue if directed to prints themselves. "We can think of matter only in terms of mind. We can think of mind only in terms of matter." We accept the assertions, if we are to understand thereby a constant correlation of the two. We as heartily deny them, if they are intended to identify matter and mind. Such a result abolishes the starting-point. We need no philosophy of identity. We must hold fast the diversity with exactly the same strength with which we seize the unity. We pass lightly the proofs of a system which issues in vacating its premises, and in rendering its own conclusions meaningless. It is not so much the weakness of successive steps as it is the obvious falseness of results that is fatal to a philosophy of evolution. If all processes are alike mental, and all alike causal, and all convertible, then our philosophy is a wheel whose constructive parts are lost to vision by its own revolution. We need to return to our uncorrected impressions of difference, in order either to secure a motive, a method, or a result of inquiry. The motive is the divergence between matter and mind, the method is by

mental action, the result rests wholly on the soundness of the reasoning by which it is reached. This distinction makes coherent every step which ends in its repudiation.

The uneasiness which compels empiricism, having rejected the more obvious explanation of phenomena, to bring forward some wholly conjectural causes, is seen in the physiological units of Mr. Spencer, and the gemmules of Mr. Darwin. Here is an organic fact on a grand scale, the body of man. It involves, apparently, many peculiar powers in its laws of growth, recuperation, propagation, and improvement. How shall they be explained? Mr. Spencer might have denied, with Professor Huxley, the distinct significance of life, and of the combinations which arise under it; he might, with his inadequate grasp of causes, have left these phenomena as mere items under his general descriptive law of equilibrium. But the sense of need was too strong for these methods. He introduces imaginary physiological units, infinite in number, so strangely endowed as to exceed all other wonders, and refers to them the minor marvels of the living body. These are infinitesimals, and he seems to think that, having driven constructive forces back into them, he has reduced the problem of life to their dimensions. Such a philosophy is not unlike that of the savage who affirmed that the steam-engine enclosed a horse. The savage had this advantage, that he knew empirically that to which he referred the new fact before him. True philosophy demands a cautious analysis of the phenomena into all their constituents, and a cheerful acceptance of them in these simplest forms.

Mr. Spencer is led, having disparaged reason in his theory of mind, to disparage it of set purpose as giving any law to events. "What is this realism which is estab-

lished as a doctrine long before reasoning begins, which immeasurably transcends reasoning in certainty, and which reasoning cannot justify farther than by finding that its own deliverances are wrong when at variance with it?" This realism of Spencer, whose conclusions are so supreme that we owe our wisdom to them and cannot bring it in turn to bear upon them, is the intellectual aggregate of the entire process of evolution. Individual reason stands abashed in its presence. Yet this way of looking at knowledge as a conjoint product, slowly accumulating within itself, is essentially absurd. Individual reason must be complete in its own action; it must be like reflections of light, possessed of all the powers of light. The progress of thought is not a march in the physical world, each position being defined by a central point around which the camp of humanity is pitched. If knowledge is a collective achievement of this sort, then our only inquiry is, what opinions contain the averages of the realistic movement? Our positions are defined by measurements from the centre of development. Such realism would be as destructive to the conclusions of Mr. Spencer as to those of another. He is not invulnerable by virtue of any nearness to the centre of aggregate thought among men. He is rather especially remote from it.

One, in pursuing such a philosophy, cannot fail to be struck with the boldness with which, opportunity being given, it overleaps its own barriers and rushes for its goal, not stopping to inquire whether the evolutionary movement is before or behind it, on the right or the left. Thus Mr. Spencer, having laboriously traced the unfolding of religious ideas, ideas so central and potent among men, suddenly narrows down the result to his own formula, the Unknown. What conclusion is to-day more remote from

actual evolution, looked on, not as an incomplete movement of reason, but as "realism"? Not only is the pyramid, whose foundations are hardly more than laid, completed at once by Mr. Spencer, a capstone is put upon it, invisible to the mass of men. Experience turns at every step of progress on the assertion of the sufficiency of reason, and that in the face of all its errors. We can discuss nothing, and measure nothing, on any other terms. The postulate of all intellectual processes is the adequacy of intellectual powers. The constant task of thought is to confront "realism." We may attach great importance to "realism," but it is an importance tempered by a supreme sense of the revelation which lies in intellectual light.

The method is obviously self-contradictory. What, contending against reason in behalf of "realism," is Mr. Spencer appealing to but to reason itself? If reason, individual reason, fails to defend him, whence will his defence come? If progress and truth are simply questions of "realism," then the more inert we are the better, as we shall thereby keep nearest the mathematical centre which defines correctness. The philosophy appeals to reason in a discussion of the methods of progress, and then extinguishes reason by an assertion of "realism." Reason sufficient unto itself must be recognized as the final output of all "realism," the test of all "realism," or reason must sink back as a drop in the ocean and be rocked to rest by the fitful tossings of cosmic tides. It is absurd to kindle a light to see the sun with. It is absurd to awaken reason simply to discern the "realism" that overwhelms it. The light that is ours must be for us the measure of all light. If the light that is in us be darkness, how great is that darkness.

These strictures would scarcely be worth making, did they not touch a central weakness of evolution as a philosophy. That philosophy must be dogmatic to be in consistency with itself; must set up "realism" as the test of truth. Having won our liberty of thought against the dogmatism of theology, we must now win it a second time against the fatalism of nature, against "realism."

The extent to which empiricism becomes verbal construction is far greater than either those who frame or those who read it are aware. The mind will have its own. Give it but words, and shortly it supports them with growing entities suited to the purpose they subserve. Nature, natural selection, law, the Unknown, gather together the attributes of spiritual agents, and travel on with the mind as its household gods. Take such a word as heredity. Discussion under it soon ceases to be collocation of phenomena, a marshalling of events. The abstract expression gathers life. It accumulates its many powers, whether as physiological units or otherwise, sums up in itself increasingly complex processes, till that which was a mere word, holding firm a relation, becomes a controlling entity of an unknown and most marvellous order. Our words impose themselves upon us and become the deities of the machine.

But in what respect, it may be asked, is a spiritual philosophy better off? Do not its conceptions grow in a like irresistible and unintelligible way? In this one supreme particular, it starts with a most certain, apprehensible, and familiar fact in experience, that of a spiritual agent, and adheres to it throughout as a term of order and knowledge. Experience and that which renders it cohere with each other.

PART III.

THE ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY.

§ 15. Ethics necessarily furnishes a very severe test of empirical theories. It is the point at which transcendent elements are most declared. On the other hand, however, moral action is interlaced by a great variety of motives, covers human experience in the broadest possible way, is amplified and supported by many secondary incentives, and so responds to empirical inquiry in results of the utmost moment. Empiricism has done some of its best work in this field, brought fresh impulses to conduct, and marked an era in ethical development. The hasty conclusions of intuitionism have been corrected. The immense momentum with which the moral forces of the world move forward in their own lines of development, and the immense inertia with which they resist violent changes, have been disclosed. Morality is thus seen to involve a wide knowledge of all social forces, and increasing wisdom in working under them. Whatever illumination there may be in the primitive insights of the moral nature, this light cannot be turned into beneficent revelation except as it gains diffusion and color in the atmosphere of the world.

Empiricism started its ethical speculation with the idea of happiness. It was able, for a long time, to add no wider motives to the simple pursuit of pleasure. James Mill combined the feelings into moral affections by three associations. The first connects certain actions with pleasure or pain in our own experience. The second

unites our personal satisfactions with the praise or disapproval of others. By virtue of these two connections conduct comes later to be associated, in a more general and abstract way, with censure and commendation. Thus morals are rooted in experience. Men will praise thee when thou doest well for thyself. The narrow impulses gain a generality which serves to soften down their self-seeking character.

§ 16. The completeness with which the English mind was subjected to the ethics of happiness is seen in the "Moral Philosophy" of William Paley (1743), a dignitary of the church, and remarkable as a writer for his clear, terse statement, and the firmness of his hold on the nearest and most convincing arguments. He does not hesitate to bring forward, as the last and most inclusive motives of obedience to the moral law,—itself resting on the will of God—the pleasures and pains of another life. It is foolish to resist such overwhelming power.

As long as personal pleasure is made to supply the impulse to action, involving in itself through social relations what it readily can of the pleasures of others; as long as no distinction, save that of quantity, is recognized between pleasures, but all are brought to the same standard of measurements, we have no ethical system. We have only those conflicting interests, each man pursuing his own happiness, which demand a moral law, a law of restraint, correction, and organization. The animal kingdom is organized within itself, so far as it is organized, by an instinctive pursuit of well-being, partially expressed in appetitive enjoyments. The appetites, however, are closely bound down to their organic ministrations, and are in many directions supplemented by purely instinctive action. The appetites and passions of men are greatly

relaxed. There is in them an easy possibility of discord. They attain construction by repressment and development under wider incentives than those furnished by themselves, and these are expressed and enforced as the moral law. The law of pleasure is a law of prudence, resting on the sensibilities themselves; the law of ethics is the law of reason, by which all sensibilities are assigned their own proper position in that supreme product, manhood. Reason enters by means of this law into its own, and rules it.

A very great change was made in the ethics of empiricism when Jeremy Bentham (1747) announced, as its fundamental principle, The greatest good of the greatest number. In it we reach a true and comprehensive moral law, a law that can and must be enforced on a moral basis. This principle is a revised statement—though a less vital one—of the second command, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Henceforth it could not be said that empiricism was lacking ethical truth, or was striving to supply its place with a refined self-interest. All that this philosophy has done for morals has followed this change of base. Bentham was especially successful in reinvigorating political philosophy, and in securing legal reform. The greatest good of the greatest number is a terse, clear, and most practical principle in social action. It gathers to itself all those more disinterested sentiments which have been slowly accumulated under the law of love, and at the same time leaves men free to accept it, if they choose, as a new truth in the field of empirical inquiry. Bentham is an admirable illustration of that sturdy and practical tendency, that strong, yet superficial, temper, which frequently characterize the English mind.

This principle taking the foreground, the burden of diffi-

culty was instantly and completely shifted in empirical ethics. It was now possessed of a law, definite, comprehensive, and applicable. The question that remained was, How shall this law be enforced? The later philosophy of empiricism has been diligently occupied with this problem. Its measure of success is shown in the multiplicity of answers, and the constantly renewed attempts to improve them. Intuitionism has the very simple response that the same reason which discerns the law discerns also its fitness, and is ready to enforce it. How can this internal sanction be escaped, and an external one be put in its place?

§ 17. John Stuart Mill relied very much on sympathy as impelling obedience. Sympathy is extremely aidful, if we already possess moral affections; but of very little aid if we are destitute of them. Sympathy is an extension of the existing spiritual state. But empiricism has on hand the difficult task of explaining the development of the rudiments of the moral affections, and may not, therefore, assume a living germ which is to be unfolded by sympathy. Sympathy in itself alone remains indifferent to virtue. It stands for a simple tendency to share feelings akin to our own, be they kindly or malevolent. Thus the strange cruelty and social injustice of the color sentiment, which belongs to Americans, are enhanced by sympathy. Sympathy accelerates currents of feeling already present; it does not create new ones. It may, therefore, increase evil and make its correction difficult. The moral sentiment has often occasion to contend with our sympathies and break them down.

Bain looks to conventional sentiment to enforce moral precepts. It is for the interest of all that the principle of the greatest good of the greatest number should

prevail. All may unite, therefore, in approving it and imposing it. But how shall the interested action of men, taken collectively, issue in the disinterested action of men, taken singly? The motive of the many, in their enforcements, destroys the moral power which is needed in each case of obedience. Good-will cannot rise higher than its fountains. If men urge upon me morality, in behalf of their interests, I shall be inclined to reject it, in behalf of my own interests. The conflict of interests remains, and each will do as cunningly as he can. If it be said the greatest good of the greatest number really embraces the well-being of each man, the response is double. This assertion is true only on high moral grounds, the affections being already in full force; nor can its truth, in the midst of conflict, be seen by those of feeble moral endowment. If they deny it, as in most specific cases they will, the grappling-iron slips, and can secure no farther hold.

Moreover, this enforcement on the part of the community assumes that there are in the individual those moral germs which prepare the way for it. One without ethical convictions can come under no persuasions but those of pleasure and penalty in their palpable forms. Conventional sentiment, like sympathy, only prospers by an assumption of moral conditions.

Spencer, always at work in the line of evolution, makes what use he can of inheritance in explaining the present vigor of the moral law. The experience of many generations is organized together and consolidated in what we now regard as the indubitable truths of morals. Leslie Stephen, in his "Science of Ethics," has very thoroughly elaborated the same opinion. Moral sentiments are a "social tissue," which is produced by the innumerable

actions and reactions of society under increasingly complex relations, broadening interests, and growing light. The process of growth is put for the thing grown. If Mr. Spencer's words are allowed to stand for what they seem to stand for, a social experience on an ethical basis, and not shut up to what they are, a neural growth on an organic basis, then both what he and what Mr. Stephen have to say cover very important and very interesting facts. The question, under this presentation, would resolve itself into the deeper question, so difficult to approach in an adequate manner, whether the changeable conditions under which the higher powers are developed cover the powers themselves, or are only the occasions on which they are called out. We do not doubt the facts of development, but these facts give nothing, create nothing, and owe their own significancy to the growing insight which accompanies them. In the most protracted and complex play of processes, we must still have the powers which give character to the play. In our natural selection we must have the antecedent, unique variety, itself the secret of all success.

Henry Sidgwick, in his "Methods of Ethics," while clinging to the empirical scheme, approaches very closely to that intuitionism which refers the authority of law, in the last analysis, to the mind which pronounces upon it. The law appeals to reason, and stands approved in the court of reason. The reason of man, opened in insight by large experience, needs not that the principle of the greatest good of the greatest number should be laid upon it from without. If such a necessity existed, it could not be met; or, if it were met, could not result in anything but degradation, the subjection of the mind to unethical impulses. Insight, once conceded, must be

pure, personal vision. It cannot be commingled with instinct, and obscure convictions running along the lines of descent. The autocracy of reason can be established on no other terms than those of sufficient knowledge and final authority. But the autocracy of reason is the postulate of all philosophy.

§ 18. The largest spiritual life can drink in health and inspiration only in the purest, deepest spiritual atmosphere. A cosmic atmosphere means the pervasive presence of reason; yet reason is everywhere personal, the very seat of personality; is always emotional, the very source of the higher affections. Empiricism is a slow exhaustion of the medium of divine revelation—personal reason. Faith subjected to this process of a constant conversion of rational powers and processes into the complexities of physical changes, into terms of matter and motion, droops and dies like a bird in the bell of an air-pump. Every stroke renders more tenuous the vital air, and a long, hard struggle sets in between the large demands of life and the growing scantiness of its conditions. In the case before us, this contention lies between the wealth of human reason and the spiritual poverty of the world in which it is lodged, the warmth of human love and the immense depths into which it is left to radiate its heat without reflection. It is astonishing that the faith of England has so successfully resisted a philosophy, laboring so long, so hard, so skilfully, in the reduction of the medium of spiritual life. The fact testifies to the inherent force of faith and to that tenacious, practical hold of English thought so often referred to. The Englishman stops in his conclusions when it becomes inconvenient to go farther.

In ethics, as elsewhere, the crowning disaster overtakes

empiricism when it reaches its own results. A law that involves no insight in its formation can issue in no insight in its application. However the fact may be hidden under familiar phrases, the ethics of evolution can be no revelation of the soul to itself, or of the world to him who lives in it. It can only be an obscure sense of a deep underflow of ungovernable energies, on which we and all things wait. It expounds not the highest and most intellectual, but the lowest and most organic experience of the race; not that most moral, but that least moral.

There has been a slight reduction of this painful rarity of the spiritual atmosphere in the illogical concessions recently made to the Unknown. Whatever illusions it may play upon itself, empirical philosophy can rehabilitate no true theism with the mere shreds of truth that have escaped its destructive processes. There may be a feeble gasping of the body after breath, but no tingling of life to its very extremities under the profound inhalations of rational faith.

The attitude of that sturdy positivist, Frederic Harrison, commands our sympathy, and, in important respects, our admiration. He refuses to pursue the dream of a dream, to watch for the last colorless distillation of a negation as it escapes from the alembic of Spencer, and turns with enthusiasm to the "synthesis of humanity," to those moral duties and that moral life which lie nearest to us. One honors the courage which renews itself in defeat. Having lost what constitutes for most earnest-minded men the larger share of wealth, a pervasive, spiritual presence in the world, Mr. Harrison still thinks himself rich in the interplay of human affections. We marvel at this buoyancy of hope, and learn much from it. Yet the inspiration which makes a synthesis of humanity

seem so possible and desirable, as an immediate object of pursuit, must come, if it comes wisely, from the reality of things widely interpreted, from the indwelling force of the world, the spiritual power hidden in its spiritual resources—from Infinite Reason. If one saves the argument for righteousness in its immediate, practical power, it matters far less if he loses some of its inner light. Having travelled all the obscure and perplexed paths of empiricism, Frederic Harrison becomes an astonishment to us, in the tenacious hold of the soul on its own, as he gathers up the remnants of social, spiritual strength, and builds them into a kingdom—heavenly, if not consciously of heaven. With the assurance of one who has witnessed a true process of creation, he pronounces this product of gracious affections very good. It is not strange that faith languishes under empiricism; it is strange that it renews itself so often, and in so many unexpected ways. Thought cannot proceed far without these flashes of insight. The clear, sultry summer day closes with lightning all along the horizon. Yet, if the highest moral possibilities are everywhere present in the world, what is this but saying that God is present?

PART IV.

DISSENTIENT PHILOSOPHY IN ENGLAND.

§ 19. The philosophy of dissent from the prevailing tendency is comparatively meagre in England. It is disconnected, and stands, most of it, in close affiliation with religious sentiment.

Lord Herbert (1581) gave independent and extended consideration to that fundamental question, What is

truth? He reached the conclusion that there are four kinds of truth: truth of things, truth of appearances, truth of concepts, and intellectual truth. There is a confusion in this analysis which we shall meet again in a more influential form. Truth involves the permanent coherence of things in physical relations, of ideas in intellectual relations, and the correspondence of our convictions concerning them with these connections. Truth pertains exclusively to propositions. It is the validity of knowledge, its coherent character within itself, and its representative character in reference to the objects to which it pertains. There is neither truth in things nor in appearances. There is reality in them, and this reality gives occasion to knowledge, and so to truth. Causation involves the fixed coherence of physical things, and so makes them subjects of knowledge. There is stability in things and appearances, and so the mind may have a permanent and correct apprehension of them. But the truth does not lie in any agreement of our sensations with the objects which occasion them, but in the correspondence of those relations between objects arrived at by the interpretation of sensations and the relations themselves. Sensations are simple facts of their own kind, and sustain no relation of likeness to the things which occasion them. Our valid, valuable knowledge does not turn on any such similarity, but on the stability of causes and effects. The importance of the relation of causes and effects does not lie in any agreement in the sensational signs of these causes and effects with the causes and effects themselves, but in the certainty of the connections indicated by them. We do not know the nature of the causes of a disease by knowing its symptoms, the sensations which accompany it; yet we have in them the

grounds of correct assertion and wise action. If sensations were wholly arbitrary signs, like words, and were true to their indications, they would remain the conditions of real knowledge. Any correspondence of sensations with things-in-themselves is as unnecessary as it is fanciful. Truth is the agreement of our conception of relations with relations themselves. Both are intellectual terms, as much so as the meaning of a sentence and our apprehension of its meaning. Truth lies between intellectual relations and not between phenomena, though phenomena must be permanent as a condition of attaining it. I think two things to be like because of the sensations they call out. They are alike. That is, the relation which the facts have suggested to my mind is a real one.

Instead, then, of four kinds of truth there is one kind, the fourth mentioned by Lord Herbert, an agreement of relations as grasped by the mind and as yielded by things. The truth of things and appearances is simply permanence, and the truth of concepts is embraced in intellectual truth. The confusion of the discussion in "*De Veritate*" arises, in large part, from a misapprehension of the nature of perception, a subject which had received very inadequate treatment.

According to Lord Herbert, our intellectual faculties are four: instinct, the outer sense, the inner sense, and the discursive power. The term inner sense was later used in connection with ethics, and helped to commingle and confuse simple consciousness and that rational insight into the nature of conduct which we assign to conscience. Under instinct, Lord Herbert included those universal ideas which determine the forms of thought. These he very distinctly conceives, in some respects, as indicated by their criteria, priority, independence, universality, cer-

tainty, necessity, self-evidence. "So far are these elements or sacred principles from being derived from experience or observation, that without some of them, or at least one of them, we can neither experience nor even observe."

Instinct is an unfortunate word to connect with these ideas. Instincts and intuitions touch each other only at one point, certainty of action. In other respects they are at the farthest remove from each other. Instinct is hidden in the darkness of our organic constitution, intuition arises in the clearest light of our intellectual life. However little revelation there may be in an intellectual act, its illumination is in its intuitive elements.

The absence of all careful analysis in reaching these primitive ideas is seen in the five primary religious truths which Lord Herbert lays down; the being of God, the fitness of worship, virtue its chief element, repentance a duty, and a future life. These are complex and obscure judgments which proceed, like other judgments, under intuitive ideas, but have no claim to be direct products of insight. We see at once what a provocation such a use of primary convictions gave to their absolute denial. Inquiry could not advance under such assumptions.

Lord Herbert was very influential in giving extension to deism. This fact helped to reduce the weight of his opinions. It not unfrequently happens that philosophical doctrines, atheistic in their tendency but associated with belief, have an advantage, in the religious mind, over opinions profoundly theistic, but critical of current dogma. Lord Herbert helped to call out the attack of Locke on innate ideas.

§ 20. The intolerant and intolerable opinions of Hobbes did not fail to awaken earnest opposition in minds in the

least spiritually inclined. Conspicuous among his opponents was Ralph Cudworth (1617), of Cambridge. His "Intellectual System of the Universe" is a full representation of Greek and scholastic philosophy. He was an unsparing critic of Hobbes, a friendly critic of Descartes, and imbued with some of the most pregnant opinions of Plato. Moral distinctions, as due to the insight of reason and the freedom of the will, were earnestly defended by him.

Henry More (1614), with less erudition and more imagination, labored in the same direction. They endeavored, with limited success, to rally in resistance to the new philosophy the most sober and fundamental conclusions of previous thought. This effort was made largely in behalf of religious truth, and suffered speculatively the weakness incident to such a dependence. The religious spirit, great as may be its value, is usually too slow in discerning new truth, too reluctant to cast itself unreservedly on reason, to be able to control a fresh impulse of inquiry, which is sustained by any real insight, and is struggling to enlarge the horizon of knowledge. It is impossible to keep the inevitable processes of change within the lines of growth that orthodoxy assigns them. It is orthodoxy itself that needs relaxation. Too much resistance begets too much eagerness in attack, and wasteful overthrow thus becomes the antecedent of construction.

§ 21. There was so much in empiricism, notwithstanding the softened form in which it was presented, inimical to religious truth, that it could not fail to call out a reassertion of fundamental principles from the wiser defenders of faith. Samuel Clarke (1675), without directly attacking the empiricism of Locke, reverted to older methods and reaffirmed the great truths of spiritual philosophy, the being of God, the independent nature of

right, and the freedom of the will, resting these doctrines on an intuitive basis. Dr. Clarke is especially associated with an argument for the being of God. It reposes largely on *a priori* grounds—the necessity of the conception to any rational comprehension of the universe. He regarded right as involved in the fitness of things, and therefore virtually as an attribute to be apprehended by the reason. His philosophy appeared in detached treatises and partial discussions, and, in the system involved, was profoundly opposed to Locke. If not a formal protest against empiricism, it broke decidedly with it. It was influential in maintaining a tonic atmosphere of faith, resting on reason. Reason is given a scope quite beyond the senses, and becomes a power of interpretation that leads us, by means of sensations, into a higher realm of ideas.

§ 22. Bishop Berkeley (1684) stands quite by himself. Idealism has played a very secondary part in English philosophy. The idealism of Berkeley did not arise from magnifying mental processes, and displacing with them the physical phenomena disclosed in the senses, but sprang from the dualism of Descartes, and from the weakness involved in empiricism itself. Empiricism becomes uncertain in its affirmation of any exterior reference of sensations. The mind is so robbed of its native powers as to be able to make no primitive assertion with certainty. Sensations, as simple phenomena, overmaster the mind, and hold it in subjection to themselves. Mill gave this tendency full expression in regarding matter as only the possibility of sensations. The correct and firm reference of our ideas becomes impossible. Berkeley, much impressed by the empiricism of Locke, and escaping the fracture in the universe involved in the system of Descartes, affirmed that the true origin of sensations is

the divine mind. They arise, not between us and the outer world, but between us and God. Direct action, on the part of God, is substituted for constant intervention between two forms of being which cannot immediately touch each other.

Faith was saved from the unbelief incident to referring all our knowledge to the external world, by pushing this world one side, and putting God in its place. This conclusion was too foreign to familiar convictions, too incapable of any proof, too completely subject to religious faith, to be widely accepted. Only a few, like President Jonathan Edwards, having the same speculative cast of mind and the same intense religious temper, were ready to receive this bold solution of Bishop Berkeley. It was united in Edwards with a like large concession to empiricism, as seen in his complete subjection of the will to existing conditions of action.

This reference of sensations cannot be successfully discussed, except in connection with those ideas under which the mind lays down the primitive outlines of belief. As regards these ideas, Berkeley was quite at one with Locke. Time is the succession of ideas, space the sense of unrestricted motion, and causation the impression of force derived from the will. Not only was Berkeley unable, against the entire flow of conviction, to secure any belief in this new reference of experience to God, no aid could have come to faith by such a reference, under the principles of empiricism. The phenomena of mind must have remained of the same limited, barren order, to whatever attributed. The difficulty is not in the ascription, but in the meagre character of the knowledge ascribed. If our knowledge is to be one of phenomena simply, it matters little whence the phenomena flow. There is in them no

transcendent element. The mind is hopelessly enclosed in its own experience. If it refers these sensuous terms of its life to God, the very notion of God is introduced surreptitiously, and can in no way be justified. Whatever the ultimate term, nature or God, we can neither affirm it nor anything concerning it. It is simply the vacancy which encloses our sensuous experience, the Unknown.

The contribution of real value which Berkeley made to philosophy was a more complete and correct interpretation of sensation in his "Theory of Vision." Secondary qualities were referred to the nature of mind, acting through organs of sense. They do not indicate any likeness in material objects to themselves, but only suitable causes awakening the corresponding impressions. In the passage of sensations into perceptions, the element of feeling is obscured or lost altogether, and the judgments incident to it take the foreground. The subjective character of sensations thus disappears, and our knowledge assumes its objective cast. The color is thought to belong to the apple, the music to the instrument. If the light is so intense as to give pain, we refer the pain to the eye; but when it resolves itself into the soft tints of a cloud, these belong to the cloud. Berkeley's "Theory of Vision" recognizes the steps of development in perception, and the obscuration of original terms in the abbreviated process by which sensation as feeling is replaced by perception as knowing.

When Berkeley added, to this reference of what were termed secondary qualities to the mind, a similar reference of primary qualities, as more obscure parts of this same experience, all knowledge became at once so thoroughly a matter of subjective impressions as to give ready admission to materialistic idealism, the most fugitive and futile

philosophy possible—a philosophy in which the mind is hopelessly enveloped in an experience whose valid being, either in itself or out of itself, whose permanence and scope, it cannot affirm. Indeed, affirmation is lost to it. The mind yields its powers to the evolution of physical forces, and in the end can neither reclaim them nor gain a firm foothold among the forces which have devoured them. It has betrayed the insights of faith to the single idea of evolution, and this, in turn, is so far lost to it that it can affirm no world of realities in which it takes effect. The mind becomes subject to shifts and perturbations to which it can set no limits, and from which it can find no escape.

Berkeley, in raising the question of the nature of things —“things as they are”—opened a discussion which was pushed much farther by Kant and those who succeeded him. The idealism of Germany was allied in its origin to that of Berkeley.

§ 23. The philosophy of Bishop Butler (1692), like that of Dr. Clarke, was fragmentary rather than systematic, and was affiliated with it in spirit. Virtue involves an order of nature comprehensible by the reason and enforced by it. The work of Bishop Butler of the widest influence was his “Analogy.” It was directed against the unbelief of the time, and hit more exactly than any other treatise the practical habit of the English mind. It urged the fact that the difficulties which we find in revelation are precisely those we meet in the construction of the world. If we accept these, equally may we those. In whatever direction we move, the same problems confront us. Revelation does not occasion the perplexity, but is only one form of it. As sensible men we shall not plunge ourselves into an unbelief which brings no remedy. Men, like Dr.

Clarke and Bishop Butler, occupying the positions of a previous philosophy without giving that philosophy any systematic restatement, held firm the ties of faith against the disintegrating tendencies that accompany empirical thought.

At a later period, Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772), who came strongly under the influence of Kant and German philosophy, rejected scornfully the empirical method in English inquiry, and endeavored to restore to it the element of insight. His effort was partially successful, and would have been more so had it not suffered, like all his undertakings, from the weakness of his own disjointed character. He enforced the distinction between the understanding and the reason, and helped to give to the term "reason" that higher and more definite meaning it has since attained in psychology—the mind's insight into primary ideas. Herein he passed beyond Kant, rather than was led by him. Coleridge combined, in an unusual degree, the faults and excellences of intuitionism. The vigor of his powers was so great that, in spite of a vague and transcendental method, he flashed intense light on obscure relations. We owe an incalculable debt to empiricism for the more definite and tangible lines of inquiry which it has instituted. We need both facts and their interpretation. But facts are the condition of sound interpretation, and have, in themselves, an antecedent value.

§ 24. James Martineau is by far the most coherent, full, and forceful representative of intuitive philosophy in England. Though his works have been chiefly critical, ethical, and religious, they contain a distinct statement of first principles, brought forward in many connections and fortified in many ways.

“To sum up in brief the positions which define our base; the collision of the mind’s activity and receptivity breaks a sensory monism into the cognitive dualism of self and not-self, each with its own activity facing the other’s receptivity. The two activities, taken as a related pair, and construed by the member immediately known, constitute, in dynamical antithesis, cause within and cause without; the two receptivities, inversely, effect without and effect within. But, to be thus provided with a *within* and a *without*, the dualism must also carry a geometrical antithesis of *here* for the self with its contents, *there* for the not-self with its contents, involving space, and, after more than one perception, time. Thus completed, perception finally recognizes, in the perceiving subject and the perceived object, a predicate over and above the acts issued and the states received, both of which are in time-order, viz., a presence in space, irrespective of succession, and the standing-ground of it; that is, self-identical existence, or subsistence, in antithesis to changing phenomena, whether given out or taken in. It needs but little reflection to be convinced that no one of these thought-relations has any right of precedence over the rest, any logical or psychological priority; with the exception of the last, which asks for time enough to allow the qualities of an object to disengage themselves, by an appeal to the several senses, from the original ‘unity of consciousness.’ All the rest are alike, and at once implicit in immediate perception of any and every kind; and not being separately contributed by empirical lessons, or deductively worked out by reasoning processes, are brought into experience by the understanding *ab initio*, and must be treated as its intrinsic categories or conditioning laws of thought.”*

* “A Study of Religion,” vol. i., p. 206.

This statement is so carefully made that it may fittingly bear a close rendering. The fundamental truth asserted in it is the primitive power of the mind to render, in a rational form, its own experiences. The obscure, sensuous elements which continuously cover, without disclosing, the terms of knowledge, which hold knowledge subject to demand, as language contains its ideas, are rendered into terms of thought by the rational insight which thought implies, from the very beginning holding within itself the methods, the intelligible forms, of truth.

Martineau needs only to break with the Scottish School at one point, to put the indirect for the direct, the rational for the sensuous, in one more particular, to occupy ground thoroughly intuitive, self-consistent, and assertory of the supreme nature of reason within itself—its competence to do its own work. Martineau gives to the mind an immediate knowledge of force in its own action. That is, he makes force a sensuous fact offered in the phenomena, not a rational term supplied in their interpretation. This belief stands quite by itself, and is unsupported by his general philosophy. It is a rendering of the notion in harmony with the doctrine of a direct knowledge of self and not-self, but inconsistent with intuitionism. Force is sub-phenomenal, that by which the mind expounds phenomena. Consciousness cannot embrace it any more in the case of action issuing from the mind and producing sensuous results than in action arising from an external object, for the very good reason that in neither case is it a portion of the phenomena, but the common condition, the interpreting idea, of them all. When the mind puts forth energy it is aware of its own purpose, but not of the connections of force by which that purpose is accomplished. Force, like space and time, is a formal element,

a rendering by reason of sensuous facts in the intelligible terms of causation. This farther logical step being taken, the philosophy of Martineau becomes wholly coherent. Sensuous facts suggest to the reason as an apprehending power, but do not hold for it as a receptive power, the general categories of knowledge. Among these categories causation is fundamental.

The derivation of the notion of causation by Martineau from the conscious energy of volition leads him to a very unusual subversion of words and ideas. He inverts the method of the determinist, who, interpreting causation by physical facts, robs volition of liberty. He says: "By a cause I understand that which determines an alternative; that is, with which it rests to produce either of two phenomena." "Far from admitting that different effects cannot come from one cause, I even venture on the paradox that nothing is a proper cause which is limited to one effect."* There is no real gain in this reversal of words. The old ideas remain, and remain to be expounded under the old difficulties. Martineau has simply discussed choice under the unusual appellation of cause, while causation, a given energy issuing in a given result, remains to be considered. An unsound view of the origin of causation is allowed to transform its very nature.

Martineau, in common with many libertarians, unduly divides the unity of the mind in volition. He inquires: "Is there not a *judging self*, that knows and weighs the competing motives, over and above *the agitated self that feels them?*"† "When I judge my own act I feel sure that *it is mine*, and *that*, not in the sense that its necessitating antecedents were in my character, so that nothing

* "A Study of Religion," vol. ii., p. 241.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 227.

could prevent its coming, but in the sense that I might have betaken myself to a different act at the critical moment, when the pleadings were over and only the verdict remained." *

This manner of putting the case hardly seems to express the facts. The mind and the flow of its phenomena are inseparable. Volition as volition has a finality. Volition being completed, the mind does not remain in a position superior to the result, observant of it, and able to alter it. It has moved onward in the choice, and is identical with it. To assert this separation of the mind is to destroy the inner force and character of the movement as that of the whole man. If I have chosen truth, I have chosen it, and it does not lie with me, at the same instant, to reject it. Freedom is not found in the volatility, the reversibility, of the result, but in the manner in which it has been reached. There is no such other-self to audit the actions of the active self. Liberty lies in the fact that the rational movement by which questions of duty are resolved is one, in its on-going, of variable energies determined within themselves, in large part, both as to the direction and intensity of inquiry. This act of suspension and investigation may lie in continuation of lines of activity already assumed, or in modification of them, according as the mind, in its inner faithfulness, is true to its own revealing power. The point of illumination and genesis is not a focus of foreign activities, but one of spiritual life. It is in the "pleadings" themselves, not in the power to reverse the conclusion reached by means of them, that freedom is achieved. The coherence and continuity of the mind are real, but its several states are united under, and subject to, its own

* "Types of Ethical Theory," vol. ii., p. 37.

spontaneous rational power. Light within distinguishes mind from all other productive centres.

The acuteness, fulness, and irresistible energy of the works of Martineau fit them to mark a turning-point in English philosophy. So, certainly, it must seem to those who hold that no philosophy is possible except through and by powers that hold a philosophy in their own action. To hope to reach a philosophy by an induction, a deposit of thought, foreign to the mind itself, seems an absurdity. This is to expect that results are to transcend all the powers that give rise to them. Reason in the mind is the first condition of a presence of rational relations in its own conceptions. If the light that is in us is darkness, let us succumb to it in silence. To contend against it is the clamor of fools.

CHAPTER IV.

SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY.

§ 1. Though the empirical philosophy of England may be thought to lack depth and subtilty, it has been widely influential, both in direct extension and in calling out opposed systems. The most immediate and continuous movement of rejection occasioned by the nihilism of Hume was that which occurred in Scotland. Hume was not a type of his countrymen, and we have assigned his philosophy to England. It took a very important and coherent position in the development of English thought. His mind was comparatively colorless, and held itself ready, with a serene indifference, for any conclusion. The Scotch are generally devout and dogmatic, and exercise their shrewdness in defence of the ground they have already assumed, rather than in winning new positions. Philosophy is so dependent on the higher sentiments for its data that neither a coldly logical nor a warmly defensive temper offers the best conditions of success in its pursuit. In it, pure thought must penetrate a widely rational life.

The first affirmation of Scottish philosophy was that the common convictions of men were not to be summarily dismissed; that general beliefs, with the intuitive elements involved in them, rested securely on common sense. The conclusions of common sense, the universal power of

knowing, must be accepted in the face of all ingenious and crippling criticisms. It can hardly be doubted that this assertion, as a preparation for philosophy, is altogether sound. It is these very beliefs, the sum of what we accept as knowledge, that call for philosophy. Philosophy is neither less nor more than a comprehensive analysis and formulation of these very truths which the experience of men has gathered and confirmed. Philosophy is not competent to reject its own data. It may correct and enlarge them, but their essential validity is involved in the very inquiry into them, and in those powers by which it is to be pursued. If what mind has done is sound, then what it may do may also be sound. The postulate of all investigation is the soundness of our faculties—faculties common to all and essentially harmonious in their results. It was quite just, therefore, as a preliminary response, commanding fresh attention and waiting on farther investigation, to affirm that the doctrines of Hume disproved themselves by being opposed to the universal convictions of men, by pulling down the entire edifice of knowledge. While this attitude is a dogmatic one, as the mind in taking it is not fully ready to meet reason with reason, analysis with analysis, it is yet a sound one, because it wisely refuses to yield opinions which are sustained by a far broader experience than that which supports those which are endeavoring to supplant them. The mind can see and assert this much, off-hand—whatever are the difficulties in defining and defending fundamental beliefs, they are not as great as those which attend on their denial. Their denial is instant and hopeless confusion. Reason can at least say, that if philosophy is ultimately impossible, our safety lies in keeping close to the familiar and instinctive paths of thought. Indeed,

the scepticism of Hume led to this same assertion—abide in familiar places because they are familiar.

The defects of Scottish philosophy have lain, not in this starting-point, but in the hesitating method of procedure which followed it. The dogmatic assertion of common sense was put in the place of complete analysis, and left the mind resting on an unverified dogma—the direct knowledge of real being, both objective and subjective. This may seem but a slight failure, if, at the very end, we must still repose our faith on a faculty, and accept its affirmations as ultimate. In appealing to common sense, we are only doing in the gross what we do separately when we refer our convictions to a power of mind. Yet this is all the difference there is, or ever can be, between philosophy and the want of philosophy, science and the absence of science. In the one case, we accept complex results without being aware of the factors which compose them, and, in the other case, we lay open the factors and by them apprehend the composite product. Our knowledge is a knowledge of relations—not a relative knowledge—and as such involves first terms, positions assumed in the diagram and introductory to its constructive truth. Wise investigation results in a better and more simple assumption of these terms.

§ 2. Thomas Reid (1710), who gave the first impulse to Scottish philosophy, was professor, first at Aberdeen and later at the University of Glasgow. The philosophy of Scotland has been closely associated with its universities, especially with the University of Edinburgh. The national character has been tenacious enough to bind together belief, knowledge, instruction.

The scepticism of Hume and the idealism of Berkeley were almost equally unacceptable. The idealism, a direct

reference of all experience to God, came in as a possible conclusion only because of the unloosening of the ordinary ties of thought by the unbelief of Hume, and because it was one degree more acceptable than that unbelief. By a heroic act of faith a new sense of veracity was given to the flow of sensuous impressions.

Reid was in diligent search of tenable grounds of opposition, and failed to secure them with the distinctness and certainty attained by those who followed him. The scene necessarily shifted with the progress of thought, and it took time to discover the exact implications of the new position.

The doctrine of common sense easily admits confusion. We may mean by it the general validity of human knowledge, its right, through all corrections and growth, to be accepted as the germ of truth; or we may carry the term forward into our psychology, and designate that power of mind by which we apprehend regulative ideas as common sense. The two uses, though closely united, are very distinct, and it is unfortunate to confound them. To affirm, as against universal scepticism, the general validity of knowledge, is a just preliminary to philosophy, since it simply states an antecedent assumption; but to imply that any given faculty, like that of reason, is a function of common sense, and possesses its indorsement in each of its products, is inadmissible dogmatism. The existence of reason as a power of insight is a question of analysis, and the strength of our conclusions must rest on the clearness and accuracy of the analytic process. Scottish philosophy fell with Reid into this confusion, and has never wholly escaped from it. Admitting intuitive truths, and attaching great weight to them, it has not affirmed the reason as an intuitive power with the dis-

tinctness it ought, nor given the ultimate truths involved in its action the free acceptance and full discussion it ought, nor made that constructive use of them for the sake of which they find admission. The movement, though slowly progressive, has been hesitating, uncertain, changeable, as if the new philosophy felt unduly the influences of empiricism, and was unwilling to break with it. The sensationalism of Locke cast a cold, benumbing shadow on many forms of belief which were striving to escape it.

Reid did not fully clear himself on the first point, the nature of the appeal to common sense. First principles he regarded as divisible into two classes: contingent and necessary. The division between them is confused. Instead of giving the exact universal ideas under which judgments arise, he gives the judgments which involve them. Judgments which imply the same ideas are placed in different classes. Under contingent principles, he puts the affirmation, The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being called myself; and under necessary principles, The qualities which we perceive belong to a subject which we call body; those of which we are conscious belong to a subject which we call mind. He also places under necessary principles the belief, Whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it. These propositions all seem to be of one order, and referrible to one ultimate idea, causation. The school has been especially timid in accepting and applying this notion of causation. In this it retained the spirit of empiricism, forever playing between causation and sequence, affirming the latter and tacitly assuming results referrible only to the former. Sequence can gain no significance without the deeper notion of causation.

Events lie as loosely in time as things in space, till they are woven together along the lines of effective forces.

The second and most distinctive doctrine of Scottish philosophy is that of direct perception, the attainment by the mind in one indivisible act of phenomena, their object and their subject—the *non-ego* and the *ego* between which they lie. The obscurity and vacillation of Reid at this point have given rise to opposed opinions, whether he did, or did not, accept the doctrine. The better conclusion seems to be that he affirmed direct perception, but at times lost sight of it under the force of conflicting considerations. Direct perception is something quite other than “suggestion,” by which occasionally he explained our belief in an external world. Direct perception accepts the last complex act of belief as primitive and simple, and so obscures all the processes of growth and the factors involved in them. No knowledge may seem more immediate than that by which the properties of an object reveal to us the object, or that which connects our own experiences with ourselves as their subjects. Yet this apparent simplicity must be accepted as the result of inseparable association, or all the relations of our powers to each other suffer confusion. The properties of an object, the sensations it occasions, the object itself, are so intimately united as to constantly stand for each other. Yet, for purposes of thought, they are to be carefully distinguished. Our sensations are purely personal experiences, referrible, under causation, to the properties of objects external to the mind. Properties are the special energies by which these sensations are induced, and the object is the permanent union of these energies, of which sensations are the partial and passing expression. The last two, properties and object, are an infer-

ence from sensations. They are reached by the intervention of rational powers. The first term of real knowledge is given, like all its terms, in and under reason.

By direct knowledge we can only properly mean that which is the product of a single, simple act of mind; by indirect knowledge, that which is reached by a complex act, one involving inference. Indirect knowledge is the fruit of previous direct knowledge. All direct knowledge must be intuitive. It can involve only a simple, primitive act of mind, containing within itself the entire product. A sensation is such an act. The recognition of a form element is such an act. Each of these constitutes a primitive experience, complete within itself, and wholly covered by consciousness. Such an experience is incapable of any modification by inference. It belongs to this direct knowledge to be wholly included as an experience in consciousness. But consciousness is the form-element of mental phenomena. Nothing which is not phenomenal to mind can be embraced within consciousness. All direct knowledge is so embraced. If the object to which I refer a group of sensations were directly known it would be a phenomenon of mind. It remains to be inferred because it is exterior to mind, not a part of its own experience. I hear the voice of a friend who is not seen by me. I infer his presence, and his approach. My direct knowledge are the specific sensations, my indirect knowledge the inferences enclosed in them. The doctrine of direct perception supersedes the notion of causation, and so, if wisely applied, cuts me off from real being. If my sensations, my mental experiences, contain the very object and the very subject to which they pertain, I have in the object and subject only phenomena. The power of inference, the great power of thought, is lost. A theory

introduced for the very purpose of escaping phenomenalism falls headlong into it.

We have the two forms of knowing, direct and indirect, a knowledge of phenomena, a knowledge of that of which they are the proof. All that we know directly is thereby shown to be phenomenal; all that is known indirectly is transcendent, unphenomenal. The notion of causation puts us, by virtue of the power of inference it carries with it, in connection with the transcendental. The attributes involve the object, the powers the spirit. The region of noumena, entered only by inference, is the rational correlative of the region of phenomena, entered by a sensuous experience, and taken under the form-elements of mind. All the conditions of thought disappear, are merged in a mere flow of impressions, if we do not unite phenomena and hold them firm in permanent relations of dependence by virtue of the real being which, in reason, they are made to cover. The fundamental distinction of knowledge is, in its initiatory application, obliterated by the doctrine of direct perception. Sensations and objects, phenomena and noumena, personal experiences and spiritual powers, all flow together in hopeless confusion. We can proceed, we certainly shall proceed, to undo, in later steps, the mischief we have wrought in our first assertion, but the inconsistency and obscurity of a false position will remain with us.

If perception were direct, the object and the subject, both data of consciousness, would be as undeniable as thought, feeling, volition. No scepticism has proceeded to the length of denying the fact of feeling, thinking. We ought to be able to give, under this doctrine, an indication of the quality or qualities of reality, the appearance of personality. This can only be done by wholly con-

founding our sensations with objects, our impressions with personality. The doctrine of direct perception is nothing more than an obstinate piece of dogmatism, put in place of skilful analysis. The results are reached with no clear insight or just reason.

Reid referred consciousness to a separate power, thus helping, in one more direction, an oversight of the fundamental distinction involved in all phenomena; each division, with its incommunicable form, physical facts declared in space, mental facts in consciousness. If consciousness is itself an additional power, then the habitual activities of mind, thought, and feeling do not contain light, may proceed in darkness, and wait to be lighted up by an act of consciousness. The reference of consciousness to a distinct power is a palpable instance of that form of explanation which escapes a difficulty by putting back of it a second example of the same difficulty. If the mind can, in one act—to wit, that of the power known as consciousness—be aware of its action, then may it be aware of all its actions. If it fails to recognize an act of thought, then it should also fail to apprehend one of consciousness. The Scottish philosophy makes a determined effort to break away from the meshes of empiricism, but carries much of the net with it.

§ 3. Dugald Stewart (1753), professor in the University of Edinburgh, at a time when it included among its students many who became distinguished in thought and action, presented the doctrines of Reid in a more concise and systematic form. He exerted great influence by the persuasive manner, profound conviction, and extended knowledge which he brought to his discussions. His hold upon his pupils was a vigorous one, and the revival of intuitive philosophy in France, under Jouffroy and Cou-

sin, is, in part, attributed to him. He not only failed, however, to carry the system forward to any higher and more defensible ground, he retreated somewhat toward empiricism. He reënforced the doctrine of association,—so easily and constantly used in reduction of mental powers—and was ready to find in it the secret of the space-relations of visible objects. The discussion of mental dependencies under the form of association is good or bad in the degree in which we regard association as an abbreviated mental process, or make it an expression of underlying nervous connections. He betrayed the fundamental weakness of the Scottish school by a very inadequate treatment of causation. If we need, in any direction, to assert rational insight, it is in this direction of causation, the invisible and fundamental relation of things. Nothing so weakens at once all mental grip as a slipping hold here. Stewart accepted Hume's reference of causation to sequence. This reference involves, at once, a great deal of illusory reasoning. We allow a uniform sequence to impose upon the mind, through the nervous system, a habit of anticipation, and to be the ground of the actual return of impressions. But these results, if real, are themselves examples of causation. A true elimination of causation utterly disintegrates, alike, things and our thoughts concerning them.

§ 4. Thomas Brown (1778) was associate professor with Stewart. He possessed the impressive power of Professor Stewart, and added to it more imagination. The negligent analysis of intuitive ideas and the consequent needless and hasty inclusion of many empirical judgments with them, faults which have so frequently belonged to intuitive philosophy, showed their unfortunate results in Thomas Brown. Rightly dissatisfied with the wide ex-

tension of intuitions, he corrected the error by an unwise retreat from essential positions. If his concessions were admitted, there would be but little need, and hardly a possibility, of retaining any primitive terms. The philosophy of Thomas Brown indicated a decided return toward empiricism. He abandoned the doctrine of direct perception, identified causation with sequence, and laid still farther emphasis on association.

§ 5. The person to whom Scottish philosophy has been preëminently indebted in its later development was Sir William Hamilton (1788), professor at Edinburgh. In erudition and influence he more than sustained the fame of those who had preceded him. Rarely have so many distinguished men stood in such close connection as did this group in Scotland. Hamilton helped to consolidate the school by restoring attention to the works of Reid, and by vindicating and completing his views. His extended mastery of logic added to the force of his opinions.

Hamilton lays great stress on the relativity of knowledge. We know things only in relation to our faculties. Both matter and mind in themselves are unknown. This assertion of the relativity of knowledge can be so used as to greatly limit and discredit it. The assertion finds its chief support in perception, and indicates the weight attached to sensations in knowledge. Our impressions are experiences within ourselves, and do not, it is said, disclose things as they are in themselves. We are only dealing with subjective conceptions, and cannot say how far these correspond with realities. We shall have occasion to consider this point more fully in connection with Kant, in whose philosophy it plays an important part.

Passing this connection of phenomena with the causes

which occasion them, we are still to remember that that which constitutes the bulk of our knowledge, as a rational product, is not phenomenal, but an apprehension of the relations between phenomena. This knowledge is not vitiated by the relativity of our sensations, any more than the meaning of a sentence is modified because it is written in an unusual hand. If our sensations are true to themselves, if they correspond with themselves under similar circumstances, then, in spite of their relativity, they may convey to us the exact truth of relations. The principles of mathematics are identical in all minds, and yet are reached by symbols very different. Two persons can play with each other a game of chess on different boards, at a distance, and with no agreement in sensuous data. All that is requisite is the suggestion to each of like relations, and any presentation that preserves the symbolism of dependencies, no matter how meagre in itself, suffices for the purposes of thought. Empiricism, making our knowledge wholly an affair of sensations, attaches great importance to the dogma of relativity, as if all knowledge suffered taint by its subjective character. If relativity were true to the degree in which it is asserted, we should be wholly subject to individual impressions, and our efforts to arrive at truth, the same for all, would be abortive. The identity of truth with itself would become an illusion of minds filled with illusions. We break this charmed circle of relativity by virtue of an insight into permanent relations, aside from the objects between which they exist. The diversity in our symbols of thought carries with it no corresponding diversity in the thought itself.

The fruit of this doctrine of the incapacity of the mind for absolute knowledge is seen in Hamilton's presentation

of the Infinite. The Infinite cannot be known by us. And yet he makes God an object of faith. Thus, in the most fundamental form of belief, we have the riddle put upon us of believing in God without knowing him. Knowing must, under this use of language, mean some particular form or degree of apprehension. If we have absolutely no apprehension, we have no object of faith. In this discussion Hamilton involves himself in all the confusion which arises in connection with the word conceive, as interpreted by sensationalism. We cannot conceive the Infinite. We cannot conceive free will. But conceive means, in empiricism, a return of phenomenal impressions, and impressions are the ultimate terms of truth. Certainly, we cannot conceive the Infinite. It would be absurd to suppose that we could entertain a phenomenal impression of God. To be able to conceive a thing, that is, to offer it under sensuous terms, and to know a thing, are not equivalent assertions in any philosophy but one grossly empirical. The weakness of empiricism lies just here, in the forced equivalence it establishes between impressions and true knowledge, divergent from each other by their entire breadth. The mind receives—knows in an inferior sense—phenomena phenomenally. These phenomena it can restore, conceive. It knows truth, itself unphenomenal, unphenomenally, and this truth it cannot conceive. “We cannot conceive a free act,” because the notion of freedom expounds the dependence of acts, and is not itself an act. If, however, we cannot know freedom, nor know God, neither Hamilton nor another can induce us to believe in them. What is it, pray, that we are believing in?

The doctrine of direct perception, as held by Hamilton, is especially unsatisfactory, taken in connection with his

assertion of the relativity of knowledge. The ego and the non-ego are given together by consciousness in "absolute coequality." Yet our knowledge does not extend to realities, either in the physical or the spiritual world. The phenomena, therefore, of sensation, instead of being homogeneous impressions at one with themselves, consist of perfectly distinguishable elements, elements yielded on the one side by matter and on the other side by mind. Here is endless difficulty. Consciousness does not seem, except to a Scottish philosopher, to contain such separable impressions in a recognizable form, any more than water offers hydrogen and oxygen as divisible phenomena. Nor is it in the least plain how physical phenomena, with distinguishable physical characteristics, can be permeated with consciousness, the form-element of mental states. Nor is it any more plain how, by virtue of these recognizable phenomena, we can reach an external object without an inference. Scottish philosophy has been slow, full of hesitancy and uncertainty, in using the weapons it won by an acceptance of primitive terms. It still strives to win from sensation that which is not in it, and this only that it may cripple insight. It will neither rest at the base, nor ascend to the summit, of the hill, but attempts to maintain a slippery foothold along its steep incline.

Hamilton reduces association to one connection, that of redintegration. Those impressions restore each other which have once been united. The question returns upon us whether this fact is an ultimate one, to be accepted in explanation of special facts, or whether it marks an agreement between phenomena, each with its own grounds. There is no universal law, no general force, of redintegration. An action once performed, a union once accomplished, does not, by an intrinsic necessity, repeat itself.

Skill, habit, rest on an ultimate tendency in a certain portion of the nervous system, in its relation to the muscular system, to favor repetition. Memory, among mental powers, in a way its own, is also an example of restored impressions. Are these two facts, increasing ease of muscular action and the return in the mind of previous experiences, examples of the same thing, or do they remain distinct, with distinct adaptations? The thoughts, in like manner, by virtue of their logical coherence, tend to restore each other. Is association a deeper force common to all these facts, or is it an agreement between facts, each of its own order, in a single feature? As long as these questions are left unanswered association is a substitution of a verbal generalization for mental powers. We say, as above, that a single thought tends to restore a logical succession, but a logical succession is the product only of a logical power, working a specific result.

Among the most characteristic features of the philosophy of Hamilton is his law of the conditioned. He brings it forward in explanation of causation, and the notion of the infinite. The law is that the conceivable—the term is to be taken in its sensuous force—lies between two extremes, equally inconceivable. The mind, therefore, is conditioned to this middle ground. In the case of causation, we can neither conceive events as without a beginning, nor with one. We can only conceive them as perpetually springing from previous events, and giving rise to subsequent ones. The law of the conditioned, as urged by Hamilton, is a good example of the hold which an ingenious device gains upon the mind which originates it. If we understand, as we should, by the conceivable that which can be constructed in the mind,—in the imagination—then it is not true that events cannot be conceived

detached from other events, their causes or their effects. It is characteristic of dreams, in which the imagination has free play, that events come and go in the most abrupt and incongruous way, with little relation to fitting causes or suitable effects. If we make the word conceive equivalent to comprehension, an act of reason and not of imagination, then it is true that each event demands a prior event on which to rest. But this demand is not the occasion of causation, it is the consequence of causation. It is simply the push of reason, in each instance, under this notion. The mind is not satisfied by an indefinite recession of causes backward, and a meaningless movement forward, because of the constant activity of reason in search of a comprehending idea. The mind will not rest, being rational, till reason lies back of all things, and embraces them all. As association is the product of specific powers, and not the specific power the product of association, so the notion of causation is the ground of the inquisitive recession of the mind, and not the recession, as an impotency of the imagination, the occasion of causation.

Hamilton discusses intuitive truth under the head of the regulative faculty. Existence, space, and time are accepted as primitive form-elements. Most of his strength, however, is expended in deducing causality and the infinite from the law of the conditioned—the limits within which the mind works—rather than in an effort to define the insight of reason. Herein is shown the weakness of the school to which he belongs, a disposition to leave its own fundamental assertion, and the fundamental assertion of philosophy, in a hazy, uncertain, changeable light. The reluctance with which this conviction is conceded, and its vague, variable quality, have always made against Scottish philosophy. This phi-

losophy planted itself on realism, and opposed, with much vigor, the unbelief involved in materialism and idealism. It, above all, needed, therefore, in making its ground clear and defensible, a sharp and complete enumeration of primitive principles, and a fearless reliance on them for their own proper work. It has failed in both of these particulars. It has done little to determine the range of intuition, and, in its doctrine of direct perception, has robbed the reason, in a thoroughly inadmissible way, of its most important function. The fundamental question of realities calls for all the resources of the mind in its settlement. To cripple our powers here is a fatal error. The existence of subject and object, a world within and without beneath the flow of phenomena, is a complex belief, the product of all the strength and all the experience of the spirit.

§ 6. A test question in philosophical tendencies is that of the nature of virtue. Is the ultimate law of conduct a result of insight, or simply of susceptibility? Does reason lay down for itself a law of action, as it does a law of truth, under given circumstances, or does the environment impress upon the mind, through its liability to pain and pleasure, a method of action?

These two things, external conditions and internal powers, act and react on each other, run parallel with each other, in a very complex way; but the declaration of law must rest with one or the other of them. Empiricism makes outside influences, in their relation to inner sensibilities, the source of law; intuitionism makes it an assertion of reason in the presence of existing facts. The effective force, in the one case, acts from without inward, in the other, from within outward. Under the one law, material influences shape spiritual ones; under the other law, spiritual forces, more and more, win the mastery over

physical ones. In either case, there is a tedious development, but the plastic power in its origin offers a distinct difference.

The Scottish philosophy has shown its timid, half-way character, its inadequate sense of its own resources, in this question of morals. Adam Smith (1723) develops the principles of virtue from that sympathy which enables us to enter into the feelings of others, and so to construct motives and laws of conduct broadly in their universal bearings. The process is thus made to conceal the primitive factors which take part in it—the universal method of empiricism.

Adam Ferguson (1724) makes the laws of virtue the product of the character of man, as united in development with his fellow-men. Attention is directed to the conditions under which the moral nature unfolds, rather than to the essential term in this correlation, the moral nature itself.

Sir James Mackintosh (1765) insists on the absolute authority of conscience, and yet is ready to make it rest exclusively on benevolence. He very justly draws attention to the slow way in which the decisions of our moral nature are built up under experience, but does not sufficiently recognize the core of intelligence, which alone makes this movement fruitful. Ethics is so broad a subject that it may gain by many discussions in themselves very partial.

Henry Calderwood, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, in his "Handbook of Moral Philosophy," offers a very favorable example of the ethical theories of this school in their present form. He involves the supreme law of the mind in the mind itself. "Conscience is reason discovering universal truth—having

the authority of sovereign moral law, and affording the basis of present obligation." He unites this power to apprehend and enforce truth with a wise use of those physical terms of spiritual life which empirical philosophy has been so active in disclosing and enforcing. Empiricism has done much to establish the unity of the world. It has accomplished this by showing that the physical terms of our constitution and of the world which encloses us so far favor, under our conjoint social development, our spiritual life, that they can, with much plausibility, be made the productive causes of it. The soil of the world and the climate of the world are not hostile to plants of righteousness. So far are they from this, that they nourish within us a moral growth whose occasions must, in many ways, be referred to them. A great deal of theology and not a little philosophy have regarded the world as hostile to spiritual development. It has fallen to empiricism, under the doctrine of evolution, to correct this unfortunate assertion. The two extremes, physical and spiritual, should be weighed with each other, and prepare us to accept a close and living unity in the world. The soil, the atmosphere, the plant; the motives, the man, the community, stand in inseparable interplay with each other. A dualism that is simply diversity, action and reaction, is a condition of growth. A dualism that deepens into antagonism divides the world beyond hope of rational exposition.

Empiricism has done most necessary and admirable work in pointing out the abundant ministrations of the physical world in the progress of events to our higher life. We are able, holding fast that life, to give it, under these conditions of development, much wider, deeper, and more coherent relations.

One cannot fail to attach high value to the philosophical discussions in the universities of Scotland. This philosophy has not, however, fully understood its own position, nor developed its own resources with coherence and confidence. It has allowed itself to constantly fall under the shadow of empiricism. The valuable results of empiricism can best be gathered up by a system that breaks at once and finally with it as a philosophy, and heartily accepts it as method of inquiry. No midway ground is open. Intuitionism, constructive realism, is the point of union between materialistic and idealistic tendencies. It is higher ground, which draws readily to itself all that is true in both forms of thought. Scottish philosophy has done much to lead men to this land of realities, but itself took only a timid and unsafe possession of it.

CHAPTER V.

PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA.

§ 1. Though America has made some positive contributions to philosophy, they have been isolated, and limited in influence. They have lain chiefly in the direction of more clear and consistent intuitionism. America has usually been, in philosophy, a remote annex of England and Scotland. In its early history theological influences determined the form, duration and degree of speculative thought. While this fact has brought some limitations to philosophy, it has more than compensated for them by the social life and national strength which have accompanied it.

Jonathan Edwards (1703), whose influence was pre-eminently that of a most sturdy, devout, and inexorable theologian, did some very sharp, aggressive, and influential work in philosophy. His line of thought attached itself to English empiricism. In early life he studied the works of Locke with the pleasure which "a man feels when gathering up handfuls of gold." His "Treatise on the Will" says about all that can be said in favor of necessary connections in choice and conduct. His theology, full of threat, needed only the clanking of the chains of causal connections to make it diabolical. Fortunately the unbelief of modern empiricism no longer knots together the terms of virtue and vice, good-will and ill-will, in the

meshes of a net that drags us onward in the train of Omnipotence, under the strain of spiritual sentiments that find no true, sincere response in the world about us. There may be conditions of belief under which it is a relief to be without faith.

The treatise of President Edwards on the Will has been often regarded as unanswerable. So it is, if we base our discussion on the notion of causation, and thus involve the result in our first assumptions. We might as well forbear argument, and affirm at once the universality of causation; for this is the issue to which all consideration of the processes included under it must lead us. Regard the mind as an energy, and motives as energies operative upon it, and the resultant in action must be involved in the terms we have accepted. Under such a supposition, the ability to move in either of two directions would leave the actual movement, in one of them, unexplained. It would be an effect with no determining cause. President Edwards's work is far more laborious than his premises required it to be.

The relation of the mind as pure intelligence to its own activity is so remote from the relation of forces to their method of expression, that the one cannot be made to illustrate the other without hopeless confusion of thought. To term the will a "causal energy" is to prejudge the question of liberty. The same difficulty reappears in the argument for the being of God, as a first cause. Cause and effect are absolutely reciprocal. They exactly measure each other. The cause can in no way transcend the effect. If it does, it is by so much more than a cause. The effect is the instant, constant, complete expression of the cause, its measure in phenomenal being. If we distinguish between noumena and phenomena, causes are

the noumena which accompany and sustain phenomena, the substantial being which they represent to human intelligence. If we do not distinguish the two, these causes and effects are constantly interchangeable. What in one relation is an effect is in another a cause. It is not possible, therefore, either for the mind of man or of God to become a term in these endless connections without at once sinking into the circle of forces, an equal constituent with other constituents revolving in it. We cannot, with any clearness of thought, recognize some causes which are more or less than other causes—which stand in some superior relation to them. There cannot be a more fundamental distinction than that of lying within, and lying without, this circle of causation. If mind is a "causal energy," we cannot rescue it from the terms of causation, which are of the most absolute and universal order. If we believe in liberty, we must interpret the words "causal energy," not as an energy that sustains causal relations, but one that from its own nature is able to act, and to act on causal forces.

Force is wholly physical. It has locality and directions of action. As applied to mind, it is purely figurative. The force of thought is as much beyond space relations as is thought itself. The forces which are contained in the nervous and muscular organization of the human body constitute a complete circle by themselves. They respond to each other, correlate with each other and with other physical forces. The energy of the mind no more finds entrance into the closed circle than does the operator in telegraphy in the electric circuit. The stroke of the finger is a condition in completing that circuit, but yields no energy involved in it. The activities of the brain run parallel with those of the mind, and sustain a quantitative

connection with them. There is, however, no proof of likeness, or interchange in action, between them. These may be assumed as a means of escaping the ultimate term, the inscrutable dependence of the two, but are assumed wholly without proof. Instead of finding ourselves helped by such a supposition, the entire problem is confounded and lost. Instead of explaining mental action, we have missed it entirely, identified it with that physical activity which, by contrast, has hitherto defined it for us. The duck has disappeared below the surface; where it will rise again we cannot say, but when it does rise it will be as far from our hand as ever. In our experience we are compelled to accept, without any intermediate term, the interaction of the nervous system and of the mind. The two terms are not reducible either to neural or to mental action. Beyond our experience, we accept, in theism, the fact of a much wider relation, somewhat akin to this, the relation of Eternal Reason to the universe of physical forces, at play under it in entire dependence on it.

In neither case can we let the lower relation in any way expound or strike into the higher one. Mind is not a cause. God is not a cause. Neither of them is a force. Both of them have a mastery over forces. If we wish to discuss liberty, we must turn our back on causation to begin with. We must contemplate the mind as a pure intellectual agent, pursuing truth under its own law, and then conforming its action to it. This spontaneous action of the mind toward and under the truth is, in every way, as intelligible as is the action of causes in the expenditure of the energy they contain. Both are perfectly intelligible terms of the reason, so intelligible that it instantly and constantly supplies the one and the other in dealing with

the complex problem of existence that lies before it. The two are the foci of thought, and all the relations of its ellipse lie between them. Allow them to merge in each other, and our distinctive propositions disappear. We can no more move in the mental world, till we are content to accept these differences, than we can walk without both limbs.

If the relation of the mind to force now presented is correct, and the energy of the mind is not force, we cannot by consciousness arrive at force. Force is not only not contained in the phenomena of mind, it is not held in its noumena. Existence is here throughout spiritual, and comes under spiritual laws. The argument for liberty is really finished before President Edwards commences his work. It turns on the manner in which we unfold the map of knowledge, the fields we make it cover, the territory we assign to truth. An empirical configuration of mental convictions necessarily excludes liberty.

President Edwards, in his ethics, went far to anticipate the doctrine of Bentham. The rule of action is the love of being in general, an expression more comprehensive than the greatest good of the greatest number. It includes, in the purview of action, animal life and the divine life. The phrase did not lie as near the experience of men, is not as human, and therefore was not as taking, as that of Bentham. The omnipotence, the fulness, of the Divine Being were the ruling conception in the mind of Edwards; and it seemed to him a small thing to thrust aside human liberty when it offered any obstruction to the absolute methods of God. He conceived God first, and shaped his works to the conception. He secured the sense of elevation there by that of debasement here. The more just idea, the wisdom and goodness of God visible

in his works, was alien to his theology. The very devout and pure character of President Edwards shows how small a part correctness of thought may play in conduct.

§ 2. Scottish philosophy has been most frequently the philosophy taught and expounded in the colleges of the United States. Dr. Noah Porter (1811), of Yale College, has given it extended re-statement. Dr. James McCosh, of Princeton University, has been its able and constant defender. He has been especially ready to accept the truths of evolution, and to fortify psychology with the physiological facts associated with it. He has not, however, made any progress in untangling the central entanglements of the school to which he belongs. He is fully involved in all the perplexities of the doctrine of direct perception. We look directly, he affirms, on a material object. Whether within the body or without it, there is an extended object immediately perceived. All knowledge obtained through the senses is out of and beyond the perceiving mind. In self-consciousness, we know the thinking self. We know force intuitively; we know objects as exercising force on us, and ourselves as exercising force on them. We hold, in intuition, body without and self within.

There is something very surprising in these assertions. If they were true, they would not need to be made. Yet they are made in the face of almost all philosophy, materialistic, idealistic, and intuitive; and made on the evidence of consciousness, which should render them self-evident. They admit of no argument. They bring philosophy to a halt by an absolute dogma. They raise the doubt whether consciousness is one and the same to us all in its primitive data. If it is not, there is no basis for philosophy. Is it possible that it only requires repeated affir-

mation and two or three generations of descent to alter the data of experience, and impose an arbitrary dogma on the mind as a primitive truth? Is the empiricist correct in his assertion that belief is a kind of habit? Am I compelled, in confronting such a belief as this of direct perception, to fall back on the personal pronoun; to confess as a weakness the fact that I am able to see neither the spirit nor the things with which it deals, nor the efficient connections that lie between them? Are there in mind, as in the mineral kingdom, pockets, containing deposits of the most perfect crystals, that are withdrawn from the veins with which they are associated? Is Scottish philosophy such a pocket, with flashes of light and revelations of truth, which the rest of us cannot hope to share? If one should say of an obscure sentence in an obscure language, "I see its meaning; it is not a subject of inquiry, but one of direct sight;" the assertion would not be more perplexing than this of direct perception. The distinction between noumena and phenomena is almost universal; yet here noumena and phenomena are alike present, on the same terms, in direct vision.

The intuitionist and the empiricist agree that there are interpreting ideas involved in all our knowledge, as the idea of space in vision. The question between them is whether the idea, as that of space, comes to the mind slowly, as a result of the composite action of the facts before it, or whether it is involved in the mind's own action from the outset. Does the optic nerve eliminate light under its own experience, or does that experience turn, from the beginning, on the presence of light? But here comes a philosophy which sets aside this discussion in the most decisive way, which fearlessly asserts, We know bodies as extended in sensation; extension is part

and parcel of sensation. One holds his breath under such an affirmation. All past thought goes for nothing. Growth, perception, as the products of abbreviated processes, disappear, and the last action of the mind, to which all its powers have for long been contributing, is put down as primary and absolute. We must set aside this assertion of a special Scotch consciousness, in spite of the embarrassment we feel in doing it, as the only condition under which we can possibly preserve philosophy, and philosophy we must preserve. If our data are not common, our thoughts never can be.

The Scottish philosophy fell back, as we think justly, on common sense, general conviction, as a defence against that scepticism which was scattering all the stores of knowledge. Having done this, it blundered at once in its analysis. In the doctrine of direct perception there is a dogmatic assertion of a personal experience which bids defiance to philosophy, sets at naught some of its soundest conclusions, and reaches a result the equivalent of the doctrine it strove to escape, that ultimate terms lie as irreconcilable impressions in different minds. If the fundamental processes by which we acquire knowledge can be laid down for us in this absolute manner, then reconciliation is hopeless. Contradictory affirmations are referred directly to consciousness, and there is an end.

The effect which this doctrine must have on the intuitions, the exposition and defence of which were the proper service of Scottish philosophy, is plain. If we know extension as the product of sense, if we have an "immediate acquaintance with time" as an outer reality, if we come in direct contact with force, then space, time, causation, are the most direct generalizations of experience. The intuitive terms of mind become as perplexed as its per-

ceptive ones, and we are back on an empiricism grosser than that we were endeavoring to displace. If we can feel force, see extension, be conscious of time, then our perceptions are directly inclusive of all the objects of knowledge.

The confusion which arises when the physical and mental elements are thus blended in direct perception is farther seen in the doctrine of association. Dr. McCosh places it on neither limb decisively, but plants it on both. There are mental grounds for it, as contiguity, and also physical grounds, as the nature of brain cells. Can a pure mental state be subject to a double law, one branch of it physical and another mental? A complex intellectual process must be consistent with itself throughout, and the law which governs it wholly coherent. If a physical series of causes can give the dependencies of a purely mental product, we have occasion to go no farther. Parts, and parts of so diverse an order, cannot go together in a final philosophy.

§ 3. President Mark Hopkins (1802), so long a distinguished teacher of mental science, entertained the Scottish philosophy in a modified form. He did not accept the doctrine of a direct knowledge of the external world in perception, but thought that we gain, in one act, a recognition of two opposing forces, mental and physical, in connection with muscular activity—an inroad of force from without, and our resistance to it. The question is not much altered by this transfer of the point of determination. We are still called on to know the unphenomenal term which we call force directly, to separate between two conflicting forces, the one arising within the field of spiritual being and the other without it. We shall not make much progress in philosophy till we learn to distin-

guish between the strength of a crowbar and the strength of a desire, the push of a purpose and the push of an elephant, the grip of conscience and the grip of the right hand, the sensations which accompany muscular effort and the energy produced by it, the force due to exertion and the mental states which occasion it; and also that in all these cases the force is an inference of the experience and not a part of it. Dr. Hopkins, having thus accepted a direct knowledge of force as force, finds no occasion for the notion of causation as a primitive idea. The mind already drops, in muscular experience, plumb to the bottom of things.

§ 4. The works of Laurens P. Hickok (1798) are fresh and valuable contributions to philosophy. He gave consistent and proportionate expression to primitive terms, and put them unreservedly at their proper, constructive work. The element of insight in all intellectual action is clearly expressed by him. The sense, the understanding, and the reason are distinctly assigned their appropriate and correlative parts in mental activity. The overshadowing feeling of rational power leads him to a somewhat terse and narrow expression of sensuous experiences, but the real relation of powers is clearly defined. His "Mental Science" and his "Moral Science" have been stimulating books in the hands of all instructors who have apprehended their scope. In his "Rational Psychology" he has discussed the foundations of belief in the two distinct forms of being, physical and mental, and, in spite of a strong idealistic tendency, has presented most comprehensively the grounds of universal knowledge. His works have been profoundly influential, and would have been broadly so were it not for a technical style which makes the first approach to them difficult and disagree-

able. He also, under the idealistic impulse, attempted a speculative exposition of the universe. The effort has little to commend it beyond its ingenuity. This suffices to beget a thin twilight, a lustrous moonshine, in which we seem to see many things very delightfully, but apprehend nothing distinctly and finally. The speculation illustrates a chronic weakness of intuitionism, the extravagance of the *a priori* method. This itch of absolute and universal exposition he caught from German philosophy.

With an admirable balance of mind and a most beautiful balance of character, Dr. Hickok lacked that empirical knowledge and habit of empirical inquiry, that modest estimate of theories, that profound sense of the sufficiency and contiguity of things, which must be united to a free recognition of intellectual powers in order that knowledge may be real and full-orbed.

Most of the expositions of ethics in this country, arising in connection with the timid claims and half-way concessions of Scottish philosophy, have been of an unequal, incongruous order. They have sought to reconcile experience and insight as sources of authority. The theory of Dr. Hopkins, that blessedness is the ultimate ground of duty, is a favorable example. A distinction is made in pleasures, which, after all, cannot be sustained without a prior recognition of moral vision. Few have been able to find, in the manifold teachings of experience, simply the indispensable conditions under which the inner life is called out. Dr. Hickok was a delightful exception to this general tendency. If he fails to render the full force of empirical circumstances—and most do thus fail—he leaves a place for them, and a most adequate place, since they minister to divine power in us. When all fruitage

shall be felt to be a fruitage of the earth, yet rising above it, in momentary interplay with a heavenly atmosphere and all the energies of light, we shall be able to reconcile the two terms of life, empirical and primitive. The pupils of Dr. Hickok will all reverently acknowledge that his words had in them more of the vivifying forces of heaven than of the fertilizing ingredients of the soil.

§ 5. The speculations of Spencer have been well presented and supported in the "Systematic Philosophy" by John Fiske. All that clearness, conciseness, and comprehensiveness can add to these theories, he has added. Empiricism has somewhat less hold in America, because of a comparative freedom from religious intolerance. Just now the religious world seems to be ready to accept, with a kind of gratitude, the additional life John Fiske has kindly breathed into the Unknown. Some minds climb up with more satisfaction along the narrow and difficult path of empiricism to a point which gives a little of the outlook of faith, than that which they experience in ascending, under a divine call, all their powers with them, into the mount of God.

Physiological psychology has been pushed forward, in its experimental researches, by G. Stanley Hall. The disposition—a disposition which always intervenes when scientific inquiry, ceasing to be subordinate to philosophy, presses to the front—to lay stress on the physical terms of our being is increasingly manifest. It is seen in the use of such a text-book as Sully's "Psychology," which passes lightly the questions involved in philosophy, and deals fully with the physical and physiological conditions which influence the mental powers. We are compelled to pay for an excess in one direction by a corresponding excess in the opposite direction.

A remarkably fresh and full presentation of mental science, on its physiological and phenomenal side, has been made by Professor William James, in his "Psychology." He brings to his work large resources of knowledge and much acuteness. One must admire the insight and ingenuity of his labor, though they are more frequently expended on the modes, means, and even abnormal incidents of mental processes than on the very substance of those processes. The measurable accompaniment has, in his mind, an advantage over the spiritual activity which alone gives it significance.

§ 6. The idealism of Germany has a tenacious, but very limited, hold in the United States. The School of Philosophy at Concord, chiefly under the direction of William T. Harris, gave for a time a visible expression to these theories, though not one widely influential. "Metaphysics, a Study of First Principles," by Borden P. Bowne, Professor of Philosophy in the Boston University, is a very incisive, vigorous, and independent contribution to dialectics. Its conclusions rest wholly with intuitionism. Empiricism, as a form of philosophy, suffers scornful and scathing attack. Its doctrine of the relation between the physical and the spiritual world is one very unusual in America. "The impersonal is simply and solely process and law. Permanence and proper existence can be found only in spirit." "Persons are capable of proper existence, but things, in the common sense of the term, are not." We have, as yet, had little occasion to consider the class of conclusions to which these assertions belong. We shall find ample opportunity when we reach German philosophy. We merely draw attention to the fact that this belief is at war with the earliest and latest convictions of experience, by which the phenomena that occur respect-

ively in space and in consciousness are discriminated from each other. That which we construct as an external world is here regarded as a product of mind simply. One-half the cosmos becomes, if not an illusion, something very like one, an unsuspected and immediate product of the other half. We thus escape what has been thought to be the mystery of mysteries, the interaction of the two, but we do it, as in so many other examples, by annihilating the problem. We have also the insuperable difficulty of declaring knowledge, in half its accumulated conclusions, false. Our two firm elements, space and consciousness, are not, as we have always supposed, distinct in the kinds of being involved in them. We retain the shadow of physical things, but this shadow will hardly offer a solid field over which to lengthen the cords and strengthen the stakes of the tabernacle of all truth. There is, in this doctrine, an elevation of mind that debases it. There is a presence of God which humiliates him. We are too much alone to be great. The angel of revelation can hardly stand again, with his right foot on the sea and his left foot on the land, planted firmly in the majesty of power. The reality of the universe is its true extension. Without it, the universe and our thoughts about it collapse, like a bubble. Our thought alone is too thin a film to distend and sustain the world.

American development is passing into that stage which is most likely to yield speculative inquiry, and this under conditions of breadth, potency, and humanity which promise to keep it close to the facts of life, aloof from theories that are driven, as unmanageable balloons, along waste, undefinable fields of air. It is sometimes said that America has produced no system of philosophy. The disparagement of our speculative power intended in the

remark may, in part, hold ; yet it is an assertion of very little wisdom. We and the world with us least of all need another philosophy. What we and all truly need is a sweeping away of a dozen philosophies already in being, by a process of correction and reconciliation. We need to clear the spaces of our solar system from the meteoric scraps of construction, that we may see how far the work of creation has progressed. There is very little invention, but an immense range of vision, in sound philosophy.

CHAPTER VI.

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE.

§ 1. French character has shown itself very distinctly in French philosophy. The data of speculative inquiry have been quickly accepted, and boldly developed to their extreme conclusions. There has been little hesitancy or delay. A ruling temper has been even more manifest than in England, and has been held in check much less by social and religious influences. Philosophy has pursued its own path, less involved in the general current of national life. That current is not so broad, unbroken, and controlling as in England.

Vivacity, facile intellectual activity, are the leading characteristics of the French mind. In the logical development of premises, it is not brought to a pause either by the extreme nature of the propositions that follow from them, or by their conflict with other convictions and other interests. The imaginative and logical faculties, impelled by lively sensibilities, are dominant, and lead to sudden and brilliant creation, with the answering liability of unsubstantial quality. This disposition is well illustrated in the story told in connection with Voltaire. A citizen wrote him asking definitely whether there was or was not a God, and desiring an answer by the next mail. The French are in marked contrast with the English in the ease with which they cast off constraints. The practical

temper of the English means this very thing, that they are sensitive to a wide range of interests, and do not readily suffer their opinions or actions to come into collision with them. They check a movement of thought which threatens the overthrow of social and religious sentiments, and hold it within the limits of safety. This disposition may be regarded as unfaithfulness to intellectual incentives. It may, indeed, be this, but it is hardly this as a national trait. It is rather a just deference to the forces of truth as indicated in ruling convictions; a sense of the ease with which a logical process, by the narrowness of its premises, slips the restraints of truth and becomes wholly erratic and misleading; a feeling that the things which are hold in themselves the true logic of events, the conclusions of many minds, and are more to be trusted than any current fashion of thought. The English have been successful in physical inquiries by virtue of this disposition. They have held back from extreme statements and startling theories till sufficient data could be accumulated to warrant a doctrine. In social questions and civic growth, this habit of mind has been associated with a mastery over critical circumstances, and an escape from wasted effort, altogether unusual. They have understood better than most people the possibilities involved in existing conditions. A national life, a national sentiment, has been achieved, which, as the product of existing forces, the outcome of a great variety of interests, has held firmly in hand the extravagance of individuals, and kept the sudden and the unexpected within narrow limits. There is implied, if not consciously held, in this temper a profound respect for that coherence of truth which turns history into progress, and human life into social growth. The individual is overawed, as

he well may be, by forces beyond the range of his vision. The organic life has its way with him and with society.

In philosophy, this hesitancy to accept extreme conclusions involves a sense of the complexity of the data covered by our reasoning, and the very different appearances which they offer from diverse positions. Experience is corrected by experience, powers are held in balance by powers, till we attain that equipoise of thought which is the fulness of truth. The French laid hold with avidity of the materialistic tendencies contained in the speculations of Locke, and pushed them at once into pronounced materialism. No other nation has given the same full and systematic statement to this form of belief. The movement was doubtless accelerated by the deep division in the social and religious life of France, and the hostility to each other of its two extremes. The theological influence was present, not by way of restraint, but as a repulsion impelling thought in the opposite direction.

PART I.

FRENCH MATERIALISM.

§ 2. Materialism in France met with a very instant and somewhat repellent birth in "L'Homme Machine." This treatise was the production of De la Mettrie (1709), a physician. It transferred the view of animal life offered by Descartes to human life. Man is a cunningly devised piece of mechanism, played on by the external world through the sensibilities and the nervous system. The work was called out by the experiences of a fever, and expressed, in the most direct and unqualified way, the dependencies of the mind on the body—always upper-

most in disease. This subjection, the symptom and product of disease, properly puts great restraint on all reasoning from an abnormal to a normal condition. He affirmed the increase and decrease of the soul with the body, and the complete inclusion of the one in the other. He was a man of loose morals—which means the dominance of sensuous impulses—and found much in his own experience to confirm his theory. The theory is an exposition of human life on the side of its weakness, and not of its strength; in its failures and defeats, not in its successes.

“L’Homme Machine” has been said to be one of those books which all read, all condemn, and from which all borrow. It has the fascination of unhesitancy, and the support of some very palpable, if very gross, experiences, which gain a sudden power when boldly pushed to an extreme conclusion. Such assertions as these: “No senses, no ideas. The fewer senses, the fewer ideas: The soul depends essentially upon the organs of the body with which it is found, grows and decreases with them,” so true in themselves, may easily be made to cast a deep shadow on the correlative truths with which they are associated in life. The simplicity of the logic and its final character commend it to the hasty mind. La Mettrie gives another example of the inescapable pressure of mystery on the spirit of man, leading him, after all his bold denials, to admit it again in a magnified form in new ways. Having subjected the mind to the body, and united in it the constructive forces by which the purposes of life are fulfilled, he affirmed that each fibre is stirred by an indwelling principle. He found a million minute impulses, in no way supported by experience, mysteriously correlated with each other, more acceptable than one

supreme impulse, which the facts before us seem to embody. This is explanation by infinitesimals, an evasion of the force of a conclusion by its indefinite subdivision, as a stone may be pulverized till its particles are impalpable to the senses, and then be blown away by the breath.

The philosophy of La Mettrie was an identification of animal and rational life. Sensationalism makes no distinction between them but one of degrees. Organic action, instinctive action, associative action, belong to the brute. They also belong to man, but are greatly modified in him by an insight into relations, which carries everywhere the light of reason. The experience of man is thus penetrated, more and more, by a new element. The light, at first hidden behind the mist and the clouds and obscurely percolating through them, at length disperses them, opens up new spaces, and gives a clearness to vision which transforms the intellectual world. La Mettrie thought it an experiment in order, to teach an ape to speak, and so to bring it within the range of human ideas. It certainly would be. No animal will speak, in the deeper sense of the word, till it has a rational idea to convey. Possessed of this, even in the most incipient form, expression will become inevitable. The ape works on the practical side under organic relations, as the tree does ; but no intelligible construction of life, on the abstract side, is possible to it. There will often be a sharp and startling reflection of the higher in the lower, as of the heavens in the cup of water in one's hand. But the two will remain as far apart as ever. It is an experiment quite crucial to teach an ape to talk. Nor need we be unreasonable in our requisition. A single idea, intelligibly expressed, will suffice. The lack of power in

animals to express, not a concrete state, but the simplest abstract idea, defines the nature of the lower form of conscious life. Its experiences lie within the range of association, but forever below that of comprehension.

Sensationalism is applicable, in a high degree, to animal life. The resources of association are sufficient to explain the intelligence of animals, but fail to expound the deeper movements of reason, which enclose human life in a profounder consciousness.

§ 3. The philosopher who gave the empirical tendency most full, consistent, and yet restrained expression, in France, was Condillac (1715). Condillac starts with the reference by Locke of all knowledge to sensation. Sensations are the first terms in consciousness. Some of these are more pungent than others, and so give occasion to what we term attention. These sensations are prolonged, and this prolongation is the basis of memory. Sensations, returning in memory, have the force of ideas. Attention to two or more sensations, or two or more ideas, is comparison. The order of the reproduction of ideas is determined by the order of their introduction as sensations. Will is desire when the object of desire is attainable. Thus the mechanism of mind is fully made out, as the result of the one primary fact, sensation. These processes are a parody of the powers of mind—a statement of that with which they are associated rather than the very powers themselves. Yet Condillac meant these shadows of impressions, chasing each other across the field of consciousness, as a full and sufficient description of a rational experience. This is seen in the image under which he enforced his conception. One sensation after another is imparted to a statue. Life is awakened in it and spreads, like a lichen, over all the field of knowl-

edge. This system cannot be easily rivalled in simplicity and inadequacy. The shadows that pursue each other on the earth are not more unlike the clouds, saturated with light, that yield them, than are these sensational traces of mind unlike the mind itself in its full quota of powers. Poetry and philosophy are not altogether unlike. Each must turn, in excellence, on its adequate conception of that with which it has to deal; and neither can receive this impression otherwise than by its own insight.

Helvetius (1715) presented the ethical theory which usually accompanies an empirical philosophy, in its earlier and cruder form, that of self-interest. He regarded self-love as the proper incentive of human action. He believed that if personal well-being is sought, in a large way, it will be found fully in harmony with the well-being of all. He did not, however, recognize the fact that this assertion implies impulses and affections of a disinterested character. The harmony of society is a thing quite indifferent to one predominantly selfish. When self-interest includes the general well-being, it involves feelings that belong to a wider relation. Helvetius strove to make the transition, but did not recognize its true grounds in the moral nature.

§4. Baron d'Holbach (1723), in his "System of Nature," enforced a very pronounced form of materialism. It was too unqualified and gross to be persuasive. It did not lie in the line of English empiricism, but reverted to ideas accepted by Hobbes, and by the Greek philosopher, Empedocles. He regarded motion as the one universal, significant fact, that into which all changes may be resolved. Motion in the brain is the ground of mental phenomena; soul, spirit, is a personification due to ignorance. Love and hate secure the order of the moral

world, as attraction and repulsion that of the physical world. Self-love furnishes the cohesive force in social life. Durable enjoyment is the true motive of action. Holbach, giving such prominence to motion as involving the nature of all phenomena, was ready to restore fire to its place as a primitive element, and to make it the life-principle. His conclusions bore the same gross character, on the physical side, as those of La Mettrie on the physiological side.

Baron d'Holbach came to Paris early in life, and established a hospitable centre of resort for men of thought and of letters. His views were tolerated and countenanced rather than entertained by such men as Diderot, La Grange, D'Alembert. It was the unbelief of the time which opened the way for these opinions, rather than any conviction which they themselves inspired. Views so barren as these could gain intellectual flavor only from a sense of opposition. Diderot and D'Alembert—Encyclopædists—were only indirectly interested in philosophy, and were too idealistic, or too sceptical, in their tendencies to entertain or advocate a materialism of so pronounced an order. It was the social position of Baron d'Holbach, united with that unbelief which was rapidly gaining a revolutionary character, that gave, for the moment, currency to a philosophy of so extreme and uninspired a character. It can hardly be regarded, any more than the speculations of La Mettrie, as resting on a philosophical basis. The disbelief of an eminent specialist, like D'Alembert, served to prepare the way for Positivism, rather than for materialism.

§ 5. The most recent expression in France of the materialistic tendency, connected with the associative philosophy of Spencer, is that of H. A. Taine. Taine, in his

work entitled "On Intelligence," gives prominence to the physiological processes which accompany mental activity, and presents fully the knowledge which had been acquired concerning them. He affirms: "We are entitled to admit that the cerebral event and mental event are, at foundation, but one and the same event under two aspects, one moral, the other physical, one accessible to consciousness, the other accessible to the senses. What we term life is a more delicate chemical action of more complex chemical elements. Phrase for phrase, word for word, the physical event, as we represent it to ourselves, translates the mental event."

The ground on which Taine affirms the identity of the mental state with the cerebral action which accompanies it is that this is the most simple theory; that if we admit their intrinsic diversity, we must then invoke some supernatural agency, some preëstablished harmony, to reunite them. The two are one in spite of the most radical difference which lies in the compass of our experience, for if they are not one, they are so diverse that we know of no way by which to bring them together. This is heroic reasoning; it makes nothing of the difficulty of the explanation. It obliterates the problem, the diversity of physical and mental phenomena, as the easiest method of its solution. This is accomplished under a vague use of the words within and without, an approach to facts through consciousness and an approach to the same facts through the senses. Within and without, to be used intelligibly, must be confined to physical facts, or both be transferred figuratively to mental facts. We lose at once all comprehension, when we mean by knowledge from without a sensuous observation of cerebral states, and by knowledge from within the mind's apprehension of its

own activity. Consciousness, instead of being a form-element, inseparable from facts of a certain order, becomes an unintelligible interior sight, directed to cerebral states; an observation of them no one knows how or to what purpose. Incongruity of imagery can go no farther. All conditions of apprehension disappear. Nor ought M. Taine to have the least difficulty in recognizing the dependence of mental facts and physical facts, no matter how diverse, on each other. All causation is resolved by him into succession, and succession may as readily hold between dissimilar as similar events.

While the empiricist pushes aside the notion of causation in its true constructive office, he retains the objections which arise from it. If his own rendering of causation is correct, then there can be no chasm between any two things or events, for there is no energy of any sort to pass between them. Explanation should be perfectly facile, for it involves no coherence of one thing with another.

Philosophy, if it is to maintain its own dignity, if it is to make its voluminous presentations worth the consideration they challenge, must assert a force and veracity in its connections far greater than those provided for in the associative processes of Taine. The mind passes every moment "through the confusion of monstrous deliria and yelling madness," and takes its risks of settling into safe knowledge. And this settling into safe knowledge means nothing more than slipping into a habitual state, the product of a fortunate concurrence of physical circumstances. Sound observation, to say nothing of searching criticism, becomes, under this doctrine of association, forever impossible by virtue of these tyrannical dependencies which render it so infinitely desirable. Madness, in

a milder or a more malignant form, is ready to anticipate the mind in every act of correction and instruction. If a man would fain think, he must still think only as the ruling frenzy permits him. We ought, ere long, to reach the point at which we shall be relieved from philosophy, when philosophy can provide for itself no suitable premises. That philosophy, however, as a play of weird fancies, should remain optional with us, is, perhaps, too much to hope. Such a fact would imply one strain of sanity among insane things. If French thought can take to itself some merit on the ground of a fearless, logical coherence in its processes, the praise is lost again in the irrational audacity with which it sets aside the mind's first hold on the facts themselves. There is not weight enough in the body of the gymnast to give importance to his somersets.

§ 6. The affirmation of the unfitness of philosophy, under the existing conditions of thought, was reached in the Positivism of Comte (1798). The fundamental position of this system is, that we have, and can have, no knowledge of the questions ordinarily discussed in metaphysics; that we should, therefore, confine our attention to the sensuous data of experience. Positive knowledge is a knowledge of the relation of phenomena to each other. This should satisfy the mind, as all the knowing that lies within its reach. Positivism is the natural fruit of empiricism. Empiricism magnifies phenomena, and signally fails in all explanations which transcend them. Positivism recognizes this failure, proclaims it as inevitable, and builds itself upon it. The positivist brings the most cogent refutation to the empiricist by accepting at their full value his negations and failures, and turning wearily from his reduplicated processes. Positivism ac-

cepts the inevitable which empiricism announces, and then has no farther use for empiricism itself. Its most instant and important assertion is the rejection of a branch of inquiry for which we have, in our own powers, no sufficient means. It reserves all its efforts for investigations that can be fruitful. Positivism is the most telling commentary on the empirical philosophy that gave rise to it.

Not only has Positivism a right to attention as taking a position which best sums up a vast amount of futile speculation; it also has a claim upon us, by virtue of laying aside a negative and critical attitude in faith and social construction, and entering on a stage of positive, productive belief and effort. Its method has been defined as positive, scientific, human, sociologic, historical—that is, evolutionary. It accepts the fundamental principle, He only destroys who can replace. “It struggles to explain the history of humanity as a whole, and points out the future of humanity as the inevitable sequel of its history.” Recovering itself at once from the disappointment of futile speculation, reasserting knowledge in its more immediate and palpable forms, enlarging this knowledge and devoting it to its highest ministration in social construction, Positivism stands for a truly vital force, and demands our respectful attention. It has been productive of noble character. The profound belief that is in it overcomes its unbelief, and goes far to set it aside in its results. Positivism is a faith, and there are few forms of faith that struggle harder to call out belief in the ultimate success of humanity, or preach it more unreservedly. Having turned despairingly away from the ordinary sources of uplifting, spiritual impulses, as illusory, it enters only the more determinedly on the effort to renew

these better tendencies by the motives that still remain. This it seems to itself to have accomplished, and therein renews and glorifies the power of faith ; faith that lays hold of the future as gathering up all the light and revelation of history.

Positivism is a philosophy, though it excludes the higher problems of philosophy, and thinks to work out human life exclusively under its sensuous terms. Positivism takes offence at any inquiry into ultimate, cosmic terms, their dependence on each other, or the nature of the order under which they move forward. It regards the facts themselves, in their immediate form, as the only fitting subject of investigation, and rules out the questions of cosmology and theology as beyond the scope of knowledge. Despair on that side is replaced by renewed confidence on this side, and having sufficiently limited the field, the mind addresses itself boldly to its cultivation. The human mind has always found itself on the verge of wider questions than those of sense, has always put them, and will forever put them, waiting on more and more sufficient answers. As long as there are facts of some order, something to be known, and clews to these facts, the indefatigable, unwearying human mind, recovering its energies with every generation, will open up afresh on these trails of thought. It will believe what it evidently must believe, that in the widest, profoundest survey of the present, in its complex physical and spiritual factors, it holds the true key of all time. In the measure in which it masters the present, it masters all events which flow into it or flow from it. All knowledge confirms this hope of the mind, all knowledge implies its correctness. A belief akin to this in the physical world is the basis of Positivism. This belief, extended to the

intellectual and spiritual world, is the foundation of theology. The weariness of Positivism puts no rational restraint on the fresh activity of theism.

The fundamental affirmation of Positivism on the side of limitation—which is its most distinctive side—is that we can know neither the beginning nor the end of things, but only their progress. This assertion is enforced by the law of the three stages through which, it is said, all investigation passes: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. These stages are not historically consecutive, but consecutive in the process of individual development. They are not stages distinctly made in the progress of the race collectively, but in the growth of thought, when thought is pushing. There is a certain color of truth in these three stages of Positivism, but there is no law, no underlying force of reason, which necessitates this movement, and justifies it. To affirm such a tendency, and to repose Positivism as a philosophy upon it, is a pure metaphysic, as obscure and difficult as any doctrine displaced by it. The way out of philosophy is thus as blind a one as the way through it. True Positivism must rest on sheer weariness, on an admitted fact of failure, on an overwhelming feeling that philosophy, in its highest range, has expended strength for no sufficient purpose. The moment Positivism, denying the province of philosophy—or metaphysics, as it prefers to term it, having attached to the word, by dint of much use, a disparaging meaning—undertakes to give a reason for its aversion, beyond that of simple discouragement, it is thrust at once back into philosophy in search of the grounds of action. The logic of Positivism is the logic of a man who sits down because he is weary, a logic addressed to those as weary as himself, and that will dis-

appear of its own accord, when men are refreshed. It has hardly happened but this once in the history of the world that enough have been tired at the same time to make the event notable.

The law of the three stages is a wild assumption as a proof of Positivism. Undoubtedly a few have accepted Positivism on the ground of its relation to the other two forms of thought. To infer from this fact that Positivism is a correct system, is to imply that there is, in the law itself, some correct and unmistakable movement toward truth. Positivists are a small number in the class of thoughtful men, and can claim nothing for the conclusion on the ground that it is theirs. The law is not established as a universal sequence; far from it. Only rarely has thought, in its development, reached this result. It more frequently has reached some other result. It has stopped short of Positivism, and satisfied itself with a correction of the methods which Positivism pronounces absolutely faulty. There is here no necessary and universal sequence of intellectual phenomena, sufficient to indicate of itself the forces which control them.

Positivists, in common with all phenomenologists, need a better definition of law. Mere sequence, in the physical world, does not constitute a law. It is not a law that night shall follow day. There must be a determining power in the sequence before the sequence has the significance of a law. Law implies a definite and fixed form of connection, resting on its own grounds. It marks lines of constructive energy. In the moral world, if we are to plead a law, we must do it on the basis of a sufficient reason. Men universally fall into error. Does it thereby become a law that men should fall into error? Are any of the steps of error made legitimate by the cer-

tainty with which men take them? Error is a universal liability; its causes are innumerable, and act, each and all, in suspension of the laws of thought. If it were true, as it is not, that men's thoughts tend universally to issue in Positivism, it would be necessary to render some sound and sufficient reason for this result, if we would accept it as having the force of a constructive principle. The wide prevalence of superstition is not a defence of it.

The tendency, in the theological phase of development, to refer events universally and directly to a spiritual agent of some sort, is not absolute error, but partial error. It has its basis in our own intellectual constitution. It is waiting the correction of a larger experience. The tendency later to admit metaphysical entities, and to refer physical facts to them, marks another valid movement of mind in correction of the previous one. The two act and react on each other, and bring to each other increasing clearness of definition. Law, for example, is often a metaphysical abstraction with us, but it does not, therefore, fail to subserve the purposes of growing knowledge. Definiteness of idea becomes more and more the very force of our convictions. This changeableness of impressions arises from the fact that our powers are not absolute, do not assign themselves at once their own spheres, but find their way tentatively, under the correction of experience, into the fine harmony of real knowledge. Personal and physical agencies are slowly distinguished from each other, are reconciled with each other, and so we grow in the comprehension of the world, never altogether correct, never wholly wrong, in our convictions. If a few, or many, minds, impatient of this reconciliation, deny the validity of the processes, and hasten on to Positivism; if, adding mistake to mistake, they turn their

backs on the past as a product of hopeless error, certainly there is in this fact no proof of Positivism. The probability is rather that they are only displacing one delusion by another. Having broken with the past, they have less reasonable hope than ever, in the newness of their start, of achieving success in the present. The sweeping denials with which Positivism starts on its way are already painful predictions of its failure.

As the explanation of the world shall advance under personal and physical agents, there will be a growing simplicity of causes, which will have something the same effect as Positivism in making our knowledge definitely phenomenal, and in ridding it of superfluous terms. In the rhythmical growth of knowledge, under powers that push alternately in opposite directions and correct the errors of to-day by the errors of to-morrow, Positivism was sure to rise, and is sure also of speedy repressment. Positivism, impatient of the slow and inadequate elimination of error, broke away from a movement which has characterized the development of thought from its earliest stages, with a bold denial of the validity of its first steps. Summing up in itself the entire significance of inquiry, neglecting the fundamental ideas under which it has so far progressed, Positivism asserts for itself a position which cannot fall to any doctrine or method whatever. Its spirit is dogmatic, unhistorical, and opposed to every conception of development. Evolution progresses by successive steps of inclusion. Positivism establishes itself by the most violent exclusion. It sweeps the ground from under all previous thought as a preparation for the reception of its own thought.

This error tends, however, rapidly to correct itself by virtue of its more constructive affirmations. Positivism

preëminently insists on being scientific, and science is full of metaphysical entities, which it finds occasion to shift and correct with enlarging knowledge. What is force under its various forms, what is causation, or law, or the elements, which, as distinct groups of properties, make up the first terms of thought, but metaphysical entities, conceptions which combine for us the phenomenal terms of truth? The relating process cannot go forward without these centres of construction. Science has no objection to these and like entities so long as they fulfil its purposes. It assumes them provisionally, ever giving them more simple and determinate expression. Its caution in their use arises not from any reluctance to accept them, but from the fear that a too ready admission in one form should prevent their growth into more perfect forms. An entity, a metaphysical entity, of some sort, is the nucleus of thought in every form of inquiry. If science rejects levity as a principle in physics, it is not because of any metaphysical quality in it, but because the conception of gravity performs the same office in a more simple form. The one disappears by an enlargement of the other. The scientist in electricity is willing to accept one or two entities, under one or another conception of their nature, according as the facts are best marshalled by the explanatory ideas which are thus brought to them. The doctrine of the equivalence of forces, whose applications have been so fruitful in physics, not only assumes unphenomenal being, but assigns it definite, quantitative relations. The phenomena which accompany a transfer of force from one form of expression to another, from chemical affinities to heat and mechanical action, have no equality in reference to each other save through the force assumed to be present in

each manifestation. The phenomena which attend on the consumption of one hundred pounds of coal in different engines, or in the same engine at different times, are not identical. The equivalence asserted in connection with them is not one of appearances, but of the forces involved. Science does not hesitate a moment in accepting the reality of force, and in tracing it through its plain and obscure forms of presentation. Yet spirit and Infinite Spirit are no more matters of inference and intellectual construction than is force.

Science is full of faith. Its inductions, its empirical inquiries, are exceedingly narrow, when contrasted either with the multiplicity of facts or the breadth of its own conclusions from them. Having grounded a law in observation, it instantly gives it the range of the universe. Science reposes everywhere on the doctrine of universality and identity of methods, and has the most absolute belief in the coherence of the world with itself—its intellectual integrity. The fundamental dogma of science is the universality of law, and this dogma is nothing more than a metaphysical doctrine, nothing more than the extension by the mind of its terms of thought indefinitely beyond all observation. If positive knowledge means phenomenal knowledge, and does not include the inferences derived from such knowledge, does not provide for its enlargement under ideas purely mental, then but a very small part of science is positive; nay, we can hardly say that any portion of it is positive, for it is not phenomena phenomenally apprehended which constitute science, but phenomena interpreted, made to stand together under forces and laws, metaphysical entities, to which the mind has assigned universal relations. Phenomena are particular, variable, vanishing, no matter how

complete our perception of them. Whatever breadth they get is given them by means of some universal notion that is put back of them, some universal force, some eternal law.

Science assumes without doubt and without discussion—it becomes philosophy the moment it enters on the discussion—all the connections of thought, and laps unhesitatingly its spoils of knowledge in this network of connections. The ideas that run through the facts discussed by it run far beyond them, and by virtue of their manifold force hold the universe together as one coherent, rational whole. The mind's grasp of relations is just as quietly accepted by science as the perception of the senses, and it is no more suspicious of a metaphysical entity in the one case than in the other. A psychology is involved in science as much as a scheme of physics, only the one is at once assumed and the other sought out.

Positivism, in undertaking to confine knowledge to phenomena, differs totally from science. Science is wholly indifferent to any such distinction. She assumes a sound philosophy, a sound mental movement, and proceeds at once to define all truth under it, allowing it to extend inward and outward as far as it may. Positivism takes the last result of a suicidal process, and then proceeds, by means of it, to establish a philosophy of negation, and that with a dogmatic force which few systems can rival. The conviction which has attended on a hundred failures is not lost, but gathered up in full force in the final effort with which they are all thrust back into limbo. Magnificent philosophy, that ever saves herself, no matter what wreck of goods and waste of wares she may suffer!

The affirmation with which science for the moment

suspends all philosophy is, that the conceptions and processes of mind are all normal, its insights are real, its references sound, its extension of data correct. The fundamental assertion of Positivism is, only a fraction of the things pursued by the mind are within its reach. In reference to the remainder, it is a child crying for the moon. The speculations it has most pertinaciously pursued with its best adult powers are illusions. It escapes this deception of method, this force of its own ideas over it, only with the utmost difficulty. The inquiries of theology and of philosophy are of this character. The theory of the inadequacy of speculative inquiry is not a return to science, it is an extreme assertion of philosophy, and yet one that wins for itself no footing within philosophy. Positivism cannot be built up on any such inadequate basis as this. It can only occupy itself with assertions which lack the underlying force of all real knowledge, faith in the vigor of mind and the vital coherence of things. Phenomena alone are the mere phantoms of truth, its disembodied symbols. We might as well study vegetable physiology in the skeleton leaf whose fluids, grains of color, vital tissue, we had dissolved away, as to study the world in its phenomenal aspects, forgetful of the intellectual relations and life that knit them together. All that science quietly and thus most completely assumes, Positivism is ready distinctly and dogmatically to deny, and then to proceed as if the acceptance and the rejection left the two in the same position. Forgetful of its own theoretical attitude, it takes to itself all the familiar methods and guiding ideas of mind, runs freely along the tenuous webs of thought, fastens its lines in the old ways, and spins them to suit its existing wants. Only thus can it keep the threads of speculation from tangling

hopelessly, or floating idly on the air, and make them visible under its own fitful flashes of light.

Science proceeds on the assured coherence of the universe both on its physical and its intellectual side. Positivism proceeds on its fundamental incoherence. The one knows no limits to investigation; the other maps out in advance the territory of truth, and, as the most instant duty, sets up its landmarks, fearful of being swept out among the ghostly, overmastering entities that lie beyond. The two conceptions are totally distinct. We cannot safely hold the least shreds of science by such a tenure.

§ 7. Positivism especially addresses itself to Sociology. It puts Sociology at the head of the sciences. Comte was peculiarly voluminous and successful in his social discussions. Inspired by a real humanity, he was able to conform to his views and turn to his purposes many social phenomena. The disciples of Positivism seem to be made up of those wholly weary of the results of empirical speculation, and those unable to find any refreshment in the familiar dogmas of theism; and hence, as men of a strong ethical temper, they are ready to accept with surprise and gratitude the harmony and growth of society, pointed out on its practical side. Certainly, this is the only stimulating view left them, when they lose hold of the coherence of speculative truth. Comte became to his disciples a great prophet by simply rendering the social world in terms of fellowship, instead of terms of theology. The "synthesis of humanity" becomes a dream and an inspiration to them, as does the Kingdom of Heaven to the devout follower of Christ. Yet how can the positivist, in pursuing his object, the most immediate and urgent of any that offer themselves to an ardent and humane mind, avoid the question that has hitherto beset the effort on

its theological and philosophical side: Is this progress truly possible, provided for in the frame of the world, in the constitution of mind and the movement of events? This question is not extrinsic, but intrinsic; is not laid upon moral unfolding as something foreign to it, but is a searching, guiding insight to which it leads us every moment. The nature of the moral tie, the force of the moral duties which bind us to each other and to society, their interior energy of construction and productive power of good, are to be discussed and clearly felt in Sociology. If we assume these ties and duties, we must accept them at a certain and sufficient moral value, and be prepared to make our opinions current, creative. Science does what it can to expound the moral ideas which are to govern society, both as original gifts and acquired tendencies. Positivism, if it is to maintain for Sociology the position it has been so quick to assign it, must deal with unusual clearness with these same dominant ideas of individual life and social duty, and in doing it can in no way escape the old embroilments, doubts, and difficulties. The fact that the notion of right has for so long played a conspicuous part among metaphysical entities must not deter the positivist in his search after suitable forces wherewith to bind men together in society, nor embarrass him in tracing their origin or estimating their cohesive value. The motives which have, and are to have, the range of the social world are ethical. They express the mind's hold on many invisible things, the impulses under which its hopes are called forth, by which it constructs ideals and strives patiently to realize them; and no man can enter this moral realm without at once encountering all these spiritual powers which rule in it. They will neither step aside nor suffer an ungenerous estimate.

There is no quiet suppression or hasty assumption possible. The progress of events has long since anticipated such an effort, and plunged us into discussions from which the only escape is solution. Religious motives have been, and are, chief factors in social construction. Neither the weariness nor the unbelief of the positivist is shared by the mass of men, nor will they concede to him his refuge. If his refutation is to be the antidote of religious dogma, it must be patient, reiterated, diversified. Men can be helped out of a slough only by those who are willing to step into it. To push the whole history of the world backward, and to put it, as it were, by the intervention of long ages, behind us, by a simple assertion of three stages of development, is attaching a degree of significance to a doctrine which does not belong to doctrine, is a magnificence of power that one would hardly expect to have arisen out of a sense of the futility of our speculative faculties. This is not pride issuing in humiliation, but humiliation issuing in pride. The peremptory wave of hand with which all outworn doctrine is put down is only a prelude to the confidence with which the new dogma is uplifted.

It is strange that those who lay so much stress on evolution often attach so little importance to past methods and achievements, and are ready to displace them in so instant and absolute a way. This attitude should belong, if to either, to the intuitionist rather than to the empiricist, to him who believes in deep insight rather than to him who sums up growth in infinitesimal increments. How is it possible that the theological stage and the metaphysical stage should have had universal sway, and yet each have stood for a profound error? How is it possible that, standing for error, they should lead to a dis-

tinctly correct result? Evolution implies the presence of forces that have in them an unerring instinct of growth. The movement, like the flow of a river, no matter how involved it may be, cannot take place in the wrong direction. The prevailing impulse, in spite of bends and retreats, is certain in its action. If theology is, and is with such energy and universality, it is because it expresses not a deceptive but a real, not an accidental but an essential, phase of progress. The impulses contained in it hold, for the time being, all the upward tending powers of mind. A Positivism that expounds the history of humanity as a whole, and looks to the future of humanity as the true sequel of its history, can hardly accept a series of steps which abolish each other. Steps must be stages of growth. As nothing is complete in development, so nothing is altogether defective. Sufficiency and insufficiency are everywhere intermingled, and express, on the one hand, the direction of growth, and on the other, the unstable equilibrium which pushes it forward. Positivism, by its too decisive rejection of previous stages, by the minuteness and finality of its own methods, is self-destructive under evolution. It is not truly historical. It is not in the line of development in that profound way which marks the steps of real progress. It is the mass of waters in ocean and in river that feels the cosmic forces; it is the body of human thought that sways hither and thither under the energies of universal truth. The positivist detaches himself by too sweeping negations from the restless play of mind under ideas general and forceful enough to keep in ferment all the generations of men, yet so subtle and profound as to gain adequate expression only under the slow growth of ages. The positivist has striven to simplify the problem to the point at which it

ceases to be a problem ; to give to development a purely phenomenal expression, which leaves out the energies it contains, the spiritual forces with which it is pregnant. Those who believe in evolution are bound above all to stand firm in the surging waters, knowing that it is by means of this very strife that the energies involved are passing to a higher adjustment. If we accept the first chance of escape, we shall replace the living stream with the dead lagoon.

Suppose the ardent positivist successful, that men show a disposition to draw together in thought and to deepen the common currents of feeling, that great constructive forces begin to show themselves, and a synthesis of humanity seems ready to be realized, what wide, profound, cosmic forces would such a fact as this imply ! What physical conditions, intellectual insights, historical tendencies, moral sentiments, softening reactions, and fresh growths ! If the world is thus organic, constructive, at one with itself from centre to circumference, what better proof could be offered that it holds within itself a latent divine thought ? How can the positivist, by his own successes, fail to reach this conclusion ? How can he, prior to his successes, if he would sustain his labors by a rational hope, fail to put this very question, whether his aims are contained in the very framework of things ? If they are not, can he hope to prosper ? If they are, then what a divine force is at work with him ! Surely it is not an ill-timed reverence that simply says : Except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain who build it ; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain. The immediate, practical, and beneficent nature of the purpose of the positivist virtually compels him to raise, in advance, the question of the concurrence

of cosmic forces in his plans ; and as this harmony of all with all is realized, should compel him reverently to admit that the promised results reach infinitely beyond his labors. It is impossible to institute and carry out so great an undertaking as the positivist assigns himself with so narrow a moral scale as he accepts. Sociology gathers in itself all knowledge, and so it must all resources and all inspirations. It must draw upon the universe to its utmost bound, or there is some irrelevancy, some inadequacy, somewhere. Can the positivist sufficiently feed and fatten the thoughts of men, in the hush of sensuous life, on things sweet to the tongue and restful to the eye, and at the same time sternly rebuke their spiritual insights, and hold back the lambent flame of their fantasies, because the spiritual universe is widened by them beyond all limits of exact statement ? Let him try. We are glad that he tries, for trial is the shortest method of testing the value of what he accepts and what he rejects. The special concatenation of his thought will prove like the ring of vapor we so often see shot into the air from the funnel of an engine, which gyrates, expands, and quickly disappears in the wider currents that enclose it.

One of the directions in which the positivist preëminently discloses his conviction—and it is this conviction which draws our attention and admiration—has been his effort to give faith for faith, religion for religion, and knit the human household together in worship. The object of worship is to be the human race, in its most worthy members. This is good, better than the worship of the sun, and a less distant reversion. Hero worship has been one of the more constant among religious cults. This worship, of course, is not to proceed without idealization. A man, in this reverence of humanity, is not bowing down

to his own image, or to any member of the human family, his faults and foibles all upon him. He is rather devoutly recognizing those rational powers, resting far back on the past, and pushing with inevitable, growing impulse toward a purer, brighter, holier future. Humanity is made to stand for the most spiritual, most potent, most divine thing in the world, and so worshipped. But the divinity which shapes our ends is not wholly within us. The not-ourselves also makes for righteousness. This must add itself, by virtue of this very concurrence, to our worship. The process of personification must go forward, not as one of fiction and fancy, but as one which recognizes the rational unity of all things, and strives to make the mind full partaker of the life that is in them. One of the most humane in sentiment and vigorous in thought of the positivists insists that "the bare knowledge of the laws of nature, with no supreme conception of what nature means, such as can fill the imagination, with no dominant idea whereon the sympathy and reverence can expend themselves, is mere dust and ashes, wholly incompetent to sustain conduct." One deeper, more universal touch of sympathy, one more throb of life, and we are back again, in spite of our earlier protest of unbelief, at the throne of God. Let reason be what it truly and forever is—Reason—and the work is done. And how profoundly is all altered by this last spiritual conversion! Littleness and largeness, the human and the divine, abide together; the flow outward, worship, the flow inward, life. The isolate affection, the drop of water with its minute image, into which we were just now so curiously prying, becomes, touched by heat, a spirit of air, ever coming and going between the visible and the invisible, potently present in each because present in both.

The world thus ceases to be a symbol without signification, a musical instrument without wind. The vibration in the human soul awakens the vibrations without it, the vibrations without it deepen the vibrations in the soul, and both abide together in growing response, where alone there is response, in the spiritual world. The positivist, having as an inquirer lost all, begins to regain all in the ever-new, ever-old, way by which we carry faith and reverence outward, upward, till at length, with slow gains, they come back upon us from the verge of being as the voice of God. If the positivist cannot enter into this work as done by others, if he wishes to do it over again for himself, we may regret the loss of time and strength, but admire his good beginning, and the patience with which he pushes on his way. Wise and good men are finding their consolation in this solitary, but not hopeless, effort. It seems to us only a rehearsal, in a small way, of what the race has done once for all in a large way. A spiritual presence, an intellectual power, a constructive energy, throbbing centrewise through all things, is the goal which the human mind, in individuals and in masses, in the clearness of rational insight and in the obscurity of sympathetic feeling, from many points and on many sides, is approaching, as the product of a development painful, tortuous, and very human, but also truly divine.

The positivist is as one who has suffered shipwreck on a remote shore. He gathers gratefully each new waif of the broken vessel, and seems to himself to have gotten great riches, because he has saved a small portion of a cargo on which he placed so light a value when it was all his own. Comte, gleaning the historic, social, and religious world in which God has been building these centuries, getting together the material of the Kingdom of

Heaven, and finding every now and then, with much joy, stuff suitable for a synthesis of humanity, is a strange spectacle, comic and tragic alike, but one in which the deeper sentiments profoundly overshadow the lighter ones. The positivist has been too hasty to declare a wreck. Under the inadequate results of empirical philosophy, with the conviction that science is digging out the foundations of faith,—as if spiritual truth rested otherwise on physical facts than the heavens upon the earth—swept on by an evolution that is a precipitate rendering of the more mechanical facts of the world into its own crude speech, bewildered by the obscurity of religious beliefs that seem to him burning themselves out in the ashes of bitterness, the positivist has striven to close the volume of the past and open a new volume, as if mankind so far had lost time and thought and the painful teachings of history amid idle tales. The courage which enables him to begin again is born of that wider faith that we cherish in the wisdom of the way, the divine way, of the world. It is the putting forth of the same indomitable powers of life, that, like early buds, have so often pierced the half-frozen soil, and will till all break out in full flowering.

Positivism is very interesting because of its genuine spiritual power, both as developed in France and in England. It accepts empirical philosophy in its intrinsic barrenness, but enters at once on the difficult task of rearing spiritual plants in this thin soil. Forthwith they spring up, because they have no deepness of earth, but when the sun is up they are scorched, and, because they have no root, wither away.

PART II.

INTUITIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE.

§ 8. Intuitionism magnifies the powers of mind. The truth understood and the understanding which attains it are reciprocal and living terms. Neither has any force without the other. Intuitionism supports realism, because the reality of that with which it deals, that which it knows, is the spontaneous assertion of the mind. The vigor of thought asserts itself in the validity of that which it attains. The danger of intuitionism is allied to its strength. Because there is mastery in mind, it may make that mastery more immediate and complete than it is. It may limit its strength in the use of the powers it has affirmed by falling at once into dogma. Intuitionism thus instantly loses its advantage. Empiricism opens a successful attack on its hasty assertions. These give way, and with them passes, as an empty pretence, the assertion of the power of insight. Intuitionism is not to be so interpreted as in any way to preclude development. Development contains other terms of equal moment, a perpetual renewal and transfer, both in themselves and in the mind's relation to them, of the truths to be apprehended. There must be the apprehending power—knowing is the highest potency—and there must also be those shifting, expanding conditions which call out the power and maintain it at its best expression. The fundamental thought of Pascal is the fundamental fact of intellectual life. Mind has too much insight to admit of scepticism, too little insight to allow dogmatism. The poise and flight of thought must lie between precipi-

tate belief and precipitate unbelief, between the affirmation and the negation which are set up on either hand in support and restraint of spiritual life. We may fail of achievement, either by thinking it too facile or too difficult. We best understand the world, and have the most persuasive motives to understand it still better, when we regard it as made up of enlarging terms on the one side, and growing powers on the other.

To enter into the beauty of the world we need an insight of its own order. All experience confirms this. But we need just as certainly that the complex and changeable facts with which this beauty, in its manifold forms, is associated, should be forever passing before us, expanding our sensuous impressions, correcting our thoughts, widening our knowledge, and calling out in new ways our emotional life. The constant mobility of the one mobile whole is as essential as is the power to be put in reciprocal activity with it.

The economist, full of first principles, easily becomes a dogmatist. He has seen all. The inductions he has made are correct, therefore are they not final? Is not nature true to herself? Most assuredly; yet as events are in full flow, this coherency does not prevent the introduction of new conditions, the modification of old ones, by the very expenditure they are undergoing. The inductions of the economist are not so much untrue as inadequate, not so much weak within themselves as in partial response only to changeable circumstances above and beyond themselves. Competition may and does help to render intolerable, and at length nugatory, its own terms. Economic action, lying within the wider field of social action, must accept the modifying force of higher laws. The chemistry of the living body is by no means

that of the dead body. The economist has no occasion to distrust his insight, but he has constant occasion to renew it at every stage of social growth; for these stages are ascensions, not mere rotations. They arise, not in suspension of previous knowledge nor in bare prolongation of it, but in furtherance of it. The insights of the mind, except in connection with the most simple, abstract truths, need to be repeated as often as the seeing of the eye.

The supreme direction in which insight is liable to fall at once and ruinously into dogma is theology. Because we can know, because there are adequate grounds of belief, it does not follow that any belief is adequate or final. A theology that settles precipitately into doctrine, suspends at once the insight it affirms. The powers of mind cannot again be made available, till the vigor of unbelief—usually in an empirical form, experience in its inevitable growth moving away from the current rendering of it—has broken the bonds of belief. The extreme prevalence of the empirical tendency in France was largely due to the vigorous religious dogma that the philosophy of faith was called on to defend. The French are a people of affairs. A social and religious *régime*, unbearable on its theoretical and practical side, was weighing them down. It became the first need of philosophy to break this barrier, and the most ready means of doing it seemed to be an attack on the grounds of belief on which it had been made to rest. No sooner, however, was greater liberty won, than counter motives came into action, and the powers of mind were ready to reclaim their own. As long as the primary movement was revolutionary, critical and destructive influences prevailed; but when the overthrow was complete, reconstruction became the great interest. The French are too instant and rapid in over-

throw to have much constructive power. Those who really apprehend the difficulty of laying foundations are slow in subverting them. Bed-rock in the social and religious world is a painful deposit of long stages of belief, corrected and recorrected within itself. The *débris* of revolution offers no secure resting-place for new structures. The people of France, active as they are in change, lack this very thing, the power to unite themselves to the past, the power to lay foundations not altogether green and insecure.

The method of insight, the method of power, but of power cautiously and conscientiously used on all the material open to it, has had few disciples in France. This method seems to be opposed to science, though in fact it is thoroughly in harmony with it. Science, first directing its attention to the relatively simple and mechanical problems of the world, reaches results more exact and final than those which can later be attained, and results thought to be more full and final than they really are. It belongs to science itself to correct this impression, to become more and more aware that the increasingly complex conditions under which higher powers are acting allow of no complete formulæ, are always admitting elements of a fugitive, supersensuous character, and must be returned to again and again for measurements that are, after all, only proximate. When science lays aside the sweeping assertions of a novice, when it sees that its own progress is achieved by insights and is never final, and that no two stages of the mobile materials of knowledge offer the same phases of truth, it unites itself at once with that philosophy which turns on the penetrative power of mind exercised on the multitudinous, shifting facts of two worlds blended in one.

The true equilibrium of mind is one of motion, and not one of rest ; the equilibrium of the skater, who by his rapid, deft movement glides between accidents, and leaves on either hand the falls that seem ready to overtake him. In all profound questions, whether of physics or philosophy, it is by a steady advance from conception to conception that truth is approached. Provisional statements become bright points in a line of light ; final ones are liable, by increasing distance, to darken down into obscurity. Whether we are seeking into the being of God, the powers of mind, the nature of molecules, the condition of success is the same, an easy gliding forward under the changing circumstances which attend on insight. This is illustrated in the notion of ether as a medium of light. First, it was the most fluent and evenly diffused of all substances. It was found necessary, in the progress of knowledge, to shift this conception, to add one and another quality in behalf of its explanatory power. Ether has thus assumed characteristics that seem very extravagant, or even contradictory, It has become more just to think of it as an "adamantine solid" than to regard it as a perfect fluid. This changeableness of interpreting conceptions, themselves moving forward with the facts which they are gathering in for intellectual ends, is a first condition of correct thought. If the truths of science were as final as they are often conceived to be, the movement of thought would be much more mechanical and narrow than it really is. The universe, as a whole, is a moving equilibrium, whose disturbing forces are always beyond our estimates, yet whose great bodies are always sweeping into the free curves we assign them.

§ 9. The French philosophy, which rested upon mind as a luminous centre, imparting and receiving light as

much from its own nature as from the nature of things, finds its earliest representative in Royer-Collard (1763). He was interested in Scotch philosophy, and united his discussions closely to it.

Maine de Biran (1766) was a more extended and influential writer. He seems in his life to have passed through quite an orbit of thought, the personal element steadily growing in force in his philosophy, till all was absorbed in the personality of God. He opened his discussion by distinguishing sensation and perception as relatively passive and active states, and making the latter the product of our voluntary activity. He thus at once lifts the mind from a simply receptive attitude, and makes the larger share of its knowledge the fruit of its own well-directed inquiry. Sensations do not glide into perceptions by simple multiplication under association. Once started in this line of thought, he made it the basis of his psychology. The knowledge which the mind has of itself is much deeper than that which it has of external things, and so becomes to it the interpreting light of all other relations. The sense of its own voluntary power and of the limitations to which that power is constantly subjected is fundamental with the mind. Here Biran approached closely the Scottish philosophy. The mind awakens at once, in putting forth its power under restrictions, to the me and the not-me, and this fact dominates all its later experience. Out of this consciousness arises the notion of causation, which is not an *a priori* form. The categories of thought arise from our rational experience, penetrated more deeply in thought than external things and relations can be. He carries this view so far as to affirm an internal space, giving the me, in its resistance to the limitations of physical powers, an imme-

diate place. The philosophy of Biran marks the reassertion in France of personal power, and was attended with much the same obscurity of ideas which accompanied the like revolt in Scotland.

§ 10. By far the most brilliant and distinguished philosopher in this line of psychology in France was Victor Cousin (1792). He had all the facile and rapid movement of the French mind. The school which he founded, departing so widely from previous beliefs, yet receiving so much from them, has been termed eclectic. The opinions of Cousin contain too independent and ruling an idea to make this description quite applicable. He made much, as every wise man must, of previous results, and regarded them as embracing the germs of truth. The maxim of Leibnitz was accepted by him, that schools of philosophy are right in what they affirm and wrong in what they deny. This maxim implies at once the powers and the limitations of the human mind. It has too much insight to pursue protractedly a vagary; it has too little insight to see all the bearings of the truths disclosed to it. The cardinal doctrine of Cousin, which carried him beyond eclecticism, was his assertion of the insight of the reason in its higher, its impersonal and absolute activity. He thus found in ideas and in the mind's mastery of them—in their *a priori* force—the solution of all philosophy. This insight of the mind is the psychological basis of all truth. These ideas are not forms of apprehension arising from the mind's limitations in knowledge; they are the products of the mind's power, its culminating activity. They involve a knowing of the most absolute order.

This doctrine is especially developed in his lectures on "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good." These three conceptions express the triple insight of mind in the high-

est field of experience—an experience which cannot be attained save by powers which are native to it. The manner in which these three highest forms of relation are regarded goes far to settle one's estimate of mind and matter respectively. These conceptions are addressed preëminently to the mind, and if they can have their origin in simply physical facts, then the highest intellectual experiences are capable of direct transfer, from below upward, in the progress of events. Mind is merely receptive of whatever matter impresses upon it. Cousin believed that these relations hold exclusively between thought and thought, man and God. Physical things are only media in imparting them, the language which for the moment holds them. Truth is the recognition by the mind of the coherent processes of mind, declared in the world about us. The perceptive power of truth lies in the mind that receives it, and in the mind that imparts it, not in the words or the things which transfer it.

Cousin was not an eclectic as gathering here and there, at random, the truths which pleased him. He had a distinct method, and he strove by means of it to guide his way safely between the dogmatic assertions of Scotch philosophy and the free-moving idealism of Germany. He came under the influence of Royer-Collard, and still more under that of Biran, but his own philosophy involved a more vigorous intuitionism in a realistic form than had yet been offered. Some have spoken contemptuously of Cousin. The feeling has had two occasions. Those who identify, under a narrow scientific temper, all knowledge with observation, have hardly the patience to consider, or the wisdom to understand, any bold assertion of mental powers. They have more consideration even for pure idealism, the tracing simply of mental connec-

tions, than for intuitionism, which seems to them the entire obliteration of sound method by facile affirmation. The rhetorical style which belonged to Cousin, and which gave him great influence as a lecturer, also enhanced the light esteem in which he was held by a few. His assertions were less guarded, less supported, less completely reconciled with each other, than they otherwise might have been, and they lacked that technical character, that musty aroma, which are associated with sound philosophy. The words of Sir William Hamilton indicate sufficiently that this unfavorable estimate of Cousin was hasty and superficial: "A profound and original thinker, a lucid and eloquent writer, a scholar equally at home in ancient and modern learning, a philosopher superior to all prejudice of age or country, party or profession, and whose lofty eclecticism, seeking truth under every form of opinion, traces its unity ever through the most hostile systems." He won a strong hold on France, and evinced the safe, practical force of his philosophy by affecting powerfully popular instruction.

The method of Cousin was eminently sound. It was that of placing psychology at the foundation of philosophy. A thorough inquiry into the powers of mind, sustained by careful analysis and wide observation, must define the limits of truth, and determine the means we possess of working within them. It is an estimate, broad, penetrative, and corrected by the facts of knowledge, of the scope of our mental faculties that must settle for us the lines and methods of inquiry. There is here no room for the dogmatism of common sense, for each power must be defined and empirically verified through the entire range of its activity; nor for the sweeping conclusions of idealism, for the full variety of facts embraced in human

experience, the bounds they assign each other, and the authority of each within its own bounds, are to be recognized.

The psychology of Cousin, which he put at the entrance of philosophy, had some remarkable features. Reason, the power to apprehend the regulative relations involved in all thought, was with him the crowning faculty of mind. This insight, which yields the rational light under which all intelligible phenomena occur, he termed impersonal; not so much for the purpose of defining its relation to the mind possessing it, as for indicating the relatively absolute and perfect forms of truth which it bestows. Knowledge, in its scope, ceases to be relative and personal by virtue of the identical, constructive terms seen in it by the reason. Higher truth is as impersonal and universal as the axioms of mathematics. This assertion does not carry over absoluteness to each included proposition, but only, in accordance with all human conviction, affirms light to be light, reason to be reason, quite beyond any local and personal rendering of them.

Cousin failed to completely work out these impersonal ideas, but in their assertion we regard him as fully and nobly right. The presence of this power of reason, giving universal forms, or, better, discerning universal forms, must be recognized as the basis of all knowledge, and has been tacitly accepted by men as the immediate ground of those convictions which they hold in common. This power rests on the necessity of the case, and is involved in all human experience. Without it, knowledge sinks at once into relativity, suffers the taint of personal quality like an appetite, falls immeasurably below philosophy, and marks our schemes and visions as private experiences, futile for all ends of wisdom, fit only to perish within

themselves under the narrow conditions which begot them. In my own experience, the psychology of Cousin was the first book that lifted the mind fairly above the enveloping mist of empiricism, and planted it on a high place, with a wide world under it and before it. The kinship of philosophy and poetry is nowhere better seen than in this flash of divination, this stroke of absoluteness, in human thought, by which, in the midst of the infinitely changeable, it grasps at the unchangeable. The wonder is that men who deny it still weary themselves to find the doors of knowledge. This very perseverance of pursuit by the mind, in spite of its own theories, is its eternal testimony to itself that it can know. There are men of wide range of thought, like Matthew Arnold, who regard "poetry as the reality, and philosophy as the illusion." Such a distinction is impossible. One cannot rescue poetry without rescuing philosophy also. One cannot retain the play of colors in the sky with no recognition of the light which occasions them. The difficulty lies in separating the two too positively. The force of poetry is philosophy, and the vitality of philosophy is poetry. The intellectual formulæ of life may often shift their form, but in every form must be wide enough and strong enough to sustain its experience, as the tree must have vigor enough to bear up its own foliage.

A second factor in the philosophy of Cousin was his assertion of the spontaneity of mind. This is the basis of liberty in volition. Volition is not a sudden break in fixed relations, it is a single expression of a spontaneity that always attends on reason. Reason is not impelled toward any result. Its own insight assigns its line of action, and it moves freely in its fulfilment. Reason must be spontaneous in the vision of the truth, and in

the pursuit of it under its own methods. Cousin failed to give this doctrine, as he failed to give the previous one, its full expression. The two do not leave us, as Cousin seemed to think, with being and causation as the ultimate productive ideas. This conclusion would land us in idealism, which at times drew strongly on the mind of Cousin. Spontaneity marks a form of being incommensurate with causation. The central idea of being dichotomizes at once, in expression, into the two forms, things and persons, spatial and causal relations, conscious and free ones. Cousin failed, while asserting spontaneity, to cut it deeply asunder from causation. We cannot define liberty as a cause endowed with self-activity. Self-activity is at the farthest remove from causation. Cousin would hardly have come under the charge of pantheism if he had made the causation of the world a secondary expression under spontaneous, absolute reason.

§ 11. A double reaction followed empiricism both in France and in England. As there had been less hesitancy and reserve in France in the advance, so was there corresponding decision in the retreat. Positivism was the reaction of weakness and discouragement. The philosophical process was pronounced futile within itself and laid aside. With Comte this was a fundamental conviction; with John Stuart Mill, an incipient feeling. The more direct reaction was, in England, a reassertion of common sense, and, in France, of the powers of the mind by Cousin. The latter was by far the more complete and just position. The intuitionism of Cousin was in completion of the fundamental truth of Scotch philosophy.

§ 12. The greater clearness and decision of the movement in France were also manifest in ethics. Theodore

Jouffroy (1796), a disciple of Cousin, wrote with much discrimination and depth of conviction a work on morals. He held that the law of duty arises under the insight of reason into the constitution of man and of society. It is the law which man assigns himself in fulfilling his own destiny, a destiny laid upon him by his powers. He also wrote a treatise on æsthetics. In both works he enforced the apprehending powers of mind. He was much interested in the works of Reid and Stewart, and extended their influence in France. Resting his conclusions, as did Cousin, on psychology, he distinguished psychology sharply from physiology, confining the former to the facts given in consciousness.

In our own time, Paul Janet has been a vigorous writer on morals. He accepts primitive mental powers, resting firmly on an intuitive basis.

CHAPTER VII.

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY.

§ 1. Philosophy in Italy has held a somewhat detached and subordinate position, as compared with philosophy in the leading nations of Europe, whose reciprocal influence on each other has been great and constant. Italy, as the seat of Catholicism, has suffered from an active and aggressive ecclesiasticism in philosophical discussion. This has intensified the critical, as well as the conservative, temper. Conclusions have been less capable of reconciliation. Scholasticism early suffered an abatement of power from a more extended and independent interest in the works of Plato and Aristotle. The Averroists, following the commentary of Averroes on the works of Aristotle, and composed largely of those interested in natural science, were especially inclined to unbelief, and hostile to theological influence. They endured much persecution. A long and bitter strife was waged during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries.

In the seventeenth century, the very prominent position won by Italy in the physical sciences served to give a more firm and secure position for resistance to ecclesiastical dogma. Galileo (1564) was a founder in Italy of the inductive method of inquiry. He did more effectively, on the practical side, what Bacon attempted in England on the theoretical side. Italy was thus able to hold, for a time, the first position in the progress of science.

Galileo was possessed of a spirit of reverence which removed all oppugnancy between science and theology as he conceived them, and left the way open for the reconciliation of truth in sound philosophy.

Giovanni Battista Vico (Naples, 1668) broadened the method of philosophical investigation by adding history and philology to psychology as a means of reaching the order of the universe. The divine plan, the problem of philosophy, is to be studied as it is unfolded in history, language, religion, law. He thus drew attention to those facts in which the laws of psychology express themselves, by which they are to be corrected, defined, and extended.

The influence of Descartes, of Locke, and of Condillac extended to Italy, and gave rise, as elsewhere, to conflicting tendencies, though in a less decisive way. Descartes, by his affirmation of innate ideas, stood for the power of the mind, which might be developed either into intuitionism and realism, or into idealism. Locke, in referring all knowledge to experience, opened the way to one phase or another of materialism, the subordination of the mind to external conditions. Though neither pure idealism nor pure materialism may often be reached, it is not easy, nor is it at all necessary, to disassociate the words idealistic and materialistic from the forms of thought that emphasize, respectively, the processes of mind and the constructive force of physical conditions. The philosophy which most directly harmonizes the two is intuitionism, constructive realism. The powers of mind are awakened by the properties of matter, and the two develop, in their interaction, real knowledge; real, because it is a knowledge of real things; knowledge, because it is the valid product of knowing faculties.

§ 2. In the present era the forms of philosophy preva-

lent elsewhere reappear in Italy. They have been presented by Professor Vincenzo Botta as "1. Empiricism; 2. Criticism; 3. Idealism; 4. Ontologism; 5. Hegelianism (Absolute Idealism); 6. Scholasticism; 7. Positivism." *

Altering the arrangement somewhat, we will indicate, under his guidance, the position of each. Scholasticism remains in Italy associated with the conservative religious spirit that strives to maintain the spiritual and temporal power of the pope, and, in consequence, has found itself at war with the progress of thought and the unity of Italy. This school has been fortunate in its principal champion, Giovachino Ventura (1792). He was a defender of popular rights and a supporter of ecclesiastical reforms. In philosophy, he held to the ascendancy of Thomas Aquinas, and made philosophy dependent on Revelation. Thus the Church remains the supreme administrator of truth. This view has been supported by many others, bound to the past by all the interests of the present and the entire force of religious faith.

The most direct opposition to this orthodox belief is found in empiricism. Empiricism never more fully displays its divine mission in the world of sober thought and sound knowledge than when called on to undertake the conflict with authority and ecclesiasticism. It is furnished forth for this line of attack as is no other aggressive tendency. It is able—not, indeed, with entire correctness, but with a correctness sufficient for its purposes—to support its advance with all the momentum of science, and, by virtue of popular tendencies which cannot be easily resisted, to demand a parley, which itself means a return to reason.

* "History of Philosophy," Ueberweg.

Melchiorre Gioja (1767), a disciple of national liberty, derived his philosophy from Condillac and his ethics from Bentham. A sturdy, patriotic, and empirical temper will hardly find more direct inspiration anywhere than in Bentham. The point of attack which he especially pushed was statistical investigation. The facts of the world, expressed in figures and leading up to politics and social construction, are the true revelation of life. The jurist, Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761), whom Professor Botta places with the empiricists, departed widely from this school in the direction of intuitionism. His most pregnant principles were the assertion of human rights as grounded in nature and reason, and social safety as the proper criterion of punishment.

What Professor Botta terms the philosophy of criticism is closely allied with realism. Its chief representative was Pasquale Galuppi (1770), Professor of Philosophy in the University of Naples. He accepted the distinction of Kant between the substance of knowledge and its formative elements, and escaped idealism by denying that these forms are purely subjective. They are all reached by the mind in connection with an objective experience, and partake of its reality. He was allied to the Scotch school in a belief in a direct knowledge of the *ego* and *non-ego*. He asserted the absolute nature of the moral law. He thus represented, in Italy, with much vigor of thought, the intuitive, realistic tendency.

§ 3. The philosophy of idealism and ontologism are closely allied. Antonio Rosmini (1797), a priest who favored the movement toward national unity, was the representative thinker in idealism. He regarded philosophy as the science of ultimate reasons, giving us the grounds of belief in reality. There are three forms of

science, the science of ideas, the science of perceptions, and the science of reasons. Examples of each are logic, psychology, ontology. The object of all knowledge is reality. This contains two elements, an *a priori* form, and substance given in sensation. The one universal, all-embracing idea is being. In thought this universal idea is united with the material of sensation, and, under the unity of the mind, given as a valid judgment of reality. All later judgments are specific determinations under this primary judgment. His philosophy was built up around the notion of being, accepted as primitive. The fundamental principle of his ethics was, "Recognize practically being as you know it. Adapt your reverence and love to the degree of the worth of the being, and act accordingly." In this philosophy the idea of being, instead of remaining the most abstract and barren of conceptions, is made to include all with which it is associated. It gains its universality by virtue of the narrowness of its scope, the slightness of the addition which its assertion makes to our knowledge. But by means of this universality, possible only because of the emptiness of the notion, being is made, in a system of idealism, to become the womb of all truth. Tracing connections under this attenuated idea, which has no control over them, takes the place of the knowledge of the various modes of being, learned only in experience, and which signify precisely what observation defines them to be, and no more. Ringing changes on the empty notion of being, as if it in some way holds the universe in itself, is one of the unproductive methods of idealism.

The ontologism of Vincenzo Gioberti (1801), also a priest and a liberal, was allied to the idealism of Rosmini. His working formula was, *Ens creat existentias*, Being

creates existencies. This is a judgment significant only to the mind which regards the general as enclosing the particular. The formula can be repeated without giving any attention to the special quality of the cases which alone give it value. The logical form carries the day as against its contents. The mind, like one lost in a waste of snow, comes upon its own track, and regards it as a highway. As long as the thoughts can move along the fugitive traces they themselves leave, there may be philosophy of this order.

Terenzio Mamiani (1799), who sympathized with revolutionary ideas, and became professor of philosophy in Turin, is placed by Professor Botta among ontologists. His views seem, however, to have had a more sober and realistic cast than those of Gioberti. He recognized two distinct forms of knowledge in perception and intuition. By the one we arrive directly at finite relations, and by the other at those ideas which stand in immediate connection with Absolute Reality. We are thus on terms of sympathy and knowledge with both.

Hegelianism has never taken vigorous root outside of Germany. It has been an exotic, with no sturdy growth or freshness of color. Either the soil has not been deep enough to nourish it, or the sky has not contained vapor enough to shield it. Augusto Vera (1817) was the chief representative of this philosophy in Italy. He seems to have been an intelligent and independent student of the system, and to have succeeded in giving it some life.

Positivism is represented by Giuseppe Ferrari and Ausonio Franchi. Ferrari regards the mind as involved in hopeless contradictions in its speculative conclusions. It is only capable of knowledge within the narrow range of experience, where its processes can be verified and its

errors corrected. The antinomies of the mind cannot be escaped, and are sure to give rise to illusions in all critical inquiry. We are the children of nature, and must be content to be led and nourished by her. True to the practical bent of the school, Ferrari occupied himself with a reconstruction of political institutions founded on experience.

Though philosophy has been developed in Italy under peculiarly stringent social and religious conditions, it has shown the usual variety of results. It has epitomized all the leading forms of speculation. It has freely received influences from abroad, especially those of Kant and of Germany. Germany has been the primary seat of idealism, and thence it has been disseminated. To England empirical tendencies are chiefly to be referred, while France is the home of Positivism. Italy can hardly be said to have exerted an appreciable influence on the philosophy of Europe.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GERMANY.

§ 1. Philosophy, in recent years, has been far more versatile, recondite, and voluminous in Germany than in any other country. While it has had a prevailing tendency, it has worked within that tendency under a great variety of methods. Its empiricism has been idealistic in cast. Philosophy is a presentation of the ultimate reasons of belief. Its purpose is to define the forms, nature, and force of knowledge. Physical phenomena arise in space, and are united by causes. Mental phenomena arise in consciousness, and are united by reasons. The two forms of phenomena are in such living interaction that causes modify reasons and reasons redirect causes. It is the first business of philosophy to define knowledge in reference to these, its two original constituents, and in reference to their interaction on each other. The one element is present to the mind as sensations, the other as conceptions, while the two are woven together reflectively under experience. The nature of these two terms, sensations and conceptions, and their respective validity, is the primary problem of philosophy. The answer we give it will modify all our notion of the nature of the reflective process by which sensuous impressions and mental ideas are united in judgments through all the diverse forms of knowledge.

This inquiry into the nature of these several kinds of mental products is one of psychology, corrected and confirmed by language, history, cerebral structure, race development. As knowledge is a function of mind, it must rest back on the powers of mind for its forms, limits, and validity. The mind, as a means of knowing, must be defined in its relation to the things known, as the just method of estimating the value of knowledge. The unfolding of ideas within the mind, the patient combining of sensations in experience, can neither of them settle for us the foundations of truth, nor enable us to pronounce any final opinion on the worth of the activity with which we are occupied.

Philosophy divides at once in its spirit and its methods, by the weight, the constructive force, which it attaches to the one or the other of these ultimate elements. It may regard sensations as the comprehensive terms of knowledge, and mental conceptions as their later and wholly dependent products. Mind is thus the passive recipient of forces which find their initiative energy in the physical world. This philosophy may proceed so far as to affirm that mental impressions are only a peculiarly subtle form of physical facts. This is complete materialism. Rarely does thought stultify itself to this degree. Every movement toward this result, no matter what may be the precise point at which it pauses, is, with sufficient correctness, termed materialistic. Using a milder word, we may designate the tendency as empirical. All that destroys the balance between the mental powers and the sensuous material with which they stand in interaction, all that enhances causation and subjects the processes of thought to it, that makes mind merely receptive under the conditions of its environment, are materialistic, ab-

sorbing the spirit in that vast congeries of forces which we recognize as matter.

But philosophy may equally well, in its explanations, take the opposite direction. It may lay hold of conceptions, ideas, delight in their logical expansion under the relations of reason, regard this movement as one self-luminous, and look upon sensations as simply the fixed, opaque points taken up in the process, the mere centres of crystallization. Philosophy thus assumes at once, as in mathematics, the self-evident nature of its fundamental truths, and occupies itself with the growth of these conceptions within themselves, by which they cover the field of thought. Sensations as sensations are regarded as hardly more than the diagrams or characters by which a proof proceeds.

If this movement of ideas is accepted as ample and ultimate, as covering all forms of knowledge, then we have pure idealism. The mind holds all truth within its own productive contemplation, and nothing is really known till it is known in this form. This method has great fascination for the active intellect, but it is never able to include the physical universe, in its diversified facts, within its survey, except in the most inadequate manner. A mere skeleton of relations is offered in place of those palpable qualities which alone give them interest. Thought floats as a loose web in the air, instead of lying as a close connection between distinct objects. The universe is no longer the framework of our knowledge, holding it taut and firm in all directions; but this knowledge becomes, like the path of a bird in the air, lost as soon as it is made—absolutely lost, were it not for a faint trail of words it leaves behind it.

Every tendency to give a weight to ideas that destroys

the equilibrium of knowledge, that renders it a tracing of the processes of thought, whether these processes run parallel with the connections of things or quite diverge from them, is fittingly termed idealistic. While this movement is a more vigorous, vital one than that of empiricism, it suffers this grave compensation; it is without end or limit. It returns comparatively empty from the most exhausting pursuit. Its wings are spread over a chaos not yet brooded into life and beauty by the creative mind. It is a bird that swoops out over a great abyss and comes back again with nothing in its bill.

It is this tendency which we especially encounter in Germany. The Germans, erudite, recondite, and unwearying, have not had, in an equal degree, the sense of values. Their conclusions are often not current coin in the intellectual traffic of the world. They bear no stamp, and it calls for a second investigation to put any sufficient stamp upon them. The sense of reality, the consummate sense of all, is deficient. This idealistic movement, once established, is enhanced by the conditions it itself furnishes. Vision follows vision, speculation grows out of speculation, each remote point is made the beginning of another more exhaustive effort. This welter of conclusions, surging hither and thither, dashing each other into still finer spray, submerges and beats down all sober thought. The voice of Bacon thus becomes clear and commanding, calling for some fact as the fruit of speculation. We are recalled from our dreams to the universe of God, and sent in pursuit of some highway of the universal mind.

The speculations of German philosophy are at once so extended and recondite that it can constitute no part of our purpose to render them with any fulness. Our

end will be met if we conceive them correctly in their general method, and apprehend how far that method is consistent with those sober conclusions which must expound the facts of the world, and the thoughts of men concerning them. We shall not strive to trace the windings of a way which we see to lie in the wrong direction.

Realism struggles to maintain the balance of truth. The mind knows, but does not in its knowing overlook the nature of that which is known. Sensations and ideas blend with each other in defining real relations. Truth lies between mind and mind. It is the coincidence of thought with itself in two forms of expression, a coincidence between that which is declared in the wide range of reason in realities, and that which we apprehend through the same medium in thought. Things lie between us and the eternal reason as the permanent media of those principles which hold the universe together, as one compacted, intelligible, and profitable whole. As, in all induction, we bring a theory to the explanation of facts, and understand one through the other, so, in all knowledge, we confirm ideas by the sensations they set in order, and we illuminate sensations by the ideas which shine through them. Realism is substantial knowledge, form and substance, idea and content—a universe that embodies intelligence, and intelligence that discloses a universe.

PART I.

KANT.

§ 2. Immanuel Kant (1724), professor at Königsberg, became, by ability and by the period he occupied, the most influential philosopher in modern times. He did

very much to determine the direction of thought in Germany, and to define lines of discussion in the entire extension of philosophy. Many, even now, after the immense productiveness of intervening years, are raising the cry, "Back to Kant." They seem to think that a safer, firmer position can be found in his works than in those of any of his successors.

Kant gave himself, during a long life-time, unreservedly to speculative inquiry. He was a quaint, kindly man, and led a most methodical and peaceful life. His gentleness is seen in his treatment of an old German soldier addicted to drink, and who, as his servant, tyrannized over him in many little ways. He at length dismissed him, but when the servant was compelled to apply to him for a character, he gave him this testimonial: "He has served me long and faithfully, but he did not possess those qualifications which are necessary to enable one to wait on a feeble and impatient old man."

Kant opens the era of modern philosophy in Germany. He was of Scotch descent, and took a position of protest against the empiricism of Hume, not altogether unlike that of the Scotch school. There was in him something of the same concessiveness to empiricism, united with a still firmer assertion of primitive beliefs.

The first striking feature of his philosophy is the want of accord between his "Critique of the Pure Reason" and his "Critique of the Practical Reason." The affirmations of the Practical Reason are bold and unflinching, while he fails, in the Pure Reason, to find for them any justification. He thus left the theory of knowledge and the facts under the theory in conflict, and this difference of results became an influential factor in his philosophy. Instead of finding in this discrepancy a disproof of one or other

of the two Critiques, he was inclined rather to accept intrinsic contradictions in the forms of thought, an irremediable diversity in the terms of knowledge. He was not able to submit either tendency, the critical or the practical, the empirical or the intuitive, perfectly to the opposed one. He thus lost hold of the unity of the universe.

This discrepancy of results between the pure and the practical reason becomes especially conspicuous in ethics and theology. All the motives of action may speculatively be reduced to those of happiness, but over against these the moral consciousness places an absolute command: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can at the same time be accepted as the principle of universal legislation." Ethics is thus made to rest on a "categorical imperative," is brought in its laws in painful conflict with the impulses of the nature over which it rules, and must look for justification beyond the range of experience.

We are also compelled, in connection with moral action, to affirm the freedom of the will. We can do what we ought to do. We must also assert immortality as the only realm wide enough for moral achievements; and the existence of God, the ruler of this moral kingdom. These all rest on the testimony of our moral consciousness, yet neither the freedom of the will, nor immortality, nor the being of God, finds sufficient support in pure reason. It is necessary to understand this double tendency in the two Critiques, never fully overcome, the large concession to empirical thought, on the one side, and the sharp, independent assertion, on the other, as later philosophy is deeply involved in it. The Kant of the Practical Reason is a philosopher of another type from the Kant of the Pure Reason. Very different conclusions

naturally follow from the two works. The rugged, inconsistent strength of Kant is seen in the simple fact that he should entertain two critiques, a pure and a practical one. There can be but one critique, as there can be but one explanation of given facts.

§ 3. The "Critique of the Pure Reason" is an inquiry into the origin and limits of knowledge. The process is termed one of pure reason because it is not the tracing of empirical knowledge, but an antecedent rational determination of its grounds. The limitation of our knowledge to experience is empiricism. To assert principles which transcend experience, without a previous inquiry into their grounds, is dogmatism. To deny these principles without sufficient investigation is scepticism. To inquire into them and to bring to them whatever justification belongs to them is criticism. This criticism of Kant rests essentially on a psychological basis, since it turns on the nature and limits of the knowing powers.

The first question of moment which Kant encounters is that of the forms of knowledge, the antecedent ideas which shape inquiry. He establishes the necessary existence of these form-elements by means of a distinction which everywhere appears in judgments. Judgments are of two kinds, analytic and synthetic. In the analytic judgment the predicate is already contained in the subject, or is identical with it. Synthetic judgments may arise under experience, or they may transcend it; they may be synthetic *a posteriori*, or synthetic *a priori*. All bodies have weight, is a synthetic judgment which expresses our knowledge of facts. Many of the judgments of mathematics, as, Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, are convictions prior to the facts. In physics, the judgment, A body must remain in its own

state, whether of rest or of motion, unless acted on by another body; or in philosophy, the assertion, All events hold within themselves some relation of sequence, are synthetic *a priori* judgments. These judgments demand antecedent ideas on which they rest. These prior notions are the pure forms of knowledge. Without them knowledge would be impossible.

The empirical philosophy has come to admit these pure forms, but derives them from a protracted race-experience, fastened on the mind by inheritance; a view not very unlike that of innate ideas, the traces of a previous experience, as accepted by Plato. Empiricism regards resemblance as the all-inclusive relation between things, but resemblance, as a form of thought, must be antecedent to the phenomena it sets in order. We do not take resemblance, causation, from the facts they expound, but bring them to those facts, as a condition of understanding them. Later empiricism thus practically agrees with Kant in recognizing synthetic judgments, which hold the form-elements of knowledge. The two systems differ from each other in regard to the manner in which these antecedent forms are attained. We attach great importance to the fact that, after protracted discussion and much acute analysis, the two schools touch each other in recognizing elements in many judgments which are prior to the experience of the individual. The inquiries remain, whether the knowing of the individual is not all the knowing there is, whether this knowing is not always, and has not always been, identical with itself in its essential conditions. If our present classifications imply a notion of resemblance, our tracing of events an idea of causation, have they not always contained these implications?

The empiricist neglects, or touches very lightly, the point of most difficulty. Things may be sorted mechanically by likeness of qualities, as sand and gravel and cobble in the drift of a river. Sequences may be repeated organically by virtue of their agreement, and so become habits. The cerebral states incident to thought may tend to renew themselves with increased facility for the same reason. But these facts do not touch the critical point. That still remains. It is, how do we know these and like things for what they are? The things themselves do not carry knowledge with them. These repetitions do not alter the terms of knowing when knowing comes. How can the analytic conditions of knowledge as a mental process be altered by any number of experiences of some other inferior order which occur antecedently to it? Empiricism fails us at the critical moment of transition. The empiricist, like the alchemist, is plentiful in information and full of method till the ingredients are all in the alembic, but then they are left to yield slag in place of gold. How does a cerebral association become the unity of thought? How does organic continuity become a connection of ideas? How does a transmitted tendency pass into a form-element in knowledge? These questions, which involve the central difficulty, are left without an answer. The required coincidence is assumed as if it were the simplest thing possible. In fact, it is the most obscure thing possible. Till this difficulty is removed, the act of knowing, with its present analytic terms, must be left in its integrity as the real fact with which we have to deal.

The condensed form which perception assumes in repeated exercise does not aid the empiricist in bridging the chasm which divides him from his goal. The judg-

ments ordinarily suppressed in perception are, on needful occasion, renewed. The most rapid perception contains these as latent terms. They are not, as in the alleged transformation of organic processes into knowledge, a putting of the clear and plain in place of the obscure, but the obscure in place of the plain, the rapid in place of the slow, the abbreviated for the full process. This is a constant transformation. The turning of the absence of knowledge into knowing is another thing, quite. The evoking of the clear connections of pure mathematics out of the depths of animal being is a kind of alchemy of its own order, and must be looked to closely.

Having proceeded so far in the proof of *a priori* forms, Kant was suddenly and wholly turned aside from the natural conclusions contained in the doctrine. He accepted these form-elements under a misleading analogy as moulds, or methods, of thought, supplied by the mind itself. They are thus not relations which belong to the objects of knowledge and constitute a part of their revelation, but forms under which the *ego*, in its own transcendental unity, shapes the objects offered to it in perception. Here is an elevation of mind which profoundly debases it. Here is an unexpected slip of method, which alters wholly the nature of knowledge, introduces much confusion and useless subtilty of thought, and remains to be wholly eliminated, as a first condition of the integrity of our faculties.

This view makes knowing something quite other than what we have thought it to be. It is no longer penetrating things like light, sharing the light that is in them, taking them up at their own intellectual values in the estimates of mind; it is putting upon them forms and colors all our own. The molten metal is not crystallizing,

it is filling moulds we have prepared for it. Knowing is not knowing, but transforming the passive material of knowledge into impressions native to ourselves. Knowing is no more an out-going movement than is digestion. The only unity in digestion is that animals of the same sort build up like food into similar tissues. Knowing is hopelessly relative, equally in its rational as in its sensuous forms. Sensations in their endless variety are, indeed, more true to their real character than are insights, since these suggest a reality and universality that, after all, do not belong to them.

§ 4. The illusions thus put upon us are of the most misleading character. If space-relations do not belong to sensuous objects, if events do not follow each other in a sequence beyond our thought, if reality is only a subjective impression, what remains of knowledge? Nothing more than the coherence of dreams. Thus there is introduced into the philosophy of Kant that anomalous and fanciful term, things-in-themselves. Things-in-themselves are forever beyond us. This philosophy, like many another, ends in destroying what it undertook to expound. It does not, as a theory, return to knowledge—knowledge, with its indefeasible hold on the human mind prior to all philosophy—with more light, but rather as a gusty wind which scatters a mist and leaves only empty air behind. Yet we are to be absolute, cock-sure, about the new philosophy which sets at naught all previous conviction. If the mind, in the very act of knowing, volatilizes its material of all sorts into colored vapor, then knowing is not only not what we have thought it to be, it loses all interest for us as a valid process. What validity remains is that of the universality of illusion. The necromancy of the mind is so complete that it perverts all things alike in

laying hold of them, and is the helpless victim of its own tricks.

Experience brings no confirmation to this view. To be sure, the perversion is so extended that one cannot break away from it. It controls the criticism as perfectly as the thing criticised, and therefore is beyond correction. Yet this is not quite true. If events owe their relation in succession to our conception of them while they lie before the mind, they cannot owe it to the same source when they proceed independently of us, and return, at a later stage, to our observation. How is the fact to be explained that our experience is not a patchwork of phenomena—progressive here under the constructive forms of our thought, and dissolved there into chaos by lying beyond our contemplation—but is a continuous, coherent whole? The visible spaces and the invisible ones, the events observed and those unobserved, must rest under the same relations, or they cannot cohere, when united, in experience. They do cohere; the forms, therefore, which contain them are not put upon them by the mind, but inhere in them as their own eternal order. Our knowing, by thus bridging spaces and times beyond our ken, shows that it involves simply an apprehension of objective connections, ever true to themselves. The relations are permanent, though our knowledge of the phenomena which fill them out is very partial. In acts of imagination we find it necessary to complete the events which hold the forms in coherent extension. In actual experience, material, arising under all the interruptions of observation, holds spaces and events in firm coherence, equally under the eye and beyond the eye.

Dr. Hickok has urged most convincingly that no common knowledge, no "one whole of all space," no "one

whole of all time," would be possible to men, if form-elements were simply subjective, did not pertain to the things which they set in order. We enter into knowledge as a common possession which belongs to us all, because it is objective to us all. But knowledge is enclosed within these forms, and can be no more objective than these are. Our fantasies are not possessed in common, even though evoked by the same objects. The words object and objective may be used to express subjects of contemplation within the mind, but these subjects are not the basis of a concurrent experience. We are compelled to come in contact with true objects, real events, phenomena that have fixed form-elements, as the condition of an experience in common.

The assertion that form-elements pertain to the mind, and not to the things known, is made in opposition to universal conviction, and so breaks down our just faith in our powers. No philosophy is at liberty to invalidate the normal action of the mind. It is not competent for reason to discredit itself. A theory of philosophy that opposes itself to human knowledge can carry no proof. It must look for its establishment to the very powers it has discredited. The facts to be expounded, to wit, our universal conviction of realities, must set limits to our explanatory process. The conclusion that knowledge is subjective in its forms is equally opposed to popular and scientific conviction. What is it in astronomy that we are measuring? Spaces, times, not dimensions of a mental form-element. How otherwise can we understand the exactitude and perfect agreement of these measurements?

We cannot escape objective reality. The notion of reality carries with it, in its inevitable application, exter-

nal facts. But if one form-element transcends the mind and reaches real being, they all do that belong to the same group. Time and causation, in the experience they order, demand not only outward facts, they require changeable forms of those facts. What are these changes which collectively constitute the universe? What can they be but the universe itself? We shall lose the mind as we lose it in dreams, if we lose the universe, its intellectual foil. Certainly the presumption is that the apparent is the real; a presumption that, in a narrow form, calls for very positive proof to overcome it, and, in a wide form, is almost beyond rebuttal.

§ 5. Kant having substituted form-elements native to mind, for relations native to things—inherent in the rationality of things, itself inherent in the mind of God—was ready to entertain the suggestion that things might have wholly inapproachable natures of their own. Thus we have that most fanciful and anomalous conception, the thing-in-itself, as the possible solution of many difficulties. We may conceive events in one way, it is thought, while they themselves may occur in a very different way. We cannot regard the world as ruled otherwise than by causes; yet things-in-themselves may admit liberty. The thing-in-itself impresses the mind, but owing to the mind's own peculiar qualities, these impressions may not stand for the facts as they are. We have convictions, but those convictions are not necessarily the counterpart of realities. We are like persons subject to illusions. The images in the mind play loosely about objects, and we have no way of determining their correspondence. The dogmatism of the Scotch philosophy, that we know the very object directly and unmistakably in perception, is sober, wholesome assertion compared

with these uncertain images of sensation, behind which things-in-themselves play hide-and-seek with us.

In a sound philosophy we have no occasion, and no ground, for the distinction between things as we know them and things as they may be in themselves. We have no occasion, for as things appear to us so are they, for all the ends of knowledge and use. This is the fact covered by causation and the uniformity of nature. Knowing is a valid process consistent with itself. Sound philosophy gives no entrance to the feeling that knowing a thing once we need to know it again, in some other way, in order to know it. Nor is there any ground on which we can rationally introduce into our speculation the thing-in-itself, as possibly other than what we find it to be. Our vision is single. We are not troubled with two images which we cannot bring together. Under the notion of causation we put realities, energies, back of phenomena, as their sources. The causes and the effects which express them are exactly commensurate. We cannot suppose the underlying energies to be in any way other than what they are indicated to be in the phenomena which accompany them. Such a supposition is wholly gratuitous, without any possible reason. We know matter, mind, fully and finally, in knowing the phenomena to which they give rise. There is not a residuum of being beyond these manifestations. It is, that we may explain these phenomena, and for this purpose only, that we accept things, causes. We have no other phenomena from which to infer other causes, other kinds of being, things-in-themselves. Things-in-themselves are the merest chimeras, taken up on no ground whatever. Never have any terms more extraneous and fanciful found their way into philosophy.

We do not fully know things, simply because we do not perfectly apprehend the entire circle of phenomena which belong to them in experience. We may enlarge observation, we may multiply the conditions of action, and so enter more perfectly into a knowledge of things and persons. We have not the slightest occasion to say, at the end, things-in-themselves may be very different from what we have now been led to think they are. We have no reason, having determined the sphericity of the earth, to despondingly remark, it may, after all, be a cube. Cubes may make upon us the impressions of spheres. Such conceptions are utterly empty, the mere quivering of intellectual vision. The remedy for this intoxication of speculation is rest and sobriety.

We may make the supposition that there are other forms of perception than those which belong to us; but such a supposition does not alter the nature and adequacy of our knowledge. It is not to be thought that sensations of another variety or intensity would stand in contradiction with our present experience, or fail to fall into harmony with it. The blind and the deaf know as we know, so far as they know. It is the introduction into philosophy of such conception as things-in-themselves which renders it vague, remote, fanciful.

Forms define knowledge. By virtue of one of these ideas, causation, we infer noumena, we place realities beneath appearances. Noumena play no other rational part than that of informing phenomena. Our entire hold on them is through phenomena. To speak, then, of the thing-in-itself, of spirit-in-itself, of God-in-Himself, is to fall into a confused, utterly unphilosophical attitude. It is an effort to bring forward to the imagination another set of phenomena, wholly foreign to our experience, for which

we have neither use nor proof. Noumena, as another set of phenomena, can play no part in thought. They must remain noumena in order to meet the ends of reason.

We know noumena to the same extent, precisely, as we know the phenomena of which they are the counterparts. Spencer, with his conceivable and inconceivable, his known and unknown, is, in philosophy, lingering in the penumbra of image worship. We know God in the degree in which we apprehend the things we refer to him. To wish to know him otherwise is an irrational hunger of the senses.

Kant, in introducing the thing-in-itself, overleaps the limits of all knowledge, and brings back thence conceptions fitted merely to confound it. The terms of knowledge must all lie within knowledge itself. The man in the moon is no more foreign to anthropology than is the thing-in-itself alien to philosophy.

Kant puts the doctrine of the thing-in-itself to various uses, and the notion has haunted speculation since his time. It contains the provisional explanation of difficulties too hard for the ordinary processes of solution. For this work it is admirably fitted. As we know nothing about the thing-in-itself, we may set it at any service we please, in any way we please. We may say the interaction of matter and mind may involve no real impossibility, since both matter and mind may be wholly different from what we think them to be.

The perplexity and the explanation both arise from not accepting the true limits of knowledge, and proceeding to occupy the mind with illusory images of the imagination. When we have brought together, under one form-element, two phenomenal terms, the imagination is satisfied. When the bat has hit the ball, we accept the

motion which follows. We forget that the inner ground of the sequence lies wholly beyond us, as much so when the relation lies between two things—the bat and the ball—as when it lies between things and thoughts—the bat and the ball, on the one hand, and our theories concerning them, on the other. The imagination has not the same definite terms to offer in the second as in the first case, but there is no more knowledge of the nature of the connection, hence no more difficulty in accepting it, in the one instance than in the other. Both are fixed connections in experience, and, as such, first terms in knowing. A possible unity between things-in-themselves and mind-in-itself as a ground of comprehension is mere illusion. The unity of the world does not lie in phenomena, but in the intellectual coherence of their relations. Distinction, separation, have their expression in phenomena. We must transcend these at some stage of thought, and pass into the unity of spiritual being. That spiritual being can assert itself is an ultimate truth, whose form and fitness we know, but whose interior connections we cannot affirm, for the very simple reason that there are no such connections. The search after them is another symptom of the thing-in-itself, of the desire, in gratification of the imagination, to put phenomena back of phenomena in an endless series.

§ 6. A correct understanding of Kant turns on an apprehension of the powers of mind as presented by him. While intuitive philosophy owes much to Kant, the meaning of terms has been so modified and the point of view so altered as to make the conception of Kant quite obsolete. Sense, understanding, and reason do not now designate what he indicated by them. Sense stands for the mind's knowledge of phenomena, whether exter-

nal or internal. The understanding covers the presentative, reflective powers—memory, imagination, judgment—employed in the intellectual construction of these phenomena. Reason is the power of apprehending ultimate form-elements. As Kant regarded these forms as involved in the perceptive and reflective acts themselves, he had no occasion for reason as insight. Reason with him furnished certain ideas, but they were transcendental ideas, ideas which could not be brought within the moulds furnished in perception and reflection, ideas which could not justify themselves, therefore, either to the sense or the understanding. These notions were the conception of the soul as a simple substance, the conception of the world as a unity which underlies all physical phenomena, the conception of God as the unity of all objects whatsoever. These conceptions are not, with Kant, products of perception or reflection, as both of these proceed under forms of thought too restricted for them. Hence, when we undertake to reflect on any of these ultimate ideas, we find that they transcend knowledge in experience. The form-elements applicable to the objects of sense and the processes of consciousness are no longer available. There is thus a conflict introduced in our knowledge. By the reason we are brought under the influence of transcendental notions, and yet, by virtue of the inadequacy of those forms of thought by which we work up the material furnished by the senses, we can make nothing satisfactory of them. Thus Kant accepts, as it were, the conclusion of Locke and Hume in reference to what we term knowledge, making it a product of experience; and at the same time adds to it, by this apprehension of the reason, an outer horizon of inapproachable ideas. These exert an immense, modifying

force on all our thinking. Noumena, with Kant, were not so much the realities which give substance to phenomena, as supersensuous forms of being impressed upon us by the reason, but inapproachable by any mode of exposition. Thus the world of realities lay farther back than the intuitionist is wont to conceive it, and so separate from the world of experience as to be inapproachable from it.

The doctrine of Kant was distinguished from empiricism by the *a priori* character of its form-elements, but this was a consideration, after all, of secondary importance. The chief difference lay in this apprehension of ideas whose rational value it could not make out. It recognized a profound cleft in our intellectual possessions, and put the richer moiety on the farther and inaccessible side. This conclusion was not unlike that of Hamilton, who asserted vigorously the relativity of knowledge, and the consequent inapprehensibility of the Infinite, and yet saved the conception as an object of faith. The mind is thus left in the very anomalous position of having two distinct sources of impressions, in the sense and the reason, impressions which the reflective powers can unite in no coherent, intellectual product. Thus a feeling of confusion and contradiction, of terms too large for its measurements, overtakes the intellect in all its speculative processes. The reflective powers stand allied with those of perception, and so fail to expound the higher presentations of the reason. Intuitionism restores the integrity of the mind by referring to the reason an insight simply into form-elements, and into all the form-elements requisite for any and every process of thought. The mind is thus thoroughly coherent in its action. Every reflective act has its transcendental element, and the sense of reality grows with this perpetual interweaving of the lower

and higher terms in experience. The unity of the world lies in the unity of thought, and extension of thought carries this unity with it. Thought brings all the terms of knowledge into coherent relation, and deepens above and below the sense of unity. But the unity which the mind establishes, it finds rather than institutes. Its inquiries seem to it, from the outset, to pertain to realities, and so it is the universe that it discovers to be one in construction. The mind does not look deeper than the facts it deals with for unity. It finds unity in those facts, and through them unity in those realities for which they stand. The noumena are apprehended directly through the phenomena which interpret them, as the meaning is arrived at by the words which express it. We have no occasion for any transcendental unity in the mind itself, in the world itself, in the spiritual universe, above and beyond that suggested to us in a rational rendering of our own experience. Such a rendering, at every stage, leads us to the transcendental, that is, the spiritual.

Constructive realism unites noumena and phenomena, the transcendental and the sensuous, in the most immediate and absolute way. Noumena are the ever-present realities which all appearances cover and present. We have no occasion to institute any inquiry whatever concerning noumena beyond the phenomena under which they arise. Noumena and phenomena are inseparable terms in reason, each expressing the value of the other. They are the reverse and obverse of the coin of thought. Kant, having accepted the form of the thought as a limitation of the mind, and not as its highest rational insight, naturally regarded noumena as remote realities, which lie wholly separate from phenomena as subjective impressions of mind. They might stand in one or another rela-

tion to our sensuous experience, or be quite foreign to it ; it was impossible to determine the nature of the connection.

While Kant himself was not willing to accept the idealism so thoroughly contained in his doctrine, those who followed him found it to be the most assured of inferences. If space and causation are form-elements put upon objects by the mind itself, then objects lose at once, as pertaining to themselves, those conditions which lead us to regard them as external. The definite position and inflexible energy which stand with us for outside reality are not due to it. Sensuous phenomena owe all their distinctive features to the mind itself, and may, therefore, far more simply be referred to it than to external realities which they in no way represent. Indeed, the distinction between outside and inside disappears. The form-elements, space and consciousness, causation and liberty, on which we had made this division, lose their differences ; all are equally limitations of mind. None of them carry us beyond the mind. The philosophy of Kant, having swept away this most fundamental difference between physical and mental phenomena, had no ground on which to maintain the radical character of the distinction. This conclusion, inevitable as it was, Kant was not willing to draw. He strove to hold on to things-in-themselves as the basis of physical phenomena. He thus separated himself from Berkeley, who allowed physical noumena to drop out, and referred all phenomena directly back to God. Kant had such a relentless grasp on the truths of experience, as given in practical reason, as to check positively the destructive criticism of pure speculation.

§ 7. Kant, accepting the sense and the understanding as coherently interpreting experience under forms of limited application ; accepting the reason as furnishing

transcendental ideas not capable of exposition under the ordinary forms of knowledge, destroyed the unity of the mind. The mind, having attained in the reason the notion of self, can, after all, make nothing of it. If it strives to ascribe to this self spirituality, unity, spontaneity, perpetuity, working under the forms of the sense and the understanding, it finds itself balked at every turn. In using the processes by which we interpret experience, in an effort to expound that which lies beyond experience, we necessarily put upon statements which we wish to offer as absolute truth the transient, unreal forms of our sensuous life.

When we come to the second idea given by the reason, the unity of physical phenomena, we again encounter the same difficulty, the inapplicability of our intellectual resources to the matter in hand. There thus arise the four antinomies of Kant. Each antinomy is made of thesis and antithesis, assertion and negation, yet neither is applicable to the cosmological idea. The first antinomy pertains to the duration and extension of the world. Thesis, the world had a beginning in time, and has limits in space. Antithesis, the world is without beginning in time, and without limits in space. We must interpret our experience under one or other of these statements, but neither of them is satisfactory, or explanatory of the ultimate unity of things. This shows that, in applying our logical methods to transcendental terms, we are carrying them beyond the region which they expound. We cannot affirm the infinite continuation and extension of events, for if we do we thereby lose all unity, the object we are pursuing. Neither can we assign the physical world definite period and distinct dimensions, for if we do our times and spaces are arbitrary. So, again, we have

lost the unity of reason, a conception returning into itself with light upon every part of it. We observe, in passing, the close relation of this antinomy to Hamilton's law of the conditioned, as applied to causation.

The mind is thus left, under the philosophy of Kant, hopelessly stretching beyond itself, aware of that it cannot attain; receptive of a problem too profound for its solution. Is this result incident to this particular philosophy, or does it stand for a defect in intellectual structure? Must criticism always issue, as Kant affirms, in a transcendental philosophy, a philosophy of unavoidable, but unreconciled, assertions? Intuitionism recognizes the infinite as a form-element applicable to time and space and personal potentiality. That this form-element shall not be used where it does not belong is as essential to comprehension as that it shall be freely employed where it does apply. All things, all events, all acts are finite. They can only offer themselves to us in our experience as finite. On that condition, in that method, they enter experience. But, being finite in every particular, they cannot, by any multiplication, become infinite. The infinite is not the indefinitely large, but the absolutely illimitable. Space and time and personal potentiality are capable of infinite receptivity of the phenomena to which they apply. These phenomena are in no way straitened by their form-elements. Space is not made up of particular extensions. These in no measure fill it or exhaust it. The acts of God do not weary him. His potentiality, after the greatest imaginable expression, remains precisely what it was before. Yet each act is, and must be, finite, as each moment is finite. The act is an act, the moment a moment, only on that condition.

Hence what we must rationally affirm of things and

events is definite extension and duration. Their nature and their unity require this completeness within themselves. What we affirm of the forms under which they arise is absolute freedom, infinity. The precise reason of each period and dimension we may be unable to render, not because there is no reason, but because our grasp of the premises is not yet sufficiently firm and ample. The thought of God returns into itself. Its unity is complete in its parts and in their relation to each other. There may be distraction and disturbance in us, but not in it. This unity is not transcendental, though a subject of inexhaustible inquiry. If we accept the appropriate form-elements, and learn, under a rational rendering of experience, how to apply them, we shall be brought in contact with profound problems, but not insolvable ones. We may push our footsteps indefinitely backward and forward, and yet not lose ourselves in a confused and confusing homogeneity or heterogeneity of events. On the contrary, they are in orderly motion, ever resolving themselves into a more visible whole. Thus the sphericity of the world is not a term of sensuous experience, but it becomes an intellectual element of which we are assured, and one which brings no contradiction or disturbance to our senses in their narrowest action.

We have, therefore, no occasion to regard thesis and antithesis as logical modes of thought inapplicable to those higher ideas which remain transcendental under them. Our powers are indeed limited, each to its own office, and bring emptiness and confusion if pushed into a strange field. Used in relation to each other, they are harmonious and concurrent in the pursuit of truth. The sense is confined to phenomena, and to a certain range within those phenomena. We cannot, therefore, construct

under the sensuous imagination supersensuous things, like force, nor even phenomenal things, like molecules, which escape the range of the senses. The understanding has for its subject-matter intellectual relations, and can, therefore, do nothing with simple, primitive terms. The reason gives us form-elements, but cannot, in their use, go beyond their bare recognition. It remains for us, under experience, to determine the method and extent of their application, their harmonious connection with each other in covering the entire ground of inquiry. These several powers fall in with each other at once in a wise attainment of knowledge. Knowledge is the product which arises from the use of them all in their own offices. They are concurrent by virtue of being confined each to its own proper activity. No one power, used in just relation to other powers, brings any contradiction to them. Antinomies arise only when we push powers beyond themselves, or allow them to fall short of themselves.

The second antinomy pertains to what Kant terms quality. Thesis, Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts. Antithesis, There exists nothing simple. The last proposition, there exists nothing simple, derives its plausibility from the fact that the processes of multiplication and division have no limits. Matter is said to be infinitely divisible because the act of division, as an intellectual effort, assigns itself no bounds. The infinitesimal, under regression, is as vanishing a term as the infinite, under progression. Space accepts no final unit in either direction. But this fact brings no confusion to cosmic unity. The cosmos is not an affair of space, but of extensions within space, and must, therefore, take up its first terms, and close its last terms, under definite measurements. The doctrine of atoms and molecules

brings no difficulty to the reason, no more than stones of fixed sizes to the architect. The dimensions of atoms are not assigned them by the nature of space, but by their own constructive purposes. They involve no more mystery by virtue of their minuteness than does the world, which, so far as space is concerned, might have been larger or less large. The inexhaustibility of space, its ability to take in every measurement, makes it the perfectly plastic matrix for all material creation. This creation receives definite dimensions under its own unity. This antinomy is virtually a reproduction of the old riddle, the search for a limit of a mental act of subdivision *within itself*—the contrasting the vagueness of a pure, comprehending process with the familiar firmness of the facts which arise under it, and fill it out.

The third antinomy lies between causality and freedom. Thesis, Freedom, in the transcendental sense of the term, is a reality; or there may be absolute, uncaused beginnings of series of efforts. Antithesis, All things, without exception, take place in the world in accordance with natural law. Kant arrives at these contradictory conceptions, the last of which he regards as applicable to our experience as interpreted by the understanding, and the former as a truth we would fain assert under the transcendental reason, by accepting the physical rendering of the world under causation, and at the same time making no provision in his psychology for its spiritual rendering under spontaneity. The antinomy expresses the force of empiricism, contending with the insight of reason. The mind's powers are made to exclude each other. Let the reason, as insight, supply the notion of spontaneity as the constructive idea under which pure thought arises, precisely as physical connections arise

under causation, and the antinomy is lost at once. The two principles become, Physical events follow each other under causation, Intellectual events follow each other under reasons; and reasons involve the spontaneous action of the mind. We have no occasion to introduce a mystical notion of things-in-themselves in order to secure a basis of freedom. We have no occasion to affirm transcendental notions, when the truth lies at the very heart of our most personal experience. Why should we, with Kant, dive for pearls, if, having attained them, we cannot land them?

The fourth antinomy is allied to the third. Thesis, There belongs to the world an absolutely necessary being. Antithesis, Nothing is absolutely necessary. Under the notion of causation, the universe, as a whole and in every part of it, is perfectly conditioned in each step of procedure. Its coherence is that of a stitch, which ravel at once if broken in any portion of it. The universe thus offers intense mechanical cohesion, but no unity. It lacks unity, because these rigid relations accept no limits in time, and so give the mind, seeking to find a purpose in them, a construction rounding to a completion, no hold. The world becomes rationally intelligible only when spontaneity, as shaping power, pervades causation, as pliant material; when mind plays upon it and subordinates it to its uses. If we affirm the freedom of the mind, as the form-element giving opportunity for a rational sequence, our two propositions no longer constitute an antinomy, but apply to different phenomena in their truly constructive interlock. On the one side, we escape waywardness, on the other, constraint; and the universe, with a push of its own and a guidance from within, moves toward the Kingdom of Heaven.

§ 8. When we come to the third transcendental conviction, that of the unconditioned, we can, of course, make no progress by an exposition resting on sense perceptions and logical processes. Kant takes up the several arguments for the being of God, and finds them inadequate. The ontological argument fails, as a transcendental notion of God does not carry with it its own reality. No conception in experience establishes itself as a fact beyond the mind which entertains it.

If we start out on the cosmological argument, we find ourselves utterly unable to rise above the series of causes whose backward path we are pursuing. If we turn to the teleological proof, no more by advancing than by retreating, no more in pursuing the progress of events than in tracing their origin, can we transcend the stream on which we are voyaging. Our movement, in all directions, is within the limits of experience, and we cannot press beyond them. Our experience is sensuous, everywhere finite, cohering under causes, and has nothing to disclose concerning the unconditioned. The form-elements we are using are also wholly subjective, personal, private. They help us to run, in a familiar way, along the continuous lines of events, but have no absolute message of any sort. The idea of God remains wholly transcendental. The doctrine of Spencer, and of all empirical thinking, approaches closely to that of Kant. The Unknown is a term of thought we cannot escape, and cannot expound. The idea of God was, with Kant, a light beyond our experience, which goes before us in our search after unity, yet fails to lead us to any real revelation.

All these conflicts, these lines which run between light and darkness, with no interflow of the two, no intermingling of shades, as if each were a wall to the other—are at

once escaped, if we find within experience the powers by which we transcend it, indeed, are constantly transcending it, in all absolute truth. If spontaneous power is the ruling idea of reason, if the infinite is a form-element applicable to this personal potentiality in its highest expression, then we have that in the universe about us and in our own rendering processes which leads us straight to God. There is footing by which the vaulting mind is momentarily transcending its sensuous terms. The light and the darkness flow into each other, and the light grows again.

§ 9. The form-elements of thought, the conditions which render it a coherent, luminous movement, are, according to Kant, involved in each faculty as a part of its own nature. Faculties, as faculties, carry with them their own conditions, as do forces. This doctrine emphasizes the division of the faculties, and in the same degree reduces the unity of the mind. It lays stress on receptive quality, and gives no heed to penetrative, revealing insight. It makes each form of knowledge a given kind of opacity, subjecting the light to its own reflecting and dissolving qualities, not a transparent body through which the light moves freely, with inner and outer disclosure.

Perception carries with it, according to Kant, space as an *a priori* term of order. Space is not a product of experience, but its antecedent condition, contained in the sense itself. We cannot escape it in any construction of external facts. Space is simple, single, ultimate. Space accepts infinity, a relation wholly beyond experience. Kant, notwithstanding this pure subjective character of space, insisted on some reality as underlying perception. Without such a reality the uniform experience which lies between man and man could not be explained. But that

something which is the immediate occasion of sensation is of the most indeterminate character. We can refer no form-elements to it. If we speak of it as external, we only mean that the mind, in regarding it, projects it beyond itself. This something gives occasion to the illusion of externality. Kant, unwilling to cast it aside, accepted it as an utterly obscure noumenon, the mystery of the thing-in-itself, in which, possibly, the constructive coherence of relations, apparently contradictory, may inhere. "The things which we perceive are not what we take them to be, nor their relations of such intrinsic nature as they appear to us. If we make abstraction of ourselves as knowing subjects, or even of the subjective constitution of our senses generally, all the qualities, all the relations of objects in space and time, yes, and even space and time themselves, disappear. As phenomena they cannot exist really, *per se*, but only in us; what may be the character of things-in-themselves, and wholly separated from our receptive sensibility, remains entirely unknown to us."

A more fatal attitude toward human knowledge cannot readily be taken than this of the entire subjectivity of its forms, one and all. The most sensuous impression and the deepest insight become one in character. Knowledge, as knowledge, lies under its form-elements, and if these do not touch realities, it becomes such stuff as dreams are made of. Our conceptions rest on the facts like mists on the mountain side; they may take any fantastic form that comes to them; they serve simply to conceal the things which lie under them. Truth is thus only the coherence of a vision within itself. The mind has not grappled realities. All its deep-sea soundings yield nothing but fanciful measurements. Such a fundamental

scepticism of our own powers cannot be made to rest securely on the powers themselves. It is, and must forever remain, a wayward speculation. All assertions we choose to make about God or immortality, under the implication that these objects of thought lie without the relations of time or of space, are utterly unintelligible. The reason is striving to hold on to the substance of thought, having dismissed its forms. It is by the form alone that the reality is reached, and a reality, without the rational presentation which pertains to it, is absolute emptiness. All that is truly transcendental is visionary. It is absurd to raise the question of immortality under the notion of time, and answer it beyond that notion. If our notion of time is subjective only, what possible pertinence is there to the idea of immortality? Can we speak of a permanent reality in color, when color is simply impressional?

The mind has, in consciousness, the example of a form-element which does belong exclusively to mental activity. It may, therefore, contrast it with space, as the form-element of external objects. We cannot, as shown by this example, regard forms as indifferent to the realities that find expression under them. The forms are involved in the very nature of these realities. The realities are precisely what the forms pertaining to them reveal them to be. We cannot put consciousness on physical things, nor space on mental acts, by the manner of contemplation.

The improbability involved in the assertion that perception gives space relations to objects destitute of them is exceedingly great to the sober mind. The conception is so remote from experience that we cannot readily find an illustration. The kaleidoscope throws into well-de-

finer patterns accidental relations. Yet it simply leads the mind to repeat relations really present, and leaves successive images with no dependence on each other. There is no real analogy within knowledge of what is here asserted of it as a whole. If the mind, in knowing, creates its own knowledge, the very meaning of knowledge is lost.

The feeling, so just in itself, which induced Kant to accept some reality in things, should have led him much farther. It is not the mere fact of knowledge, but knowledge in all its details, that requires explanation. For the same reason that there must be a common something for its occasion, that something must be such as to control all its particulars. Our sensuous impressions cover minute specifications in which they agree, and this agreement demands an equally extended definiteness of constitution in the objects which give rise to it. Diverse persons, constructing a story addressed to the imagination, arrive at very different pictures. They have common material, but material not sufficiently elaborated for perfect agreement. The defining process divides into very distinct results. To prevent a like diversity in perceptions, there must be, in the objects perceived, exactness of details, touching every relation under which they present themselves. Certainly, the one straightforward supposition is that details, which reproduce themselves as spatial relations, themselves involve such relations. The hypothesis that they do not renders the subject less intelligible, and so has nothing to commend it. The relation of cause and effect is weakened and confused by it. Only the most undeniable reasons, found in some deeper bearings of the subject, could give color to such a supposition.

Kant seems to have been led to this belief, partly by

concession to empiricism, and partly in opposition to the doctrine which finds statement in Scotch philosophy, a direct knowledge of objects. Constructive realism avoids both difficulties. It recognizes the sensuous material and the constructive energy in perception. The object perceived is, in its essential qualities, involved in perception, while the sensuous impression is referrible to the sense alone. The mind grasps the real relations of objects, and through them the objects themselves. The action, on either side, expresses specific conditions and real correspondences. The reality of the conditions carries with it the correctness of the impressions. Truth lies in this agreement of intellectual convictions, under the action of causation, with the things which give rise to them. Resemblance is not the primary fact, but identity, under diversities, of the cause with the effect. Break this dependence, and truth, which lies in the correspondence of our conceptions with the realities which they cover, is lost. The knowing process runs loose, like machinery that is doing no work. Secondary differences are made to hide radical agreements. Because the mental product and the external object are not identical, therefore it is inferred they stand on no fixed terms of dependence. The two worlds do not rest on each other. The seamless garment of experience is torn in twain, from end to end.

Kant regarded time as the form-element of the inner sense, apprehending mental action. This fact calls for no additional comment. Consciousness is the distinguishing form-element of intellectual phenomena, while time is an interpreting idea common to all events, whether physical or mental. Great confusion is wrought by the supposition that time is not necessary to the very progress of

thought, but only to our reflective consideration of it. If the mind knows its own processes for what they are, then these involve time as a necessity of their being, since the mind interprets them under this notion. If the mind does not know its own activities as they are, but puts upon them a presentative or receptive form, to wit, that of phenomena which succeed each other, what is the real relation of its processes? To what does knowledge attach, to these processes as they are, or as they are not? Is our apprehension of our thoughts, like the glinting of an oily film on water, wholly untrue to what lies beneath it?

§ 10. The categories of the understanding were elaborately presented by Kant. They come under four divisions, each division containing three subdivisions:

QUANTITY.	QUALITY.	RELATION.	MODALITY.
Unity.	Reality.	Substantiality.	Possibility.
Plurality.	Negation.	Causality.	Existence.
Totality.	Limitation.	Reciprocity.	Necessity.

What ought a scheme of categories to contain, and what ought it to exclude? A category, in the highest application of the word, expresses an ultimate form-element, one which defines the inmost nature of the propositions under it, their significance; but is itself directly intelligible to the reason. Thus the proposition, "We are occupied with the consideration of the understanding," turns on the notion of time for the meaning of the word occupied. A scheme of categories should cover all primary ideas, and exclude all derived ones; and it should arrange these ideas, if possible, so as to express the map of knowledge whose outlines they establish. As each category is in itself simple, nothing can be derived from

it; and yet a category may give occasion to subordinate conceptions. Thus we can deduce no definite extension from the notion of space, yet space gives room for all the constructions of geometry. Space is the simple and primary condition of them all. It is sufficient, therefore, in a list of categories, to put the notion of space for all the axioms which come under it. That most fundamental notion, the notion of being, does not fall into distinctions according to the objects to which it is applied. A dream, a perception, the object perceived, are all real, though the permanence, the force, the form of the reality are in each case very different. This variety belongs to the distinction in things, is learned by experience, and does not touch the notion of being. We have no occasion to extend our categories to cover the variable phenomena which are grouped under them.

One proposition may involve several categories, and the same category may enter into the interpretation of very different propositions. The assertion, "This is the same specimen we saw yesterday," involves, manifestly, being, time, causation, resemblance. The appearances, the circumstances, are such that we explain them under the supposition of continuous being. The identity of the mineral is involved in the facts interpreted under these notions. Identity is not something in addition to them, it is the rendering of them. Reality, reality enduring through time, assured on the phenomenal side by observation, and expounded under the notion of causation, constitute together the fact we express by identity. Identity is not a distinct category, therefore, but a word of interpretation of a complex experience arising under several categories.

With this view of the nature of categories, the list

offered by Kant seems both deficient and redundant. It fails to include all primitive ideas; it includes those which are not primitive. The form-elements, space and time, assigned to the sense, are really form-elements of the understanding. The sense, aside from the judgment, has no form-elements. The mind has no occasion for such an element as a constructive feature, till it advances to a judgment. It is judgments alone that necessarily involve prior ideas. The sensation can remain unrendered in terms of knowledge. When we perceive, when we unite judgment to sensation, the forms, positions, distances we recognize are products of the understanding. The same is true of our inner experience, as involving time. Space and time are no more parts of our sensuous experience than are being, resemblance, causation. All arise on occasion of a sensuous experience which appeals to the understanding to be rendered in terms of thought.

The first division of categories, unity, plurality, totality, is said to arise under number. "The scheme of quantity is number." If this is true, we have in them but one category, that of number. Unity, plurality, totality are but a grouping of the ways in which objects may be considered under the relation of number. But unity is not equivalent to one. One no more stands for unity than two stands for opposition, or four for involution. The identification of one and unity is but a loose play of images. Unity, as a notion, is a result of experience, an apprehension of things or acts that stand in close intellectual dependence on each other. We may well accept number as a primitive form-element, but it does not touch those constructive dependencies which we express by unity. Unity is a growing insight into the relations of actions, established in experience by the mind's knowl-

edge of its own activity and the activities of the world. It learns to seek unity, a definite combination of effort, and also to discern it where it exists. The reason furnishes regulative ideas simply as empty possibilities. The content which may, at any time, be included in them, belongs wholly to experience. The reason enables us to grasp sensuous terms in supersensuous relations. Unity is in every case a definite, intelligible fact, which remains to be apprehended for exactly what it is. It is not a prior idea brought to experience, it is an intellectual relation found in it and learned from it.

The three specifications, the single, the plural, the total, so far as they pertain to numerical distinctions, resolve themselves into one category, that of number. The tri-chotomous division was held by Kant to involve, in each case, a definite dependence. The first term expresses a general condition; the second, examples under it; and the third, the unity of the two. Thus totality is plurality expounded by unity, taken in their entire extension. Limitation is reality and negation combined in one form of being. Reciprocity is the reaction of causes as contained in substances. Necessity is the possible become actual. Most plainly the unity, plurality, totality of Kant are not simply numerical expressions; they are not the grammarian's singular, dual, and plural. These last do not exhaust, they only group, relations; they cover a naked numerical fact. Totality, as conceived by Kant, is the highest expression of unity. These categories are the relatively barren notion of number, inflated by a vital, intellectual experience, and placed for its highest result.

The second division Kant refers to being in time. The only new category it contains is that of being. The three

modes of assertion, affirming, denying, or limiting the reality, involve simply a convenient logical classification of judgments. Judgments of limitation, like judgments of plurality, cover an inexhaustible and very variable class.

The third triplet, substantiality, causality, reciprocity, involves the category of causation. In their distinctions these terms are an expression of our apprehension of the facts of the world under this notion. We infer substance from continuous phenomena, and reciprocal action from changeable phenomena. Kant, under the influence of empiricism, identifies causation with sequence. The third and fourth triplets are construed under causation as a particular expression of a time relation. The productive idea in the triplets is causality. Substantiality and reciprocity are our rendering of experience under the one notion of cause and effect.

The fourth triplet is possibility, existence (actuality), necessity. There may be a double application of these conceptions, either in connection with physical events or with intellectual activity. Possibility, in reference to events, may express our ignorance of the causes at work in a given case, and hence our ignorance of the events which may follow them. Actuality is a determination, in the evolution of causes, of what is contained in them. Necessity then follows as the completion of the relation. In connection with intellectual activity, possibility may express our ignorance concerning the truth of a proposition, actuality our assertion of its truth, necessity the conclusions which follow from its truth. If this triplet gains its significance, not from the inner relation of things, but only from our inability at once to grasp that relation, then most assuredly it is, throughout, an interpretation

of experience, and contains no addition to our stock of categories. It ought, however, to receive another rendering wholly, as covering the relations of intellectual activities under the notion of spontaneity. Spontaneity yields a real possibility. This, once determined by action, lapses under physical connections into necessity. The significance of possibility and necessity is referrible, respectively, to spontaneity and causation.

Such were the intellectual modes which Kant presented for the government of our intellectual processes. It is a mixed product of secondary and primary, empirical and rational, forms. The categories ought not to be united with simply logical divisions of judgments, laid down for the ease and clearness of proof. True categories involve another consideration wholly, the presence of a primitive idea. A judgment, as positive or negative, as particular or universal, affects the validity of the conclusions drawn from it, but has nothing to do with interpreting ideas. We may affirm and deny under the same form-elements. Affirmation and denial are mere accidents of expression, as compared with the force of true categories.

It is impossible, therefore, to mingle successfully categories and logical distinctions. The two have reference to totally distinct things; the one, to the primitive terms of reason under which judgments arise; the other, to the safety of the processes by which they are interlocked with each other in argument. By this union, neither of the two purposes is clearly before us. This method leads to the far more important error of omission. There is not included in these categories a single one which pertains to spiritual phenomena. The notions which order this branch of our experience are wanting. Consciousness, spontaneity, truth, beauty, right, find no admission. It

is inevitable, therefore, that the beliefs which are interpreted by these form-elements should sink back into confusion and darkness, should be regarded as transcendental, since they are transcendental to the forms of thought which Kant has provided. The very presence of such ideas in the human mind as freedom, virtue, God, becomes a strange anomaly. These conceptions not only force their way in through the barriers of experience, they profoundly affect action. Yet Kant has no processes of thought which can expound them. The transcendental, in the philosophy of Kant, involves the same difficulty as the Unknown, in the philosophy of Spencer. The Unknown is known in the very naming it, is known by virtue of all the purposes of thought which it subserves, is known to the very limit of its rational recognition. It clings to us, in spite of every expulsive process, as the firmest constituent of reason. So is it with the transcendental. It does not transcend knowledge; it only transcends the explanatory methods of a given philosophy, and so condemns that philosophy. What should we think of a scientific hypothesis that disposed of the most difficult facts, waiting explanation, by pronouncing them transcendental? Transcendentalism is the negation of philosophy.

§ 11. This difficulty, this want of one concurrent system, is greatly enhanced by the "Critique of the Practical Reason." Here a variety of fundamental convictions finds admittance, which are not provided for in the critical outfit of the mind. Philosophy thus affirms its own inadequacy, and then relapses into dogmatism. Kant as a dogmatist, is far superior to Kant as a philosopher. On the ground of possibilities which escape our knowledge, because we apprehend things in a peculiar way, and not

necessarily as they are, he accepts conclusions over a large range of thought for which no provision is made in current forms of inquiry. As form-elements are subjective, phenomena and noumena no longer contain each other. The noumena which give occasion to spatial, physical phenomena are not determined to any form of being by this fact. They still fly at large, to be used conjecturally as we please in cosmic construction. Our experiences give us no fixed terms in the world of realities, and our philosophy is wholly free in its hypotheses, with the result that no hypothesis carries with it any proof. Our experience offers itself in a dual form, but forms do not declare realities. When we deal with realities, monads, we have no restraint put upon us by phenomenal relations, and so our constructions are wholly fanciful and perfectly worthless.

A transcendental philosophy, in divorcing itself from experience, cuts itself loose from all the limits of inquiry and the tests of truth. Yet it must proceed under images derived, in a remote way, from these very fields of familiar thought. Such a philosophy becomes most serviceable when, as with Kant, it settles down into the affirmation of spiritual convictions as undeniable, irrefutable facts. This is to save the phenomena with which we start, in spite of the philosophy with which we close. It is to reaffirm the facts in the face of an inadequate theory concerning them. The philosophic instinct of Kant is at its highest and best when he confronts his own critical work, and rescues the spiritual world from it.

Having asserted another set of facts in experience, we are prepared for a new philosophy of experience. We are ready to extend our hypothesis till it encloses all the phenomena, to make our critique of the pure reason

cover the practical reason. As a condition of saving philosophy, of imparting to it any significance or value, we shall be compelled to recognize knowledge as knowledge, and to carry the knowing process, as a clear, self-consistent, coherent act, through the whole range of thought. No part of this field, remote as it may be, and diverse as it may be, can, in reference to any other portion, be transcendental. If we are to have a path, we must accept the foundations on which it rests. Truth must be one universal, harmonious product. The least flaw mars the entire crystal. Conjectures that are not in extension of truths and the realities which contain them are the shreds of clouds.

The practical reason, with Kant, gathers its conclusions close about the moral law, and so breaks ground in the spiritual world. All the motives of experience can be reduced to a pursuit of personal pleasure. But there is in us a moral consciousness which affirms, in the presence of these lower incentives, a universal law, rising above experience for its government. Kant gave this law a threefold expression. Act according to those principles which are fitted to be universal laws; Regard humanity in thyself, in others, as an end, never as a means; Regard the law of action as the general expression of the will of all rational beings. The power of the mind to apprehend a law that rises, in a universal form, above all experience, shows its superiority to experience; that, as noumenon, it gives a law to itself. Strong and admirable as are these assertions of Kant, how much more complete and coherent do they become when the facts on which they rest are recognized as integral parts, with sensuous sensibilities, in one complex experience, constructed under fitting form-elements that define the entire life.

This ethical law, from which there is no appeal to

experience, demands, in its fulfilment as a categorical imperative, three postulates : freedom, immortality, and the being of God. Without freedom; the law is inapplicable; and with the law the will is set free in obedience from the government of the desires. Freedom remains, however, inapprehensible, though we see that it is involved in this assertion by the moral consciousness of a supreme law. If this law is applicable to the spirit, it must be by virtue of the liberty which belongs to the spirit-in-itself. The very presence of the law shows that the spirit is lifted above the government of phenomena, and the empirical principles which prevail in them.

The second postulate is that of immortality. This moral law is incapable of fulfilment within the narrow period of life. We must, therefore, assume a period sufficient to give the law its necessary conditions of action. This must be conceded, if the law is to have its full force as law.

The third postulate is that of the existence of God. Happiness and virtue are not now coincident. They do not run parallel with each other. We are bound under a supreme law to the pursuit of virtue. This involves a greater or less loss of happiness. Virtue is not independent of happiness. It is not so supreme a state as either to be indifferent to happiness, or to command it. Natural law and ethical law ought to concur in conferring happiness on virtue, in making virtue complete in happiness. Virtue, as a supreme law and a supreme good, postulates this ultimate harmony. There must, therefore, be a supreme reconciling power between these two terms, now colliding with each other. There must be a loving intelligence bringing them together in perfect justification of an absolute law.

The acceptance of these postulates Kant regards as a necessary antecedent to an apprehension of the relations of the moral law. They transcend the pure reason, and cannot be proved by it, neither can they be disproved. They are possibilities enclosed in the noumena. As the noumenon, spirit, declares itself in an unempirical, a transcendental, law, in accepting that law we also accept its implications.

The footing of Kant in the Practical Reason is that of the moral law. This he magnifies with the strongest assertion. It is perfect and inviolable. "Two things fill the mind with increasing awe the oftener and the longer we reflect upon them, the starry heavens above and the moral law within." Kant thus wins back, by stanch assertion, in the Practical Reason what he had so needlessly lost in the Pure Reason. These truths, however, suffer the disparagement of being transcendental, of standing in no recognized and harmonious relation with the mass of our convictions. If we choose to take the "Critique of the Practical Reason" at its full value, and restrict thereby the "Critique of the Pure Reason," we shall find ourselves far up on the table-land of rational insight. Experience and faith, the sensuous life and the spiritual life, are more than ever divided from each other by this philosophy. In the one, we pursue a firm, plain path among things, but have no outlook above or beyond them. The mists everywhere lie low on the horizon. In the other we rise above the clouds, we see them beneath us, we breathe the pure air of immense, open spaces, but we cannot connect this vision with what lies beneath it. We conjecture that there is a correspondence. This correspondence becomes with us a hypothesis, but we cannot establish it, much less see it.

One is astonished at these results, so weak, so strong;

so irreconcilable, so undeniable; astonished that a mind, having lost so much, regains so much by a sudden output of spiritual strength. Yet one must feel that, in spite of this recovery, there is here no sufficient philosophy; that our experience cannot be so divided into incommunicable halves. When we find the clews of truth, they run obscurely, it may be, but continuously and firmly, through all phenomena, knitting them together as one integer. The upper air and the air beneath are but the same atmosphere, in which all elements are seeking diffusion.

Kant closely identifies religious duty with moral obligation. As the moral law is the basis of our faith in God, so is it of our duties to God. The divine is expressed in the law which gives us our only secure footing in this transcendental region. In harmony with the wide chasm thus recognized between experience and insight, life and faith, Kant accepts an evil principle, in immediate conflict with the good principle. Virtue thus becomes not so much the subduing of all the powers of mind and body under one law, for their true harmony and strength, as the victory of one portion of a nature, not in keeping with itself, over another portion. That discrepancy of faculties which has found entrance in psychology reappears, in a still stronger form, in the moral world. Yet where does the moral law lie, what is its field of operation? Its lines of order and construction seem to rest on this very sensuous, social experience which is opposed to it. The office of the moral law is to convert this very experience into a gracious spiritual life. The bodily expression of spiritual being must be of this external order.

The practical reason—practical as directing action—turns for its validity on ethical law, and hence on the character and source of that notion. The ethical law is

the *a priori* element in the practical reason, giving form to its conclusions. The principle that each man is so to act that the law of his action may be universal, has the force of an axiom. It is another rendering of the principle, Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you. The only proof these principles require is a clear presentation. There is in them a primitive idea, not present in any other class of propositions. To this idea they owe their force as ethical precepts. The sense of right, of obligation, is something other than simple truth, and separates the precepts of morals from all other forms of law. In this lies the secret of a categorical imperative. If Kant asserts this imperative simply on the authority of the mind itself, he is treating the facts of the practical reason in a way very distinct from his method in pure reason, and one much wiser. If he were to follow that method, he would be compelled to say that this governing notion of right is subjective, a condition put by the mind on the facts before it, and one which expresses nothing, with any certainty, in the real relation of things. But if this is true, then the postulates lose hold of facts; as the law on which they depend weakens into a personal impression. We are still in the same subjective region that made all our reasoning in the pure reason simply formal. We have gained no new footing. If, on the other hand, Kant persists in the assertion that we have, in moral precepts, ultimate and adequate laws of belief and action, then he should carry back a similar affirmation to the convictions of the pure reason. He should accept the authority of those ideas and judgments under which we assert reality and the relations of space and time. He should rectify and enlarge these first processes till they too are valid. The power to reach once the transcendental, and

reason safely concerning it, settles the scope of the mind. All farther theory is merely the wise harmonizing of part with part, power with power.

The boldness of Kant in the Practical Reason and his timidity in the Pure Reason are wholly inconsistent with each other. The two legs of his system are unequal. If one holds stanchly by the one Critique, he is sure greatly to limit the other. The gist of the entire method is not to let one's right hand know what his left hand doeth.

§ 12. Kant's "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" affords another example of a drawn battle between the empirical and the rational tendency. Kant points out the fact that our explanations of the external world assume unity of construction, and are satisfactory only as they arise under an *a priori* conception of harmonious, constructive relations which the mind itself has put upon the phenomena under its consideration. All hypotheses which go before induction are framed under this notion of unity. The extension we at once give to a law which has been established by a very limited number of examples implies an overshadowing sense of construction in the world akin to that of our own intelligence. We seek results under this clew of perfect dependence; we expand them immediately to the full extension of this idea. An *a priori* idea is thus constantly present in induction. To its successful application all science is to be ascribed. It is by virtue of the concurrence of nature with our conceptions of order—conceptions so much broader than any possible sensuous knowledge—that nature meets in us the demands of freedom of thought and becomes a fitting intellectual workshop. So true is this relation of thought to inquiry, that Kant should have felt constrained to carry it much farther, or to have stopped much sooner.

The fact that nature responds through so wide a range to the mind of man should either satisfy us that this coherence is the inner force of realities, the constructive interdependence of the internal and the external, or is due to the entire absence of external realities, the union of conception with conception as homogeneous, subjective products. We have, in this pervasive harmony of results, the essential condition of a universe ; either a universe made up of two equally valid terms in constant and concurrent reaction, or a universe of coherent images.

One of the ways in which, in conformity to the methods of our own intelligence, we must look upon the physical world, is that of final ends. We cannot attain the full sense of unity without it. Especially is this true of all living things. The organized being seems to us to possess in itself formative power, working toward its own well-being. We put the same notion, the same thought-form of the understanding on the world as a whole, especially in its relations to man and to life. What bearing, then, has this teleological determination of thought on its simply causal or mechanical explanations? How can a movement which is impelled from behind be drawn forward in front?

Kant again rests on double and irreconcilable grounds. We cannot assert, he thinks, that all things are explicable by mechanical laws, efficient causes ; nor that the production of all material dependencies is not possible to merely mechanical forces. The two regulative principles of thought must be allowed to act side by side. Natural things and their forms must be regarded as the possible products of mechanical laws. Certain relations of the material require, in their apprehension, another law than that of causality, that of a final end. The connection

between the two transcends our powers. The whole may involve in it and draw with it the parts. We can only conceive the parts as constituting the whole. Here, as elsewhere, there are weakness and conflict in the philosophy of Kant, arising from the fact that he is willing to yield neither to the empirical nor to the intuitional method, and has not fully wrought out the relation between them. He was strong in his assertions and in his masterly efforts to justify them. The reconciliation of the two sets of facts, to each of which he so tenaciously clings, is to be found in shifting form-elements from subjective limitations to the essential and eternal laws of reason itself; and, then, in so extending their number as to include in one whole those of spiritual as well as those of physical phenomena. The harmony of the two, in action and in conception, is a growing product of a rational experience. In the case before us, the whole draws with it the parts by virtue of the forecast of Infinite Reason. The parts unite in and secure the whole, by virtue of the causes and reasons under which they are conjointly wrought out. Causes and reasons interpenetrate each other, neither excludes the other, nor the phenomena therein involved.

It is quite true that, in making this assertion, we project on the world about us and above us our own methods, but these methods are those of knowing. Their essential justness is the postulate on which alone any knowledge, any philosophy, is possible; a postulate, therefore, established by all the accumulations of truth and involved in the validity of every step of inquiry. We ought to alter the above image. We are not projecting forms on a world alien to them; we are finding forms in a world subject to them; receiving them and their contents in a pure, perceptive act. Reason, finite and infinite, is

everywhere one, and shares its methods in common. We have paid no attention to the manner in which these discrepancies of Kant are softened. They are in the fundamental positions of the philosophy, and its influence has turned, in a large measure, upon them. These are the facts in which we are chiefly interested.

§ 13. Kant was a great philosopher by virtue of the comprehensiveness of his system, not by virtue of its sufficiency within itself. All have found something in it which they could heartily accept. The cry, "Back to Kant," after all the vague wanderings of idealism, has had this reason in it: that at this intersection of so many lines of thought more profitable directions of inquiry could be found than those paths actually pursued by the leaders of philosophy. Kant felt many influences, and felt them strongly, and so, in turn, gave occasion to conflicting forms of speculation. The empiricist finds in his assertion of the transcendental character of all spiritual truth, and of the wholly relative character of knowledge, his first principles. Neither need the modern empirical philosophy object to the *a priori* forms of judgments. These are much the same as those instant and instinctive outlines of truth which it itself provides for as the inherited outlines of knowledge. Here are numerous and strong reasons why an empiricist should honor Kant. The idealist finds in Kant an equally fair start and favorable send-off. Drop the unphilosophical and disappointing assertions about things-in-themselves, accept fully the subjective character of all form-elements, allow these to carry with them the subjective nature of realities, and firm ground is won for idealism. Indeed, this is the most immediate and consistent issue of the philosophy of Kant.

The intuitionist, the realist, can, in turn, look for aid

to the "Critique of the Practical Reason." Passing lightly the conflicting theories with which these assertions are associated, he sees in the categorical imperative, and in the postulates which it involves, the essential terms for a spiritual rendering of the world.

No other man in modern philosophy has exerted an influence equal to that of Kant, and chiefly because of this comprehensiveness. Eager as we are in the search of unity, a unity which is attained by narrowing down the problem and omitting leading factors can gain no permanent acceptance. It is of more moment to keep the problem in its entirety before us, than it is to bring to it a solution that suffers the taint of inadequacy. Philosophy and religion need constantly to be reminded of the breadth and variety of the facts they have under consideration. Our conceptions must have elasticity, or they will perish in their very birth. Kant owes his greatness to the fact that so many lines meet in him.

PART II.

IDEALISM IN GERMANY.

§ 14. Nowhere else has idealism played anything like so important a part in philosophy as in Germany. The Germans, obedient to the impulse given in this direction by Kant, have exhausted the possibilities of this form of speculation and tintured all their thinking with idealistic quality. Even their empiricism is not free from it. Idealism was carried rapidly forward to its most complete and elaborate expression by three brilliant thinkers, working one vein of thought in close dependence on each other. Fichte gave impulse to Schelling, and Schelling

to Hegel, while Hegel left the theory in so rarefied and recondite a form that it has come to a halt by virtue of its own tenuity and remoteness from human knowledge. Each of the three held, for a time, a professorship at Jena. By a movement extending through a series of years, they passed over a space which could hardly have been traversed by any one man. The philosophy of each is not so much a position, as a section, in a movement which was completed in the later conclusions of Hegel. No phase of philosophy has involved more subtilty, vigor, and continuity of thought than German idealism, yet none has added more to that reproach which has overtaken metaphysics as a net-work of speculations, which, if they are not altogether unintelligible, are destitute of any practical worth, without verification and alien to all knowledge.

The results of idealism, summed up as a philosophy, turn so entirely on the adequacy of its premises and the correctness of its methods, that we need not go beyond these preliminary steps in assigning its position in the development of thought. Idealism may lead to specific truths of much value by virtue of its astute and coherent processes, but its worth as a philosophy is invalidated at once by an assumption which sets at naught the larger share of experience. In any branch of inquiry, like æsthetics, in which interpretation and insight abound, idealism may yield admirable results, but these go but a little way in justifying it as a philosophy. One may follow, or may excuse himself from following, the obscure and perplexed path by which idealism reaches its more remote conclusions. He may be sure, in either case, that he apprehends, with reasonable correctness, the position it occupies as a speculation. Yet a system which involves

so generous a gymnastic cannot be destitute of valuable results.

It is a fact not a little surprising that philosophy should ever wander in a continuous line so far away from the haunts of mind, and from conclusions capable of incorporating themselves, in a familiar way, with human experience—that experience in which the sensuous and the intellectual constantly illuminate each other. It seems to arise from an antecedent conviction that philosophy is not simply an exploration of the limits of knowledge, but the conversion of knowledge, through its whole extent, into some deeper and more ultimate insight. Ordinary apprehension is regarded as, in some way, superficial and defective, and an effort is made, with no inquiry into its reasonableness, to deepen and transform knowledge within itself into what is termed philosophy. This philosophy consists in the mind's taking from itself the ordinary conditions and postulates of truth, and then restoring them with a more certain and inward apprehension of their very nature. The mind herein deludes itself. All knowledge has its postulates, and these postulates are a portion of its primitive and rational equipment. The mind must consent to begin; and wastes its effort in trying to go back of the beginning.

A kindred disposition is shown when we insist on what we term a scientific method as applicable to every branch of inquiry. Complex things must be known according to their own nature and their own complexity, and not as more mechanical or more simple relations are apprehended. The subject of inquiry defines the method of investigation. Knowledge lies not in reducing distinct relations to one standard, but in accepting them in their diversity. The method, call it scientific or what we please, which

belongs to an investigation of physical facts, is not applicable to an inquiry into mental phenomena. If we limit science in its definition, and then strive to carry it beyond the restricted field which this definition implies, we produce nothing but confusion.

So is it also in philosophy. Philosophy is not a new, another, a deeper, form of knowing; it is simply a clear and consecutive observation of the familiar terms of thought as they lie in experience, and the acceptance of them for what they are. The profundity of philosophy does not consist in finding something deeper than the deepest in experience, but in seeing that the deepest is a necessary and adequate foundation of truth. The light of reason is kindled, not outside the field of knowledge, but inside of it. The mind passes into strength and insight in the fulfilment of its own familiar processes.

In mathematics we deal with pure form-elements; we are able, therefore, to give a demonstrative force to our conclusions which cannot belong to our apprehension of any concrete facts whatever. Philosophy, it is felt, should find similar form-elements, enclosing all truth, and thus impart an absolute character to knowledge. But philosophy is not an inquiry into abstract relations merely, but is also an extended exploration of concrete facts. Its purpose is to see the reconciliation, in our familiar convictions, of all terms of thought, be they sensuous or rational. Its very object is to protect us against a narrow empiricism, on the one side, and a barren exploitation of empty form-elements, on the other. Philosophy is successful only when it contents itself in accepting and defining all the processes of knowledge which come under its observation. If it allows itself to wander far afield, misled by some false notion of the possible and the desirable,

it ceases to be philosophy and becomes speculation, the use of powers when the profitable clews which guide them are gone, the motion of a machine when the material of manufacture is no longer present.

When idealism came to give no value, or gave a factitious one, to half human experience, it became a foregone conclusion, that, lacking the guidance and correction of adequate premises, its results would be remote and illusory. The logical process cannot proceed profitably in pure thought when robbed of the material which fastens it, fills it, and gives to its results the continuity, certainty, and firmness of a closely woven fabric.

The disposition of idealism to frame a technical vocabulary helps it onward in its erratic and visionary development. When science has occasion to deal with distinctions which have not been made, or not been completely made, in ordinary speech, it, of necessity, frames a terminology suited to its purposes. The precision and safety of thought are promoted by its more adequate instrument of expression. The words employed remain explicit and firm in meaning, and identical in use, because there are perfectly definite facts back of them. This method in science seems to promise success to a like effort in philosophy. But the purpose of philosophy is not so much to explore a new territory as it is to define an old one. The powers and processes it has to expound are the familiar ones of psychology; the facts it has to set in order are those which arise in our daily experience, and have been embodying themselves in language from the very beginning. The phenomena to be discussed are not new phenomena, waiting to be disclosed, and when disclosed capable of exact definition; they are those variable facts whose most permanent and exact expression is

found in history and current speech. It is this speech which best measures them. If, in philosophy, a technical vocabulary is introduced, it aids the mind in separating itself from the forms of knowledge which await its exposition. The discussions which arise in it are less readily and constantly referrible, for correction and illustration, to familiar facts. The ideas contained in the novel phraseology become more and more remote from the ordinary activities of thought—the activities which are the only subject-matter of inquiry. The errors of the system hide themselves in its vocabulary, and are extended by means of it; and a coherence of words is more and more mistaken for the correspondences of truth. A reflection of intellectual relations is found in our ingenious travesty of them. The philosophy roots itself in the words, and the words nourish the philosophy. They become the means of a coherent and tripping movement, on the part of those familiar with them, by which they delude themselves and illude others. Remote regions are made habitable to thought by novel expressions, which become at length their indigenous population. Philosophy sinks into a barren propagation of conceptions all its own, and which return with difficulty into the one familiar path of truth for different minds. Philosophy that concerns the common terms of all knowledge ought to be able to express its thoughts concerning them in a familiar way.

§ 15. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1797) was the first of the German idealists. His opinions grew directly out of those of Kant. Previous to coming under the influence of Kant he had adhered to the view of Spinoza, in which extension and thought are regarded as attributes of one substance. The strong distinction which Kant drew be-

tween physical phenomena, as subject to causation, and the personal *ego*, as subject to moral law, drew his eager attention. Herein lay the possibility of a more absolute union of physical and mental facts than that expressed by the doctrine of Spinoza. It was a union, moreover, which exalted the personal element. This fact made it more acceptable to Fichte, with whom moral forces played a supreme part. It was an accepted aphorism with him, "The philosophy one chooses depends on the man he is." Fichte was very ready to escape from the fixed evolution of Spinoza into the liberty of the personal noumenon included in the belief of Kant.

Nor in doing this did he lose the unity of the system of Spinoza. The subjective form of perception involves the entire subjective character of mental phenomena. If the reference we make of external objects to the external world is, in all its concomitants, illusory; if physical phenomena do not prove what they seem to prove, objects measurably like themselves, why should we go beyond the mind for their occasion? Certainly, the first and obvious and inevitable assertion failing, there remains very little to support a reference of physical phenomena to some transcendental noumena. Let these noumena drop away, absorb all phenomena in the personal noumenon, and we attain both unity and liberty. The moral side of Kant's philosophy is saved, and the physical side is included in it. The mind itself gives to itself its apparent limitations in sensuous experience, and perception lies as completely within consciousness as pure thought.

There is, indeed, one most immediate and grave objection to this view, but one which Kant had encountered and greatly reduced to his own mind and the minds of others. The objection is this: we do not and cannot

interpret our daily experience in this subjective fashion. Our convictions arise universally and irrepressibly under a dual form. Sensuous phenomena indicate to us a double activity, and we can no more dispense with external objects than with our own activity in their explanation. Nothing is more deeply rooted in the spontaneous action of mind than this inner and outer reference of our experience. To set aside a conclusion of this order is to allow philosophy to overbear the facts given it to expound; is to place the hypothesis beyond the reach of the phenomena it is brought forward to explain. The common mind thus conceives so instant and instinctive a repulsion to idealism as to preclude its growth. The bulk of our knowledge involves the reality of things, and arises from searching them out as we find them to be. No man understands a quartz crystal, a rose, a robin as something "posited" by himself. The assertion seems ridiculous to him. All their specific qualities give flat contradiction to it. His own creations in imagination are of another order, quite. The methods of acquiring knowledge impart no color to idealism.

Urgent and insuperable as this difficulty seems, Kant had greatly weakened its force by affirming the subjective character of all form-elements. This assertion cut off the connection, the interpreting relation, between phenomena and things-in-themselves. If phenomena in no way define noumena, how can noumena determine phenomena? The causal relation, having lost its qualitative force, can hardly serve any definite purpose whatever. Failing in the one direction to determine the sensuous nature of the impression, it may well enough fail in the other direction to determine the reality of the object. If the cause does not guarantee the effect, the effect cannot guarantee the

cause. Kant, indeed, held fast to an external reality as the ground of our common, sensuous experience ; but this reality became a loose, factitious element, because it stood in no connection with the phenomena referred to it. Primary and secondary qualities alike were wholly mental experiences, and left the noumena airy nothings, afloat in the world of conjecture. Fichte thus not only found much of the labor in preparation for idealism performed, but that the coherence of logical method demanded its completion. He proceeded at once to fully open the door which stood ajar, and so we have, in German philosophy, that wonderful exposition of the possibilities of idealism. Yet, from the outset, we feel that the conditions of sound and sufficient knowledge are wanting, and that all achievement will be of the nature of a feat confined to a single person, and which cannot perpetuate itself. No subtilty within the system can cure the inadequacy of its premises. The motive that led Kant to retain noumena, the need of common ground for a conjoint movement of diverse minds, remained a controlling consideration in shaping the successive phases of idealism. Idealism recognized, more and more, one absolute, comprehensive movement.

The individual ceases to be the measure of things, and is taken up, as a single beam of light, into the ocean of light that fills the spiritual concave. The waves that break on this particular beach are only one expression of the universal tide. The relation of the particular and the general is, indeed, obscure, but is not suffered, as an empirical difficulty, to stand across the path of wide-sweeping and universal thought. The personal, in intellectual movement, is constantly subordinated to the impersonal. The latter gives rise to the former, rather

than the former to the latter. This is the result of an oversight of consciousness as the exclusive form-element of intellectual phenomena.

§ 16. When philosophy is supposed to consist in the discovery of primitive truths or principles, which can be traced through all the growth of knowledge, it necessarily lays great stress on monism. Monism is closely connected with any scheme of philosophy which undertakes to bring the guiding light of a few distinct ideas to every process of thought; as single axioms interlace all mathematical proof.

Fichte started with Kant in the unity and liberty which belong to mind in its higher, transcendental action. It sees, seeks, and feels a concurrence of relations, which is the ground and motive of all thought. The steps by which this unity of consciousness is developed are three. The *ego* first posits itself. Consciousness carries with it the identity of the *ego* as disclosed in its own states. The *ego* then posits, in distinction from itself, the *non-ego*. The sensuous material of this *non-ego* is given by the mind itself. The mind posits its own products as a *non-ego*. The mind thus opposes these changeable, divisible impressions to its own unchangeable, indivisible being. The *ego*, whose being is involved in and limited by its own experiences, is each man's personality. The *ego* first reached in simple consciousness is, as yet, impersonal. Its personality is expressed in that completed experience in which it finds itself at work under conditions assigned by the *non-ego*. The ultimate idea towards which personality is moving is reason, reconciled in both its terms, subjective and objective, in its inner law and actual experience under that law. Fichte thus takes the complex experience of man, assumes it as in the highest sense all

his own, and then proceeds to treat it under its various relations. The subjective and objective remain, though greatly softened down in force. In the earlier philosophy of Fichte, the law of development is from a relative and personal form to a more absolute and impersonal one. In this scheme he found no place for God, save as the universal moral force involved in the entire movement. The vigor of his moral conviction found expression in a comprehensive growth under a universal law that thoroughly harmonizes the *ego* with itself.

Later, Fichte moved forward toward the position taken by Schelling. The need of a wider unity was felt than can accompany personal development. The Absolute became the primary idea. God alone is truly existent. The threefold expression takes place in him, and the development of all rational life is found in communion with him. Thus the separation of individual lives and the want of any common consciousness are in a measure overcome, and we reach the assertion, applied in a transcendental way: We live and move and have our being in God.

The use of such a word as *posits* marks the illusion which attends on a technical scheme. The mind perceives, reflects, infers; it does not posit, as an act distinct from any and all of these. None of these words can take the place of the new term, because they bear the mind back to familiar things which fail to cover the form of action expressed in the word *posit*. *Positing* is a sort of laying the foundation-stones of being, when the mind is the sole architect of its intellectual structures. It covers a transcendental idea very helpful to a transcendental philosophy. It secures a notion distinct enough to be made a stepping-stone in thought, and remote enough to escape

the contradictions and corrections of experience. Words thus take on an elasticity which makes them the convenient instruments of a new method.

§ 17. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775) was closely united to Fichte. Fichte and Spinoza furnished the ideas which he developed in his "System of Identity." He identified matter and mind in the Absolute, but he identified them under the idealistic conception of them offered by Fichte, as object and subject. They are not, as with Spinoza, inseparable attributes of one being, but distinctions evolved in the activity of one being. An original unity passes into two forms of expression, the positive or ideal, the negative or real. The positive pole is spirit, the negative pole is nature. The ruling conception of philosophy, as a rendering of the necessary genesis of things, was strong in the mind of Schelling. It assumes two forms, a tracing of the passage of nature into intelligence and of intelligence into nature. The first effort issues in speculative physics, the second in transcendental philosophy. In physics, we trace the objective as it gives occasion to the subjective and rises into it. In metaphysics, we trace the objective as it springs from the subjective, the truly productive force of the universe. The objective and subjective hold each other in poise, and sustain each other as correlative parts of one process. The entire effort of science is to permeate physical facts with intelligence. It is successful in the degree in which this is accomplished. Matter as matter is simply extinct mind. The processes of nature rise, as they advance, more and more distinctly, as in man, into conscious intelligence. All the forces of the universe are reducible into ideal relations. History is a progressive revelation of the Absolute. God is not visible in any one

act. He is disclosed only in the historic growth of events, that movement in which the conscious and the unconscious separate themselves more perfectly, and more perfectly reflect each other. Single intelligences are integrant parts in this moral order, which goes on to complete itself in the harmony of the objective and subjective, the fixed and the free. There have been three periods in history—the revelation of the Absolute—the period of fate, of nature, and of providence. What is first regarded as fate comes to be conceived as nature, and gives rise to the mastery incident to obedience to law. Later, nature is accepted as providence, the revelation of the all-comprehensive intelligence. Final causes are an expression of the harmony which belongs to intelligence in its full unfolding. In the entire movement there is “one force, one changing play, one interweaving of forces, one bent, one impulse toward ever-higher life.” Complete intelligence does not so much anticipate the movement as arise from it. Nature was regarded by Schelling as the unconscious expression of spirit, the same spirit whose activity we apprehend in consciousness. The soul of the world is struggling on toward a complete expression and knowledge of itself. Spirit, on the other hand, in full self-consciousness, finds itself dealing with things in their unconscious and necessary action. It harmonizes its action with them under the scheme of teleology and of art. Nature is thus moving toward intelligence, and intelligence toward a more perfect mastery of nature. The Absolute, from which this double movement springs, was with Schelling little more than a point of indifference from which the two tendencies, expressed in nature and in spirit, take their rise. It thus subserved no real purpose of explanation, and gave no substantial unity. The

mind simply played with the Absolute as a notion of God which had lost all definite content.

The affinity of idealism with moral insight was observed in Fichte, its affinity with artistic penetration is apparent in Schelling. The conscious and the unconscious, form and substance, find complete union in the beautiful thing. Our apprehension of this relation is our apprehension of beauty. The conceptions of Schelling were so wholly speculative and personal that he was not able to bind them fast as a philosophy. Gathering his ideas from many quarters, he passed on toward mysticism, and so discredited his more sober expression by forsaking it. It is the nemesis of idealism that its successive phases, like the steps of one wandering amid drifting snows, obliterate and obscure each other, and no more leave a path behind them than they pursue one before them. The fascination of idealism is the range and scope and constructive force it gives to ideas. Its weakness is that it so obscures the deep division between the unconscious and the conscious; so unites the regal, exclusive movement of mind in its own clear light of reason with the progress of events along the blind trail of causes, so identifies the person before the glass with the image in the glass, that our thoughts lose all distinctions, stoop from their high point of observation, and go drifting before the wind. There is no clear vision till we recognize consciousness as the sole medium of mind.

§ 18. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770) united his philosophy, in turn, directly to that of Schelling. He modified its fundamental idea, and then gave it a much more systematic, comprehensive, and productive statement. Hegel approved the philosophy of Schelling in that it concerned itself with things, and assumed a more

concrete form. In spite of his extreme idealism, Hegel entertained some very positive, realistic tendencies, and brought his methods to the discussion of the problems of history, society, and art. Schelling's philosophy was a system of identity. It turned on a double movement in nature and in spirit, interpreting each other. Hegel rejected this double movement as inadequately united in the Absolute. He sought for the two some more single and sufficient source. He found this in pure thought. All interpretation, all reality, are associated with thought. Without thought there can be no reality. Thought is the primary term in all movement, the "idea," "the dialectic idea," from which all things proceed. In absolute knowledge, thought and being are recognized as identical. The rational is real and the real is rational.

But this free, primitive thought, from whose activity all things spring, which lies at the basis of the material and the spiritual world, is not a product of consciousness, it is rather a potentiality whose highest manifestation is to be found in the philosophic consciousness. Thought, not necessarily conscious in its progress, completes itself in this grasp of its own entire method of development. Its principal stages are consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, ethical action, religion, absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge lies in tracing this path of development. The unconscious forms of thought underlie its conscious forms, and find their highest expression in them. Thought, the one productive process capable of this double expression, takes the place of the Absolute in the system of Schelling. The Absolute of Hegel is the rhythmical movement of thought in which God unfolds himself. God stands revealed in the very organism of thought, in the "idea," in nature and in mind. The

world is understood as a process. Evolution is an evolution of thoughts, not of things. Thoughts are things. The dogmatic disposition, first in order, frames a narrow, exact statement of truth, and enforces it as final. Then comes scepticism, with more inquiry, more insight, and denies, point by point, the sufficiency and applicability of dogmatic formulæ.

The process of reconciliation is the work of philosophy, and involves the interpretation of the world as a growing, changeable product of thought, to be grasped, not statically, but dynamically, as that which is constantly becoming other and more than it is. Idealism carries this view of unfolding truth as a perpetual flow of thought, a stream that becomes more and more transparent by its own movement, to its utmost terms. We look on the physical world as we might look on a river, beating against the rocks that fill its channel and retard it. The first impression is one of stable relations, remaining much the same, no matter how long contemplated. This is the sensuous aspect of facts. The least effort at comprehension alters the conception. In the world at large, as in the running brook, our sensations are renewed every moment. They are simply symbolical terms which lead us to the energies and dependencies by which we are encompassed—which are open to our thought. The moment we launch out on these intellectual connections we leave the sensuous terms behind us. The significance of events is not in them. We find ourselves dealing with rational terms which glide one into another by virtue of sequences, living only in the mind. When one speaks, the words are set afloat in the intellectual world by the buoyant force of thought, and are nothing without it. The stream on which the eye first rests as a mobile, in-

deed, yet well-defined, fact becomes a complicated interplay of forces, uniting things near and remote, and, under apparent sameness of phenomena, expressing ever-renewed and ever-changeable energies. Idealism, by drawing attention at once to the flow of events which involve all the relations of reason, penetrates to the substance of things, and evolves whatever intellectual life they contain. How great soever its defects, it is always a relief to turn to idealism from a superficial tracing of phenomena which leaves the thought-processes involved in them undisclosed. If sensuous impressions are not the instant product of the thought which floats them, it is far more stimulating so to regard them, than to accept their inner force as a slow evolution of their outer form.

Idealism, as unfolded by Hegel, has been a powerful and fascinating philosophy, because of the supremacy it gives to rational relations, because of the breadth and insight with which it traces them under so many forms of facts, and because of an inner coherence and fidelity to itself by which it holds fast to the methods it has once laid down. The comprehensiveness which gave weight to the philosophy of Kant involved inconsistency and contradiction. The comprehensiveness of Hegel, though attended with much obscurity, arose from one fundamental idea, broadly applied. The strength of the system lies in the vigor with which it lays hold of the true significancy of the world, its revelation of rational relations; and its weakness, in the method in which it dwarfs and obscures the permanent way-marks of truth, and so makes its own path private, dark, remote, inaccessible as a highway for man. The sensuous world, no more than language, can be regarded as the immediate product of the thought that expounds it. Much less can reason be

given an unconscious, impersonal form, and still be made to retain its own living energy. Whatever we impart by this method to that below, we take from that above. Reason must forever retain its own inner, conscious coherence, or it brings no light, and stands in no affiliation with the mind of man. Phenomenal terms may disclose very much to us, but their disclosure all lies in leading us to pure, rational relations other than, and deeper than, themselves. This is our experience, and we cannot interpret experience by a law new to it.

The Absolute of Hegel was not the personal Absolute of faith, but that background of reality which underlies the rhythmic unfolding of thought, is fully contained in it and expressed by it. It is not a higher, deeper consciousness enclosing all, and pushing all forward, but only the sense of reality by which we buoy up the process itself—a form, a movement which is coming into the light, rather than one coming out of it.

Hence a portion of Hegelians—"the Left"—rejected the Absolute of Hegel. The universe is to be regarded only as a series of relations, the products of philosophic thought. Under this rejection, the universe either shrinks back again into a personal experience, and philosophy retreats on Fichte; or the physical universe, conceded substantial being, becomes the germ of intellectual life, passing by development from the unconscious to the conscious, mounting up by steps of organic life into philosophy.

A difficulty with idealism is that it essays to start without a starting-point. Its first step must be as intelligible as its second and third, and hence it recognizes no Absolute that rises above and beyond the universe. Its Absolute is only another name for the universal, philosophic process. Whenever the understanding stops weaving,

and wishes to attach its web, it is wholly at a loss ; for the fundamental conception of the movement is that it shall accept no first terms. It can occupy itself only with an eternal regress and progress of logical implications. Hegelianism seemed successful so long as it confined itself to the flow of thought. The moment it was asked to give conditions to that which had been accepted as unconditional and absolute, it had nothing satisfactory to say. It was bound to a process, and to that process it must adhere. All ulterior purposes and anterior reasons must sink into the movement itself. Simple movement, without a whence or a whither, a why or a wherefore, must satisfy us. The particularity of things is swallowed up in their generality. We may navigate the stream at liberty, but we must not ask to land. Landing is limitation, the weakness of thought, not its strength ; the cutting short of philosophy, not its extension. It is not easy to create a grander intellectual world, nor yet a more homeless and unreal one, one better fitted for restless and peremptory thought, and less well fitted for the affections of men—so readily wearied, so suppliant of shelter—than this system of Hegel. The logical processes submerged the perceptions, and then swept, like a universal flood, over the face of the whole earth.

§ 19. The step with which Hegel traversed the universe of pure thought, whose highways had been thrown up along the lines of evolution from the beginning, was always one of triplets. This movement he caught from Schelling, Fichte, and Kant, though he gave peculiar force and precision to it. It became with him the inevitable *a priori* gait of the mind. Kant had introduced the triadic law, the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in connection with the categories. Thus we have, under quality, in its exposi-

tion, reality, negation, limitation. The limits are a synthesis of affirmation and negation, inclusion and exclusion, in a definite proposition. Definition is the first step in logic, and this triadic law expresses in it its purely formal movement. The positive apprehension in which the reality lies, the opposition which this implies to things unlike it, the union of the two in discriminating statement, together constitute definition, definiteness of idea, an idea in its relations.

This formal movement, under which discrimination goes forward, Hegel carries very ingeniously, and at times instructively, into all fields of inquiry, as the universal norm. Thus pure activity in consciousness gives us sensations, internal states; these in their limitations and relations lay down for us the external world; the two, reunited, issue in completed thought. The three corresponding powers are sense, understanding, and reason. The equivalent forms of knowledge are logic, science, and philosophy. In logic, the incipient idea is that of being. This separates itself from non-being; the two unite in the notion of becoming. In the philosophy of mind, mind, in its subjective aspect, gives us psychology, anthropology; in its objective characteristics, ethics, jurisprudence; in the resumption of the two, religion, philosophy. While these triple dependencies, everywhere underlying each other, stand out at times with clearness, at other times they need the aid of a constructive imagination, making the most of the slightest hints of form. Hegel, having so definite a mould in which to render the facts, gave them, occasionally, an extension to suit the exigencies of the method. Logic becomes with him a more comprehensive department than it ordinarily is. Philosophy ceases to be a broad presentation of knowledge, in the relation of its

several parts to each other and in their dependence on the powers of the mind, and becomes an ingenious application of fixed formulæ to physical and intellectual phenomena. In spite, therefore, of occasional suggestiveness, the movement tends to increasing weariness and barrenness. The rigidity of a logical process takes the place of the freshness, multiplicity, and variety of things and events. The form-elements become more and more formal, and we at length drag our net in empty waters.

§ 20. Idealism, as a system of philosophy, culminated in Hegel. It has taken on, since his time, no new phase of power, and has hardly retained its old strength. However much a few patient disciples may be fascinated with the joint simplicity and obscurity of Hegelianism, it makes no way as a branch of knowledge. How is it that so much ingenuity and insight give rise to a theory so empty of all substantial acquisition? A leading reason is an antecedent misapprehension of the purpose of philosophy. Its real purpose is to run out the boundaries of truth, and to find the title-deeds of each portion of its territory. It is a science of discovery, not of invention. The impression which gives rise to a speculation, like Hegelianism, is something very different from this. It is that all the terms and starting-points of knowledge can be fully penetrated by reason, made equally transparent under the light of philosophy. Thus the mind struggles to carry the force of necessary principles to all departments of inquiry. Such an effort can only issue in an airy oversight of facts here, in a dreamy expansion of notions there, and in distortion almost everywhere. Simply because our senses give us their own opaque data, these data can neither be altered nor dispensed with, in the precise form in which they are rendered. To sweep through

all facts with a reasoning process, is to sweep over and trample under foot the larger share of them. All that sound philosophy can do is to accept each and every faculty in the full contribution which it makes to our intellectual wealth. Empiricism retains its power of resistance to a method which, rendering some of the relations of knowledge, is not able to fill in the meagre outline with the specific qualities and minute features of that world of realities which sustains our intellectual steps. Idealism and empiricism are opposed errors. Idealism gives philosophy a range impossible to it. It fails of intelligible results. Empiricism turns to observation. It forgets, or inadequately treats, the expository ideas which accompany all its inquiries. It even goes so far as to deny, in their higher forms, the validity of those explanatory processes which hold all the light of thought. It is ready to overlook the infinite radiation of intelligence, and to shut in the spiritual world by a wall of its own construction, as if it were a garden of herbs. Sound thought is equally removed from both methods. It accepts sense, it accepts insight, and unites the two in a glowing landscape, palpitating with revelation.

Idealism easily issues in weakening what it has undertaken to magnify. We quite assent to the integrity and scope of reason, its perfect coherence within itself, as asserted by Hegel. Yet the philosophy of Hegel hardly assigns reason its true strength. Reason, under the evolution of events, is rising into the light, rather than abiding in the light. Light is not forever streaming from it, but is by an obscure method slowly derived from it. The reason of men has range, not because it is moving in infinite, open spaces of intelligence, but because it itself is the highest revelation of the inner idea, the most dis-

tinct striking of truth into the light. The Infinite Reason, as revelation, is to be found in us and beyond us, not around us and behind us. The mind is not resting, with level wing, on an atmosphere of wisdom, it is feeling the inflation of a little wind, begotten in its own growth. The mind gladly escapes from so thin and rarefied a medium, back again to a universal air, compacted throughout by the superincumbent pressure of divine thought. A true anthropomorphism is refreshing after the vain beating about of a disembodied spirit. The universality we would affirm of reason is not a monopoly of the human mind, but a full participation of man in the forms of thought as they lie traced for us in the universe of things, not themselves visions, but words articulated in truth and articulating truth—the overflow of Infinite Reason. We are glad to walk in a way blazed for us through the boundless stretch of created things. A mistaken notion of philosophy issues in expecting of thought impossible things. The impossible, illuding us, leaves us weaker than we really are. Striving to know more than we can, we come to know less than we might. Agnosticism is the downfall of idealism.

A second reason why these astonishing excursions of speculation are possible is that they start in oversight of the first truths of experience, and so do not feel their restraint. German philosophy is full of the notion that there are unconscious and conscious movements in thought, essentially one in kind. The evolution of events is with Hegel an evolution of reason, as certainly as is the succession of thoughts in consciousness. Here—in a fundamental division of experience is set aside without proof and without clearness of conception. Consciousness is the one exclusive and universal form-element of thought,

and thought the sole activity of reason. A thought without this condition of consciousness is as foreign to experience as a force that has no centre or lines of action in space. Neither finds any hint of interpretation in observation. The flowing together of the conscious and the unconscious in philosophy obliterates, in advance, the shore-lines of phenomena, and leaves the whole outlook one of shifting and interchangeable parts. We have lost the fundamental distinction on which our entire experience rests. This taken away, exposition and apprehension perish with it. If we cannot discriminate between a movement in things and a coherence in thought, between the links of reason that can abide only in the light, and the connection of physical events that have in them no touch of comprehension, we have lost sight of the widest distinction in inner nature and outward development that belongs to knowledge. All minor shades of confusion become unimportant, and wholly impotent in checking the career of speculation. Our philosophy opens its effort by utterly confounding the terms of knowledge, not by explaining or justifying them. No matter in how many ways spiritual energies and physical forces interact; no matter how long may be the lines along which they skirt each other, they are the most incomparable and eternally distinct of all objects of thought.

Closely allied with this confusion of first terms is the effort to give philosophy the form of monism. Unity of relation is displaced by oneness of nature. If we were to reach the monism of which this inquiry is in search, we should find ourselves hopelessly imprisoned in it, unable to escape thence into the largeness and variety of the universe. In the physical world, even, we are less and less attaining oneness of substance, singleness of nature.

Fundamental diversities are as much a condition of unity as complete concurrence in constructive relations. Unity is the product of reason, the relations of thought expressed in the simple and the manifold. The dualistic form of the world is but the first branching of energies which are to ramify into the distinct parts and portions of the universe. Philosophy has either confused the division between matter and mind, or given it an absolute depth wholly fanciful—a depth which cannot belong to it, as the two run parallel in momentary interaction through the whole sweep of being. It is an equally fatal error either to break the universe asunder along this plane of cleavage, or to allow these distinctions of thought to lapse again, as poles in a galvanic circuit not yet active. We must accept first terms at their true value, if our later results are to show any intelligible correspondence with the facts. Monism is a reduction of the conditions of comprehension, not an extension of them in that circuit by which they return into each other.

The result of the effort of German philosophy, since the time of Spinoza, to attain monism, has been a constant sinking of reason at its very centre, a loss of any real Absolute, a personal, typical consciousness of truth. With Kant, the affirmation of a Divine Being is transcendental. We cannot practically escape the assertion, but we cannot rationally verify it. Fichte, in striving to trace individual development, had but a secondary hold on the Absolute. The Absolute of Schelling is but a vague point of departure for nature and spirit. The Absolute of Hegel is hardly more than another term for an endless process. Monism, in raising matter toward mind, correspondingly depresses mind toward matter, till the two meet under conditions true to neither. Thus the fundamental im-

pulse which impels us into philosophy, the desire to put a sufficient reason back of things, is sacrificed to philosophy, and we are compelled, in one way or another, to accept the movement of events as its own explanation. We are as busy as ants in running backward and forward, but the onlooker can tell neither what we are pursuing nor what we have attained. The waters which, previous to our inquiry, seemed to spring up, like those of a fountain, at one centre, fed by a higher source, slowly subside under our speculation to a uniform level, and are expanded as a self-contained pool whose currents, whatever they may be, are referrible to nothing beyond itself. We start with the notion of a true Absolute. We end by finding it in the finite, and so our philosophy sinks back into itself, with nothing to show but a generative process. Better far to remain at the advent of effort, aspiring to belief, than to drop into the repose of weariness, our only sufficient reason being the insufficiency of reason itself, its hopeless return on its own steps. This sentiment may not seem to apply to the philosophy of Hegel. Yet, after infinite activity, which we mistake for satisfying labor, we are left to fill ourselves with the wind of our own motion, to rest in a process, to cradle ourselves to sleep with the restless rhythm of waves that beat upon no shore. There is only one conception which lifts itself sufficiently above the mind to give it true repose, that of Infinite Reason, in the clear light of whose gracious purposes all movements can go forth and return.

Idealism, notwithstanding the immense intellectual activity elicited by it, fails at once under the clear and pungent demand for fruit, as the sole adequate test of speculation. When we accept mental sagacity as its own reward, we are shortly left without even this recompense. Idealism makes important contributions to philosophy,

but, as itself a philosophy, it wins and retains no ground. It does not annex itself to knowledge, in direct and certain expansion of it. As a tendency, it helps to hold empiricism in check. The two constitute the balancing-pole with which the mind maintains its equilibrium, and saves itself from falling into the gulf of nescience, as it pursues its narrow and tremulous path across the abyss. Opposite as they are to each other, idealism and empiricism are more nearly allied than is either of them to realism. A little excess on this or that side leads instantly to the opposite conclusion. Empiricism often leaves the mind too little power to pronounce on the reality of the external world, and so locks it up in its own impressions. Idealism, unable to give sufficient sweep to the net of thought to enclose physical facts, accepts these facts as themselves a portion of the unconscious products of mind. If we start in the direction of materialism, we lift, for the ends of exposition, physical processes into mental ones ; if we turn toward idealism, we are constantly tempted to depress mental activity, till it can be made to cover physical connections. In either case, the two terms approach each other, and are lost to the vision of experience in that region of chimeras, the unconscious. This becomes, in either theory, the unexplored land whence flow all our streams of thought, whether, in the end, they turn to the right or turn to the left.

There are two ultimate and inescapable terms of knowledge, phenomena and the ideas under which they are rendered in reason. When empiricism exaggerates the one, idealism, in reaction, exaggerates the other, and so by the rhythm of a sinking and rising movement the mind wings its way.

The purely speculative and tentative character of ideal-

ism is shown in the fact that it retains no one position, but is in perpetual transfer from position to position. Each succeeding form grows out of the previous one, but with such irregularity and detachment as to leave no common and symmetrical axis. Its most continuous development lies between Kant and Hegel. Idealism can do no better than to hold fast, with expansion and correction, where Hegel left off. Yet Hegelianism rendered the systems behind it little more than dry pith, and began at once to yield its own substance to a like free and sporadic growth. The idealistic materialism spoke most contemptuously of the work of Hegel, while itself expressing one impulse of the general movement.

This changeableness of a phase of thought shows conclusively that the star which guides it has not yet settled down over the birthplace of truth. Our conceptions of truth are, indeed, as Hegel apprehended them, shifting ones. We hold fast spiritual truth, not with a close, suffocating grasp, but with an open, gentle hand, which allows all processes of change to proceed as if we were dealing with a sensitive, living thing. There lies between the penetrative, emotional, mobile mind and the revealing fact a living pulsation, which makes their ministration to each other reciprocal and vital. But this amplification, in which the power of truth lies, is not an aimless one, leaving nothing behind it, securing nothing before it. It is rather a series of dissolving views which, on the same canvas, rehearses a steady flow of events, in close relation either way. Idealism is not condemned because it shifts its ground constantly, but because there is no continuity in its successive stages, no conquered territory in its several positions. There is flux, not growth, a pursuit of a purpose which refuses to be achieved.

Idealism readily affiliates with ethical, æsthetic, and religious ideas. These ideas have, in a high degree, the expansive and propagatory power which characterizes the methods of idealism. Hegel was preëminently religious in his bent of thought. God was with him the "category of categories—the subject of all absolute predicates." But there lies against his philosophy the same objection which, for a kindred reason, presses upon that of Spinoza. He retains words from which he has eliminated the familiar meaning. The idea, the thought-process, the movement of reason within itself, is identified with God. Men, rising gradually, in being and knowledge, into the light of consciousness, are organic with this one self-contained idea, with God. The immanence of God means not so much his spiritual omnipresence as the identity of God with each and all the movements of intelligence. Though we have the same number of counters given us as of old, when we come to reckon them up we find that they stand for very different values.

This philosophy may wish to retain, and may employ language which does retain, the personality of God and man, but the very conception of personality, and of its relation to reason, is profoundly altered. Reason, under the view prompted and confirmed by experience, inheres in clear, conscious intelligence, the only expression of personality. Personality is not the product of reason, reason is the activity of personality, moving, with inherent insight, in the one spiritual realm of conscious, reflective life. God is not, therefore, an idea, a process, an expression of reason; he is personality, a spiritual productive power lying back of all these.

If we restore God, in thought, to this his position of creative comprehending intelligence, then the philosophy

as one of idea, as the organic unfolding of reason within itself, disappears. We cannot content ourselves with a process, we have sought and found a person. We stand before the clear, impelling eye of pure insight. We are back on the basis of God and man and the world which lies between them, no longer as phases of a necessary evolution, but as definite points and productive powers in a spiritual universe.

Thus, while the Hegelian who has more of the temper of the master may magnify personality and closely adhere to the familiar terminology of the intellectual world, the colder and more critical disciple quietly deals with the simple, self-sustained movement of the idea, and sweeps before it, as if it were a veritable deluge, all our familiar conceptions.

In proportion as Hegelianism is a final philosophy, it alters the nature and relations of what we term personality; in the degree in which it retains these, does it lose its peculiar scope as a theory of the universe.

Hegel encounters, in common with all idealists, the difficulty which lay in the path of Fichte, the difficulty of saving the particular and yet reaching the general. It is not the empirical *ego*, protests Fichte, that is the source of the world, but the transcendental *ego*, holding both the finite and the infinite in its essential nature. But what is this supreme *ego*, and what its relation to the poor, empirical *ego* which is our sole term of interpretation? In answering these questions, we shall engulf the world with all its beauty of particulars in a universal of which we have only the most evanescent and visionary notions. If we must lose either, let us lose, with the empiricist, the underlying power, and not, with the idealist, the vision definite, clear, and divine, of the universe about us. We

can more readily climb from things to thoughts, than we can descend from thoughts to things. If we are to be put off with a process, let it be the sensuous process of the universe and not the fanciful process of a single philosopher. Let us, in keeping with the order of events, first plant our feet, and then our thoughts, on the firm earth.

Our knowledge is made up of two incommensurable terms, the sensuous and the rational. The rational penetrates and interprets the sensuous; the sensuous contains, expresses, and holds firm the rational. The polarity of our knowledge is akin to the polarity of the mind itself as perceptive and interpreting power. While these two movements of mind are inseparable from each other, as much so as form and idea, if we wish to rank them in reference to each other, we must find the true constructive energy in the rational rendering process.

Herein lay the merit of Hegel. He gave his attention—by far too exclusive attention—to the rational relations which impart coherence and substance to knowledge. He absorbed the sensuous symbol in the idea which gives it significance. He thus in the end weakened the idea itself, which cannot hold on its way without the symbols which direct and steady its steps. We cannot follow art without workmanship. The lines of our geometrical figure are no part of the demonstration, but the demonstration cannot proceed without them. The mind cannot lose sight of the symbols which it is to render in terms of reason, and retain the reasoning process. The path of reason must be beaten by its own footsteps. Schelling's assertion concerning Hegel was fatal: "His philosophy is a succession of metaphors."

The successes of Hegel were achieved in fields where

the ruling idea is of preëminent moment, and the phenomena under it changeable and readily supplied. Where the symbols are definite, minute, final, as in physical inquiry, his philosophy had not much to say. In art, history, religion, his insight was more fruitful.

His dialectic was a kind of logic, rendering intellectual relations in an abstract form. We see this in his apothegms. What is real is rational. What is rational is real. The intelligible is the real. The truth of necessity is liberty. There is a vivid flash of light in these assertions, but they give us no one definite exposition. They express the most general relation of the constructive thought to all its manifold symbols. They overpower for the moment the sense of variety and independence in things, with a sense of the one office of expression they render to ideas. Thus necessity, it is said, must be the product of and expounded by the antecedent liberty of thought.

Yet you must pass from maxims like these to the details of experience or they remain unfruitful. You have received a certain impulse, but the impulse does not carry you on your way. A prophetic, intellectual force attaches itself to a bold spirit, like that of Hegel, but the moment the weary march of progress is renewed, the moment our prayer is, Give us this day our daily bread, our prophet leaves us, and our labor returns to us on the old, familiar hard terms.

PART III.

IDEALISTIC MATERIALISM.

§ 21. As so many are restless under the adjective materialistic, and as it so rarely applies in its full force to

any system, it is well to draw attention once more to the fact that materialism, empiricism, is a thing of many degrees. While fully developed materialism involves the assertion that intellectual and physical phenomena belong to the same series, of which material connections are the type, there are many conclusions which stop short of this statement, and yet are in line with it. Any philosophy which finds its primary, interpreting idea in material dependencies, which extends the law of causation to intellectual relations, is materialistic in its tendency. In rendering the universe, it is losing balance on the physical side.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788) adopted the fundamental notion of Kant, the subjective character of the forms of thought, but regarded the idealism of Hegel as an unintelligible and preposterous speculation. Yet his method is not wholly unlike that of Hegel. The philosophy of Hegel lies in tracing the "idea," as a pure development of thought. Schopenhauer puts will in place of idea, allies it with force, and then follows this development of energy as offered in the world of realities, in place of the development of thought in the world of ideas.

Schopenhauer was strongly idealistic. He opened his philosophy with the assertion, The world is my notion ; Things are objects of knowledge only by the relations we put upon them ; There is no object without a subject. We are not, however, with Fichte, to derive the objective from the subjective. The subjective presupposes the objective, and the law of causation under which we construct our knowledge is the universal law of things. That which is the innermost essence of things, the one pervasive noumenon, is will. The will is known by us, in our own experience, in its inner energy as well as in its outer

forms. We here apprehend directly the mystery of the production of effects by causes. The will interprets to us all forces. The forces of the world should be regarded as identical with will.

Schopenhauer is materialistic in his philosophy, because will, first recognized as a causal agent in ourselves, is traced by him as the one supreme source of all events. The lower expressions of will are physical forces. Higher manifestations are those of the organic world. Will, in every form of life, is striving to assert itself, to secure a correspondence between the organism and its circumstances. Psychical states come forward as an incident of this effort. In automatic action the impulse accomplishes its object perfectly. Consciousness arises when the impulse is ineffectual in reaching its end. When the stimulus is again effective, consciousness disappears. Habit and association take its place. Thus the mind, in its unfolding, rests on the nervous, automatic action which underlies it. His psychology is of the empirical cast, rendered in terms of evolution. His philosophy, in spite of its origin in idealism, is a retreat from the reason, as giving the terms of comprehension, and an assimilation of mental processes to antecedent physical activities.

Schopenhauer was a pessimist. He looked upon life as a futile struggle of the will, always lamentable, often horrible. Art brings consolation because in it we cease to search into things in this stress of strife, and contemplate each object in itself. We thus reach the idea which lies back of a work of art, and are no longer tortured by the unattainable in experience. Will asserts itself as a blind impulse to live. It pushes relentlessly against the obstacles and evils which oppose it. An ethical temper puts us in sympathy, through the whole range of human

life, with the suffering and sorrow of this growing and futile effort. The highest ethical attainment is the reduction of evil by the reduction of the will to live. In rising out of life, and leaving it behind us, we reach Nirvana.

The philosophy of Schopenhauer made very little way during his life. Later, it commanded some attention, but it is not sufficiently systematic, or closely enough united to any prevailing tendency, to gain any considerable footing. Its chief office was a protest against the extreme speculative elements in the philosophy of Hegel. Schopenhauer seems to have entertained great dislike to Hegel, possibly enhanced by the overshadowing influence of Hegel, and his own ill success as private lecturer in the University of Berlin. The tide of pure idealism was too strong for him to make any considerable ripple on its surface. It was not till this movement had, in a measure, expended itself, and the conditions were present for a reaction, that his philosophy began to gain ground. It, in common with most German philosophy, struck root in Kant's philosophy. Schopenhauer was a pupil of Fichte. A good many very alien opinions have shared his initial error, an assertion of a direct knowledge of force in consciousness. Yet we reach noumena no more there than elsewhere, save as a rational inference.

§ 22. The philosophy of E. v. Hartmann is closely allied to that of Schopenhauer. The primitive term involves, according to it, not simply will but idea also. The original, impulsive force is not a blind one, but is under the direction of definite, constructive activity. The unconscious spirit which lies beneath all development includes two coördinate functions. The idea cannot secure its own development without the will, nor can the will

guide the unfolding of which it is the source. Hartmann thus unites the logical idea of Hegel to the original essence of Schopenhauer. The form under which this unconscious spirit develops itself is not the logical expansion of Hegel, but the empirical evolution of the physical world. Consciousness is a later stage of growth. The primitive, unconscious intelligence is the leading tenet of this philosophy.

Hartmann, like Schopenhauer, was a pessimist. The will is an ever-restless, unsatisfied impulse, only partially corrected by the idea. The only escape from the pain incident to insatiable desire is the intensification of intellectual consciousness, the victory of the idea over the will. The two are incapable of any ultimate harmony. In the triumph of the idea, the movement impelled by the will is arrested, and peace obtained. The philosophy of Hartmann is monistic, uniting force and thought in one primitive term. And yet this unity is not one of concordant tendencies. The universe is first the unconscious, and later the conscious, unfolding of one form of being.

There is in this philosophy a hopeless blending of physical and spiritual phenomena. It renders physical elements in intellectual terms, and then expands them under forms which belong chiefly to the material world. Instead of accepting the division between the material and the mental, which belongs to all experience, it assumes a point of indifference between them, and makes all later divergence the fruit of development. It readily accomplishes this by setting aside the inseparable form-element of thought, consciousness, and wandering forth into the region of the unconscious, where we have not, and never can have, the slightest empirical ground of affirm-

ing one thing or another. There is nothing left to check our fancy. The philosophy is a philosophy of the unconscious—and therefore of the absolutely unknown—opening the way equally to physical and intellectual evolution. As long as the conscious and the unconscious, mental phenomena and physical facts, are allowed to meet at a point of indifference, removed from all knowledge and all conception, this form of philosophy, though in itself profoundly unintelligible, will have a certain fanciful coherence and plausibility. Its entire worthlessness for purposes of exposition is found in the assumption of unconscious intelligence, terms incongruous through the entire circuit of experience. Knowing, in its essential force, is thus set aside, and something wholly below it put in its place. It is far better to raise all activity into the light and coherence of a logical process, than to submerge the intellectual life in the flow of physical forces. Yet either movement is constantly lapsing into the other. We can save thought as thought, causal relation as causal relation, only by saving both. The *differentia* of one defines that of the other. If we fail to discriminate the movements of matter and mind, under form-elements that are incapable of confusion, we shall easily identify a logical process with a cosmic movement, a cosmic movement with a logical process, and play loosely and vaguely between the two. Matter and mind so dominate all our experience that we can bring no light to it from a philosophy which confounds them, a philosophy of the unconscious, which has no single fact to light it on its way. The two forms of development, in their complete separation and constant interaction, must stand in theory as they do in fact, in comprehension as they do in observation, over against each other, eternally distinct and irre-

solvable terms. A thing must remain in space-relations, for only thus is it a thing; a thought in consciousness, for this it is which makes it to be a thought. Form-element of being other than these two there is none. Hartmann's philosophy, having broken with the first and fundamental fact of experience, brings no light to it and derives no proof from it.

PART IV.

MATERIALISTIC TENDENCIES.

§ 23. Philosophy is an exposition of things as well as of persons. The two are inseparable. Their partnership in the universe is the problem we have in hand. Realism asserts that physical and spiritual phenomena are to be held as each equally and fully valid, under their own order as offered in experience. The significance of the universe is found in the poise of the two, in their constructive and mutually explanatory equilibrium. Materialism disturbs this balance by undue weight conceded to material forces; and idealism, by depressing the scale on the side of mind.

Materialism is slow to accept its last conclusions, and most men draw back from it as an unworthy rendering of human life. Yet it readily enters as a hasty extension of physical processes and causal relations. Evolution, as an extreme theory, tends inevitably to materialism. Matter is the primitive term by a long antecedent period, and from it mind is to be evolved in a secondary descent. The powers of mind are much restricted, that they may be placed in harmony with their sources. If evolution fails to assign mental phenomena a dependent position among physical facts, it is rather because speculative thought has not courage to complete its work, than

because this conclusion is not involved in the premises. The facts of our spiritual life are so present and persistent under their own type, that it calls for no little audacity of assertion to degrade them peremptorily from their true rank. Such a doctrine as that of liberty firmly holds its own in the presence of insufficient proof and sagacious disproof. It stands as a barrier set up, in the mind itself, to the sweep of causal forces. No matter how often it is submerged by them, the least subsidence reveals it in its old position.

A second tendency that works strongly for materialistic exposition is the natural desire to carry the forms of inquiry which we have found successful in the physical world, which have gotten to themselves the prestige of science, into intellectual facts. There is a large number of phenomena, chiefly of a nervous character, that lie distinctly in the physical world, yet are closely associated with mental activity. These give occasion for a transfer of inquiry from one field to the other without a change of method. If, then, we can obliterate the dividing line of consciousness, and suppose that essentially the same activities are now on one side, now on the other, of this variable and secondary boundary, we have made a long stride in fusing the two kingdoms. Thus the investigator is fairly launched on what he terms the subconscious phenomena of mind—phenomena that suffer no definite or decisive change in becoming conscious—though the material of discussion is wholly physical and under physical law. Thus the primordial conditions and dependencies of mind are found in the nervous mechanism with which it is associated. The mechanism is the germ and the law of the power. The universe is to be interpreted from below upward. The prior event is the efficient cause and

controlling idea. The entire movement of mind is reversed before, in exposition, we reach the mind itself.

Thus we have a physiological psychology, nervous relations being substituted in examination and discussion for mental facts. In this inquiry the fundamental distinction is forgotten. Yet consciousness is not an accident of intellectual activity, it is its essential characteristic, its exclusive form-element. The moment we pass this bound all things are changed. We were dealing with relations in space, and our conclusions, whatever they might be, concerned physical events, and not intellectual ones. The dividing line between the two lies inexpugnable—subject not to the least shift or variation. The instant we enter the region of mental facts, the work of observation is wholly of another order. Our old terms disappear, and new ones take their place. We may establish reciprocal dependencies between the two sets of facts, but these do not in the least alter their diversity of character. These relations, indeed, owe their significance as expositions to the maintenance of this radical difference. Merge the two sets of phenomena, and the problem has disappeared. The primitive nature of the two forms of phenomena is defined by wholly distinct methods of approach, and by form-elements that have nothing in common. Our introduction of a third subconscious territory does not assist us, because we find nothing in experience corresponding to it. All our facts of observation are definitely those of mind or those of matter, facts in consciousness or facts in space. The overlap is purely fanciful. This furtive stealing in of physical dependencies in the exposition of spiritual phenomena is a very familiar fact, but has no more justification in sound thought than the reverse movement which

belonged to the early stages of physical investigation. Then we gave mental characteristics to material things ; now we assign material connections to intellectual events.

This diversity of phenomena cannot be overlooked or shaken off. Hence the words which the materialist uses soon come to acquire a scope which does not belong to them. To put will and idea at the root of development is a furtive effort to assist mechanical conceptions by a phase of power which belongs to mental activity. The constant result of both materialism and idealism is the slipping of words, first defined for us by actual experience, into a wider use, in which they cover both physical and mental action indifferently. Our theory slowly destroys the explicitness of the language in which we express it, and leads to a degeneracy of speech, a loss of previous distinctions, and not to any new mastery over them. Our words will not long bear the strain the facts put upon them, and so a mental designation comes to embrace a physical force, and terms which express material dependencies widen their scope toward intellectual relations. We have weakened the nerve of speech, not strengthened that of comprehension.

§ 24. Idealism was so early, and so predominantly, present in Germany as to imply a predisposition of the German mind to it. The patient, subtile, remote methods of inquiry which have belonged to the Germans find their fullest expression in the manifold, obscure, and intricate forms of idealism. The national tendency has been strengthened by its philosophy, and materialism, in its sensuous nearness, its intellectual superficiality and inadequacy, has found but a narrow place in German thought. Louis Büchner has best represented it in that crass form in which it affiliates most directly with physical science.

“Force and Matter,” which has been translated into English and into other European languages, is simply a bold, stubborn perversion of the facts under the prepossessions of empirical knowledge. A philosophy that unites itself determinedly to science, even though very inadequately, draws to itself very powerful interests.

The direction of inquiry most successful and extended in Germany, which approaches philosophy chiefly on the physical side, has been that of physiological psychology. The subjects of investigation have been the functions of different portions of the brain; the periods occupied by various forms of mental action, the conditions which modify these times; the localities, kinds, and degrees of sensibility in the body; the abnormal mental phenomena associated with an unduly impressible or a diseased nervous system. Much ingenuity and diligent observation have been exercised in this class of inquiries, and valuable results have been attained. This effort to trace the interdependence of body and mind lies in the direction of sound thought, gives facts of much interest in themselves, and may indirectly bring light to psychology as well as receive light from it. These investigations are not necessarily materialistic in their tendency, and only become so when they are regarded as, in any way, a part of psychology, or a clew to philosophy. If both elements are freely recognized in these physical runways of thought, if both are handled under their own empirical forms and terms, there is no more necessity of, or fitness in, confounding intellectual processes with their conditions than there would be in identifying the artist with his tools. Psychology, in its intellectual completeness, must precede all such investigations. They are incapable of giving a single fact in consciousness, or doing anything more than

tracing the physical conditions which accompany given forms of mental activity, either as an occasion or as an expression.

One may be tempted to underestimate the value of the facts elicited by physiological psychology because of the undue position assigned them by a few. Nothing can well be more lumpish, unleavened bread-food for the spirit than physiological psychology, made to take the place of psychology. Yet, its own limitation freely accepted, this inquiry may not only yield interesting results, but scatter light on both worlds.

It has been found impossible to introduce mathematics successfully into psychology. In the exact sciences, mathematics are a leading condition of the growth of knowledge. Notwithstanding a variety of efforts, no unit of measurement has been established within the domain of mind. Not only are the periods of any given mental action variable, they are an expression, not of anything in the nature of the act, but of the nature of the nervous connections involved in its utterance. The measurement holds on the physical, not on the spiritual, side of the activity under discussion. It expresses the performance of the engine, not of the engineer. Mental phenomena are more or less discontinuous, do not return in identically the same form and force, and, by the very nature of their being, exclude, in the consciousness of a single person, any permanent second term with which they can be compared. The true spontaneity of mind is strongly indicated by this very fact, that no experience is explicit and final and recoverable enough to be laid alongside other mental phenomena as a term of measurement. There is no such uniformity in mental activities as to admit of a universal expression. All is free, personal, variable.

Gustav Theodor Fechner, following in the steps of Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795), laid down the law, Stimuli whose intensities form a geometric ratio call out sensations whose intensities are in arithmetical ratio. This law expresses a general relation, but one which cannot be applied with precision. The limit within which it proximately holds is a narrow one. The nervous system maintains its tone, and responds promptly, only under moderate stimuli, stimuli that lie in the ordinary range of its function. If these limits are exceeded, its action is correspondingly deranged. If we accept the law in a loose form, it expresses the facts. Successive excitations, distinctly noted, may be feebler, if added to slight excitations; must be more intense, if added to strong excitations. This means that the intensity of sensation does not keep pace with the intensity of stimulus. This again signifies that the nervous system, as a means of transmitted impressions, is rapidly exhausted by use. It comes markedly under the variability of vital forces. Of the two terms in this comparison, stimuli and sensations, one is physical and one is mental; one is measured by external tests, the other by internal impressions; the one is cause and the other effect. But as the nervous system intervenes between the cause and effect, the dependence of the two is modified by the very changeable character of nervous activity. Subtile and obscure differences enter into our measurements and distinguish them at once from a simply mechanical estimate. The second term, the impression, is the only unit which has any claim to be called intellectual. This is defined by the first sensation, or the least increment of sensation, of which the mind is conscious. This unit shares all the vagueness of dimension which belongs to consciousness, cannot be carried beyond the individual

experience, nor be used within it to determine, by any direct comparison, the volume of mental states. This unit varies according to the intensity of the action of stimuli. The mind does not, probably owing to the ready exhaustion of nervous energy, respond uniformly to the conditions of activity, the vigor of the forces which assail it, but, beyond a familiar range, soon finds itself lost in confusion. The nature of the dependence of the mind on its material organs is thus determined, but its own processes disclose no definite dimensions. It is not possible to say that each distinct increment of sensation, in an experience of growing intensity, is equal to every other; nor to lay hold of any one of them as a unit of measurement in mental states. The law that Hamilton states: Perception is in inverse ratio to sensation: draws attention to the fact that mental states tend to exclude each other, but does not reduce that fact to an exact and verifiable expression. So vital an organ is the brain that it does not, in its infinite variability, readily subject its action to any certain measurement, and the mind, in its freedom, makes one or another use of cerebral conditions according to its own inner promptings. The mind is not unfrequently so preoccupied as to anticipate the force of stimuli that would otherwise result in distinct or even intense sensations. Stimuli are conditioned not only by the immediate state of the nervous system, but by the form of the intellectual activity they are approaching.

Another class of measurements pursued extendedly by Weber is the determination of the discriminating power of organs of sense, in reference to position. Different portions of the body are very differently endowed with sensation. The inquiry is almost purely a physiological one, as much so as the difficult investigation of the pri-

mary functions of each part of the brain. The duration of psychic acts has recently received much attention. Wilhelm Wundt has especially prosecuted this class of inquiries in Germany. The transmission of impressions through the nervous system involves the period of a pure mental act in consciousness, connecting a sensor with a motor act. Having defined the time required for sensation and action, we can vary the intellectual activity by which the transition is effected, and so settle the period of each form. Much ingenuity has been exercised in determining these times. We should be careful neither to disparage nor to overestimate the results. They are interesting in themselves, and have some practical value. Their bearing on psychology is indirect and remote. No data in consciousness are declared by them; these are all assumed preparatory to them. Neither do they touch the nature of the dependence of one mental state on another. The time, as one-seventh or one-fifth of a second, consumed in the completion of a reflex act, stands simply for the nervous conditions under which the mind is united to the external world. The period varies with the organism, and with its condition, and with the state of mind.

Our estimate of the value of these determinations will depend very much on our psychology. If nervous activities are regarded as the ruling causes of intellectual phenomena, and not simply as the instruments of their expression, we shall seem to penetrate somewhat deeply into the nature of intellectual activity by these measurements, though the impossibility of drawing any real psychological conclusions from our data will still remain. If, however, we regard intellectual activity as prior, in determination, to the cerebral action which accompanies

it, and only conditioned in time by this neural dependence, then our results will be felt not to touch, in any direct way, the problem of spiritual powers. Our study becomes psychological physiology, rather than physiological psychology. We are simply using our previous knowledge of mental activities to direct our inquiries into the nervous system, as an instrument of the mind.

Eduard Zeller, the historian of philosophy, holds that these measurements are not measurements of psychical states, and give us no unit within the mind itself. Take the most favorable case, that of sensation, and the least increment of sensation open to consciousness as affording a distinct unit; what is it that is measured? With what form of magnitudes are we dealing? Our unit is not one of time, the time measures simply the neural movement. It is not one of intensity. We have no expression or test of this intensity, other than that of the force of the sensuous stimuli present in the case; and, as we have seen, the inner state does not respond directly, or with any fixed relation, to these stimuli. Our results are general and variable. We have not secured an absolute ratio, even in the relation of exact physical facts to psychical experiences. The unit is determinate only on the physical side of stimuli, not on the intellectual side of sensation. The minimum sensation is not a measure, and may not, in different experiences, or even in the same experience, be identical with itself. We know neither how to double it nor divide it, nor how to lay it alongside of any other experience. The external stimuli, which alone admit of anything like measurement, are variable in reference to it. The least sensation has no parts. Prior to its presence there is no sensation, though there are unsatisfied stimuli. The least sensation has no dimension within itself, and

can be made to disclose no dimensions in other mental states. Our mathematics have not passed beyond physical dependencies. We are still, so far as mind is concerned, in a region of figurative and intangible estimates. The mechanism of the brain carries its own definite connections with it, so far as these can be traced; but when we touch the farther shore, other impressions and relations, manageable in a totally different manner, are present to us. The elasticity of spiritual phenomena, responding to the meditative purposes of mind, shrinking here and enlarging there, according to the occasions and directions and intensities of thought, takes the place of determinate causal movement, and eludes all other relations save those which consciousness discloses.

Herbart, regarding himself as a realist, discussed the phenomena of mind under conceptions so purely physical as to stand in affiliation with the materialistic tendency.

§ 25. Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776), whose life covered very nearly the same period as that of Hegel, was, next to Hegel, the most influential teacher of philosophy of his time. He was a pupil of Fichte, and a professor at Königsberg in place of Krug, who was the successor of Kant. Later he was professor at Göttingen. He styled himself a realist, and his disciples esteemed his philosophy peculiarly tangible and exact. His critical penetration put him among influential thinkers. He regarded philosophy as pertaining to the perfection of conceptions. Clearness of conceptions, with the judgments that follow from it, is the theme of logic. A portion of our conceptions are inconsistent with each other. The harmonizing of these conceptions is the purpose of metaphysics. There are also conceptions which appeal to us simply for assent or dissent. These conceptions

give us æsthetics. He regarded ethical impressions as the highest form of æsthetical ones. They are judgments of taste which pertain to the will. Herbart found, in a contemplation of nature, and still more in ethics, an occasion for religious faith.

Among the contradictory conceptions that call for the reconciliation of philosophy are those which pertain to space and time. We can subdivide neither space nor time so as to reach an ultimate. If we undertake to attain an ultimate part in matter, we are lost in the confusion of infinitesimals. Neither can we in events grasp the successive changes of which they are made up. What is continuous in time drops, in conception, into successive parts without union.

This incongruity of Herbart is the old riddle of infinite divisibility, and arises from making that discontinuous, by virtue of successive steps of conception, which is continuous in fact. We cannot grasp the same thing at the same time in analytic parts and as one uniform procedure.

Another inconsistent conception is that of a thing with several attributes. The variety in the attributes implies equal variety in the thing. We cannot, therefore, put back of complex qualities simple substances. The notion of causation also involves contradictions. Changes must arise either from without or from within, or be without a cause. If the change arises from without, we are borne backward in hopeless recession in search of a first cause. Moreover, such a change implies that the agent works by something not included in it. If the change arises from within, the thing is divided against itself into two opposed tendencies, active and passive. If we make change to be the very nature of the object, these changes will either

be causeless, incoherent, without unity, or we must unite them in that which does not expound them.

Herbart also regarded the conception of the *ego* as irreconcilable with itself. It is the union of manifold phenomena, and is, at the same time, thought of as simple. Moreover, the *ego* must understand itself by one of its own acts. It must think, and must, in a second act, refer that thought to itself, and so is always left at one remove from itself.

In order to free ourselves from the contradiction of various attributes in the same thing, and the farther contradiction of changes in things, we must accept the notion of simple, ultimate essences which intrude on each other, and which take on, in reference to each other, acts of self-preservation. Herein Herbart returns to ultimates, playing the same part as the monads of Leibnitz. Phenomena arise in their complexity and changeability from the interpenetrability of these ultimate, simple essences, and from their reciprocal modification by each other, according to their likeness or unlikeness.

Thus the soul is a single, spaceless essence, located at a definite point in the brain. In sensation, the soul is permeated by the simple essences about it, and its acts of self-preservation are ideas, the impressions of consciousness. These ideas, in blending with each other and by displacement of each other, give us the phenomena of mind. Ideas that are opposed to each other arrest each other with a reduction of intensity, which may result in the exclusion of an idea from consciousness. The "sum of arrests" determines the states of mind. The facts of psychology are facts of equilibrium. Freedom is an equilibrium between the will and the moral judgment. The intensity of ideas admits of mathematical expression. In

this effort Herbart introduced the symbols of algebra, though he was able to secure no unit of measurement. His equations were as much afloat on vague and figurative conceptions as are the words of ordinary speech.

Herbart regarded the forms of experience as given us, not as subjective. If they were subjective, we should be able to put any form on any experience; whereas experience resists every form save the one peculiar to it. It thereby shows its own power to determine our perception. These determinative elements are valid for all intelligence, though we cannot affirm them of things-in-themselves.

§ 26. The entire mechanism of Herbart is open to the most destructive criticism. It is an effort to expound phenomenally that which is not phenomenal. We can observe and analyze the states of mind, and follow their order of dependence, but we cannot put back of them, with any power of exposition, another set of phenomena, to wit, the exclusion of essences by each other. These essences and their modes of operation are wholly hypothetical, beyond all verification. In assigning them the work of causes, we are dealing with what is entirely unknown. A theory that adds the unknown to the unknown brings us no nearer knowledge. Nor can we, granting these essences and their displacements, secure, by means of them, any insight into the facts of mind. These essences and their interpenetrations are very vaguely conceived by us under physical images, and the translation of these images into intellectual experiences and laws is wholly unintelligible, a by-play of fancy. Why an effort of self-preservation, in a simple essence, should be the occasion of a self-conscious state is as obscure as any proposition can be. We understand the words, but not in the least that which they indicate.

It is only a minor criticism, when we consider this complete failure of the theory to expound anything, that it involves contradictory terms. A spaceless essence admits of no position or interpenetration. The conception rests on the fiction of a point without dimensions and the passage of points into each other. These theories consume time and thought to no purpose, attach themselves in no way to our knowledge of the actual, weave fancies together in so vague a manner as to admit readily neither proof nor disproof, and weary the mind with intangible results, till it is ready to discard with disgust all speculation. Our very notion of the nature of knowledge is disordered. We flee to agnosticism from inquiries which spring out of nothing and lead to nothing.

The philosophy of Herbart is especially faulty in expounding the spiritual by the physical in such a way as to confuse the very notion of spirit. The soul is held to be simple—with a physical simplicity—because, if it were complex, essences, ideas, would be outside of each other, and we should lose the unity of thought and the unity of consciousness. This unity is to be interpreted under the notion of absolute oneness of physical being.

In one respect the psychology of Herbart may have been helpful. It set aside the notion of a combination of faculties in the mind, and drew attention to its essential unity. The interdependence of ideas was traced and referred to a closely coherent movement. Yet here, there was a loss of true personality, the instant initiation of spiritual life within itself. An inferior and mechanical activity was put for a superior and intellectual one. The realism of Herbart inclined decidedly toward materialism by drawing its germinant idea from the relation of essences to each other—essences essentially physical in their char-

acteristics and causal in their dependencies. The two kingdoms are hopelessly intermingled and confused by expounding phenomena that lie on one side of the boundary line by notions derived from the opposite side.

Nor are the reasonings of Herbart, under the notion of causation, sufficiently guarded and corrected by observation. We cannot cease to assert the relation of cause and effect, and must adhere to it as our constant and only clew to physical facts. If this fails us, knowledge fails us also. Yet we have occasion for the utmost empirical caution in expounding intellectual relations under it. Herbart, by his doctrine of simplicity of attributes and so of essences, strove to carry conclusions, resting on the idea of causation, into a transcendental region. Essences are conceived as absolutely simple, giving rise to equally simple effects. These essences interpenetrate each other, and so give occasion to complex phenomena. But if essences offer themselves to us under many forms of manifestations, may not their original structure involve complexity? We cannot affirm that simplicity, in the sense of absolute singleness of action, is any more intelligible to us, or a more fitting primitive term, than the union, in one element, of diverse forces. An interlacing of qualities may as well belong to the original constitution of things as to an acquired constitution. It is as apprehensible in the one case as in the other. It is a familiar fact of experience, and we have no such insight into the nature of things as to discover any constructive or logical incongruity in the variety of qualities under which a single object expresses itself in diverse relations. The notion of absolute oneness is fanciful.

That any well-ordered and harmoniously related phenomena should follow from the resistance which simple

essences offer to interpenetration is a conception, on the other hand, as difficult to be entertained as any we can readily offer. We have no such knowledge of the nature of forces—indeed, we have no knowledge of them save in that very experience in which they appear under complex forms,—or of their tendency to exclude or include one another, as to get any hold for *a priori* inferences. The changeable interaction of elements—groups of forces—the effect of objects remote from each other on each other, the extended interlock of relations, must be accepted by us as facts wholly in accord with the law of causation. They gain nothing in comprehension by a gratuitous and complicated mechanism of essences, a mechanism which is, after all, nothing more than a crude product of our crudest experience, that in which solid bodies exclude each other or liquid ones entertain each other. While we may be sure that no physical event is without a cause, the nature and action of that cause are questions of observation. If we go on to assume what may seem to us more simple and primitive methods, we shall lose the path of knowledge altogether. The exact office of things is to steady and guide thoughts in this otherwise waste territory.

It is especially inept to try to expound the simplicity of mind by the simplicity of an essence. The simplicity of a thing is totally distinct from the simplicity of the spirit. We may mistakenly, in search of unity, reduce the attributes of an object to one, and crowd this object, with its single attribute, into what we are pleased to term a point; but we have not thereby attained any expression of real unity, real union, in things, much less in thoughts. That conjunction which we term mind involves the coherence of many diverse phenomena in one movement con-

current throughout with itself, its energies all subserving a single purpose. Mind is what it is by no one of its acts, but by virtue of a superconscious presence knitting them all in one life. Herbart introduces conflict into personal powers by mistaking the nature of unity. The mind acts, and by a second act refers its experiences to itself. It does not thereby separate itself from itself, and fall into parts. It renders its own union to itself as a constant fact. The succession of thoughts, of phenomenal states, by which this insight is rendered in judgments, in no way alters the unity itself. Indeed, this is the gist of spiritual unity, the presence of one impelling power in many actions. True unity is found in the mind alone, must be apprehended there, and lies in the constant interlock of mental states by which they arise in the fulfilment of a single, coherent life. Unity is solely an intellectual relation, and involves diversity as certainly as concurrence. There is no occasion for the notion till mental phenomena have arisen in their variety. It is in subversion of all psychology to expect the mind to know itself directly, to make its own being an object of contemplation. The mind would thus become phenomenal, would lose its pure spiritual being as noumenon, would disclose effects, facts, other than its own acts. It is an illusion of the senses that leads us to wish to know, to see, the mind otherwise than in and by its presentation in thought and feeling.

A doctrine of essences carries us at once into a region of moonshine, where the notion of causation yields but a shimmering and uncertain light, and experience—above which we are striving in vain to set ourselves—corrects inadequately our inevitable errors. One of the worst results of a philosophy of this order is the sinking of

knowledge into hopeless relativity. If a simple essence, the soul, is interpenetrated by other essences; if our impressions are due to the sum of arrests, what scope or revealing power can belong to our convictions, what significance have they beyond other phenomena arising at other atomic centres? Knowing, that it may be knowing and not simply being, must have the range of the universe, and not be limited to the accidents of an infinitesimal part of it. Such a philosophy must begin at once either to reduce knowledge to a phosphorescent light at detached points, or it must struggle to give these hopelessly obscure and narrow experiences a breadth of representation that in no way belongs to them.

Herbart strove to give a mathematical expression to the fusion of different mental states and to the arrests between them. As, however, he had no reliable unit, no empirical basis from which to start and to which to return, his equations gained no footing, and subserved no purpose. They were only another portion of the general illusion, another method of disclosing its inadequacy. The failure of mathematics, when wrongly applied, is only the more conspicuous because of the precision which properly belongs to it. The measurements of Wundt express real, though not mental, relations; those of Herbart are as fanciful as the suppositions on which they rest.

We find in Herbart another example of the unfortunate results traceable to that very unphilosophical conception of Kant, things-in-themselves. These things-in-themselves are now offered as essences. An essence is something endowed with an original, simple nature of its own; and these essences begin to act on each other in production of physical and mental phenomena. Thus the simplicity of the world, as interpreted by reason, is lost.

Phenomena no longer imply noumena, inner reality, causal energy; noumena are no longer fully and finally expressed in phenomena. We have first a world of essences and then a world of things derived from them. The essences are wholly unintelligible both to sense and to understanding, nor can we render, in any terms of experience, the translation by which they pass into the facts of the world. Our real knowledge does not begin till we get back again to things, and study them in the old, unphilosophical way.

PART V.

REALISM IN GERMANY.

§ 27. Idealism is a bold and fascinating form of speculation. It loosens extendedly all the customary restraints of thought. It has been a thoroughly dominant type of philosophy in Germany, and has been productive of free, changeable, and facile theories, as regardless of each other as of any and all sober tests of truth. Philosophy has thus been rash and wayward, not patient and accumulative. Successive systems, taking their departure from previous ones, have not returned to them to correct their own wanderings, or to collate themselves with them. Diversity has been more conspicuous than agreement, originality than the light of converging lines of thought. Realism, lying close to the ordinary convictions of men, has suffered the eclipse of dulness—something too near to be seen.

The best result of idealism has been that it has magnified spiritual power, and held in check the mole-eyed forms of materialism. The mind has not submitted its

freedom to the domination of sensuous impressions. This sense of integrity within the mind itself is much to be preferred to that self-abandonment by which its own rational powers are made nugatory in the very process of exposition. Better not render the world than not to render it deeply, under wisdom's own terms.

The first condition of sound philosophy is faith in mental powers and processes. We must accept the instruments of the mind as already fully involved in it. Correction cannot be with us overthrow. Primary ideas must stand as laws of mind and laws of knowledge. We may uncover and strengthen the foundations of truth, we cannot alter them. While idealism fails to recognize the full force of first terms, it never, in its most wayward speculation, loses confidence in the rational process.

The second condition of sound philosophy is a firm hold on the facts, the empirical facts, which call for explanation and guide it. Here it is that idealism fatally stumbles. Its expositions are more remote, more unintelligible, than the facts which call them out. The questions gain nothing from the answer, the phenomena from the theories which are united to them. The world of speculations is one world, and the world of realities is another, while the transition is rare and difficult. Realism owes its sobriety of results to a quiet acceptance of facts in the forms in which the ample light of experience has declared them. It thus starts from the haunts of thought, works in familiar ways on familiar objects, with the modest hope of deeper insight into relations admitted by all. It does not, in expounding the events of life, destroy their recognized character, or leave the connections of thing and theory purely verbal.

The works of Kant were so influential, and the idealism

involved in them so inevitable, that many were swept at once from the footing of realism. Those who retained its principles were unable to check the new tendency, or resist the prestige which attached to it. They were left stranded among out-worn opinions, while the current swept on. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743) rejected the doctrine of Kant, that regulative ideas are simply subjective form elements, the source of impressions which have no necessary agreement with things-in-themselves. He held that the mind has an immediate apprehension of supersensible relations, preëminently of the true, the beautiful, and the good. He carried this belief to the extent of affirming a direct knowledge of God. His philosophical conclusions rested on faith, and were fitted to sustain faith. Realism unites itself so readily to religion, that it sometimes suffers both in fact, and in the estimates of men, from this too facile union. Jacobi felt that his explanations did not reach as deep as his beliefs; that he was "a heathen with the understanding, but a Christian with the spirit." This attitude is not inconsistent with a sound philosophical method, when the rational force of a faith is felt which the mind has not yet mastered in its speculative bearings. In a conflict of impressions, lower and higher, sensuous and spiritual, we may well hold fast to the higher, waiting a final solution. It is the presence of the deeper sentiment that springs the problem, and we may rightly believe that its true solution will find germinant light at this very point of inquiry. Jacobi affirmed unhesitatingly the primary truths of faith, though not able wholly to divest them of the obscurity put upon them by the scepticism of Hume, and the transcendentalism—itself a kind of scepticism—of Kant.

§ 28. The name of most mark in the record of realism

and of rational faith was that of Friedrich Ernest Daniel Schleiermacher (1768). He was the son of a clergyman of the Moravian Brethren, and became professor of theology, first in Halle, and later in the University of Berlin. He studied the doctrines of Spinoza under Jacobi, who regarded them as the most self-consistent of speculative systems. He also came under the influence of Plato, and of Fichte and Schelling. As a preacher and professor, his activity and influence were very extended. Zeller says of him that he was the greatest theologian of the Protestant church since the days of Luther. He was a man of wide powers, penetrating insight, and deep convictions. He was equally able to move the heart and the understanding. He favored the union of the Lutheran church and Reformed churches, and carried into philosophy and religion a true inspiration. Without devoting himself to any one system, he laid hold freely of the most pregnant forms of spiritual truth.

Schleiermacher held, in even balance, the two impulses which sustain sound realism, the scientific temper, and religious insight. He deemed the earnest want of his own time—which remains the want of our time—to be “An eternal compact between vital Christian faith, on the one hand, and scientific inquiry, left free to labor independently for itself, on the other.”

Schleiermacher referred the material of knowledge to perception, or the organic function, and the forms of knowledge to reason, or the intellectual function. The forms of knowledge are not merely subjective. They pertain to the objects of knowledge, and stand for real relations. We thus have both parts of realism, the power to know and the correspondence of things to our knowledge of them. Truth is the agreement of our convictions

with the relations to which they pertain. Schleiermacher regarded science as conditioned on the conformity of things to reason, their existence in reason; art as the transfer of reason to things, the existence of reason in things; and religion as the consciousness of the essential and universal unity of nature and reason. We are religious in the degree in which we can accept every separate object as a part of one whole, in the measure in which we can find ourselves, in insight and feeling, at one with the Eternal. Science and religion are both possible only because all things are held in solution by reason. Science groups intellectual relations and leads on to religion. Religion expresses the higher feelings which are called out by the Infinite, contained in the finite and perishable. God is neither identical with, nor separated from, the world. By virtue of our rational insight, the world puts us in unity with God. Philosophy and religion are legitimate and concurrent activities of mind.

The end of ethical activity is the highest good. It aims at the union of nature and reason in all ways. The various virtues are the methods by which reason, as an energy, expresses itself in human action.

There was abundant material for spiritual enthusiasm in the realism of Schleiermacher. Secondary conflicts in the relation of things to pure thought, in the world as a fact and as an ideal product of divine wisdom, disappeared. The obscurities of subtile speculation were swallowed up in the light of faith, the light that runs before insight. An overpowering sense of motion, of growth singly and collectively into the divine mind, swept away distrust and fear, and carried the spirit buoyantly forward toward its true goal.

§ 29. The philosopher whom we must place next in our

list of realists was one of a much tamer mood. Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798) came early under the influence both of Jacobi and Schleiermacher. Later he gave much attention to the works of Herbart. His thinking was distinctly modified by them, though often by way of dissent. His philosophy is most readily approached when regarded in contrast with that of Herbart. The lectures of Beneke at the University of Berlin were interdicted, as he thought, at the instigation of Hegel. He retired to Göttingen, and later returned to Berlin, where he at length received an appointment to an irregular professorship.

Beneke was fully possessed of some of the most fundamental convictions of realism. He regarded the phenomena of consciousness, clearly distinguished from those of space, as constituting the facts of psychology. They are to be sought out, like other facts, by observation, and to be combined by induction. The boundaries, therefore, which he assigned to mental science were of the most distinct character. The spirit stands in no spatial relations. In our inner experience, we apprehend the objects of knowledge directly; in our outer experience, indirectly, through their effects. We know within ourselves the relations of substance, cause and effect, and by means of them construct the external world. He regarded psychology as the basis of metaphysics. The nature, forms, and limits of knowledge are determined by the powers of the mind.

The soundest philosophy is often the result of diverse tendencies, each held in check by the other. Especially does realism involve the rendering of relatively equal weight to inner and outer facts. Beneke added to his affirmation of the primitive character of mental phenomena a development of mental powers which, fully traced, would have led to empiricism. He pursues this unfolding

on the intellectual side, but under images that gain fitness and clearness in connection only with the nervous system. His most distinctive tenet was his denial, with Herbart, of faculties of mind, each acting as a separate power. He assigned to the mind, in opposition to Herbart, many closely united methods of action. These are farther specialized and combined in use. Later stages of growth are dependent on the grouping of activities in earlier ones. Beneke highly commended the unity which Herbart had attributed to the mind, though he found it consistent with various forms of action. He was equally hearty in approving the opposition of Locke to innate ideas. The furniture of the mind is not ready-made. The mind is to be understood in the genetic rise of its several processes. The philosophy of Beneke was like and unlike empiricism in this particular. It was like it in the importance attached to development; it was unlike it in tracing this development on the intellectual side.

He laid down four fundamental processes, which pass into each other. The first process is that of sensation, in its most general form. Impression from without and the power of response from within are the first germinal facts in mental development. All later processes are the result of this mobile, progressive flow of sensations. The earlier processes, involved in impressions, become more ample, more complex, and fall into groups. These gain power by repetition and attention, and so issue in the more distinct and complete forms of perception. Concepts arise by the coalescence of common terms present in the perception of individual objects. Judgments are the results of the union of more general with less general concepts. Mental processes are formed by the affiliation of activities directed toward the same objects.

The third fundamental process is the result of the relation of unconscious to conscious activity. States of mind persist. They leave "traces" behind them which have, in reference to subsequent states, the force of "rudiments." The relation of unconscious states to conscious ones, and the government exercised by the former over the latter, are seen in memory.

The fourth fundamental process is that of association. Similar activities attract each other, modify and strengthen each other. The soul, according to Beneke, is a wholly immaterial form of being, endowed with closely united forces which, called out by the external world, fall into groups in their later unfolding, and gain power according to their affiliations. It is more difficult to put this scheme of thought clearly under intellectual relations than it is under neural dependencies. The images and analogies which sustain it are physical, and it retains coherence only as we refer its successive stages to the cerebral interactions which sustain them. Beneke labored under the difficulty of holding fast pure, psychological principles, and of presenting them under conceptions not wholly consonant with them. The value of his work lies not so much in the success of his own theory as in the clear recognition of the fact that mental activity is necessarily modified in its exercise, and so has a history of development allied to growth.

The ethics of Beneke discloses, with equal distinctness, an empirical predilection. The pleasure which attaches to action constitutes its underlying impulse. Ethical judgments hold between objects and efforts according to their worth, defined in terms of happiness. Here, there enters an element of a higher order. Our faculties have not the same value, and so the pleasures they confer are

not possessed of the same worth. The worth of pleasures is to be estimated by their relation to psychical development. As the powers of men are essentially the same, they have common conditions of moral judgment. Their choices are accompanied by a sense of duty, which is justified, in the authority which attaches to it, by belonging to the inmost constitution of the soul. The realism of Beneke, while sustained by firm affirmation, lost consistency by a variety of subtile, empirical influences. There was a constant leaning toward a mechanical exposition of spiritual things. Pure, intellectual power was not easily entertained in its full scope.

§ 30. The German philosopher who, on the whole, has represented realism in its fullest and best form was Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817). He was professor at Göttingen, entering on his work in 1844. Herbart, who had been transferred from Königsberg to Göttingen, had died in 1841. Lotze thus followed in close connection with him. This led to his being regarded as a disciple of Herbart, and became the occasion of a distinct denial on his part.

Lotze had this in common with Herbart: they both attached much value to the conception of monads presented by Leibnitz, though these, as ultimate terms, bore no such part in the scheme of Lotze as in that of Herbart. The monads of Leibnitz are too far removed from experience to gain any interpretation from it, or to bring any interpretation to it. The "punctual simplicity" of the soul, which was made the basis of psychology by Herbart, is a fanciful notion which we can only handle in a fugitive way. It can tell us nothing of the powers of the mind. The doctrine of monads involves an unintelligible term between physical and spiritual phenomena, and is

true to neither. Held as a possible basis of monism, it is too speculative to be very harmful, but when this notion is made the starting-point of a theory of mind, it confuses everything, landing us in idle conjectures.

Lotze accepted, in common with a large portion of German philosophy, the subjective character of space and time relations. The anchoring force of physical phenomena in a common experience, their unmistakable permanence and guiding power in knowledge, were thus lost to him. But even this distinctive term of idealism did not overcome the strong realistic elements in his system. He was characterized by a very happy combination of tendencies ordinarily in conflict. He united close, empirical inquiry with a profound spiritual temper. His earlier work was especially in line with that of Weber and Fechner. He was committed, in the public mind, to the school of physiological psychology. The fact, also, that he rejected, with much decision, the idealism of Schelling and Hegel, strengthened this feeling concerning him. Yet this affiliation, after all, was comparatively slight. He laid great stress on mechanism, using the term broadly, in the physical world. All organic processes are capable of mechanical explanation, come fully under the play of physical forces. Life is not to be accepted as a distinct force. Over against this conception of the perfect mechanism of the body, every part playing into every other under fixed physical laws, he puts vital energy, not as a single force among other forces, but as the sum of the effects of special forces, acting under given conditions. Life thus becomes a combining, spiritual power, the energy of a constructive purpose.

Lotze also strengthened the practical side of philosophy by an inquiry into the variable forms of sensation, its

"local signs," by which the mind is aided in the construction of space-relations. Those relations are associated in sensation with the discrimination of differences, and these differences, in turn, guide the mind in its constructions. Its constructions arise empirically, and not simply as the fruit of insight.

Lotze was admirably equipped in two correlative forms of inquiry. He was predisposed to a thorough investigation of things, while he also keenly felt those more spiritual dependencies which make the physical so profoundly significant. It was an inclination toward poetry and art which first prompted his study of philosophy. He felt that the true explanation of the world demanded, on the one hand, the complete recognition of its dependencies under physical laws, and, on the other, a recognition of its universal ground or occasion in the Idea of the Good. True science must answer the three questions, By what law? Through what means? To what end? "The world of worths is the key of the world of forms."

This conception of the world is thoroughly realistic, though it is worked out by Lotze, in part, under idealistic notions. We must, he thought, assume, as our starting-point, our material and our psychical existence as coördinate facts. The distinction between body and spirit must be sharply drawn as primary in experience. Whatever union we may later show between them must grow out of this first diversity of knowledge.

Lotze held with Herbart that the problem of philosophy is the effort to bring unity and harmony into our conceptions, to combine them in one consistent view of things. This effort embraces three subordinate ones. The first is a discussion of the universal forms under which alone we can know objects. This is metaphysics.

The second is a consideration of the facts to which these forms are applicable. This gives cosmology and psychology. The third is a discussion of the judgments of approval and disapproval called out by the forms of experience. This inquiry is that of æsthetics and ethics. The first step is a clear and correct apprehension of the facts in each department, and of their relations to each other. Such a statement will prompt us to take the second step, to form some general idea of the method in which the separate systems of facts can be combined into one comprehensive whole. The attitude of Lotze throughout is a very sober one, in which experience prompts and corrects speculation. His method of propounding and solving the problems of philosophy is realistic throughout. His own conjectural answer, however, is framed under the notion of monads and the ruling idea of idealism—that space is a form given by the mind itself to its experiences. Lotze held that things are truly objective to us, though space is only the form under which relations—true being—are offered to us. God is the one supreme monad in the system of Lotze. We, in a measure, share his personality. The universal being is allied to ourselves, and involves the same diversity of states in complete unity. Matter stands only for the reality of relations presented to us by it. It is the language of the Divine Mind. The teleological processes in the world could not otherwise be disclosed to us. These processes only are realities. The summation of all knowledge is the apprehension of the divine purpose through those visible means which are its expression. The body is constructed as a medium of giving and receiving these spiritual impressions. Lotze urged that the conflicts of things disappear when we cease to consider the origin of things—some-

thing beyond our knowledge—and confine our attention to things in their interactions,—a present revelation of God—holding them fast in the ways of wisdom assigned them.

The philosophy of Lotze must depend for its power very much on the force of the spiritual life which entertains it. We read the word, the Word of God, much as we read the works of a poet, and what we find is very largely determined by our own powers of reflection. The spiritual import and burden of the world will gain for us the dimensions of the Infinite Mind only as we enter into its beauty, its spiritual worth, and the scope of its purposes. Lotze appeals in his philosophy at once to the freedom and insight of the individual. Its monads are no essential part of it. We may hold it fast and give no rendering of its noumena beyond that simple and direct one involved in phenomena. Indeed, this method is more in harmony than his own with his fundamental conception, that revelation lies for us, not in substances, but in relations. The location of the soul as a monad in that portion of the brain which is without fibres may be regarded by us as fanciful and destitute of light, while we hold fast to the essential unity of the two worlds expressed in the one supreme fact, that things are everywhere a reflection of thoughts. We are satisfied with the harmony of words and ideas, without the supposition that the two have the same substantial being. Equally can we withhold our assent to the illusory nature of space-relations, and yet look upon matter simply as one term in the history of mind. The substantiality of the universe need not become to us primarily physical, nor its words of truth the implications of insensate things, because its physical terms hold fast in real being, true to the dependencies under which they are

offered to us. It is only a question of the force of that vocal impulse with which the divine wisdom reveals itself. Validity, we may well believe, characterizes both the method and our impressions concerning it, as truly as it does the principles which are rendered under it as the spiritual realities of all things. Ultimate method, absolute substance, we must have under any view, because simple, primitive acts contain no relations and express no truth. We must not try to press meaning deeper than significant things. If we do, we abolish the fundamental distinction on which knowledge rests, substance and attribute, reality and the forms under which it appears. That the validity of space, as an objective relation, excludes the activity of spirit under it, is a metaphysical fancy, finding no basis in reason and no confirmation in experience.

Lotze resolved all things into spiritualism by making space a spiritual form. This conception, obliterating the materiality of material things, greatly weakens the force of one of those energies between which the universe lies as a created product. Spirit retains its own attributes largely by virtue of their complementary relation to things. The universe, as an integer, best discloses its integrity by keeping its units intact. We would not impel our boat in uniform motion by shifting a single paddle from side to side, but by a strong pair of oars bending to the same stroke.

This view does not involve that matter is any other than pure force, permeated with pure thought; it does involve that forces lie in coherent, permanent, causal relations, wholly unlike the energies of mind, and in constant reaction with them. Turn this half of the universe into vapor, and the other half dissolves away with

it. We are thrown back on invisible things, illusive to all our processes of knowledge. Space, as a true form-element, is not half so embarrassing as space an inescapable, yet deceptive, habit of mind.

It is playing fast and loose with the idea of space which enables the mind to entertain the notion of a spiritual monad, and to assign it position in that portion of the brain without fibres; as if thereby there should be found a centre for receiving and giving influences. This is the mere dizziness of thought. Speculation is brought to its knees by too heavy a blow of the sensuous mallet of mechanism.

The ethical system of Lotze is of the same free, personal character as his philosophy. It is sufficiently summed up in the single statement: "There is such a thing as a moral judgment of conduct only on the supposition that this conduct leads to pleasure or pain. But to this conscience joins the farther truth, that it is not the effort after our own, but only that for the production of another's felicity which is ethically meritorious; and, accordingly, that the idea of benevolence must give us the sole supreme principle of all moral conduct." Lotze united the acceptance of a supreme law with the freedom which enables us to fulfil it, and so gained the conditions of a truly spiritual life. It is pleasant to part with the philosophy of Germany at so high a point, one built up and supported by so much of its previous thought, and also one so suggestive of farther progress. If the good and the bad seed, which fell so freely from the hand of Kant, were alike productive, the better affirmations return, in each renewed circuit, with the greater strength.

CHAPTER IX.

THE CONCLUSION.

§ 1. German philosophy has been far more voluminous, varied, and vagrant than the philosophy of any other nation. Notwithstanding its extreme, subtile, and erratic tendencies, the readiness with which it has shaken off the restraints of experience and wandered endlessly in purely speculative regions, it has brought more stimulus to inquiry, and been more influential in ridding the mind of narrow, empirical notions, than any other form of modern thought. Most of the spiritual insight—the awakening of the mind to its own robust powers—that has come to English and French philosophy, has been occasioned or strengthened by German philosophy.

The empirical philosophy of England, resting ultimately on the doctrine of evolution, has had a somewhat more continuous development than the speculation of Germany. In a single direction, it may rival this speculation in the practical value of its conclusions, but in scope and penetration there is very little ground for comparison between the two forms of philosophy.

Doubtless agnosticism has been strengthened by the remoteness, intangibility, and wholly unestablished character of many of the conclusions reached by explorers, each fearlessly following his own slight clew, yet hardly more than by the crude identification by empiricism of spiritual and physical relations, of the inner idea and force

of a process with the process itself. This reading of the meaning out of things is certainly more barren in the end than the reading into them of ideas too remote and fantastic for the sober movement of truth. German philosophy has valiantly maintained, and, in the midst of its failures, helped to extend, the sense of certainty and range in that one supreme act, the act of knowing. It is not a philosophy that buries itself in ditches of its own digging, nor one that protects itself from the futility of its own labors by the plea of agnosticism. It has in it that buoyancy of power which, sobered and corrected by experience, will lead it from many positions and by many advances into the dawn of light.

The conceptions involved in different German systems are often so shifting and pliant, that they may be used very differently by different minds as expositions of truth. Thus the absolute of Hegel may stand for an abstract, logical movement, whose unfolding, in the one world of thought, is as barren of life and personality, as innutritious to the spiritual nature, as is the evolution of things, driven onward by inherent, causal energies; it may be a pantheism of dogmatic dependencies, the toughest integuments of thought; or, to a mind like that of Professor Green, it may become a pervasive, intellectual element, taking on personal quality, and standing for the deep substructures of reason in a wholly rational world. All statements in philosophy are so inadequate as final presentations of truth, that they must be interpreted, in the very flow of the stream of which they form a part. It is the combined movement that is significant, and not its detached propositions; the course the mind is pursuing, and not each stepping-stone by which, for the moment, it supports itself. The vagueness and mobility

of philosophy may help the mind onward in the exploration of regions whose revelations must be made many times, with many modifications, before they settle down into familiar truths.

Anthropomorphism, so obnoxious to philosophy, is never so offensive as when it is hidden from itself, fancies that negation is safer than affirmation, and begins to interpret the universe by the lower things in it, not by the higher. This is to fling ourselves over the walls because the fortress is so difficult to possess and defend. We reach the next rung in the spiritual ladder from the last one; we approach God as the fulness of reason by the paths of reason which lie open to us in our own minds. The true remedy for the infirmity of anthropomorphism is to recognize its inevitable character, and push beyond it by means of it. Our movement toward the higher forms of truth is like that mathematical proof in which we reach a conclusion by indefinite approximations. We trace a coincidence that is never complete. German philosophy sets its face forward; and though its visions may, many of them, be too special and personal to repeat themselves twice in the same form, it is never without a vision.

§ 2. A strong tendency toward monism has been a ruling, and frequently a misleading, impulse in German philosophy. The effort has been to reduce all to one, rather than to unite all in one. We can no more find our way outward from one to many, than we can find our way inward from many to one. The unity we pursue in monism is physical rather than spiritual, identity rather than harmony. The unity which the mind demands is its own unity, a unity of relations, and this of necessity lies between diverse things. It rejects dualism only when dualism is irreconcilable difference. Accepting the physical

and the spiritual as ultimate terms of experience, we have a universe of intellectual revelations, unrolled, stretched, pitched, like a tent, by the force of physical facts which are themselves expounded in this the service they render, as midway ground for mind, all minds. Here we find their spiritual significance, their relation backward and forward, and rest in a nature that is ever approaching a higher harmony, no matter into how many distinct parts and divided ends it may seem to have fallen. The deeper unity for which the mind is truly in search must be thrown forward as a final cause, not backward as an efficient cause. This without that is an illusion, the breaking down of unity, not the winning of it; the sinking into darkness of our thoughts about the world, not the rising of them into light. This voice of the reason, seeking for one, comprehensive, constructive, purposeful idea, we accept as the postulate of wide, rational inquiry, that by which thought completes itself, and becomes art.

Monism was foreshadowed at the very opening of German philosophy in the monads of Leibnitz. It found its most direct expression in the doctrine of Spinoza;—one eternal substance with the inseparable attributes, extension and thought—yet if unity is in thought, thought cannot lie as a parallel attribute alongside of extension. It received in idealism a new direction and new enforcement: first, in the unfolding *ego* of Fichte; later, in the absolute of Schelling; and, last, in the universal process of Hegel. Schopenhauer and Hartmann gave it a new statement, on the empirical side, by putting will, and will and idea, at the centre of all things. Herbart found it in the interfusion of essences, and Lotze in the supreme monad.

All this is simply a transfer of the question of unity from the intellectual world of relations to the substantial

world of being. Substance, an opaque enigma if we undertake to question it, the serviceable symbol, x , in our equations if we let it alone, thus becomes the leading, and so the misleading, conception of philosophy. We scrutinize the characters which form our words, as if in them lay the secret of thought, and not in thought itself. Being is fully and finally interpreted by the phenomena for whose sake alone we predicate it. Study the relations of phenomena, and we glide prosperously along the ways of thought; attempt to penetrate to the nature of substances, and we are instantly lost in a vague reproduction of phenomenal facts beyond the region of phenomena, as if there lay a world beneath a world to which we must penetrate. The architecture of spiritual things is not in substructures but in structures, not below the line of light but above it. The unity of mind lies in unity of the phenomena, and these declare the eternal coherence of rational being within itself. We are not to seek a reason for a reason, some deeper and dead substance the source of the congruity of intellectual life. The spirit is as free and vital as its conscious acts, for these are its disclosure. Nothing is plainer than reason, and reason lies in relations. The equivalence of cause and effect, substance and attribute, agent and action, spirit and spiritual process, will lie at the foundation of a philosophy that does not allow itself to be enticed beyond the limits of knowledge, or put to itself the futile problem of knowing how we know.

If we look at physical and intellectual phenomena respectively, we find that they express and hold fast, by virtue of their differences, an extended, complex, and permanent network of relations; that these relations are conditioned, in expression, on these differences; that if

we withhold these articulate sounds, each in its own significance, the words of truth sink instantly back into silence. This fact itself is full of light, and needs no farther fact to expound it. This fact makes the method rational, and the effort to go beyond it is quizzing reason as to its reasonableness; is an effort to find an inscrutable something as the ground of thought; is a subversion of the universe, an effort to put at the bottom of it an eternally opaque term, being, instead of an eternally transparent one, thought, in whose diamond depths lies all the play of light.

The monism of Germany was greatly aided by a constant recognition of unconscious, mental phenomena. This region of subconsciousness is one on which no empirical light, physical or spiritual, can possibly fall, and one whose creations and emanations and lines of causation, therefore, are subject to no criteria, no corrections. All knowledge lies in consciousness, not beyond it. A beyond consciousness is to spiritual observation what a beyond space would be to sensuous inquiry. The moment the mind leaves mental facts, under their own form-element, it is walking on air. The real significance of a recognition of subconscious facts is that the permanent lines between two sets of phenomena are thereby obliterated, and they are allowed to flow into each other with no mode apprehended, or reason rendered. The two forms of phenomena, perfectly distinct in reciprocal power, are in constant interaction, but an interaction defined in terms of experience. The moment we obscure this fundamental distinction, that moment we cease to study the empirical facts, the real reactions; we find ourselves adrift among vague images and unverifiable assertions, and able truly to interpret nothing and to understand

nothing, till we return to the terms under which alone the facts offer themselves to us.

Here it is that agnosticism is the true wisdom. It is a refusal to know, not what is beyond our present knowledge, but what is, from the nature of the case, unknowable, out of relation to all the forms of thought. That which is not conscious, and not physical, is non-existent, is the mere shadow of thoughts cast on empty space. If we are to solve our problem we must firmly grasp it, and that problem is the relation to each other of the only two and eternally distinct terms of experience, those we call physical and those we call mental, those which take on space relations and those which take on the relations of consciousness. As they are interlocked in all the activities of thought, their unity lies there; as their difference is a permanent factor in experience, their diversity lies there; and this dichotomy is the first constructive term in reason.

§ 3. We have attempted to give an interpretation of philosophy. The very effort pushes aside the notion of vague, unrestricted inquiry. It presupposes questions capable of just solutions, no matter how often answered inadequately or wrongly. Philosophy is a rounding out of knowledge, an estimate of its terms in reference to each other, and a determination of their respective values. It is not surprising that this process should proceed slowly, nor that it should often lead, under the predilections of men for particular methods, to fanciful results. It is sufficient if this perpetual shifting of inquiry issues in a slow separation of the materials of knowledge, and in an increasingly just estimate of them.

The nature of ideas, the stability and value of general conceptions, were the earliest questions, on the side of

psychology, raised by philosophy. A determination of the mental factors in the cosmos involves that of all other factors. The correspondence of ideas with some permanent form of facts was seen, in the very beginning of inquiry, to contain the secret of truth. Plato thought that general notions stand for eternal realities, and that the truly germinant, forceful, creative world is this very world of ideas. Aristotle regarded ideas as entities, but entities which have their existence in and with the things which express them. Then came the long discussion, so central in the history of philosophy, of the relation of general terms, the counters of mind, to things. The conclusion was reached, with much delay, difficulty, diversity, and reservation, that ideas are the intellectual counterparts of things, their significant qualities bundled up as concepts, and made, by generalization, to bind the world together along its lines of agreement. The mind, tracing the thoughts contained in things, stores up its labor in language. Language and the ideas it indicates thus stand for the discoveries of reason, busy with the connections contained in the permanent and fluid facts of the world. The world is a more enduring symbol, and language a less enduring symbol, of the same relations; and the agreement of these two, reached by the insight of the mind, is truth.

Then came the more modern inquiry, growing out of the earlier one, which has been presented with equal patience and variety of discussion since the time of Descartes: Are these ideas, general terms, all of the same order? Does one explanation cover them all? The answer of Descartes was, they are not of the same order. Some of them stand for supersensuous relations, and are not to be found in a sensuous experience. They

are like the particles in speech, which stand for invisible dependencies, not for visible things. Then came the response of Locke, that ideas are all equally derived from experience, some more obscurely and remotely, some more obviously and directly.

This discussion has involved the very gist of knowing. Is knowing action or is it reception? Or, if both, in what relation do the two processes stand to each other? Intuitionism, corrected by empiricism, holds that knowing, though constantly called out by experience, is essentially an act of its own supreme order; that it is not a residuum of outward impressions, left as traces on a sensitive medium, or as modifications of a self-sustaining, organic process, in itself of an inferior order. Knowing is that supreme insight which can alone take knowledge from its symbols, symbols that owe their entire significance to their appeal to intellectual power. The intuitionist, therefore, affirms that there are two sets of ideas, one antecedent in the order of existence to all interpretation, ideas by which interpretation becomes possible, and which stand for the most general relations under which reason constructs its judgments. These primitive ideas are the essential terms of reason itself, its eternal principles of order. Reason apprehends them not as a part of things, but as the constructive relations under which all things stand up together as an intelligible universe.

The fundamental character of these forms of thought being under discussion, there arises the division of the idealistic and materialistic tendencies concerning them. Idealism regards these forms as indeed primary, but as belonging to the mind itself, a part of its private equipment. At once, in place of the force and fine power of reason, we have limitations of human intelligence, barriers

it can never surmount. The relation in which these methods of ours stand to things-in-themselves, to the Eternal Reason, becomes a hopeless riddle. We see the devices on our own side of the shield, we know nothing of those on the farther face. We can escape from this unexpected pressure of the absolute relativity of all knowledge only by reflecting that, if knowledge is relative, it is not made thereby any less extensive than hitherto. It is still commensurate with the universe as we have known it. If the transcendental exists at all, it exists beyond the familiar range of human thought. All exploration remains exactly what it was before this notion was sprung upon us. Our conclusions still retain their old scope. The only question between the intuitionist and transcendentalist is, whether there is another universe back of our universe, being that is not being as we know it, but something other than it. This is a question we can the more readily defer, as such a supersensuous and super-spiritual universe, if it be conceded, offers no proof of its presence, and leaves us wholly undisturbed in the field of our own knowledge, as complete as ever within itself. Thus the limits put by idealism on our knowing practically vanish again. The overblown bubble bursts, and we are left, as hitherto, in the presence of the one whole of all knowledge. We may then most rationally say of these form-elements, space, time, causation, consciousness, spontaneity, that they are involved in reason itself, are common to all reason; that they define reason, and are defined by it; are wholly at one with it by virtue of its own insight. But this is intuitionism, only intuitionism adds, Knowledge is one with itself everywhere; in this sense absolute.

One who builds the universe on the physical side looks

upon these forms as the deepening impressions, the permanent lines of order, in the process of transition from the unconscious to the conscious, from matter to mind. But of the real nature of this transfer, this perpetual miracle, he can tell us nothing. The lower begets the higher, he knows neither how nor why. The equality of causes and effects, the condition of all inquiry, is neglected. The opaque, inapprehensive thing holds the transparent, significant truth, and relieves itself of it in due order of birth, in strange defiance of causal dependencies. But if reason is born of unreason, nothing later can be irrational. Reason thereby loses its right to assert for itself universality. What is, not what is reasonable, is the supreme point. Reason, starting boldly out to expound the world, sinks in the first quicksand. The intuitionist, therefore, in simple preservation of the problem, is compelled to say that an intelligence that is itself in the line of causation can explain nothing. The effort of explanation is an absurdity, and must either be abandoned or take to itself powers proportionate to its purposes. But reason is invincible. It submits to no detraction; it gives way to no ridicule. Hence the empiricist unwittingly, and the intuitionist wittingly, go straight forward to assert the all-comprehending character of rational relations, and so we are restored again to our primitive powers. In the case of idealism, we affirmed our knowledge to be relative, and went to work with it as if it were universal. In the case of materialism, we asserted that our powers are acquired, and take their position among the products of a universe antecedent to themselves. Yet we instantly employed them to judge all things, as if they had been brought forth when there were yet no depths.

Constructive realism, resting on experience, taking intelligible form under the primitive notions of reason, offers itself, in a historic interpretation of philosophy, as the one movement which gathers in all the fruits of thought. It allows the rational processes to sink downward to the first incipient activities of mind, and to rise with them and above them, at every stage of development, into the growing light. It lays aside the dogmatism of natural realism. It accepts the enlarging constructions of thought, both in physical and spiritual being. It affirms reality, on either hand, but under reason and for the ends of reason, and stands by the powers of the mind in sensation, insight, reflection.

Constructive realism asserts with idealism the prior, comprehensive quality of fundamental ideas, but it avoids that illusion of idealism, things-in-themselves, the uncertain shadows of transcendental notions, which serve only to perplex and confuse our vision. It affirms the eternal identity of reason with itself, that its insights and processes, like the revelations of light, are and must be coherent everywhere. To treat them otherwise is to divide them against themselves to their final overthrow. What possible end is met by the supposition that the forms of knowledge are wholly relative, and that there are, therefore, unattainable relations involved in the reality of things? If we know at all, why should not we know the very things to be known? A supposition of impotence is not to be entertained on any other than the most positive proof. The widest induction possible, that by which we add truth to truth through the whole range of knowledge, is against it. The validity of our faculties, involved in their indefatigable use, vouches for the verity of our convictions; and the coherence of our convictions,

through the whole range of experience, vouches for the validity of our faculties. If we are to attain truth, we must start with it as the primordial fact of mind, its essential nature. In this extension of reason to all limits, we are at one with the ruling conviction of the human mind.

Constructive realism strikes hands with empiricism in affirming the ever renewed suggestiveness of the world of realities; that it alone offers the highways of thought which the mind can safely and productively travel. Yet it rejects most positively the assertion that the inner and the outer, the process and the impelling power, are essentially one. It sets no store by the husk of the world, when it has lost its germinant, spiritual life. Not even the instinct of the squirrel will suffer it to fill its nest with nuts already pierced. Much less, then, will mind, enamoured of its own powers, empty the facts before it of their most permanent intellectual uses.

Constructive realism is able to gather proof to itself, on either hand, not merely because it runs midway along the line of division between opposed theories, not simply because it can reconcile with each other the truths it so widely appropriates, but because it lays down the orbit of equilibrium between contending and vagrant forces. If philosophy passes into idealism, it is quickly forced back toward materialism by the pressure of unreconciled tendencies; if it is deflected toward materialism, the energies of mind begin at once to work against it and drive it, in rapid curvature, in the opposite direction. The line of reconciliation must lie, as shown by the entire history of philosophy, somewhere between these two evenly matched, ever returning, forces. The supposition becomes natural and just, that the union is to be found in

the reality of all the elements of knowledge and their even-handed construction in thought. Grant the permanent significance of sensuous symbols, concede the validity of the insights of the mind, trust ourselves freely to those reflective processes by which these two are woven into knowledge, and we attain to that growing harmony of truth which is the soul of its infinite nature.

When the impulse of any new theory is expended, when it begins to feel the need of correction and restraint, its line of curvature is always toward realism. Realism, like the attraction of the earth, stands for that steady energy which, in the end, must tell on the most reckless and divergent movement.

The underlying suppositions of philosophy thus become the same with those of all knowledge. The questions that remain unanswered are unanswered because, like those of a child, they either go back of first principles, or are prematurely put. A knowledge, which is a knowledge of relations, must accept the terms between which these relations lie, as conditions of the entire movement. The simple points and lines which compose the diagram cannot themselves be made the occasion of exhaustless discussion. The truth is not in them, but in that which they disclose. The forms of reason are a part of reason, rather than the objects of reason. When we accept reason, we accept it for what it is, a transcendent, not a transcendental power. We abide in the sufficiency of the processes which have so far defined truth for us.

Philosophy, in all its history, has been simply finding its way to the assured conviction, that truth is the eternal coalescence of the physical and the spiritual, the outer and the inner, in one wide-spreading and immeasurable fact, the interlacing of all events along a line of light

which is the pathway of mind, the revelation of God and the discovery of men. Here our thoughts rest themselves in unending activity; here also, obedient to inspiration, lie the labors of ethics and art. A realistic statement of this order gathers in more profound truth, from more diverse quarters, than any other apprehension of the relation of man to the world and of the world to man. It, therefore, more than any other, justifies itself to reason, as holding for it the largest wealth of knowledge.

The sophist opened philosophy by denying the significance of ideas, their power to contain and present the facts. From that moment onward, the discussion has progressed along the path thus assigned it, the relation of ideas to the facts they seem to cover. It is now drawing near the conclusion that ideas are the clear reflections, mirrored in mind, of the eternal truths of the spiritual universe.

A philosophy whose explanations lie remote from the facts our lives are busy in discovering and handling, whose suppositions are beyond construction, and beyond verification, under the familiar terms of experience, can have but little claim on our attention. A philosophy resting on the powers of mind, each ultimate in its own office, helps to compact knowledge by unfolding its harmonious and self-supporting relations, and disclosing the revelations it bears with it from limit to limit of the world in which we are. This philosophy is nothing more than the completion, correction, rectification of the knowing process, every moment with us in each lighter and each weightier exploration. When all knowledge coalesces and flows together, like an atmosphere alive with light, we have philosophy, the unity of truth within itself. Our effort has been the simple yet difficult one of show-

ing from how many points single rays are reflected back on the one flood of revelation, how easily revelation gathers in all special disclosure. By reducing philosophy to a minimum as embracing private and ingenious devices, we have raised it to a maximum in the generality and scope of its uses. Let it reign as the penetrative and universal power of thought.

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